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Lale Yalçın-Heckmann

Tribe and Kinship among the Kurds

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Notes on transliteration

For the transliteration of Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish and Persian words within the text I have tried to maintain consistency and similarity to the systems used in the studies of other Middle Eastern societies. The following rules are adapted:

1. For the names of Turkish and Kurdish persons, the Turkish way of pronunciation and spelling is used. This aims to avoid confusion which arises from the many different ways of spelling names of an Islamic origin. I write "Abdülhamid" as in Sultan Abdülhamid, or "Abdülkadir" and not "Ebdulqadir" as in Kurdish. Names of clearly Kurdish origin are written as they are pronounced and spelled in Kurdish, e.g. "Azadê", "Beybûn" and "Suto".

2. Names of Kurdish things, objects, concepts, tribes and the like are written using the Kurdish letters following E. C. Bedirkhan & R. Lescot, *Grammaire Kurde (Dialecte Kurmandji)*, Paris: 1970.

3. Names of places, towns and villages are written in Turkish and Kurdish when within the boundaries of today's Turkey, or in common English spelling when in other areas. For example, I give both the Kurdish and Turkish names for "Culamerg"/"Hakkari", but follow the other method for "'Amadiya" (and not Imadiye as it is known in Turkish) or Urmiyeh (and not Rumiye).

4. For terms like *khan*, *agha*, *shaikh*, *sayyid*, *tariqat*, I follow the common English spelling, although there seems to be some variation in the spelling of these words from one writer or book to another. Terms like *agha* or *shaikh* do not have exactly the same meaning in all the Middle Eastern or Muslim countries. The particular meanings are both explained in the text and listed in the glossary.

5. Finally, various administrative terms from the Ottoman history and terms like *beylerbeyi*, *sipahi*, or *tımar* are kept in the common Turkish transcription (with the Latin letters) and are explained both in the text and in the glossary.

Various letters from the Turkish and Kurdish alphabets are pronounced in the following manner:

	Turkish	**Kurdish**
a	long /a/ as in father	same
c	as /j/ in "jam"	same
ç	as /ch/ in "chapter"	same
e	as /e/ in "bet" or /a/ in "bad"	same
ê	-	as French /e/ but prolonged
ğ	generally silent, tends to lengthen the preceding vowel	-
h	aspirated like in German "haben"	more aspirated in Kurdish than Turkish, similar to Arabic ح or ه
x /kh/	-	like /ch/ in German or خ in Arabic, unvoiced guttural fricative
ı	neutral vowel like /e/ in German "machen"	-
i	long /ee/ as in "beet"	same as Turkish "ı", short
î	-	same as Turkish "i"
j	as in French /j/	same
ö	as French /eu/ in "peur"	-
q	-	unvoiced guttural stop as in Arabic ق
ş	as in /sh/ of "shame"	same
u	short as in German /u/ in "kurz" or "Burg"	same
û	-	long /oo/ as in "moon"
ü	as French /u/ in "tu" or German /ü/ in "Süd"	-
w	-	as in English /w/ in "well"
ẍ/gh/	-	like غ in Arabic, or the French rolled "r"


Map 1: TURKEY
International boundary
Il (province) boundary
National capital
City
0 100 200 km
0 100 200 miles
BULGARIA
GREECE
Black Sea
SOVIET UNION
IRAN
IRAQ
SYRIA
LEBANON
CYPRUS
Mediterranean Sea
Sea of Marmara
Edirne
Istanbul
Bursa
Izmir
Muğla
Antalya
Ankara
Konya
Adana
Sinop
Trabzon
Artvin
Erzurum
Elazığ
Diyarbakır
Urfa
Mardin
Siirt
Bitlis
Van
Hakkari

Introduction

Kurds have become visible once again to the world with their tragic exodus from northern Iraq, as a consequence of the Gulf War and years of oppression by the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. As I write these lines, their suffering and despair is being shown daily in the media. Their national and political chances of survival and a dignified life have become a concern for the western governments. The rugged mountains of the Iraqi-Turkish border and their barren and rocky hills covered with snow is for the western audience the backstage for the human misery of hundred thousands of Kurds. I know these mountains and the people who live there in a different way. The province of Hakkari, which lies on the Iraqi-Turkish border, was the setting for my anthropological research on Kurdish tribes and kinship system. In 1980 I went to Hakkari for the first time and was struck by the beauty of the landscape and its contrasting modes of human life. As I was waiting to make the right contacts and find a suitable village to stay, I heard many dramatic and tragic stories about tribal fights, raids, kidnapped women or deadly avalanches and have often been perplexed at the particular combination of beauty and ugliness of the life in these Kurdish mountain villages.

During the eighteen months I spent in the province, I gathered information on the research questions of my doctoral dissertation in anthropology. They concerned in general the social organization of an ethnic and tribal community in Hakkari. Although the Kurds are in majority in Hakkari, with their tribal social organization and underdeveloped infrastructure they are not "typical" for Turkey. In my doctoral dissertation I explored the significance of tribal ideology and tribal forms of organization among the Kurds of Turkey, who have a strong kinship ideology; the importance of semi-nomadism, combined with "illegal" international livestock trade, for the drawing and maintenance of tribal boundaries and relations; and the significance of affinal relations for the apparently patrilineal ideology of Kurdish tribal and non-tribal groups.

This book is a revised version of my dissertation.[1] My initial interests in doing research in an eastern province of Turkey were related to the problems of Kurdish identity, processes of assimilation and national awareness, differences between Kurdish and Turkish cultures and customs and the degree of incorporation of Kurdish groups into the economic, political and social structures of modern Turkey. These topics which I have dealt with in a limited way in the dissertation have been further developed in the revised book form. The focus is, however, still on the micro-level issues. After a decade of learning, reading, and writing about the history and culture of Kurds and Turks, I believe the wider issues of "ethnic identity" and "national awareness" are most interesting and challenging at the micro-level social and political processes.

The now classical study of the Kurdish social and political organization by M. M. van Bruinessen (1978) has been most illuminating as a rich, historical and theoretical background to many of the questions I have dealt with. Two earlier ethnographies on the Kurds, by Leach (1940) and Barth (1953), especially the particular emphases they had on various aspects of political and tribal organization and the role and types of leaders have been also points of departure for my work. But as van Bruinessen has already pointed out,[2] the analyses of Barth and Leach on the role and types of Kurdish leaders are not only outdated but also based on inadequate data from their limited periods of fieldwork. Moreover, both Barth and Leach have overlooked some aspects of the Kurdish social organization, such as the importance of marriage alliances, the extension of kin terms, the role women play in political alliances, which are important for my analysis based on data from northern Kurdistan.

Other studies from the wider region, which have also dealt with tribal structures, are mostly about nomadic groups.[3] These studies have looked at the relationship between the mode of production and economy and the corresponding tribal or non-tribal organization. The population of Hakkari, who engages in semi-nomadic pastoral production, has some of the characteristics of nomadic societies, yet its inevitable dependency on subsistence agricultural production **and** pastoral production together with "illegal" animal trade impose further constraints on its social organization.

As Hakkari contains semi-nomadic, tribal and ethnic structures in addition to having been a part of the Ottoman Empire since mid-17th century and the Turkish Republic since 1920, I have tried to look at continuities and discontinuities in political and economic relations of the region with the surrounding systems and peoples. Hakkari is not an isolated and distinct community in any sense; nor was it in the past. Thus, the cultural and social organizational continuities should render this analysis relevant for the analysis of other Middle Eastern societies and ethnic groups.

Fieldwork. Being a mountaineer and having an interest for Kurds, nomads, and tribes, I chose Hakkari for fieldwork. Hakkari is a mountainous province bordering Iran and Iraq and is frequently referred to as "the stronghold of 'pure' Kurds and Kurdish tribes."[4] Prior to the 1980 military coup, the province had the smallest number of political murders and troubles of all the Kurdish dominated eastern provinces. Moreover, it is a beautiful region, fascinating with its hills and magnificent mountains looking uninhabited yet allegedly full of unrest between tribal groups who fight among themselves over pastures, lead blood feuds and apply their own tribal laws.

My first contact in the region was a local mountain guide, to whom I was referred to by my mountaineering friends. He accompanied me to many villages in my search for a "suitable" village and hosted me in his urban home. My criteria for "suitability" were: 1) the acceptance by the villagers of my request to reside there, 2) access to the village by some means of transport,[5] 3) the establishment of a mutual understanding that there would be no "danger", mainly of a political kind. The region was riddled with political intrigues and rumours, and that is why the last criterion, mutual understanding, was very crucial for me and my hosts. It took two months, and several visits to the village and from the villagers to me in town, until they agreed among themselves, and the family to whom I was taken on my first visit agreed to give me accommodation.

I stayed in Sisin,[6] and lived in a two room house with 18 other household members, for nearly ten months with short breaks of visits to other villages or towns. During the rest of my stay in the province, which lasted 18 months altogether in two periods between 1980-1982, I stayed in a village west of Hakkari for one month, travelled in Şemdinli for two weeks and stayed in the towns of Yüksekova and Hakkari, making occasional visits to villages on the plain or near the border. The census and kinship networks data I collected from the village of Sisin, following their networks in other villages too. Case stories about kinship relations, marriages, tribal links within and between tribes and economic data were collected from a wider area for comparison and analysis. Finally, I carried out historical research in libraries and archives in Ankara, Istanbul, London, Cambridge and in Germany, to present a complete overview of the historical background.

The main problems of research in the area stemmed from the political situation and relations between the local people, the administration and outsiders. Although the political violence seen in other parts of Turkey prior to 1980 was absent, the area's borders are considered insufficiently guarded from the traffic of goods and political ideas; the influence of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran and Iraq had spilled over to within Hakkari's borders and in 1978 two Iraqi origin Kurdish groups fought within Hakkari, killing and leaving many wounded behind. The continuous smuggling of various goods gave the administrators a suspicious if not cynical view of the affairs in Hakkari. The local people's views were no less cynical in many cases.

I had to put up with constant rumours about my reasons for being there, although they decreased in intensity and imagination once I became to be known as "the woman in Sisin". Travelling was problematic; I could not travel alone but had to have someone to accompany me which made me dependent on others' plans and programs; sometimes I benefitted from overstaying, sometimes not. The Kurdish language I mainly had to learn in Hakkari, as the local dialect varies from the Kurmanji Kurdish found in books. Once I could converse in Kurdish, it was possible for me to talk to village women and children who spoke Kurdish only. But my data were collected using both languages depending on which was more convenient to use.

Being an unmarried woman during my stay in Hakkari had its advantages and disadvantages. The advantages were that I could slip out of the role of the "guest" and center of attention and watch and hear people talk out their conflicts, agreements or deals. Politically, also, I was considered less harmful than a man would be. The disadvantages were the predictable limited access to the knowledge men have. This, however, I think is less true for the village context than for the town. In the village men meet in private houses and women are usually present in these meetings and know about men's activities. Village women, thus, were very knowledgeable on local affairs, conflicts and politics. In town, on the other hand, men meet each other in the market place, on the main and single avenue, talking to each other in coffee shops or while walking up and down. Some private matters are still discussed at home but to a lesser degree.

The identification with a village and the tribe it belonged to made my access to non-villager leading families and *aghas* (tribal leader) rather limited. The tribal leaders expect to host "guests" themselves; if the guest takes her own initiative to find another host, then the tribal leader's family is implicitly offended. At the beginning, I had tried to stay in the most prominent tribal leader's village (and was immediately warned and threatened by left wing youth in town who had learned my intensions), but was refused. After I settled in Sisin, I tried to use the networks from the village level upwards and outwards. This, I believe, although limiting my access to more influential people who lived in town, has allowed me to avoid a "Big Man's" bias. Thinking back, I would not have been able to make certain acquaintances, friendships, and contacts if I had used the channels from above. This was evident, for example, when the villagers were warned by the leader's men for having given me inforation about internal affairs, like money collection from tribal members. Even if my position has not allowed me to draw a full picture of the political and economic relations in the area (which probably is only hypothetically possible), it has allowed an approach from the commoner's level and point of view, which I believe has been missing in studies of the Kurdish society.

Outline of the chapters. The following chapter is aimed to introduce the complexity of ethnic, tribal and political relations and processes in the area with a striking case study. It holds almost all the themes of this book in a nutshell, which I hope would unfold in subsequent chapters. The discussion and analysis of the case study aims to show the constraints on the political system on the one hand, and the dynamic potential of the local political culture, which allows for shifting symbols and allegiances according to the context, on the other. Various forms of identity and loyalty, such as kinship, tribalism and ethnicity do not simply disappear, giving way to the dominance of only one framework, but the constraints on the system are challenged by maintaining a multiple and complex system of networks and allegiances.

Chapter 2 tackles the history of politics in the region with the purpose of showing how the province's environmental and physical conditions have interacted with the (outsiders' and insiders') political and economic interests and determined the marginal or more central position the province had for neighbouring states and empires. Within the limitations of available historical data, the problems of tribal unity or fission, the influence and power of local and outsider leaders, the significance of the change from the authority of tribal rulers to religious leaders are discussed. The relative strength of the tribal organization in the past is connected to the particular position of the region on the border between 2-3 states, the multi-ethnic political structure of the surrounding states and the relative unimportance of the cultivable land as opposed to mountain pastures suitable for semi-nomadic pastoral production.

Chapter 3 is intended to provide the geographical, administrative, demographic and economic background to the region. The information which is rather descriptive and comparative should allow the reader to have a general understanding of the peculiarities of the setting and the level of development compared to other Turkish provinces.

Following the chapters on the history and the geography of the region, the contemporary tribal organization in Hakkari is discussed in Chapter 4. The local terms used for different levels of the tribal organization are detailed and the flexible usage of these terms are explored. The territorial base of the different levels of the tribal hierarchy is most clear at the top, where tribes as political and "kin" units are traditionally assigned rights to certain pastures. An individual's membership of a certain tribe is recognized or challenged by his genealogy and the practice of pasture usage rights. The local model of tribal divisions rank tribes according to a mythical model of "left" and "right" tribal blocs. The present divisions are assigned to this traditional model only when it concerns the tribal or supra-tribal level. At sub-tribal levels the segmentary or checkerboard models of division or fusion do not apply. The tribal ideology involved notions of solidarity among groups related in a spectrum of "closeness" and "distance". Real or fictive kinship, neighbourhood and friendship qualified the actual patterns and networks of cooperation or dissent. The role tribal leaders have for the tribal organization is discussed subsequently. Political leaders and rulers in the past cut across tribal and regional loyalties; today's political leaders fulfil several roles. Some tribal chiefs function as patrons for various groups, sometimes for different tribal groups, and successfully play the political broker's role between the central state and the regional ethnic forces. Several leading tribal families are given as examples for the multiple directions their members lead to and the problems they face for carrying out the joint leadership.

Chapter 5 looks at the village and the village household. The village houses, the use of land and social space within the village and the seasonal cycle of village activities are described. The use of social space according to its symbolic meaning and the division of labour within the household reflect ranking between household members. Household chores and productive activities are assigned according to sex, age and kinship position. The production cycle also influences the use of social space within and around the household compound; thus, household members unite or disperse according to the seasonal cycle of production. The term for household in Kurdish, *mal*, refers to the household as well as the house (building) and the lineage. Common residence, assumed kinship relations and collective production and consumption are the criteria for defining a mal, but the definition is, nevertheless, flexible to suit various household strategies. Patrilocal residence and the unity among the patrilineal kinsmen are strong ideals for the household members and influence the household's developmental cycle. The relations between the household members are looked in reference to production, consumption and socializing patterns.

Relations of exchange and reciprocity between the village households are examined in Chapter 6. The relations of exchange are found to be influenced by notions of equality, hospitality and solidarity related to the multi-ideological background of Islam, tribalism, and kinship. Certain types of labour and goods exchange emphasize the equality between households and aim to disguise ascribed or acquired status differences. Religious alms giving serves a similar end, mainly that of reinforcing equal status between all the village households. The main sources of wealth in mountain villages are sheep and goats, which are mostly raised for sale across the borders. The mean herd size per household is less than that found among the nomadic groups in neighbouring countries and provinces. Other sources of livelihood are fruit and vegetable gardens and corn fields which are tended by, and whose product is consumed together as households. The sale of animals is organized at different levels; the mountain villagers usually work with small traders or else organize the sale themselves.

Chapter 7 focuses on the detailed analysis of kinship and affinity, the meaning and significance of kinship within the tribal and non-tribal systems. The method of and reasons for extending kin and affinal terms are examined. Kin terms are found to be extended from the primary meaning, with different levels of consciousness and according to the context. The moral meaning of kinship unify the non-tribal and tribal groups; the difference is that a tribesman is thought to have more kinsmen than a non-tribal person. The terms used for affines are also widely extended, and generational differences are sometimes ignored. Kin and affinal relations are seen here as part of the interaction between terminology and kinship specific behaviour, and a selection of kin and affinal relations are examined in reference to inheritance, succession, labour organization and socializing patterns.

The complementary analysis to the study of kinship, that is the analysis of marriage relations and strategies is carried out in the final Chapter 8. Affinal alliances and marriage strategies are significant for the understanding of the limits of the patrilineal ideology as well as the conceptualization of gender roles, hierarchy and solidarity. I discuss local concepts on marital status and the symbolic and practical meaning of different civil and religious marriage ceremonies. The practices of parallel cousin, bride-price and direct wife exchange marriages are discussed as strategies where various aspects of the notions of hierarchy and equality are activated. Claims to higher status, the overall economic and political household strategies and tribal politics are among the main factors determining matrimonial strategies. In the last section, wife-kidnapping and elopement are looked under the light of the concepts of female subordination and male power politics. The effects of wife-kidnapping and elopement on tribal politics in the region are furthermore exemplified.


MAP 2 HAKKARI AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

International boundary (today)
Roads
Major city
Town/Village
Mountain peak over 3000 metres
U.S.S.R.
IRAN
IRAQ
SYRIA
Lake Urmiya
Lake Van
Erzurum
Ağri
Doğubayazit
Khoy
Salmas
Rezaiye (Urmiya)
Uşnu
Nagade
Patnos
Erciş
Ahlat
Tatvan
Bitlis
Muş
Kulp
Lice
Bingöl
Diyarbakir
Batman
Mardin
Kamişli
Nusaybin (Nizip)
Midyat
Idil (Hazex)
Cizre
Şirnak
Eruh (Deh)
Siirt
Şirvan
Pervari
Hizan
Mukus
Gevaş
Van
Çatak
Hoşap
Saray
Qotur
Başkale
Şikefti
Beytüşşebab (Elk)
Uludere
Koçanes
Hakkari (Culamerg)
Çukurca (Çel)
Oramar
Şemdinli
Yüksek ova (Gewer)
Bajirge
Zibar
Amadiya
Bamerni
Dehok
Zakhu
Mosul
kilometres
0
40

1. Guns and loyalties

This study is concerned with the relationship between various aspects of Kurdish identity, tribal organization and kinship in a particular region in southeast Turkey. Kurdish identity, which is most clearly based on speaking Kurdish as the mother tongue, interacts with the state, its representatives and agents in the region. The immediate relations and encounters with governmental, military and civil administrators (who are local or non-local, of Kurdish or non-Kurdish origin) shape most of the concepts villagers hold about the state, the government and national political structures. The intertwined ideologies of kinship, tribalism and ethnic identity sometimes lead to drastic actions by individuals who "misunderstand" the norms. Such ideologies can also, however, give the political actors flexibility for interpreting and stressing one aspect of political ideals over another.

In the following I present a complex story involving conflicting ideologies and interests, and shifting kinship, tribal and political alliances. The presentation of this case aims at introducing the main issues of kinship and tribal structures in Hakkari together with the local political processes. The following discussion points out the main implications of kinship relations for the tribal structure in Hakkari and in Turkey. The overlap of tribal and ethnic identity from the point of view of the central state and regional political processes are further themes which dominate this case and which will unfold throughout the analysis in this book.

The case of the Sisin guns

The setting of the events consists of several tribal villages belonging to the Oramarî tribe, a plains village and the town of Yüksekova. (See Map 2) The tribal villages of Oramar and Yeşil are about 4 hours walking distance from another. Oramar is larger than Yeşil and has several neighbourhoods spread on the slopes of the Sat mountains. Yeşil, on the other hand, is located along a river in a valley and its quarters are smaller and less dispersed than in Oramar. They both have gendarmerie posts, the first one being larger and older. The town of Yüksekova in 1982 had about 14,000 people and it was the second largest town of the province but the busiest one in terms of trade and business. In Yüksekova there were two military units, those of the commandos and of the gendarmerie. The military intelligence affairs were administered from Diyarbakır, where the martial law authorities were located;

thus, the civil police, who under martial law regulations in 1981-82 was confiscating arms in the area, came from Diyarbakır and people who were suspected of arms smuggling were taken and detained there.

The tribal villages of Telli and Zilli are near the Iraqi border. Sisin is the village where I stayed during fieldwork. Belli is a quarter of Yeşil (which is a *muhtarlık*) and is positioned between Sisin and Yeşil, about an hour walking distance from Sisin. All these five villages belong to the Oramarî tribal district. Further north of the Oramarî tribal area is the district known as Dorskî area, where the Dorskî tribe has its pastures and the villagers are mostly Dorskî tribesmen. The town of Yüksekova is mixed in its population, containing tribal and non-tribal, local and non-local residents.

Finally, it should be added that the physical background comprises a larger area than of that the above villages, including the villages on both sides of the borders with Iran and Iraq, since the smuggling of guns involves all of these border villages.

The main characters of the story are from Oramarî tribal villages. Three of them, Zahir, Cihangir and Fazil on the diagram (see Figure 1), are leading members of the two Oramarî *qabîle*s (tribal section) and they were able to mobilize more people for various kinds of support than an average tribesman could have. Zahir and Fazil were *muhtar*s (village headman) of their respective villages and had connections to various position holders in the military and civil administration, as well as to local politicians, lawyers and rich traders. Cihangir himself was poor. His kin and affinal links to Fazil and the late *agha* (tribal chief) of Oramarî and his family's prestige within the tribe made it possible for him to mobilize some political and financial support. Nevertheless, his immediate family suffered much in his absence. Fazil, on the other hand, is rich. One of his half-brothers works in the bank in Yüksekova, another half-brother is a local politician, and his father's wife's brother (his step-mother's B) is a former senator of Hakkari. Zahir is also wealthy, owns property in Yüksekova and has well-off trading partners in town besides the support from his populous lineage.

As for **the social background** to the events, the border villagers have an uneasy relationship with the military in the region mainly because their economic livelihood relies heavily on the sale of herds across the border, whereas the gendarmerie is supposed to stop the smuggling. An increase in military presence means lower prices offered to animal owners, higher costs in terms of bribes and payments to the "smuggling" shepherds, and decreased sales in general. On the whole, the villagers aim for a peaceful co-existence with the military authorities in their vicinity and are keen to get to know the officers, especially those in charge, to determine their own course of action, i.e. whom one could try to bribe, whom one should approach for mediating in conflicts within the village and whom to avoid. Thus ideas and expectations concerning the military authorities are closely connected to the local political and economic structures.

Another important aspect of the social background concerns the wider attitudes and notions about Kurdishness, Turks and Kurds and the national states ruling them. Hakkari was comparatively untouched by the political violence which existed in many larger towns and cities throughout Turkey prior to the 1980 military coup. However, it has always been an area subject to political and military influences from across the borders and there have been various cross-border incursions of rival Kurdish nationalist groups.

Mainly due to Kurdish nationalist activities across the border and refugees who came over after the defeat of the Barzani movement in Iraq in 1975, Kurdish nationalist consciousness has been raised. People had on the whole good knowledge of the current situation and the problems of the Kurds in Iran and Iraq, since the Kurdish clandestine radio broadcasts could be and still are heard within Turkey. Thus, the military presence of the Turkish army is also allegedly related to the "insurgent and separatist threats" across the borders, and it is perceived as such by the local people. There is a fair amount of resentment against the military presence in the region especially since some of the military officers are thought to be corrupt. There were, for instance, numerous stories about secret deals between the local military officers who turned a blind eye to the passage of one Iraqi Kurdish military unit through Hakkari and then allowed the rival Iraqi Kurds to attack the former and kill many of them in Hakkari in 1978.

The nationalist views and concepts of the local people, however, are shaped and influenced by a variety of political events as well as personal experiences, education, conscription, and the relations with the local military and civil administration. The interpretation of various political moves of the military or Kurdish nationalist groups, therefore, is by no means unitary or constant. Military and civil officers of Turkish or other origins are not immediately classified as anti- or pro-Kurd, but are assessed in terms of personal qualities, such as deportment, religiosity, integrity and actions. For example, one corporal who spent a longish period of service in Oramar is said to have become "assimilated" into the Kurdish society a good deal. He was a Laz from the Black Sea region; the villagers have favourable opinions about the Laz and refer to them as "*pisxals* (MBS) of Kurds" as an ethnic identity. He was admired for his Kurd-like interests and fascination for guns, hunting, shooting and weddings. Allegedly he became a "friend" and "one of them" (*mirovê me*: "our men" in Kurdish) for Sisin villagers and took their side in disputes with other villages and tribal groups. Several other officers and teachers of Turkish ethnic origin in the area also have won respect and admiration from the people are considered honest and trustworthy. In comparison, Kurdish soldiers posted to Oramar are received with some suspicion despite their ease of communication in native Kurdish. In a village gathering, I was surprised to see the lack of willingness and even anger the village men showed when two visiting soldiers, one Kurdish and the other Turkish, wanted to talk about the history of the region, the tribal leaders and specifically the Oramar rebellion in 1930. One villager later told me that the Kurdish soldier was trying to provoke them and have them make anti-Turkish or anti-state comments, which he would probably report to his superiors and blame the villagers. The villagers would discuss the Oramarî rebellion among themselves and accuse one another's ancestors of having taken the side of the government or the rebels, but in their eyes these issues are not points to be discussed with any stranger even if he is Kurdish, and much less so if he were in the position to exercise power, however limited, over them.

Finally, the events recounted below developed during my fieldwork, in 1980-82, but the end occurred after I left the region. I have divided the the story into five sequences supplied with diagrams showing the main characters and their kinship position, status and residence. I believe the effects of the events are continuing to unfold, thereby changing relations and alliances. It is my hope that the subsequent analysis will provide an understanding of possible changes in social relations in the area.

> **Sequence 1:** Three men from Oramar's leading families were called by the gendarmerie in Oramar to present themselves for questioning. Of these men (see diagrams in Figure 1.1 a and b below), the first one, Zahir, aged about 50-55, of *qabîlê* Mefî, lived in the village of Telli, was the wealthy *muhtar* of Telli, a sheep trader and smuggler. He was a leading member of his tribe and had the support of a large patrilineage, the largest of *qabîlê* (sub-tribal section) Mefî. The second one, Cihangir, aged about 65-70, belonged to the *qabîlê* Lemdinî, lived in Oramar, was the elder brother of the previous *muhtar* of Oramar, and also the father-in-law of the present *muhtar* there. Married three times, Cihangir had many children and although not very wealthy, he was

Figure 1.1. Persons mentioned in the story of Sisin's guns.


a)
(2)
Emin
(1)
muhtar in Yeşil
Zahir
muhtar in Telli
in Sisin
b)
Agha
Cihangir
Haso
Tahir
Yusuf
Selim
Necip
in Yüksek-ova
Fazıl
muhtar in Zilli
muhtar in Oramar
Kaso
Adil
in Sisin
Piroz
in Dize
in Sisin
in Belli
▨, ▲ Lemdinî subtribe
○, △ Meîf subtribe
┌---┐ Lineage cousins
▨, ▲ Dorskî tribe
●, ▲ Ertuşî tribe

considered a respectable and leading member of his tribe. The third man, Fazil, belonged to the same lineage as Cihangir and the late *agha* of Oramarî. Fazil, the youngest of the party, probably in his early 40s, was the son of the late *agha* of Oramarî, of *qabîlê* Lemdinî. He lived in Zilli, a village near the Iraqi border, was the *muhtar* there. He was also a wealthy smuggler and trader, and brother of the present *muhtar* of Oramar village.

Soon after the news came of the call, the three men fled their homes and went into hiding. The rumour and the semi-official information concerning the accusation against them was that they had illegally gone to Iran, contacted some political groups there, among others an allegedly pro-Khomeini group called Hizb-ul Islam (the party of Islam) and were given arms to distribute within Turkey and organize support to fight against Saddam Huseyn along the lines of the Iranian regime.

Sequence 2: Four other men of the same tribe were detained shortly afterwards, but not all at the same time. They were detained by the civil police and intelligence service. All were at some point taken to Diyarbakır, the centre for the southeastern division of martial law authorities at that time. The first two were Piroz and Emin. Piroz did not live in the Oramar tribal area but in Dize, a village of the plains. His father was a wealthy and leading member of the neighbouring Dorskî tribe, his mother was the sister of Cihangir, thus a member of the Lemdinî and Oramarî. Piroz was allegedly cooperating with Zahir, Cihangir and Fazil in the same cause, and was taken to Diyarbakır and tortured. All the Oramarî knew about him. He was released after about a month. Emin was detained about the same time as Piroz for a period of two weeks. Emin was an Oramarî, aged about 45, of *qabîlê* Mefî. He was the *muhtar* of Yeşil (which included Sisin as a neighbourhood quarter), and a relatively wealthy and respected man. His detention came a few days after his wedding with his second wife, a woman from the Ertuşî tribe. His first wife (in the polygynous union) was the sister of Zahir. Emin and Zahir (and of course Zahir's sister) were also classificatory FBSs, *pismam*. After Piroz and Emin, two more detainees were taken from Yeşil. They were Selim and Tahir, who lived in Belli neighbourhood of Yeşil. The four of them together were accused of dealing with and buying arms from the first three men referred to above to support Hizb-ul Islam. Although Emin was released after two weeks, Selim and Tahir remained in jail for nearly a year. Piroz was wanted once more by the military authorities and he went into periods of sporadic hiding.

Sequence 3: About 10 days after the release of Emin, and the finding by the civil police of some rifles in the village of Yeşil - other than those belonging to Selim and Tahir, (which were allegedly Hizb-ul Islam rifles) - the villagers of Sisin were given a warning by the military police, via Emin, to surrender their arms as well. The military intelligence had received information about a list of household heads in Sisin with their names and the type of gun each had. 12 household heads surrendered their guns to the civil police the following day. The civil police who came to collect Sisin's guns made a brief speech to the villagers, warning them that "the government had eyes and ears everywhere", "knew who owned guns and fired them in the air during village weddings", but was, at the same time, "forgiving" and "understanding". The government realized that Sisin people were "loyal" citizens, and would not carry on any criminal proceedings against them for illegally possessing these guns.

The impact of the surrender on the villagers was immense. There was a mixture of fear, embarassment and humiliation for having yielded their treasured possessions which some claimed to have owned for twenty years. There was also incredulity at the accuracy of the information the police had. As a result of this event the villagers became insecure and suspicious about the identity of the collaborator or informer. They were remorseful about having lost an asset without having had the chance to sell it, thus retrieving the cost and perhaps making some profit from the sale.

At this stage, their suspicions were concentrated on Emin, Selim, Tahir or Yusuf (who was a classificatory FBS to Tahir) depending on who made the accusation and what that person's relation was to the accused.

1. Initially the household heads of Sisin, as they were all of *qabîlê* Mefî, supported the view that Emin, also a Mefî, could not have informed on the Sisin villagers. He was "their man" (*mirovê me*) and Emin had taken an oath on the Qoran that he only had spoken of the guns belonging to his brothers and FBSs, while under torture. So Emin took the responsibility of having given the names of his brothers and FBSs, but not of Selim or Tahir or any of the Sisin villagers.

2. Although the men of Sisin belonged to *qabîlê* Mefî, there were many Lemdinî women who married into the village, as well as women who married Lemdinî men in other villages. Piroz, for instance, had two mother's sisters and several MZSs and MZDs in Sisin. Tahir had 3 sisters who were married to 3 household heads in Sisin, thus these Sisin men were *zava* (groom, son-in-law or affine) to him. For these households the accusation and suspicions centered more on Emin than Tahir. They thought Emin had told on

Selim and Tahir while under torture and fear, and that Selim and/or Tahir had given information about the guns of Sisin.

3. Some household heads who belonged to the same *mal* (lineage/clan) as that of Emin had an alternative explanation of the informer. They said when Emin was detained he must have told on Selim and Tahir who belonged to *qabîlê* Lemdinî, and Tahir's FBS, Yusuf, must have informed the police about the guns of Sisin men, all of whom were of the same qabîle, Mefî, as Emin.

4. Some rumours, mostly spread by townsfolk or people from outside Sisin, suggested that I had given the information. This was not very plausible for the villagers however, mainly because by the time the guns were surrendered I had spent only a few weeks in the village and hardly knew the household heads by their surnames[7] let alone knowing the type of gun each had. The list the police had was detailed, and I also learned from the gendarmerie that the informer had come forth with his name and identity. I could not learn who it was.

5. The suspicions and accusations spread but no retaliatory action was taken against anyone. As the events unfolded and new situations developed people seemed to become more certain about who the informer was although they discussed the matter less frequently.

Sequence 4: After about 5 months of hiding, Zahir, Cihangir and Fazil emerged and after much alleged negotiating with the military officers, were advised to surrender themselves. The period of hiding had been especially difficult for the two elders, Zahir and Cihangir, and while they were detained, the tribal members were asked to contribute to a cash fund for the three men, allegedly to pay for legal help and bribes to the military authorities. As Zahir and Fazil were already quite well off, they each managed to collect about a million TL. from close kin. For Cihangir his patrilineal kin had gone to ask a wealthy *pismam* (a genealogical FBS here) for about a 100,000 TL, another 100,000 TL from Cihangir's sister's husband Haso (see Figure 1.1 b) in Sisin, who was a Mefî, a 100,000 TL. from another *pismam* in Van, who was a sheep trader and 50,000 TL. from Cihangir's other sister's son Kaso (see Figure 1.1 b) in Sisin - a Mefî according to the patrilineal descent group.[8] The son of the late *agha* of Oramar, Necip, who was also a classificatory FBS to Cihangir, and lived in Yüksekova, had allegedly proposed to pay 50,000 TL. himself for Cihangir, if he would turn himself in to the police. *Agha*'s son, another brother of the present *muhtar* of Oramar, was anxious that he might be arrested to put pressure on his fugitive brother, so he wanted the three men to surrender, while he and his influential connections would try their best to secure their quick release from jail. Thus, the three men gave themselves up and were taken to Diyarbakır.

Sequence 5: Within a month, Zahir and Fazil had been released after their first appearance at court. People said that they were released because they had denied all the charges or any relation to Selim or Tahir who were still in custody. Cihangir, however, did acknowledge Tahir as his kin and when asked if there were any feuds or fights between him and Tahir, he said no. So he remained in jail. People said Tahir had given evidence against Cihangir and had also most probably claimed to have bought his gun from Cihangir.

Sometime later, Cihangir's sister in Sisin told me that there was a feud between Cihangir and Tahir and that this was related to a murder case some 15 years ago. Very briefly, the story was that Cihangir's sister's son Adil (see Figure 1.1 b, Kaso's elder brother) was murdered by someone in Tahir's neighbourhood of Belli. Tahir and his neighbours had done nothing to prevent the murder nor later to punish the man. So although Cihangir and Tahir were of the same lineage, this affair which must have caused a great deal of tension in the area, had actually been a potential source of conflict according to the sister.

When I left the area Cihangir was still in jail. I have learned that he was released only after a year in prison, in 1983.

Epilogue. Towards the end of my stay in Sisin the political and military situation had already started to change. The gendarmerie post in Yeşil was being extended to quarter several hundreds of men and new land was being bought from the villagers to open a landing ground for helicopters. The construction of the bridge at the end of the road through the tribal area of Oramarî, which should have been finished several years before my arrival but had been left unfinished due to lack of funds, suddenly gained momentum. In 1989 I learned that the road to Sisin had been completed and that one could now reach the house of my host by car. A primary school was built in Sisin in 1986 and the villagers are hoping to get electricity soon. All of these important infrastructural changes have been happening at a time when the general political situation in Hakkari is rapidly deteriorating. In 1984 a Kurdish nationalist party, the PKK (Parteyê Karkerê Kurdistan), started a guerilla campaign in Hakkari and attacked the town of Şemdinli. From that event onwards PKK's guerilla warfare and the military's retort and measures continue to escalate. The state security measures on the one hand, and the pressures from the Kurdish nationalists on the other hand put the villagers under the immediate pressure of having to choose sides and bear the consequences. Tribal alliances and leaders have assumed new (or renewed) roles. Sisin villagers took part in the state policy of establishing village guards (*köy korucusu*, in Turkish) against PKK attacks. The same Sisin villagers who had surrendered their arms under such embarrassing conditions in 1982 rebought or were given guns by the military authorities and 7 men became village guards, receiving a salary for the job. When I visited the village in autumn 1986 and again in May 1987 the men proudly displayed their guns. They were not happy about the pressure they had to put up with but they saw their situation as manageable after establishing contact with the Barzani movement in Iraq and Barzani's assurance that he would mediate between the Oramarî and the PKK to prevent any hostility or attacks by the latter. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1989 tribal leaders in Hakkari were reported to have held a meeting in the province with military and civil authorities there (at the latter's instigation) and promised the support of their tribes against the PKK. On my visit to Sisin, Zahir, who now had become a village guard, was also there and boasted a great deal about his good contact with the military officers and how he had ordered a military helicopter to pick up his sick wife to be delivered to Yüksekova in winter. The tribal leader of Oramarî, who is also Fazil's brother, had been in jail for alleged Kurdish nationalist political activities in 1981-82 and was elected mayor of Yüksekova as a member of the Social Democratic Party in 1988, but he changed in summer 1989 to the ruling Motherland Party. Although the rest of Hakkari, and especially the most western and eastern parts of the province have been much affected by the continuous fighting between the two sides, the Oramarî region was relatively calm until November 1989. The fragile alliance and the balance of power between various tribes and the nationalist forces seem to have broken down. In November 1989 a tribal village close to Oramar and who belongs to a tribe allied to the Oramarî has been attacked allegedly by PKK guerillas and many villagers, mostly women and children have been massacred.

Analysis: Norms and contradictions

The ideas, acts and beliefs of the persons in the case above reflect the inherent contradictions between the "ideal" and the "practical" as well as the structural problems. From the normative point of view, there are many violations of the norms. Firstly, the existence of an informer among kin, affines and tribesmen violates the ideology of solidarity at all levels, a fact recognized by those involved. Secondly, the financial support demanded from tribesmen and kin does not actualize in the prescribed form but, instead, people either give excuses for their failure to meet the demand or deny the norm altogether. Thirdly, the ethnic unity and solidarity principle, although invoked, can not be fully acted out because the costs would have been too high; to act as a unified ethnic group would mean resisting the military and the threats of detention and alleged torture. Fourthly, the meaning of taking an oath on the Qoran is challenged by lying. Tahir and Selim in the above story, after pressure from the local gendarmerie officers, had first taken the oath on the Qoran that they possessed no guns but in the search the police found the guns. Sisin villagers, on the other hand, refused to take the oath about their guns in the presence of the gendarmerie officers. Instead they all fled to their pasture camp first and only produced their guns after the civil police arrived with the list of the names from the village. The first two were not publicly criticized for lying under oath.

There are, thus, many practical strategies which try to find acceptable alternative moves. People do know that norms are often not adhered to, that people of one lineage, one tribe or one village often betray one another and shift alliances. Similarly, it is seen as normal and legitimate to lie in court, to support (even if by keeping quiet) affines instead of kin and to accuse one's own lineage member of betrayal while praising another tribal man for his loyalty to his affines.

The breach of ideals is resented by the local people. Sisin villagers, after giving up their guns, frequently discussed the affair among themselves, expressing their frustration for their loss of face as well as valuables. Their own failure to be united and that they had informers among themselves led to accusations of a decline in moral values, manhood and corruption within their society. There was a reinforcement of village unity as opposed to others or outsiders - kin, affines, co-tribals and other villagers. The informer was not suspected of being from within Sisin. Various grudges held towards some of the main characters or groups were inflated and added as reasons for or signs of the corruption of that person. The *muhtar* of Yeşil, Emin, was sarcastically referred to as giving in to pressure on him and telling on the villagers because he "missed his new wife's bed". The new wife had been the cause of many rumours as she is from another tribe, and a bride-price was paid for her and Emin's first wife was a close kin to several Sisin households and sister to Zahir. The old murder case of Adil was brought up as evidence against Tahir and it was alleged that he must have told on Cihangir. The case is an illustration of how the normative ties of support, i.e. solidarity and unity between close patrilineal kin are invoked but the cross-cutting loyalties of affinity, friendship and "closeness" on the basis of residence and personal liking provide alternative forms of action. The alternative forms of action are not permanent as the case shows, the villagers were divided not only among themselves but about whom to believe and support. They also fluctuated in their support or accusation of different actors.

The structural restrictions on individual and groups strategies derive from the complexity of overlapping systems of norms and loyalties: it is bad to deny a kin link, but it is all right (and even useful) to deny it in court. One may not be a sympathizer of Hizb-ul Islam's politics but one has to support a kin or affine who supports that political view. One may be a very religious man, but it is acceptable to take a false oath on the Qoran. One wants to live peacefully with the military authorities, but one also wants to keep one's own gun. In Bailey's terms, the encapsulated society (the village, tribe, and the region) contains laws and norms which are incompatible with, and sometimes contradicting, the rules and norms of the encapsulating structure, here the bureaucracy, the government and the state.[9]

The multiplicity of norms restricts the groups' strategies perhaps but it provides them with the possibility of changing the context and level of explanation and resort to strategies which suit one's own interests the best. For instance, Haso (see Figure 1.1 b), when asked to contribute to the fund for his wife's brother Cihangir, used several frameworks to challenge the demand; firstly, he said the wife's brother was not his agnate, thus appealing to the traditional lines of obligations towards one's patrilineal kinsmen. Secondly, he criticized Cihangir's actions as a man. According to him, Cihangir failed to fulfil his duties as the head of a household and father of many children. By getting involved in a guns affair he had acted like a young adventurer. Haso's accusations touched on Cihangir's religious personality as well; old men like Cihangir should not seek more wealth (Haso believed Cihangir bought the gun to make profits from its sale) but sit at home, enjoy their family and worry about the next world. Greed (*tamah* in Kurdish and Turkish), Haso said, was his weakness. Thirdly, Haso made it clear that he did not approve of Cihangir's political involvement, thus using political differences as another reason for not supporting him, although the demand from him was formulated not only on the basis of affinal links between him and Cihangir but also on the basis of tribal and ethnic solidarity. Haso rejected the claims with a riposte for Cihangir's well-off patrilineal cousins: "Why were they not giving more help for their *pısmam*?" Fourthly, Haso (who did not want to burn all the bridges behind him and be accused of letting down his WB) offered to buy Cihangir's mule for a good price and that would be his contribution. Here the economic and trade interests are also brought in as legitimate concerns.

Kinship, tribe and state

From the tribesman's point of view, kin ties are part of the total social ties between individuals which allow for services, goods and sentiments to be cultivated and which demand maintenance through frequent contact. The kinship terminology does not differ for tribal and non-tribal people. From a tribesman's point of view he has more relatives than a non-tribal person as kinship ties are reckoned further back than the non-tribal's kin. There is a differentiation between levels of reckoning but the principle is the same; simply by raising one's level of social unit one can invoke feelings of likeness, unity and solidarity between people. The term "*mirovêtêkin*", therefore, can be used to mean "we are one people", i.e. a village, a tribe, people of Hakkari, Kurds, or Muslims.

The significance of reckoning kinship, and using the idiom of kinship becomes obvious when the non-tribal people share the moral meaning of kinship. Loyalty between kinsmen is an assumption held both for tribal and non-tribal groups. Thus, the judicial or military authorities can seek a fugitive's brother on the assumption that the brother either knows the fugitive's whereabouts or that the latter will give himself up to secure the release of his brother. This, in fact, had been a practice in the past as well, as will be demonstrated in a case study in the history of Hakkari. In this case, Nurullah Beg, one of the princely rulers of Hakkari, got into trouble with the central authorities and took refuge in Iran. When he wanted to return, he was told to bring his family as well to secure his full return. The idea of holding kin responsible for a member's acts is normal in calculating political moves.

Tribesmen see the moral meaning of kinship as part of a wider network of social relations, applicable to those between tribal and non-tribal groups, bureaucrats and ordinary citizens, local administrators and residents. Kinship obligations and networks are thought to be meaningful and useful in dealing with administrators, politicians and military personnel. Among the local people who work in the city administration, police forces or as clerks, kinship ties with the villagers mean securing a supply of village produce such as yogurt, cheese, butter or honey, goods which are bought at high prices and low quality in town. For the villagers the same relations mean help and advice with all sorts of bureaucratic problems and sometimes a bed in town. Tribal *agha*s, on the other hand, seek to form kin/affinal links to local administrators. A tribal *agha* had a ritual parenthood (*kirve*) relation with the commander of the commando unit and this was thought to have helped in securing the release of the *agha*'s son from detention. The idiom of kinship thus is a fundamental part of the shared culture between the regional and wider national group.

Secondly, from the tribesman's point of view, although the tribal system and network implicitly and ideologically means a kinship network, it also entails hierarchical elements such as the tribal leaders and noble or saintly lineages. If reckoning kinship and extending kin terms have to do with emphasizing equality and solidarity, the recognition of noble and prominent lineages and tribal leaders from these lineages brings hierarchical elements into the system. The concepts of political authority, the government and the military are formed along these lines; the existence of governmental and military authority and the assumed wide range of power it has is integrated into a tribesman's overall picture of the world around him.

Ethnic identity and the non-corresponding kinship and tribal structures present a very flexible picture of loyalty and identity. It provides for flexibility in interpretation and actions, but leads to difficulties and misunderstandings as well. A local military officer who accepts gifts and visits from a group of villagers on a regular basis may be thought to be forming kin-like ties with these people but at a critical point the acceptance or refusal can be interpreted as a pro- or anti-Kurd attitude. This was an irritating turn of events for some administrators who experienced such shifts of opinion. The crux of the matter is, however, the rigidness of the political system in accepting ethnic structures and identity as something different from localism, regionalism or tribalism. The common idiom of kinship provides for important channels of communication and exchange between the local and national cultures. However, the unmistakable mixture of ethnicity together with kinship and tribe makes the local political phenomena distinct. And this poses the main structural constraint on cases like that of the Sisin villagers who shift alliances to cope with the severity of threats to their social organization but end up suffering further alienation from the national political processes.

The story of Sisin's guns brings together many elements of the wider and local social and cultural system and could be fully interpreted only with further exploration and analysis of the social relations and cultural meanings which are introduced in the story. The characteristics of the region, be they political, economic, geographical or historical, deserve as much attention as the indigenous factors of kinship relations, tribal structures and religious practices. The answers to questions such as "Why are there two tribal sections of the Oramarî?", "What is a tribe in Hakkari?", "How are tribes related to one another?", "How important are the relations through women?" or "Why is it necessary to support one's agnatic kin?" all of which are fundamental to the case above will be sought in the following chapters.

2. The history of politics in Hakkari

Introductory remarks

Hakkari as an administrative unit with its present borders has existed since the formation of the Turkish Republic. But the political formations and structures in the region are far reaching in space and history. The province, with its shifting borders, has lived through the rule of tribal confederacies, semi-autonomous princely families and religious dynasties such as the Sadatê Nehrî. Presently, the region has marginal importance for Turkey's economy and society, except for its image as a tribal area, lenient towards Kurdish separatists or bandits, but basically backwards and politically "underdeveloped". In the past, however, Hakkari seems to have drawn much more attention. Through its shifting alliances with the neighbouring states it played a more important role in politics than today.

The need for a historical analysis of power and politics in Hakkari is twofold; firstly, we need to understand the level of causation in the history of the region in order to analyze the present more efficiently and thoroughly; secondly, we need to compare the local oral history, the local version of the official history and the history as it is written by various historians, travellers and political administrators in order to assess the reliability of these sources. This rather ambitious interest in the history of the region made me aware of the problems of dealing with the historical data rather than with the historical facts themselves. The attempt here is to present a sketch of the history of the area. As even a fairly general overview of the local historical developments gives new insights not only into the local but also into the surrounding state level political processes.

My knowledge of the history of the region is far from complete, especially because it is very much a history of the rulers rather than the ruled. Moreover there is the problem of inconsistent and fragmented documentation from different periods in the history. Nevertheless, the history written from the point of view of the rulers provides us with insights useful in the analysis of leadership in Hakkari today. Another point about the existing historical knowledge on the region is that despite the common conclusions drawn about Hakkari as a backward region due to its inaccessibility and physical isolation, the level of communication within the region in the past seems remarkable. Thus it is necessary to look beyond the physical and infrastructural framework and constrictions to understand the past and the present of Hakkari. The interdependency of nomadic, semi-nomadic or settled populations in the past, the type of labour division which existed between the nomadic and settled sections of tribes (or tribal confederations),[1] the type of production and settlement patterns which existed in the past all contribute to our understanding of today's relations and constraints and formulate meaningful questions. For example, if the tribes were divided into nomadic/warrior and settled/semi-nomadic sections in the past, what sort of leaders or leadership hierarchy existed then? Following from this question, since today's political borders do not allow for large nomadic groups to exist, how, then, are the functions of the previous nomads fulfilled within today's tribal structures? Are today's tribes totally different than those in the past and if so according to which criteria could we assess this? These are a few of the inquiries which have led me into the historical background analysis of the following pages.

Some notes on the problems of sources

a. The most detailed references to the early history of the rulers and tribes of Hakkari and its administrative system are in *Chèref-nâmeh* and Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname.* The first is considered to be the earliest detailed history of Kurdish dynasties and tribes and was written by Şeref Khan, the *mîr* (prince) of Bitlis[2] in the 16th century. The second one is from the 17th century and it recorded the military and administrative divisions and tribes of Hakkari and Van. With these two sources it is possible to reconstruct the succession of administrators and rulers of Hakkari until the 17th century, but both works are characterized by inconsistency, exaggeration and inaccuracy.[3]

b. The secondary sources mostly rely on the information in *Chèref-nâmeh* and *Seyahatname* for the period stated above. Some other historians, like Abū'l Faraj[4] from the 13th century, who briefly mentioned politics, rulers and tribes of Hakkari are also referred to in these secondary sources. An important survey of Hakkari's history, especially for the Ottoman period up to the end of the empire, was carried out by Sevgen who studied the history and personalities from the Ottoman archives; it is a unique study of its kind for Hakkari. Sevgen used the original texts of historians like Abū'l Faraj, Şeref Khan and Evliya Çelebi as well as those of European historians like Minorsky, Nikitine and von Hammer; but the significance of his work lies mostly in the use of Ottoman official texts, decrees and communication, revealing interesting material on Ottoman policies concerning the Kurdish principalities, and in return the response and initiatives of the Kurdish ruling classes.[5]

c. The secondary sources vary according to their relevance for Hakkari's history; for example, Minorsky who has written widely on the origins, history and culture of Kurds adopts a broad perspective and does not give the details of particular developments in Hakkari. On the other hand, historian and sociologist Nikitine who has also written widely on the Kurds has travelled both in Hakkari and in the particular tribal villages where I stayed; thus his information is very valuable. He has not only recorded his own travel observations but also local histories, stories, myths and songs as well as meticulously writing down the names of people, tribes, villages and places. Travellers before and after him have either not been very well informed or they passed through the area rather quickly so that their information is not all that accurate. Nevertheless, travellers' accounts are still useful even if for the patchy bits of information they provide; here I try to put together every bit of detailed information one can get out of these reports about the social conditions and history of Hakkari at different periods.

To summarize the general problems in dealing with the sources on the history of Hakkari:

1. The lack of comparative material: usually there are only one or two historical records which have dealt with any period; thus one cannot use the cross-checking method (for some periods the information is very scanty.) The veracity of some of these records is open to question; one cannot tell if a particular historian has actually been in the area, read documents or simply got his information orally. Şeref Khan for example has the most detailed accounts for his own principality of Bitlis which fortunately provides records of events in Hakkari as the two principalities had close contacts with each other.[6] Evliya Çelebi, on the other hand, seems to have relied more on what he heard from the notables he stayed with on his travels, so he sometimes has exaggerated descriptions of some "wild tribal" people.[7]

2. Other than the general lack of verifiable and reliable information, the accounts of the travellers especially have been much affected by the political and geographical conditions in the area (e.g. whether or not they could reach some district despite seasonally high rivers or rebelling tribes). The travellers' accounts therefore could be qualitatively ordered by looking at the length of time spent in the area, knowledge of the language(s) there, and of course the purpose of travel. It is remarkable that a German alpinist who travelled in the Yüksekova-Oramar district with a team of geologists in 1937 had lots to say

about geological formations, but was not aware that there had been a rebellion and insurrection a few years before his trip precisely in those villages he wrote about. His only comment is that the villages and settlements were deserted and uncultivated.[8] On the other hand, many of the travellers in the area were representatives of one or another military or political interest in the region,[9] and their reports are tinted with various prejudices as well as some candid observations.[10]

Early history of Hakkari

Although there is evidence of neolithic settlement in Hakkari in rock paintings and carvings, its earliest written history dates back to the Assyrian documents from 1300 B.C. which described some high plateau peoples living as independent counties.[11] Hakkari's involvement in the Urartu kingdom of Musasir,[12] Assyrian domination, Median and later on Persian raids are cited by scholars for the period until the 6th century B.C.[13] Hakkari is also thought to be on the crossing route of the "retreating Ten Thousands", mentioned by Xenophon, and later of the armies of Alexander the Great.[14] During the first 3-4 centuries A.D., the area does not seem to have been under anyone's complete control, the influence changing between the Seleucids, Romans and then the Parthians and back several times.

The emergence of the Christian Nestorian doctrine and sect around the 4th century and the crucial role they played later in relations between the Sassanid and East Roman Byzantine empires provide us with further and more concrete historical evidence from the region. The oldest Nestorian churches dating from the 4th and 5th centuries are found in the mountains and valleys of Hakkari.[15] The Nestorians must have used their mountain strongholds to escape persecution first from the Sassanids and later from the Byzantine Empire, when the Nestorian doctrine was rejected by the Eastern Church.[16] In times of peace the Nestorians were active missionaries, spreading their teaching throughout western Asia as far as India.[17]

The name "Hakkari" first appears in the records of Arab historians in the 10th century. Ibn al-Athīr,[18] who wrote about the history of the region then, described a country called "Al-Zawzan" which included Hakkari.[19] The first mention of Kurds living in and around Hakkari occurs around the same time although Arab historians mention victories of Arab armies over the Kurds in southeast Anatolia from a much earlier date, c. 637 onwards.[20]

The political situation in and around Hakkari at the beginning of the 10th century which can be gleaned from the souces was as follows; most of eastern Anatolia was under the rule of the Byzantine Empire; southeastern Anatolia, Syria and Iraq were ruled by various Kurdish dynasties like the Marwanids in Diyarbakır, Hasanwayhids in al-Djibal, northern Iraq, the area of the Barzanî tribe, or Seljuq Atabegs in Mosul. Some rulers chose strategems to pacify the Kurds of Hakkari,[21] whereas Oğuz Turkic tribes which were spreading westwards in eastern Anatolia around the 10-11th centuries are said to have suffered defeats at the hands of Hakkari's inhabitants.[22]

What is clear is that by the time the Great Seljuq Turks, under Alp Arslan, defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus IV at Malazgird in 1071 and secured all Armenia, the inhabitants of Hakkari, referred to as "Hakkariya" were a mixture of Kurdish tribes and various residual groups of people who had mixed with one another and assimilated into the population, and the Nestorian Christians were an established community living especially in the southern valleys of Hakkari's mountain ranges.

Some theories on the origins of Kurds in Hakkari

The theories on the origins of the Kurds generally overlap with some elements of the mythologies concerning Hakkari and its surroundings. The scholarly theories cited by Nikitine, emphasizing the linguistic origin of the word "Kurd" and either try to trace links to other similar language groups (mainly to the Iranian and Indo-European language groups) or emphasize historical-ethnic factors, such as the assimilation and mixing of groups over the etymology of words and linguistic similarities.[23] The details of these arguments are not of concern to us here, except for the suggestion that the "Kardochoi", mentioned by Xenophon as inhabiting the region of Hakkari, were the ancestors of the people known as Kurds later on, according to one of the theories.

Local mythologies on the origins of the Kurds, as recorded by Nikitine (1956:17-18), are more interesting as various elements from these myths recur across time, space and context. A rather well known legend is that of Dahhak. He was a tyrant who had snakes in his shoulders to which he fed the brains of two young men each day. The executioner, who felt sorry for these men decided to save one each day by replacing one human brain with that of a sheep and sending the saved youth to hide in the mountains.[24] Mountains thus are considered to be where the Kurdish nation originated. The symbolism of the snake appears in many places and cultures in eastern Anatolia: the most famous mythological stories and beliefs within which the snake is an element are in the Yazidi religious sect,[25] like the story of Noah and the snake,[26] and the story of Nestorian churches built on the stone under which a saint hid all the snakes.[27] Today the figure of the snake appears in Hakkari on ornaments, embroidery, and snakes are believed to have supernatural powers.

It was recorded very early on that "Kurds give Arabs as their ancestors"[28]; the Kurdish rulers of Hakkari are recorded as claiming descent from the Abbasīds, and the prominent *sayyid* families of the 19th and 20th centuries claim descent from the Prophet himself even if the genealogy could not be supported with written records.

Finally, another local and widely held theory of origin is related to the Kurds as a nation; it deals more with the expansion and differentiation within the Kurdish nation and less with determining the oldest possible original country or ancestor. The oldest variation is about the Kurdish nation having two branches: Milan and Zilan. Milan came from Arabia and were superior, Zilan came from the east and were of a lower race according to Sykes' collection of the story.[29] There were variations of these two branch divisions in Hakkari, concerning the tribal configuration there; not only were all the tribes in the area said to be divided into two main branches, those of the left and right, but also the tribe of Oramar is said to have two sub-divisions, claiming two brothers as their mythological ancestors. The significance of these recurrent divisions into two for the tribal structure and politics are discussed in Chapter 4.

Hakkari from the 12th to the 16th centuries

From the first half of the 12th century onwards, Hakkari came under more pressure from the south than the north. The Atabegs of Mosul, the Zangī dynasty, mentioned above, started expanding their influence northwards towards Hakkari, taking over various castles now in northern Iraq and raiding the tribal areas in order to gain control over them. Minorsky says that the lord of Arbil, who might have been a member of the Hakkari tribe, (as the tribe at this period lived south of the region which is now known by the name), submitted to 'Imād al-Dīn al-Zangī, and after his death, c. 1135, 'Imād al-Dīn seized his lands and the fortress of Jalab to which he gave his own name, hence the town of 'Amadiya today.[30] 'Imād al-Dīn continued organizing new military expeditions towards the north and took a fortress which is now within Hakkari's borders, rebuilt it and kept his forces there to be used against resisting tribal forces and he was able to collect taxes from those tribal groups that he could keep under control.[31] Eventually various parts of Hakkari, like Elk (Beytüşşebab) in the west, came under the influence of the Atabegs. It is interesting to note that a leader of Hakkari's tribes who took part in an expedition against the Atabeg of Azarbayjan along with the Mosul Atabegs was probably a Turk, and therefore from a different ethnic group than the tribal Kurds there.[32] This type of ethnic differentiation between the chief of a tribe (whether a *mîr*, prince, or *agha*, paramount chief) and the tribal followers is not uncommon in many parts of Kurdistan;[33] it is a historical occurence which will be further taken into consideration within the analysis of tribal leaders' power, status and links to the tribal members in Kurdistan.

Around the beginning of the 13th c. two events which have been recorded point to important developments in Hakkari. The historian Abū'l-Faraj is quoted[34] as reporting that Hakkari's Kurdish *mîrs* were involved in plotting against al-Kāmil, the Ayyubīd ruler of Egypt, c. 1218.[35] On the other hand, at about the same time, two rival branches of the Zangī dynasty of Mosul were competing with each other to control 'Amadiya, Akra and Hakkari.[36] Sevgen reports that c. 1222, the leader of one branch of the dynasty got hold of the strategic castles in Hakkari and obtained the support from the local tribal chiefs after promising fewer taxes and fair rule. The two events show that the tribal leaders in Hakkari were in close contact with the political developments within their immediate as well as distant surroundings and had influence over, and political relations with other ruling dynasties like the Ayyubīds who ruled over Syria and Egypt.

During the second half of the 13th c. the Mongol Ilkhāns dominated the political and military scene in most parts of western Iran, Iraq, eastern and southeastern Turkey. In these areas resistance to the raids of pagan Mongols and their local allies, the Christians, was formed by muslim Arabs, Kurds and Türkmens. Minorsky states that the Kurds "had to remain confined to their mountains and to hope for success for the enemies of the Mongols."[37] In this period we learn from the records that some Kurdish forces did ally themselves to the Mongol army and tried to attack Hakkari. The attack was stopped by killing the leader of these Kurds, the ally of the Mongols. But a year later in 1259, Hulagu (the Mongol prince) on an expedition to Syria, "put all the Kurds he found to the sword."[38]

During the reign of Mamlūk Sultans in Egypt in the 14th c., the Mamlūk historians have recorded lists of Kurdish tribes and the areas in which they lived, with whom their chancelleries of Cairo were in correspondance.[39] From the lists composed in 1347 there were the following tribes in and around Hakkari:

1. The Culamerg (the central town of the province of Hakkari today), of Umayyad (Arab) origin, numbering 3000 men.
2. The Zerzarî[40] living in southern part of Shamdinan (Şemdinli today).
3. Near Culamerg was the canton of Gewer.[41]
4. Near Culamerg beside Akra and ‘Amadiya was the canton of Zibarî inhabited by 500 men.[42]
5. The Hakkarî lived at ‘Amadiya and numbered 4000 men.[43]
6. The Dumbulî inhabited the high mountains.[44]

The lists include 14 more tribes living between Mosul and Gewer (Yüksekova), Hamadan and Cezire, and it is one of the earliest lists of the tribes which inhabited Hakkari. However, the large tribes of Ertuşî and Pinyanişî which are mentioned in later records as being prominent political forces in the area are not mentioned in this list. It is possible that Pinyanişî and Ertuşî were living mostly to the north of the mountain ranges and had their influence more in the provinces of today’s Bitlis, Siirt and Van. Furthermore the Mamlūks probably had links with a limited number of tribal groups who lived further south towards Iraq, and as the tribes were not united in a confederation then, the names Pinyanişî and Ertuşî were unknown to them.

In the second half of the 14th c. and the first half of the 15th, we see more unificatory efforts in the Hakkari region as well as stronger political influences from the surrounding dynasties and states. Hakkari’s tribes are claimed to have united for the first time around 1360[45] and the first ruler (*mîr*) was an Izzeddin Şîr I.[46] He is mentioned in the *Chèref-nâmeh* as "having held out against Timur’s forces in the fortress of Van" in 1387.[47] After this fight Izzeddin Şîr, who had extended his rule to Van and Gewaş in the north, had to give in to Timur and continued ruling Hakkari as a vassal.[48] After Timur’s death the rival Türkmen dynasties of Karakoyunlu (blacksheep) and Akkoyunlu (whitesheep) extended their power over Kurdistan.[49] Hakkari, like the other Kurdish governorates (*beylik*) at that time suffered from the rivalry between these dynasties as well as the expanding political and territorial influence of the Ottoman and Persian empires to the west and east. After Timur’s influence died out, Hakkari was governed independently for a short while but soon had to bow down to Karakoyunlu rule. Yet when Timur’s son returned to Armenia and Kurdistan "homage was done to him by *Malik* (*mîr*) Muhammed of Hakkari."[50] A year later Karakoyunlu rulers this time punished the same Kurdish rulers for their alleged allegiance to Timur’s son.[51]

From 1450 onwards for about twenty years, Eseddin Kelanî, son of Imadeddin, ruled Hakkari as *mîr*.[52] During his rule the governorate (*beylik*) had control over a large area extending to Gewaş, the island of Akhtamar on Van Lake and Culamerg; but whenever the political and military threat of the Akkoyunlu dynasty, based in Amid (Diyarbakır) in western Kurdistan, was strongly felt the *mîr* would withdraw his forces to Culamerg, which was less accessible to outsiders. Partly under this continuous pressure and partly as a result of the good relations with the Mamlûk Sultans of Egypt, Eseddin left for Egypt and distinguished himself as a brave warrior for the Mamlûk armies. According to various mythical stories, after Eseddin lost his arm in war, the Sultan had a golden arm made for him; thereafter, Eseddin was called Eseddin Zerrîn Ceng (Golden Arm).[53] While Eseddin was in Egypt, Izeddin Şîr II took over the rule of Hakkari but he was unable to adequately resist the Akkoyunlu pressures. In a fight with Uzun Hasan's forces (Akkoyunlu Türkmens) he was killed,[54] and Akkoyunlus gave the rule of Hakkari to a Dumbulî tribe.[55] Şeref Khan writes that the Nestorian Christians of Diz (near Culamerg) who traded and travelled as far as Syria and Egypt, went to look for Eseddin Zerrîn Ceng to fetch him back, fight the Dumbulîs and win back the rule of the *beylik*.[56] This is an interesting alliance between various factions of the Kurds and Nestorians which had phases of breaking up and restoration along the historical developments in the region.

Hakkari in the 16th century and the case of Zeynel Beg

In the 16th century the Safavid dynasty in Persia became prominent and the Shia doctrine became a cause for militancy for Shah Ismail's Türkmen tribes; "for about three centuries Kurdistan became the arena for struggle between the Ottoman Sultans and the Shahs of Persia."[57] During the first 3-4 decades of this century Eseddin Zerrîn Ceng's son Zahid Beg ruled over Hakkari, apparently without much conflict with their Safavid protectors.[58]

Before and after the defeat of Shah Ismail by the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim I in 1514, Kurdish *mîr*s, especially those who were threatened by the Safavids, were joining the ranks of the Ottomans. Yavuz's able diplomat Idris Bitlisî had much to do with winning these Kurdish *mîr*s over to the Ottoman side. Minorsky notes that it was Bitlisî's policies that began to feudalize the Kurdish provinces, securing the predominance of the Kurdish nobility.[59] Van Bruinessen also draws attention to the special government policy concerning Kurdish provinces; Bitlisî, "who had received plenipotentiary powers from the Sultan, appointed *mîr*s

... as hereditary governors of districts -an anomaly in the empire, where these positions were usually held by military appointees, and were (at least in theory) not inheritable."[60] However, the highest military and civil commander's post (*beylerbeyi*) was filled by someone sent from the Sublime Porte and was not a Kurd. Even if it is true that Ottoman policy around the time of the formation of Kurdish principalities was different from the Akkoyunlu and Safavid policies, in that the Ottomans "consolidated the position of the old aristocracy", whereas the latter tried "breaking these families' power...(and) replacing them with their own (Turkish) governors, otherwise with other, less aristocratic Kurds,"[61] this was not a consistent and long lasting policy. The case of Hakkari shows that the *beylerbeyi* (*mîr-i mîran*) in Van frequently tried to influence the affairs of those who ruled Hakkari, favouring one branch/son of the descendants over another. In later years the hereditary dynasty was sometimes disposed of altogether. The Ottomans knew that they needed the support of the local people and it was easier to win them over by investing in a local chief; on the other hand, they did not trust the local nobility, especially those at the border areas who had the chance to play the interests of one empire against another by simply changing sides, so the policies fluctuated not only according to the specific conditions and interests at the same time but also the strength of the empires concerned. These policy fluctuations are illustrated in the two case studies below, those of Zeynel Beg in the 16th century and Nurullah Beg in the 19th century.

Zahid Beg, who ruled mostly under Safavid influence and later under the Ottomans in the 16th century, divided the *beylik* between his two sons; one was to rule from the fortress of Bay[62] and another from Gewaş. After 1535, when Hakkari was won back under Ottoman influence from the Safavids through the efforts and promises of the *beylerbeyi* of Van, Hakkari had 13 changes of rulers for about a century. This period, which is well recorded in *Chèref-nâmeh* seems to have been turbulent, with loyalties shifting frequently; moreover, the members of the ruling Şembû family had much conflict among themselves (e.g. sons rebelling against fathers, one brother getting into the service of Safavids while the other fought against them with the Ottoman army, conflicts between uncles and nephews; inter-familial conflicts which resemble those between the leading tribal families in Hakkari today). Van Bruinessen (1978: 177) comments that "sons ... governed sub-distr icts of Hakkari as representatives of their father just like Ottoman Sultans and Persian Shahs appointed their sons as provincial governors, for the double reason of centralizing the administration within the family and of keeping their most dangerous rivals far away from the capital." For the sake of demonstrating the wide ranging contacts, relations to local and other tribes, to the Ottoman Porte and various administrators there of the *mîr*s of Hakkari, in the following Zeynel Beg's biography, based on Sevgen's articles in *BTTD* (1968-70) and *Chèref-nâmeh*, is narrated:[63]

> Zeynel Beg was Zahid's grandson and the son of Melik who had inherited the fortress of Bay. He had 6 brothers. During his father's reign, he revolted against his father with the support of the Pinyanişî tribe. His father was saved by Zeynel's brother from being killed and they both took refuge first with Zeynel's father's brother Seyid Mehmed who had inherited Gewaş fortress, and then with Bitlis' *mîr* Şerefkhan. Seyid Mehmed and his sons were subordinate to Shah Tahmasb of the Safavid dynasty. Yet neither Shah Tahmasb nor the Ottomans had a strong say in Hakkari's matters; Zeynel's own brother Bayındır had joined the *kızılbaş* (Iran's Shi'ites, the Safavids) as well, while some brothers were close to the Ottomans and some others to the local tribes.
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> In this confusion the *beylerbeyi* of Van supported Zeynel as *mîr* of Hakkari. Yet his father's brother's son Zahid, getting support from the same Pinyanişî tribe this time against Zeynel, took over the *beylik*. Zeynel took refuge with 'Amadiya's governor and with his mediation appealed to the prime minister (*vezîri azam*) of the Ottoman Porte and the Sultan in order to be restored to his office. *Vezîri azam* Rüstem Paşa supported Zeynel's claim, against his father's brother and father's brother's son who were on the Safavid side, but asked Zeynel first to bring his kin back from Iran (his brother or his wife?).
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> Zeynel on the way to Iran had been attacked by the men of Bedr Beg, *mîr* of Botan (west of Hakkari) and was saved from being killed by Bedr's wife who treated his wounds and protected him. Meanwhile Zeynel's father's brother Seyid Mehmed was back as *mîr* of Hakkari but ruled from Gewaş. The *beylerbeyi* of Van tried once more to restore Zeynel to office and using some ruse had Seyid Mehmed caught and brought to Van. This time, however, Seyid Mehmed's son Yakub claimed the office. He was duly chased by the Ottoman soldiers and the army of Mahmudi's *bey* (a governorate northwest of Hakkari); Yakub took refuge with Pinyanişî and then Şahkulu (?) but was given back to the *beylerbeyi* who in return had both Seyid Mehmed and Yakub hanged.
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> Zeynel was now free to take up the post yet at that time the prime minister Rüstem Paşa was dismissed from his post and Zeynel was not sure anymore whom he should ally himself with. He must have thought it safer to ally himself with the Persian Shah Tahmasb until Rüstem Paşa was restored

back to his office. Then Zeynel went in person to Istanbul to express his loyalty to the pasha who gave him a fief (*zeamet*) in Bosna (today in Yugoslavia). After staying in Bosna for a while, Zeynel returned to Istanbul and was sent on to Van to join a military expedition against the *kızılbaş* (Shi'ites) of Safavids. Zeynel showed great zeal and despite the fact that it was his brother Bayındır who led the shiites, he won the battle, taking back many prisoners of war. He was duly honoured with high Ottoman decorations.

Zeynel finally returned to Hakkari as *mîr*. After a while, however, two of his sons rebelled against him, and he posted them both away, one to his fief in Bosna, the other to the Albak fortress (northwest of Hakkari). Yet the Ottoman administration was not happy at this time with the enmity and rivalry between Şahkulu (probably a dynasty in western Azarbayjan which changed sides between Safavids and Ottomans, like those in Hakkari), and Zeynel Beg; they warned Zeynel to give up the animosity, reconcile with Şahkulus, and win them over to the Ottoman side. Zeynel, feeling insecure once again, gave up his post in favour of one of his sons, had a castle built in northern Hakkari and asked for cannons from the Sublime Porte, obviously in fear of being attacked by his enemies. His rivals the Şahkulus mean while were bribed into Ottoman allegiance by carving away some of Zeynel's land, the governorate of Hakkari, even though according to the Ottoman documents the supreme governor of Van was asked not to take away any of Hakkari's land. Zeynel's final service to the Ottomans was when he joined an expedition to Tabriz with the Ottoman army. He was killed there and his body was brought back to Culamerg and buried in the courtyard of the *medrese* (religious school) he had built. Thus his whole reign lasted for about 40-45 years between 1540s and 1585.[64]

Several conclusive points could be drawn from the story above:

1. Van Bruinessen pointed to the rule in Kurdish principalities (*hükümets*) resembling those of the empires surrounding and dominating them. This can be observed in Hakkari as well; the region was divided into two parts by Zahid (Zeynel's grandfather) and his sons were appointed to rule from two different castles. There is no exact information about the borders of these two regions, nor the area of surplus extraction; strategic positions of the castles indicate that the subrulers had unreliable support from the people and that they in return used coercion as a regular and necessary means of asserting their authority.

2. As for the degree of support the rulers needed from the "patron" empire and its administrators, or their own tribal forces in the area: There does not seem to be a dominant, consistent, or single force influencing the choice of a ruler. The historians who wrote about the rulers of Hakkari and the basis of their authority have varying views; Şeref Khan comments that Zeynel "occupied himself with ruling and governing this country, by virtue of this *firman* (the decree from the Sultan), with an absolute power and his reign lasted nearly forty years,"[65] thus emphasizing the power derived from the Ottoman Sublime Porte. But the *firman* apparently was not indicative of permanent support from the Porte, since when Rüstem Paşa, who had the contact to Zeynel, had fallen from favour for a short while, Zeynel felt very insecure in his position and sought protection from the Safavids of Persia. Finally, the protection and formal support of the Great Powers was not enough to legitimize a ruler's absolute hold of the office as *mîr*. As we have seen, at least one big tribe is mentioned as supporting a rival candidate as *mîr* but could also shift its support to the other and thus change the course of events. Pinyanişî, for example, which is mentioned as a large and important tribe, first supported Zeynel when he revolted against his father and removed the father from his position; in the second instance, they supported Zeynel's father's brother's son against him and put Zeynel to flight towards 'Amadiya; and finally, they protected one of Zeynel's father's brother's sons against the Ottoman armies together with some Kurdish soldiers and gave refuge to him. Therefore, one could assert that, as far as Hakkari is concerned, and possibly due to its strategic location and geographical conditions, the legitimization of authority was dependent on external (states, empires, high officers) and internal forces (tribes, later religious *shaikh*s), independent of the office holder's ascribed status (e.g. belonging to the chiefly lineage).[66]

3. Ruling families could be split up (as between Zeynel and his brother, or his father's brother) in terms of their allegiance to the Ottoman rulers (orthodox Sunnis) or the Safavids (militant Shi'ites). Van Bruinessen (1978:166-69) cites many expeditions by Safavid or Ottoman rulers to punish the Sunni or Shi'ite Türkmen and Kurdish rulers respectively. Some tribal groups are also said to have rebelled against their *mîr* because of the *mîr*'s allegiance to Shi'ite Persians. There is no such reaction from the local population of Hakkari which is recorded by historians; we do not know, for example, how it was accepted by Pinyanişî (who are later on mentioned in Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname* as fanatic fighters against the Shi'ite Persians) that Zeynel's father's brother and father's brother's sons took refuge with and led armies of Shi'ites. A case of revolt against the *mîr* of Hakkari by the locals, because they

objected to being under Shi'ite protection, is mentioned only later, c. 1632. A hypothetical explanation of this differentiated behaviour concerning religious loyalties could be that, a) the local tribes and population were distant from the rulers and had power independently of the ruler or the empire the ruler affiliated himself with; b) the religious loyalties in terms of the opposition between Sunni and Shi'ite divisions were not very strong, neither for the ruler nor the population; c) for both the ruler and the tribes the secular aspect of the politics of the two neighbouring empires was more important and relevant than the religious opposition between the two; thus despite being Sunnis it might have been acceptable then to change sides between the Ottomans and Persians.

4. The principle of succession to office, even if seemingly based on the father to son principle,[67] shows considerable variations and is sometimes quite random or chaotic. It is implied, later in the account of two brothers fighting over the office, that the primogeniture rule was the ideal, but who finally got the office depended on many factors such as support from the tribes, the Ottoman Porte, or the surrounding *mîrs*. Similarly the succession problem in the Ottoman Empire from the 15th century onwards is usually described as the beginning of endless internal fights between the sultan's sons, which lasted till the end of the 16th century, when the rule of primogeniture was done away with, younger brothers were jailed, sent into exile or simply killed. In 17th century Hakkari's politics, there is also fratricide in struggles for the princedom.

5. The Ottoman policy of rule by playing one regional force against another is well demonstrated in the case of Zeynel. Ottomans first favoured Zeynel over his kin who sided with the Persians but then, when Zeynel's enemies were desirable allies as well, pressure was put on him to leave aside his animosity against the others, while some land under Zeynel's rule was carved away to give to his rivals, who were by then released from jail. It is, however, difficult to pin down the real maker of these policies from the limited historical records, since there existed endless power struggles between different levels of the Ottoman hierarchy as well. The short dismissal of Rüstem Paşa serves as an example. Şeref Khan noted that due to continuous intrigues and struggles between Rüstem Paşa (the prime minister), Iskender Paşa (the supreme civil and military commander, *beylerbeyi* of Van) and the Sultan Süleyman and Shah Tahmasb (of Iran), nobody, quite understandably, trusted Zeynel.[68] Correspondingly, Zeynel had a very insecure position as has already been mentioned.

6. Finally, a detail in the sequence of events is related to the role played by Mîri Botan Bedr Beg's wife. It is one of the earliest examples of the political role the Kurdish noble women played. Bedr's wife was able to take a man under her protection and secure his life in an enemy quarter. Such self assertive and politically powerful women are mentioned in various accounts from different parts of Kurdistan and different periods in history.[69]

Following the events after Zeynel's death, the struggles for succession between his sons, fratricide and the Ottoman policy of favouring one against the other continued. One of Zeynel's sons Zekeriya was favoured by many tribes.[70] The Ottoman Porte appointed another descendant as *mîr*. Zekeriya appealed to the Ottoman Porte through the mediation of another *mîr*, his protector, the *mîr* of 'Amadiya. The Ottoman Prime Minister appointed Zekeriya to rule the governorate of Hakkari on the condition that he paid 100,000 gold *ducats* as tax to the Ottoman court.[71] This is the first evidence we have in the available historical records of financial relations between the Ottoman central administration and the principality. It is interesting that the Ottoman administration practically sold the title of *mîr* in 1596.

Zekeriya is reported to have ruled the *beylik* for 20 years but rebelled against the Ottomans once again together with the *beg* of a neighbouring *sancak*. The Ottoman Sublime Porte appointed a Yahya Beg to Zekeriya's office. It is not clear whether Yahya was a native, or a kin of Zekeriya. He was appointed as *hakim* (governor rather than prince/hereditory chief). He was followed, however, by Zekeriya's son Şerefhan as *hakim*, but Şerefhan chose Persian protection and took part in an expedition with the Persians attacking Van and got killed by the people of Hakkari who revolted against Shi'ite Persian rule and influence in 1632.

In 1635 Sultan Murad IV carried out a military expedition against Erivan (today in Soviet Armenia) and it is recorded that the *hakim* of Hakkari, Imadeddin, did not come to "pay his respects to His Royalty". After he was disposed of the following year, someone else from the noble lineage of Hakkari's rulers took the office and he is the last *mîr* mentioned in the records, who belonged to the Şembû dynasty of Hakkari until 1840s. Sevgen notes that 1688 is the year Hakkari became fully a part of the civil administration of the Ottoman Empire, as a *sancak*.[72] As to how this happened, there are no details in the Ottoman records available to us. We can only assert that from this date onwards the governors were called *müdür* or *mütesellim* and appointed by the central administration and most probably were not from the region.

Hakkari as recounted by Evliya Çelebi in the 17th century

Other than Şeref Khan's account of the rulers of Hakkari and the information gleaned by Sevgen from the Ottoman documents, Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname* which covers the period till the mid-17th century also provides some observations and facts about the governmental system and tribes of Hakkari.

Evliya seems to have contacted some tribesmen belonging to the Pinyanişî and Hakkari tribes. Both Hakkari and Pinyanişî however are also mentioned as autonomous units (*hükümet*, literally government)[73] which did not tolerate interference in rule and administration from Van, which was an *eyalet* (administrative province) divided into many *sancaks* (districts). Hakkari had an "administration alike" *hükümet*, says Evliya, with various castles and 47,000 soldiers, 10,000 of these being armed and salaried.[74] The Pinyanişî is said to be a separate *hükümet*. This is interesting because in *Chèref-nâmeh* the Pinyanişî is mentioned only as an independent tribe (see above); Evliya however says that the Pinyanişî in 955 A.H. (c. 1577 according to the Christian calender) had served Sultan Süleyman (Kanuni) well and thus acquired their land with the right of administration as an *ocak beyliği*[75] ("family estate", thus the governorship and revenues were to remain within the Kurdish ruling family).[76] The Pinyanişî had 6,000 soldiers and all were described as very courageous and good fighters, who "wage war against the Persians day and night."[77]

Evliya joined a mission together with the governor of Van to Iran along with the Pinyanişî who wanted to recover the 40,000 sheep stolen by the Persians. He claims that there were, in this *hükümet*, the main types of Ottoman fiefs (*tımar*, *zeamet*, *has*) granted to the *sipahis* (tribal cavalry)[78] of the Ottoman army and *haraç*, the poll-tax, taken from non-Muslims.[79] The area described by Evliya as belonging to the Pinyanişî is the mountainous area south of Başkale probably including Yüksekova and stretching over the Persian border as well. Finally both the Pinyanişî and Hakkari cavalries joined the leading front ranks of the Ottoman army for military expeditions to Iran.[80]

Hakkari's Nestorians from the mid-17th until the 19th centuries

The information available on the history of Hakkari for this period is very scanty indeed. On the one hand, Sevgen suggests that Hakkari came under the strong influence and administrative power of the Ottomans. On the other hand, we know from several sources that the Christian population living along the southern valleys of Hakkari's mountains started up a new organization. With the break up of the western church of the Assyrians and the emergence of the Chaldeans who recognized the supremacy of Rome, those Christians in Hakkari's mountains elected a relative of the Catholic Patriarch, "as the patriarch of Nestorians and remaining faithful to this rite, who was enthroned under the name, henceforth hereditory, of Mar Shimun ... where his residence was sometimes at Koçanis and sometimes at Culamerg. Thus originated this quasi-autonomous community of Nestorian highlanders in which ecclesiastical authority exists alongside that of a purely tribal organization ... The tribal organization and way of life of these highlanders has caused some writers to give them the name of 'Christian Kurds'."[81]

We know more about Hakkari's Nestorians from about the mid-18th century onwards due to various missionaries who started working with the Christian communities in central Kurdistan.[82] A few European travellers in this century mention Hakkari as an almost totally Nestorian inhabited area where the ruler (*beg*) of Hakkari was appointed by the Ottoman pasha in Van.[83] Thus, by the 19th century two developments in Hakkari could be observed; first, the increased penetration of the Ottoman administration and control (exemplified by the appointments of *beg*s from the central administration, rather than allowing the old ruling family of Şembûs to choose the successor), and secondly, the emergence of Nestorians with a quasi-autonomous system of both tribal and ecclesiastical organization.

Hakkari in the 19th century

During the 19th century the Ottoman Empire underwent some fundamental changes in an effort to stop the decline of the central government's administrative and military power.

Sultan Mahmud II, who was fighting the Russians in the east (1806-12, 1828-29, and after his rule wars continued in 1853-58 and 1877-78) and facing independence movements and the breaking up of the Empire, had decided to carry out administrative and military reforms which were to have important consequences in eastern Anatolia. "The Kurdish *mîr*s were certainly not the only semi-independent rulers in his empire. All over Anatolia locally influential families had arrogated the functions of government and became virtually independent rulers ('*derebeyi*', 'lord of the valley')." (van Bruinessen, 1978:220) Consequently the governor of Sivas was given the task of pacifying the Kurds and installing Turkish governors in Kurdistan.[84] Some of the Kurdish emirates, like those of Hakkari and

Botan, were already under tighter central administrative control, and their *beg*s were appointed by the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the Empire's weakness became apparent to them as well after the Ottoman army was defeated twice by the Egyptians first in central Anatolia and then in Nizip. In order to restore their old quasi-autonomoous status, in addition to a Mîr Muhammed in Ruwanduz, who declared himself independent around 1830, Bedirkhan Beg of Botan (Cezire)[85] and Nurullah Beg of Hakkari began an uprising in 1843. Bedirkhan had already asserted his intentions by then by refusing "to send tribal contingents when, during the Ottoman-Russian war of 1828-29, these were demanded." (van Bruinessen, 1978:224) The governor of Sivas attacked Bedirkhan and forced him to withdraw to his mountain strongholds. After the defeat of the Ottoman army (1839) mentioned above, Bedirkhan grew suspicious of Ottoman intentions to reform the administration of the province of Botan, and increased his defiant behaviour.[86] He had not only Nurullah Beg of Hakkari but also Khan Mahmud (his father-in-law) of Mukus under his influence, according to two American missionaries who visited Bedirkhan in 1846.[87]

The American and British missionaries by that time were active among the various Christian populations of eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq and western Iran. Thus there was enough ground for the Muslim Kurds to fear and be provoked by the increase of power and influence of Christian communities, as well as for Christians to feel more confident and refuse payment of taxes to the Kurdish *mîr*s or take up arms.[88] Bedirkhan in 1843 attacked the Nestorian Christians near Botan, and their Mar Shimun (archbishop) saved his life by escaping to Mosul and taking refuge with the British missionaries there.[89] Sevgen cites a document which shows that Bedirkhan had the help of not only the *mîr* of Hakkari (Nurullah Beg) but also the Ertuşî tribe there.[90] It is also obvious from Sevgen's data that the Nestorians were being pressured and threatened both by Bedirkhan and Nurullah Begs.[91] While the Ottoman Porte was trying to find a suitable way of handling the affair of Bedirkhan,[92] he attacked the Nestorians of Hakkari once more in 1846 alleging that the Nestorians were not paying their due taxes. This second attack and alleged massacre of the Nestorians in Hakkari was to cause Bedirkhan's eventual defeat and exile by the Ottoman Porte. Three years after the first massacre of Nestorians by Bedirkhan, the British and French governments protested strongly on behalf of the Nestorians. They appealed to the Ottoman administration and reminded them of the rights of the Christian populations guaranteed by the Imperial Edict of 1839 *Hattı Şerif*. The Porte, as a result of this diplomatic pressure, had to take some large scale military action against the two *beg*s.

The case of Nurullah Beg

Below we have a closer look at Nurullah Beg, who is recorded to be the last *mîr* of Hakkari from the Şembû dynasty and examine the kind of political strategies he undertook in these years.

> Nurullah Beg seems to have played along with the two forces; while he allowed (or did not prevent at least) Bedirkhan to claim due taxes from Hakkari's Nestorians, he was also in touch with the Ottoman governor of Van and expressed his loyalty to the Porte. (Sevgen, 1969:93-94) We understand from his letter to the Porte a few years later that he took part in the suppression of Bedirkhan's and Khan Mahmud's rebellion with the Ottoman army and that he was decorated for his services. (Ibid., p.70) The central government which had decided to unite all the Kurdish districts in one province, (Kurdistan *eyaleti*), and under one provincial governor (Esat Muhlis Paşa), in 1846, did not trust Nurullah's loyalties or intentions as the reports of the governor demonstrate. Yet Nurullah, having once been allied to two rebellious *mîr*s of border districts and himself ruling Hakkari of which the border with Iran was still to be settled, had to be handled cautiously by the Ottoman administration. (Ibid., p.69)
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> For his part, Nurullah was in constant fear for his life and when the governor sent some troops to Hakkari he fled to Iran via Gewer. The commanders of the troops entered Culamerg and managed to win the support (possibly with both threats and promises) of the local people and tribal leaders for the Ottomans. Among these tribal leaders and notables, was Nurullah's father's brother's son. (Ibid. p.70)[93] Nurullah wrote a letter to the Porte reminding of the services of his noble ancestors and of himself, pleading for understanding and expressing his sorrow at being accused of being a rebel, "*dağî*".[94] He humbly asked for any post he could be appointed to in the service of the Sultan, or a *reaya* village to live on.[95] Meanwhile the border castle in which Nurullah had taken refuge was in dispute between the Iranians and Ottomans.[96] The Ottoman commander in chief of the eastern division asked Iran to return the castle but the *agha* of the castle claimed that he was rebelling against Iran and thus would not obey their orders. Nurullah was trying to obtain the protection and mediation of Shaikh Taha I and thus approached the Ottoman Porte, but as the latter showed intentions of using force and surrounding the border castle, he escaped to Tabriz and took refuge with the British Consul there. Sevgen documents the letters which were

> exchanged between the British Consul, the Ottoman governor, Nurullah Beg, Nurullah's representative to the Porte (a Naqshbandi leader) and the Iranian governor of the Azarbayjan province. What is apparent from this correspondance is that Nurullah was trying to secure his safety by all means, and at the same time could not rely on his friends (the rebel *agha*, the Naqshbandi Shaikh, or the British) for too long, since all these parties had interests with the Ottoman and Persians governments. The correspondance continued till 1849[97] and finally Nurullah returned to Hakkari's Şemdinli district under the guarantee of Shaikh Taha I (of the Sadatê Nehrî family who had great influence in Hakkari's and Kurdish politics as Naqshbandi *tariqat* leaders, beginning from the second half of the 19th century, for more on Sadatê Nehrî see below) and was deported first to Istanbul and then to Crete like Bedirkhan of Botan. Nurullah, hence, is reported to be the last governor and *mîr* of Hakkari from the Şembû dynasty.

When the case of Nurullah is compared with that of Zeynel above several points are striking. **First**, the pattern of rebellion and then refuge in Iran is recurrent here; some new developments, however, are that, a) the two empires are closer to each other and more centralized, thus Nurullah had to have more to offer to Iran if he were to expect full and permanent protection, b) the new sources of political power and influence interfere with Iranian and Ottoman politics. Mainly it was the British interest competing with the Russian influence over north eastern Anatolia and the Armenians there which provided a new source of protection and mediation for Nurullah or other anti-Ottoman inspired groups like the Nestorians.[98]

Secondly, the tribes of Hakkari in the last case seem less autonomous and a weaker factor in Hakkari's politics. This is probably a corollary of the extended Ottoman influence and administrative control; in Zeynel's case a strong tribe could support one leader against another despite Ottoman preferences, but in Nurullah's time the tribal leaders seem less powerful and more ready to cooperate with Ottoman governors. Van Bruinessen (1978: 244-48) argues that the Ottoman policies of centralization in Kurdish provinces eventually led to the fragmentation of tribal confederacies led by a *mîr* into smaller units, tribes led by *agha*s. This seems to have been the case here as well; although Nurullah was a *mîr* (i.e. from the noble dynasty of Şembû) as well as *müdür* (an administrator appointed by the central government), the tribal groups around him seem fragmented and not united within a tribal confederational structure headed by the authority of the *mîr*, but they fear or respect more the power emanating from the Ottoman administration. This interpretation is also implied in the stories published by Jaba.[99] The stories were collected by Jaba from a Mela Beyazidî who was sent to Hakkari by the governor of Erzurum to warn and retrieve Nurullah. Mela Beyazidî is said to have governed Hakkari for a short while when Nurullah was hiding himself. His accounts of the tribal and political affairs of Hakkari and the surrounding *sancaks* are full of intrigue, murders and political power struggles between different tribes and their leaders in and around Hakkari.[100]

Thirdly, while the power of the *mîr* as the supreme head of the tribes and tribal confederation seems to have declined from Zeynel's time to Nurullah Beg's, a new source of authority emerged in the 19th century, namely that of the Sadatê Nehrî family. The case of this family who ruled in Şemdinli and its surroundings has been described by various authors.[101] We shall deal with a few of the prominent members of the family within the chronology of political developments in Hakkari.[102] The point here is the growing emergence of a religious authority which could either play alongside or supersede the civil and military authorities. The influence of this Naqshbandi *tariqat* filled the power vacuum after the removal of Nurullah Beg according to the historical sources; its members were to lead revolts against Persians and Ottomans, become prominent members in the Ottoman Senate, manage farm estates, cultivate, trade and export goods or attract followers from many parts of the Islamic world for the *tariqat* (the path). Even in Nurullah's time the influence of this family was such that he appointed a Naqshbandi leader as his representative and asked for the guarantorship of Shaikh Taha I for his security.

Hakkari's Nestorians in the second half of the 19th century

The political developments after the second half of the 19th century mainly concern the Christians and the activities of the Sadatê Nehrî. After the recognition of equal rights for all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire in 1839, the American and British missionaries started working with Nestorian, Chaldean, Jacobite and Armenian Churches and Christians in eastern Anatolia.

> Chronologically the first missionary in Hakkari's mountains was an American, A. Grant, who visited the area first in 1839, and again in 1840 and 1841.[103] He was followed by the British traveller Ainsworth[104] and the missionary Rev. Badger (see notes 88 and 89) in 1842, who visited Mar

> Shimun in Koçanis and took details about the Christian population, Nestorian tribes and *reaya*, the villages in which they lived.
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> An American Presbytarian missionary Rev. Rhea followed Badger after Bedirkhan's attacks on Nestorians and stayed in a plain's village in Gewer in 1851-59. He has collected a detailed vocabulary of the local Kurdish, and in an article published after his death, his successor gives information on the tribes living in and around Gewer, the description and location of which is closest to the present situation. (Rhea, 1880) A German scholar and traveller O. Blau who visited Gewer and Şemdinli in 1858 made an interesting observation about the assimilation of the local Kurdish tribes into the Ottoman administrative system, stating that the chief (governor) of Hakkari, Hacı Mehmet of Başkale, at the time had become a Pasha; he cited the fact that the taxes from the area were to be sent to Istanbul as supporting evidence for his view.[105] Blau has also done a study of the Ottoman records from the 1860s where tribal names and places were listed. He noted that in areas where the Ottoman administration had taken over and tribal groups (probably nomads) were settled, the tribes no longer were recorded with their tribal names but with the name of the place, the district or town.[106] It is difficult to confirm that this is solely a result of the Ottoman administrative policy and system of recording these groups; some groups, like the Oramarî, had as their original name that of the area they lived in. They had not lost a previous indigenous tribal name. Also, giving the name of a place to a tribal group could have happened before the Ottoman penetration too, since we have various lists of tribes and peoples of Hakkari before the Ottoman time with the similar pattern of tribal and place names overlapping. Finally, even independent sources like Mela Beyazidî who ruled Hakkari briefly gave many place names as tribal group names. (Jaba, 1860:5).

As for the the Nestorian politics and the missionary work by the Great Powers in this period; using van Bruinessen's term, the Nestorians have been not only "discovered", but they were also seen by the Great Powers as a means of furthering their own political interests. Yonan (1978:22) cites the fact that in 1847-50 the British Consul in Diyarbakır had a lengthy correspondance with the Foreign Office about the mountain Nestorians, emphasizing that their area could be strategically important as a buffer zone against Russian expansion and influence. Not long after that, "during the Crimean campaign (1853), the Russians raised two Kurd regiments ... when the Turkish troops had left for the north, a considerable rising was stirred up in Botan by the popular Yazdan Şîr, nephew and a former rival of Bedirkhan."[107]

He rallied Nestorian and Yazidi support and extended his revolt to Hakkari, Bitlis and Mosul. In 1855 he agreed to the promises of a British agent, surrendered and was taken to Istanbul, thus ending the revolt.[108]

The Nestorians must have been aware of the political potential of their location to the extent that by 1868 the Mar Shimun was writing to the Russian Consul in Caucasus asking for protection for 100,000 mountain Nestorians; the British Consul warned the Foreign Office about the Nestorians' intentions. (Yonan, 1978:23) After the reconciliation of British and Russian political relations and the weakening of Ottoman sovereignty following the establishment of military attaches of Great Britain and Russia in Van, Diyarbakır and Erzurum, there was a new mission sent by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Assyrian Mission. The missionaries were MacLean and Browne,[109] the latter of which stayed in Koçanis between 1886-1910, died and was buried there. The British interest and Church mission continued for some decades, highlighted by the visits of British MPs to Mr. Browne in Koçanis in 1897, and the Archbishop of Gibraltar some years after that.

The politics of the Sadatê Nehrî family

While Russian and/or British interests were felt in one part of Hakkari, in another part, the sub-district of Şemdinli, the anti-Russian politics of Sayyid Taha I of Sadatê Nehrî led him to join the holy war (*cihad*) against the Russians in the Crimean campaign of 1853. His brother Shaikh Salih continued campaigning against the Russians in eastern Anatolia and Azarbayjan.[110] After another Turco-Russian war in 1877-78, the Ottomans were forced to give more concessions, after "a special defence treaty with Britain, which was to assist the Ottomans against further incursions by the Russians and also to protect the Sultan's Christian subjects." (van Bruinessen, 1978:328) Sayyid Taha I's son Shaikh Ubeydullah who had eclipsed the influence of all the Ottoman subjects or independent major and minor *mîr*s of Hakkari and came to rule over a large area extending to both sides of the Turco-Persian border, (Ibid., p.292)[111] was to lead one of the first (proto-) nationalist Kurdish movement (for some writers it was of a "feudal" type, see Edmonds, 1971:96). Sevgen (1969:41) refers to Shaikh Ubeydullah as "not only as a *shaikh*" (for him the *shaikh*s in Kurdistan had been only rogues and exploiters of poor and ignorant people) but also "an extremist Kurdish nationalist". Van Bruinessen (1978:328) describes the attempts of Shaikh Ubeydullah in rallying British support (through the Mar Shimun - who denied having supported Ubeydullah-, Armenian clergymen and American missionaries in Urmiyeh) on the one hand, and appealing to Sultan Abdülhamid's anti-Russian and Sunni Muslim unity feelings and plans, on the other. He sees Ubeydullah's alliance attempts and strategies as nationalistic since "he was pressed to do so by an acute awareness among the Kurds of neglect and national oppression in both the Ottoman and Persian empires - to which the American missionaries of that time attest."[112]

Relying first on the support from the Ottoman Sultan, Shaikh Ubeydullah attacked Persia in 1880. He and his son Abdulkadir led two armies, composed of the tribal groups under their control, some of the Nestorians of Hakkari and the Persian Kurdish tribal groups who were kin to those in Hakkari and who had readily accepted Shaikh Ubeydullah's authority. Shaikh Ubeydullah's troops -numbering 23,000 men according to van Bruinessen (1978:329) and 40,000 in Dickson (1910:370) -invaded large parts of Persian Azarbayjan and advanced to Tabriz, attacking Shi'ite Azeris mostly, surrounding Urmiyeh and finding local allies as far south as Mahabad, where "the Sunni clergy ... issued a *fetva* to the effect that the revolt was a *cihad* (holy war) against Shiism." (van Bruinessen, 1978:329) The revolt was suppressed when Persian troops managed to attack and disperse some of Shaikh Ubeydullah's forces, and the Persian government put pressure on the Ottomans (through British and Russian mediation) to stop supporting Ubeydullah. Other tribal groups from around Van were sent against Ubeydullah.[113] He was arrested and sent into exile with his son Abdülkadir to Mecca, where he died in 1883. Abdülkadir returned to Istanbul after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and became a prominent member of the Ottoman Senate (*ayan*), but later was hanged in 1926 after allegations of plotting with the Kurdish nationalist revolt leader Shaikh Said. Shaikh Ubeydullah's descendants continued to play important political roles. They presented dramatic contrasts in terms of alliances with one power or the other from one generation to the next.

The last decade of the 19th century corresponds to Sultan Abdülhamid's efforts to form tribal-cavalry corps in eastern Anatolia. These Hamidian tribal-cavalry corps were mostly loyal to the Sultan, but eventually came into conflict with the central bureaucracy's administrators and became notorious for their independent behaviour, looting and attacking Christians or rival Kurdish tribes.[114] Although Hakkari's big tribes like Pinyanişî, Jirkî, Dorskî and Ertuşî are not listed as having joined the tribal corps,[115] Kodaman writes that after the Shaikh Ubeydullah affair the Sultan wanted to offer a soft hand towards the Kurdish and other tribes; "for example, Ethem Paşa, who was appointed mayor (*vali*) to Hakkari in 1884, had continuous contact with the tribal leaders, treating them in a friendly and sincere manner, solving the conflicts between them and thus trying to win them over to the government's (Ottoman) side."[116] On the other hand, Abdülhamid's politics of holding the empire's Muslim subjects together and emphasizing his own Sultan-Caliph qualities must have helped the *sayyids* and *shaikhs* in Şemdinli especially, to expand their religious as well as worldly power. Travellers and missionaries recorded "the real power in the mountains" as belonging to the *shaikhs*.(Dickson, 1910:370) "The *shaikh* of Şemdinli has 1500 men-at-arms ... they do not use their power and in fluence entirely for religious purposes, and some of them are little less than brigands; but their power over the petty *aghas* is great, and they can usually force them to do their will." (Ibid.)[117]

The missionaries who had contact with the mountain and plains Nestorian villages reported bad treatent and frequent harassment of subject Christian peasantry (as opposed to Nestorian semi-autonomous tribes) especially before the 1908 Young Turk revolution, during the rule of Shaikh Muhammed Siddik, son of Shaikh Ubeydullah.[118] While Dickson (1910:369) reported that Christians were not allowed to carry guns, other sources recorded the arming of the Nestorian tribes,[119] as well as an uprising apparently by the Muslim population in 1895 against Shaikh M.Siddik's iron rule.[120] M.Siddik's competition for power and influence with other *shaikhs* in the region,[121] and his economic power built up by buying land, sharecropping with the peasants and having a monopoly for the sale of almost all the tobacco in Şemdinli to Iran are well documented. (Erdost, 1968:180-87) He is also accused of manipulating or ordering the murder of the Nestorian bishop Mar Gauriel of Urmiyeh. (Heazell&Margoliuth, 1913:125)

After Shaikh M.Siddik's death in 1911, his son Sayyid Taha II and his brother struggled briefly over succession. S.Taha II already had good contacts with Russians. (He had been invited, along with a prominent member of Bedirkhan family, and Cafer Agha - of Shikakî tribe, Simko's brother, see below - by Czar Nicolaus II in 1899 to Russia and "they returned with generous gifts and encouraging messages that stimulated their imaginations and ambitions." Eagelton, 1963:7) With ambitions to lead a Kurdish independence movement, he took over the affairs of his family. Shaikh Abdülkadir was already a proinent politician in Istanbul and active as a Kurdish nationalist.[122]

Sayyid Taha II who owned and managed land in Şemdinli and in the neighbouring districts of Iran and Iraq became a prominent figure after the first World War, trying to win over the strongest political power for a Kurdish cause. He sought Russian help until 1917[123] but later was in touch with the British political and military officers in Iraq who themselves were trying to handle the Kurds, Assyrians and Nestorians in a way that would best suit British interests.[124] Hakkari in general seems to have been under nobody's total control. The Nestorians were divided among themselves, both aspiring for some form of autonomy as was promised to the Armenians under Russian and British protection, and, at the same time, quite worried about their own security before the outbreak of the first World War. Their Mar Shimun visited the *vali* of Van in 1914, expressing the neutrality of the mountain Nestorians.[125] Further north and east Azarbayjan had been subject to invasions and temporary control of first the Turks in 1906 (as part of the expansionist policies of the Young Turks) and then the Russians in 1909. The Turks were expelled in 1911 but re-entered in 1915 and the Russians again in 1916-17, the Turks in 1918.[126]

Hakkari was affected by these wars first in December 1914 when the Russians briefly invaded the province but withdrew in a week's time in order to avoid Turkish attacks from Urmiyeh.[127] In all these wars, although the Armenians from the north of Hakkari had been victims of deportations and murders, the Nestorians in Hakkari had not been; nevertheless, fearing genocide, the Mar Shimun decided to evacuate all his people to Urmiyeh and Salmas in early 1915 under Russian protection.[128] The Russians, however, could not stop the attacks on the Nestorians by Barzanî and Hakkari Kurds and Turks, who sacked Tkhuma, Tiyarî, Cilu and Baz,[129] even though the Russians reinvaded Hakkari shortly after the evacuation of the Nestorians. The fighting was in the mountainous region of Hakkari where the Russians could not easily penetrate. Some elderly people in Oramar today still remember how the Russian troops were held back at the narrow mountain passes and gorges by Kurdish tribesmen using guerilla tactics. They say that in those years of severe famine due to continuous wars, the villagers climbed over steep mountains, carrying guns and sowed their fields secretly at night.

The Nestorians finally succeeded in breaking through the siege and harassment of the Kurdish tribes, led by *aghas* and *shaikhs*, and reached Salmas in Iran which was under Russian control in November 1915.[130] These Nestorian refugees numbering c. 40,000 people were settled in camps in the districts of Khoy, Salmas, Urmiyeh and remained there until the Russian troops withdrew after the October 1917 Revolution. Hakkari was freed from the 3 year long Russian occupation;[131] however, the Nestorian refugees[132] who took over the arms of the withdrawing Russians organized revengeful attacks on Hakkari. The Turkish army with the help of Kurds entered Hakkari from the south and led the counter-attack as far as Tabriz. The Nestorian refugees then were to evacuate their camps once again and move to Iraq to seek British protection there. Their patriarch Mar Shimun had by that time been murdered by Ismail Agha Simko, the chief of the Shikakî tribal confederation who was active in Iran with similar goals as Sayyid Taha II of Şemdinli (they had an affinal link and were cooperating politically as well). Simko's activities, dealt thoroughly by van Bruinessen (1983), varied from pro-Ottoman, anti-Russian allinces in 1913, to a pro-British stand till he ended up leading a Kurdish nationalist rebellion against the Iranian government in 1919 and controlling an area covering most of Iranian Azarbayjan and Kurdistan and north western provinces of Iraq until 1922.

Hakkari after the First World War

In 1918 Turkey lost the war alongside the Germans and in October an armistice was signed in Mondros. Parts of Ottoman Turkey were to be occupied by Italian, French, British, Russian and Greek forces and the whole Ottoman army was to be dissolved. However, the armistice conditions were never realized due to the formation of resistance forces under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal who had detached himself from the Ottoman army and was seeking the cooperation of different groups, rural and urban notables in central Anatolia, as well as the *shaikh*s and tribal chiefs in Kurdistan. The British who occupied Iraq formed a policy of defending the northern border which included the southern part of Hakkari with the aid of the Assyrian and Nestorian levies they raised among the refugees and local Christians. Mustafa Kemal's supporters and propagandists were also active in northern Iraq trying to rally support on the basis of Muslim unity and anti-British sentiments.[133] Between 1919-1925 Hakkari's border area was subject to raids from both the north and the south, between the Nestorians, some of whom had resettled in their old villages in the southern valleys of Hakkari's mountains and the Kurdish tribes who had the support of the Ankara government. Sayyid Taha II of Şemdinli by then had benefited from the concessions the British gave to the Kurds in Iraq and in 1923 he was appointed *kaymakam* (mayor) of Ruwanduz to resist against the Turkish agitation from the north.

After the declaration of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, the Allied Powers were to attend the Lausanne Conference in 1924 with the new representatives of the Republic. The Mosul question, to which the border problem of Hakkari with Iraq was attached, could not be solved in the Lausanne Peace talks but had to be referred to the League of Nations. Meanwhile the greatest Kurdish revolt ever took place in Turkey. The revolt of Shaikh Said in 1925 affected a large area covering about 4 provinces in eastern Anatolia and ended in a brutal repression. Shaikh Said and his collaborators were hanged after trials which lasted 10 days. Among them was Sayyid Abdülkadir from the Sadatê Nehrî family mentioned earlier. Shaikh Said's revolt had far-reaching and complex consequences for the status and aspirations of the Kurds in Turkey.[134]

Hakkari's tribes did not take part in Shaikh Said's revolt directly, since probably by that time the population had considerably diminished and was displaced following the political events of those decades, coupled with famines and deportations. Yet, Sadatê Nehrî still exerted strong influence in Şemdinli and across the borders. Sayyid Abdülkadir's son Shaikh Abdullah II learning that his father had been hanged along with Shaikh Said, led a local revolt in 1926, and with the help of his father's brother's son Sayyid Muslih and Sayyid Taha II, besieged the army posts in Şemdinli and Oramar, killing a few soldiers and taking officers as prisoners. The revolt remained very local and was soon suppressed by the Turkish army, with the last prominent members of this family having to escape into Iraq and Iran. Shaikh Abdullah II, his sons and kin were later prominent in the Kurdish politics of Iran and Iraq but they were hindered from playing any direct political role within Turkey; their lands had been confiscated and some descendants of the Sadatê Nehrî, although still receiving much local respect, are far from being the ambitious politicians of the previous generations.

The Nestorians of Hakkari, on the other hand, re-occupied their old villages around 1924 with the support of the British in Iraq, but after an incident where the *vali* of Hakkari who was inspecting the area was kidnapped by some Nestorians (his life was saved by a rival influential Nestorian leader) and released in Iraq after a few days, the new Republic's government sent troops to Hakkari and caused the final exodus of the Nestorians from the region (September 1924).[135] The local people's memory of the Nestorian's exodus is vague and people do not discuss it readily. A few elderly people mentioned some Nestorian women and children taking refuge among Kurdish families. Probably these were later incorporated into the Kurdish families as some adult men and women remember themselves or their parents being converted to Islam. The brutality of some *aghas*, like Suto of Oramar mentioned above, against the Nestorians has not been totally forgotten. Yet, the official history which quotes Armenians as the dominant Christian group in eastern Anatolia, who "fled" or were "deported" to neighbouring countries seems to have been accepted as the official explanation of the faith of Hakkari's Nestorians. The local people today do not use "Nasturi" for Nestorians but refer to them as "Ermeni" (Armenian).

The border question which was referred to the League of Nations was settled after the report of a commission which researched the Mosul region and recommended certain solutions for the rule there. The final border, which is called the Brussels line and separated Hakkari from its sub-district 'Amadiya, was accepted unwillingly by Turkey which had to give in to the pressures arising from the international situation and the aftermath of Shaikh Said's revolt.

Hakkari and the formation of the Turkish Republic

During the turbulent decades from the 1910s to 1940s Hakkari's leading tribal chiefs and religious leaders had shifting alliances with the surrounding powers and conflicts with one another. For example, when Sayyid Taha II was seeking support from the British to expand his influence from Şemdinli to Ruwanduz (see above), his father's brother Sayyid Abdülkadir was pursuing Kurdish nationalist activities in connection with Kurdish nationalist organizations based in Istanbul. On the other hand, some of the Kurdish tribal chiefs in Hakkari (including some Ertuşî *aghas* and the *agha* of Oramar)[136] were sending a telegram together with other tribal leaders from Van to the Peace Conference denying any desire for a separate Kurdish state and supporting Turkish-Kurdish unity under the leadership of the Caliph.[137]

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Hakkari was made an administrative unit (*il*) of the new Republic in 1924. However, the border problems and security in the region remained unresolved for yet another decade. The final border line between Hakkari and Iraq was decided in 1926. The new state apparently had only a small and weak presence in the region; the British Foreign Office documents report, in 1928, complaints about the Turkish border soldiers who, underpaid and hungry, were raiding south across the border and stealing flocks of sheep and cattle.[138] The new Turkish state seems also to have been nervous about the movement and settlement of Nestorians and Assyrians in northern Iraq,[139] although there was no more trouble between the Nestorians and the Kurds of Hakkari.

Throughout 1929-30 there were rumours of a new Kurdish uprising, especially from those sources who were following the activities of a newly established (1927) Kurdish nationalist organization, Hoybûn, in Syria, whose members had either taken part in Shaikh Said's rebellion or were other local Kurdish leaders. The rebellion broke up around Mount Ararat in February/March 1930.[140] It lasted for some months and was supported by various smaller uprisings in different parts of eastern Turkey. One of these was in July/August 1930 in Hakkari's Oramar region. A group of Barzanî and Girdî tribesmen from Iraq had attacked the gendarmerie post in Oramar with the help of some of the local tribesmen. The attack was connected to the events in Ararat, in that Shaikh Ahmed of the Barzanî tribe allegedly wanted to weaken the Turkish military operations there by distracting them away from Ararat to the south. The local tribesmen (Oramarî) were divided, some supporting the Barzanî leaders, others fighting on the Turkish government's side. The rebellion was suppressed by the end of August after extensive military operations and use of aircraft. Some of the rebels and their families fled to Iraq, some were sent to exile in western Turkey and returned only years later after a general amnesty. The Oramarî rebellion remains a painful memory and sensitive issue among the tribesmen, and the topic of who supported or fought against the government forces is brought up mostly in intra-tribal conflicts and challenges, as a serious accusation. To outsiders, the rebellion is mentioned depending on the sympathy or pro-Kurd attitude the outsider is thought to have.

With the consolidation of the new Republic's power in the region, the tribal and other leaders who supported the government against the rebellious elements secured for themselves the local political offices. It probably is not a coincidence that some of the local leaders praised for their efforts to suppress the Oramar rebellion,[141] for example, still have family members who were members of the Parliament and the Senate. (This, however, does not mean that the Oramarî today are against these politicians. For reasons and issues of tribal support for political leaders, see Chapter 4.) The father of a recent member of the parliament from Hakkari was even said to have had messages of personal friendship from Mustafa Kemal.

The leading families of Hakkari, with their tribal followers, still dominate party politics in Hakkari. Hakkari had one seat in the National Assembly and one seat in the Senate until 1983 and the candidates for these seats were of a mostly tribal background. In times of weak party political balances in the Parliament, Hakkari's representative has played a crucial role by changing his party membership a couple of times, thus drawing more attention to the province.

Hakkari, despite its lagging development, relative isolation and marginality, still has close links to various political developments in the neighbouring provinces and states. For example in 1978 two Iraqi Kurdish political groups crossed the border into Hakkari and fought a battle between themselves. The involvement of the Turkish authorities has not been publicly clarified, but there were numerous casualties among the Iraqi Kurds and some local Kurds who had supported one of the two groups.[142] In May 1983 Turkey has carried out a military operation from Çukurca in Hakkari, crossing the border to Iraq. The Turkish authorities claimed and the Turkish media generally agreed that this operation had no political but rather security purposes.[143] Prior to the operation the borders had been violated by "bandits" and 3 Turkish soldiers had been killed, Turkish lorry drivers had been attacked by Kurdish guerilla groups in Iraq and there were rumours that groups of Iraqi Kurds wanted to cross Turkey on their way from Iran to Iraq.[144] In fact, some Kurdish nationalist groups from Turkey who had gone underground since the 1980 military coup had chosen bases in Syria, Iraq and the Lebanon and began launching guerrilla attacks into Hakkari and Siirt. A particular Kurdish nationalist group called the "Workers' Party of Kurdistan" (PKK, Parteyê Karkerê Kurdistan) started a virtually guerilla warfare which has been escalating since its beginning in August 1984. The consequences of this warfare are manyfold: Firstly, from the beginning of the terrorist style attacks in 1984 until the end of 1989 about 1400 people have been killed within 8 eastern and southeastern provinces Hakkari inclusive.[145] Of these 502 are alleged to be PKK guerrillas and 528 are civilians. Secondly, apart from the loss of lives which exceed far most the numbers prior to the 1980 coup, the events in this period have contributed to the sharpening of political awareness on the issue of Kurds and Kurdishness in general. Thirdly, the state has introduced a policy of local guards against the separatist guerillas. Thus the strict measures of collecting legal and illegal arms immediately after the coup have been reversed to distributing arms for self defense and for use against the guerillas. From the village of Sisin where arms had been handed over with such embarassement and shame in 1982 (see Chapter 1) 10 men were practically forced to become "village guards" and many others rebought rifles and acquired licences for them. Fourthly, the political power of tribes and tribal leaders has been particularly effected by these events. Media reports suggest that tribal groups are forced or assumed to act collectively (more than before) and take sides with the Turkish state authorities or the separatist guerillas. A weekly journal has published a secret document (allegedly prepared by the military intelligence service) where tribal groups and tribal leaders in eastern and southeastern provinces have been classified as being on the side of or against the state.[146] This is probably not that far from the truth. On a visit to the village in 1987, Sisin villagers said that despite the fact that they had 10 village guards (and thus could become a target for the PKK like many other villages before), they were not too worried about their security as their tribal and political links to the Barzanî movement were to protect them. Nevertheless, the constant challenge and mistrust on the issue of loyalties (whether one was pro or against the state or the PKK) and the sheer danger and insecurity of daily life was the cause of great tension.

In addition to the unrest and tension caused by the attacks of the PKK in 1988 Hakkari witnessed its greatest wave of Kurdish refugees seeking asylum from the chemical warfare attacks of their government in Iraq. Within about a week in early September 1988 more than 100,000 Kurds, especially women and children fled from northern Iraq into Hakkari. Many of these people were tribal or otherwise kin of the Kurds in Hakkari. This tragic event speeded up the controversy concerning the Kurds in Turkey. In the second half of 1980s in Turkey probably more has been discussed and written about the Kurds and the Kurdish problem than at any time in the history of the Republic. Similarly, Hakkari has gained much more attention and there is an increased interest in the media in the daily life, tribal matters, leadership patterns and ethnic feelings in the area.


MAP 3 TOPOGRAPHY OF HAKKARI

Land over 2500 metres
International boundaries
Provincial boundaries
Mountain peak over 3000 metres
kilometres
0
30
IRAN
IRAQ
Van
Siirt
Mardin
Başkale
Bajirge
Yüksekova
Şemdinli
R. Nehil
Cilo Mts.
4170m
R. Oramar
Oramar
Sat Mts.
Sat
R. Şemdinli
Hakkari
R. Zap
Çukurca
Beytüşşebab
R. Habur
Uludere
R. Nizil
43°
44°

3. The physical, social and economic landscape of Hakkari

The physical landscape and the climate

The province of Hakkari covers 9,885 square kilometers (Turkey is c. 779,000 sq km) and borders on the provinces of Van, Siirt and Mardin within Turkey, and Iran and Iraq to the east and south. (see Map 1) It is one of Turkey's most mountainous regions. The mountains cover 87.6% of the province, while the plateaus cover 10.3% and the plains 2.1%. [1] The highest mountain peak is Reşko (or Gelyaşin) at 4,170 m. and there are more than 15 peaks over 3,000 m. (see Map 3) The east-west mountain ranges are cut by valleys of rivers flowing mostly from north to south. The river valleys, however, are rarely lower than 1000 m. within Hakkari's borders, although the rivers flow at lower altitudes further south and west. Because of the climatic changes and physical features of the land, with deep ravines and high peaks they have an irregular water flow, which is not very suitable for use in irrigation or energy production and causes flooding on the high plain of Yüksekova during early summer months. One can cross the rivers, usually on very primitive bridges, only at the end of summer and early autumn. The many beautiful small glacier and crater lakes on the mountains serve as water resources for the inhabitants and their animals in summer pastures.

The main areas of settlement are along valleys, on mountain slopes and a few plains. The river valleys are sometimes very narrow, allowing only a footpath along the creeks and do not have large areas on the river banks for cultivation. The largest plain is that of Yüksekova (Gewer in Kurdish) which is about 175 square kilometers and stretches in a north-west south-easterly direction. Its altitude of c. 1900 m., short summers, extreme temperature changes between summer and winter and the flooding caused by melting snow on the surrounding hills allow some cereal agriculture on the plain, but it is mainly rich with pastures and fields of clover and hay. In recent years the river of Nehil has been fairly regulated through irrigation canals and there is a project to develop this irrigation system and dry the marshes along the river.[2]

Despite the mountainous landscape there is still arable land in the region. In fact, only 14% of the soil in Hakkari is unsuitable for any type of cultivation. Of the remaining 86%, 59% is used as pastures, 1.4% is for agriculture (cereal and other) and 25.6% are forests.[3] In terms of soil quality and suitability for tilling, however, the top quality soil comprises only

0.2% of the total arable land. The plough-agricultural land, including various qualities of soil, makes up 6% of the region's total land. (Turkey's average for arable land is 34%.) The main causes for the inefficient use of this 6% of arable land - 1.4 % of the area is actually cultivated - are linked to the lack of efficient irrigation systems, causing land erosion. The general characteristics of land use in Hakkari are the relative unimportance placed on extensive field cultivation and the high ratio of land used for pastures. (Turkey's average is 60% of all the land which have the specific soil qualities for pasture usage, the same figure in Hakkari is 80%).[4]

The main problems concerning soil and the land usage in Hakkari can be summed up as land erosion, deforestation, irregular river flow causing flooding or arid zones seasonally, and land slides after heavy rainfall. Despite these limitations, most of the land in Hakkari is suitable for pastoral production, but even that is relatively undeveloped due to the lack of roads which would enable the marketing of hay as well as animal products. (The quality of animal products in Hakkari is lower in comparison to sheep and goats raised in western Turkey.) Land use and pastoral production are further effected by unreliable marketing procedures and prices for the animals which are mostly smuggled to Iran and Iraq and sold there as livestock by local and outside traders.

As for the quality of roads in Hakkari, in 1980 there was 447 km. of state roads in Hakkari but only 40% of them were asphalt. Of the rest 33% were of stabilized gravel 20% were earth roads and 7% not passable by motor vehicles. Of the roads built by the municipal administration and the state organization for village road construction, only 3% were asphalt roads, the rest were loose earth roads, many of them passable only in summer months.[5]

Hakkari's roads, other than being generally of low quality and limited length, connecting only provincial and sub-district centres, are also characterized as connecting the small towns not to each other but to the main road, which crosses the province from west to east and reaches the neighbouring provinces and Iran. (See Map 2) This road network does not directly aid communication and trade between towns like Çukurca, Dağlıca (Oramar) or Şemdinli, which although close to each other on the map are connected only by mule tracks and roads not suitable for motor vehicles. Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, and considering the almost negligible returns of the region to the central state, it could be said that Hakkari gets a favourable investment share for its roads.[6] It seems, however, that Hakkari needs more state or local funds for the maintenance of its roads than what it receives, as the road construction season is fairly short and when the road is not finished within a summer season the costs for maintenance increase continuously in the following years. The road construction projects thus are prone to a good deal of political pressure both from local forces and other interest groups.[7]

The climate of Hakkari differs from one part of the region to the other. Compared to the high plateaus and mountains in the north and the high and open plain of Yüksekova, the southern river valleys are protected from the extremely cold and dry climate. The different climatic conditions effect the vegetation as well; the northern high mountains and pastures have mainly shrubs for goats and sheep, the southern valleys on the other hand, especially near Iraq, are suitable for growing Mediterranean fruits and crops like maize, rice, sesame, grapes, walnuts, pomegranates and mulberries, as well as rich forests. Moreover, because of Hakkari's southerly position, its yearly average temperature is higher than the rest of eastern Anatolia.

Other than the extreme temperature changes from summer to winter, the average number of days under snow is also high.[8] This factor combined with a landscape of high altitude changes - narrow valleys between steep mountains - presents additional difficulties. In 1981 during our residence in Sisin, the first snow had already fallen in October. The road from the Cilo mountains to Yüksekova was closed at the end of November, and thereafter was opened a few times, each period of feasible transportation lasting only about ten days at most. The final snow clearance was in mid-March after which the road was roughly passable by big trucks and army vehicles. The reason was not so much that there was continuous snowfall after each clearance but that there were avalanches of various kinds (wet or powder snow) which fell on the road at different times as well as landslides which carried parts of the stabilized stone road away. The avalanches sometimes incurred human casualties. The accessibility of mountain villages in winter months varies according to the time of first snow and the average snowfall that year, but it is not very unusual to have towns like Şemdinli or Beytüşşebab, which are sub-district centres, cut off for some time from other towns, Hakkari and the main state roads. As a matter of fact, the high pass connecting Beytüşşebab and Hakkari was closed for 2 months at least in winter, when Beytüşşebab was to be reached from the west, the provinces of Siirt or Mardin only.

Population characteristics and settlement patterns

Hakkari as a provincial administrative unit (*il* or *vilayet*) is divided into 6 subdistricts (*ilçe*): Hakkari (central *ilçe*), Yüksekova, Beytüşşebab, Çukurca, Şemdinli and Uludere. These subdistricts are further divided into smaller administrative units called *bucak*. The smallest administrative unit is the village, generally defined as *köy* but also as *muhtarlık* after the village headman (*muhtar*) who has some administrative responsibilities over one or more settlements in the *muhtarlık*. *Muhtarlık* is the smallest unit with an elected administrator, but there are smaller settlement units which are described as belonging to the *muhtarlık*. These smaller units are mainly *mezraa*, *mahalle* and *kom*. *Mezraa* is "a rural settlement comprising a cluster of dwellings or hamlets (2 to 35 houses), which is situated in remote parts, within village (*muhtarlık*) boundaries but separated from the villages themselves by geographical obstacles such as mountains, hills, deep valleys."[9]

Mahalle in everyday language means neighbourhood and usually refers to the neighbourhoods within a town or a larger village. *Kom* is more of a seasonal settlement, smaller than *mezraa*; it refers to the seasonal, high and distant settlements of houses (usually one room) inhabited by shepherds and animals together, more as a shelter for both in late spring.[10]

Outside the administrative classification, the local settlement pattern and system of classification emphasize the summer *zoma* (pasture camp) versus winter village dichotomy. Some of the villages (*gund* in Kurdish) which are *mezraa* in administrative terms include up to 25-30 households with a population of nearly 300 and comprise a social and economic unit. Each village may have one or more *zoma* groups which may or may not camp within the administrative boundaries of the village pastures. The formation of *zoma* groups depends on kin and affinal ties as well as economic relations, and the choice of the pasture site depends on traditional tribal pasture usage rights and/or economic relations (e.g. one can hire pastures as well). The pasture camp, which is generally referred to as *zoma* in Hakkari and both *zoma/zozan* in other Kurdish areas, changes its location between June and October according to the availability of spring water at the camp and the condition of the grass around it. Thus *zoma* could be further specified as early-summer, late-summer or early-autumn *zoma*s. The number of tents and the people staying in them change as well, the highest being in the late-summer *zoma* when the amount of work around the camp is most demanding and the villages are too hot to stay in.[11]

The largest unit of settlement, on the other hand, is the town, *şehir* in Turkish and *bajar* in Kurdish. The only towns in Hakkari are the subdistrict centres. The smallest of them is Şemdinli with c. 2,000 people, and the largest is Hakkari, the provincial centre, with c. 18,000 people in 1985. The only other town with a population over 10,000 is Yüksekova. The towns could be characterized as administrative rather than important economic centres. They provide limited educational, health, banking and trading services, but many villages around the towns are cut off from them in winter anyway. The traffic between the towns and villages is busy in late summer months, when the animal and agricultural produce of the villages are sold and wholesale goods and household items are bought in towns. The towns are cultural and social centres to a limited degree, where one can meet not only the central government's agencies but also tribal and nontribal people from other parts of the province, especially in the market, where the shops are. Hakkari's towns are the only centres where coffee shops, gambling clubs, and various associations exist; the villages have no public meeting space or building other than the mosque (if they have one at all).

All the public places in towns are male areas, and the only women who more or less freely frequent these places are either non-local women (like teachers, mid wives and nurses) or local notable women mostly accompanied by kinsmen. Men spend their time, in summer especially, parading up and down on the market street, or talking and trading in the coffee or other shops. Thus, for men at least, it could be said that the towns have some cultural and social life. The two biggest towns, Hakkari and Yüksekova, are different in character however. Hakkari is the provincial centre, thus the mayor and the heads of the army, gendarmerie and commando units are stationed there. Hakkari is more the bureaucratic centre, with local branches of the governmental organizations and ministries, banks, a few lycées and technical schools, a town library, a hospital and a cinema. Yüksekova, on the other hand, is livelier in terms of trading activities, with a larger variety and number of shops. Prior to stricter control of smuggling, based on the Van-Iran transit road, it was possible to find many electronic household goods at low prices in market shops; nowadays, the smuggled goods are sold mostly under the counter and at higher prices.

Out of Hakkari's total, the population of towns adds up to 28.4% (Turkey's 1980 total population figures: 43.9% urban, 56.1% rural). The number of villages in Hakkari was reported to be 143 in 1980.[12] The largest number of villages (33 villages) had a population of 501-750. The population density for the whole of Hakkari was 16 persons per square kilometer (the lowest in Turkey) in 1980. Despite being the lowest in density, Hakkari's population growth was the 2nd highest in Turkey with 4.2% in 1980 (Turkey's overall average was 2.1%).[13] The rate of rural or urban population increase is different for each subdistrict in Hakkari. For instance, the town of Yüksekova grew nearly nine times between 1960 and 1980. The reasons for this high population increase are related to the opening of the Van-Iran transit road and the enlivening of trade and business. Yüksekova also seemed to have the highest village to town migration apart from a relatively high birth rate. The rural population increase, on the other hand, did not show any significant variation between the subdistricts, more or less doubling its size in each area between 1960 and 1980.[14]

Population movement and mobility in Hakkari

Despite the high annual population increase and the general level of underdevelopment in comparison to other parts of Turkey, Hakkari has had, in the last 50 years, a very limited in and out migration. "In the 1950s the percentage of people born outside but living within Hakkari was around 5% and the percentage of those born within but living outside Hakkari was about the same. In 1975 the in and out migration of Hakkari was balanced ...The highest number of those living outside had settled in surrounding provinces, mostly in towns, and some had followed the labour migration pattern and migrated to distant metropoli in western and southern Turkey."[15]

The in-migration is from the neighbouring provinces. For example, many have come from Siirt and settled after a seasonal step-migration. Seasonal labour migration occurs to some extent mainly for work in the construction business in towns or for state roads. The main pattern of migration and settlement into Hakkari seems to follow first a seasonal migration of men, followed by residence for a few winters, and finally bringing in other kin from home town or village. This pattern could be observed among the settlers in Yüksekova from Gümüşhane, a province more than 1000 km. away to the north. The settlers from Gümüşhane in Hakkari are mostly kin and/or affine to each other and have settled in the town one after another. The settlers from Siirt, on the other hand, seem to come from different parts of that province, as individual men first, with the purpose of trading wool, butter and other animal products with the villagers each summer and after a few summers, if the business prospects are good, settles in Yüksekova with the extended family and starts a wholesale shop in the market. The settlers from Siirt constitute an important number of the tradesmen in towns and *imams* in remote villages. These two professions are locally explained as stemming from the good trading links of Siirt people with Syria, facilitated by their knowledge of Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish as well as possibly having kin links across the border. Finally, there is a small number of settled migrants from Iran or Iraq. Some of them have status as family members of the locals but most of them are illegal refugees from either country. All are Kurdish and living under difficult economic and security conditions.[16]

The population movement within Hakkari could be summarized as: 1. the regular seasonal movement between *zoma*s and villages or between different *zoma*s, 2. the migration and settlement into another one, 3. the village to town migration. The first one is of a temporary and periodical character, while the latter two cases are mostly permanent. The migration from town to big city or town to village does not exist within Hakkari. The details of the first case of migration between *zoma* and village are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The two other types of population movement is probably directly linked to the dynamics of the pastoral economy. The movement seems to be more from villages, which are hardly accessible by roads, along the national borders or in remote valleys, to those villages nearer the main roads, with better means of contact with larger villages and towns. This happens in the form of: a) households extending through formal division (as between two brothers) and one branch settling in the new village, b) households extending without formally breaking up (as in the case of one son settling in the new village and the parents and other siblings remaining in the old one) and keeping the two houses within a single economic unit, or c) households moving together from one village and settling in a new one. Movement between villages within a tribal area has advantages over moving between different tribal villages as in the first case one would hold the tribal pasture usage rights.

The land for the house and fields, and sometimes the rights of usage for hay cutting areas, can be sold and bought. One should note here, however, that very few land transactions (within or outside the tribal area) are carried out by way of legal procedures or actual transfer of deeds. More often the sale of usage rights, within the tribe as well as outside it, is subject to market prices and bargaining. As in the case of village to town migration, the crucial factor, determining which household moves when, is the man:land:animal ratio. It is not the poorest households which migrate to town but those who have expanded enough and reached their limits for household size and the number of animals which could be fed on the given amount of land (for hay cutting and grazing especially) and could turn over the surplus of men and animals to a new settlement. The poor villagers would have a bleak chance of surviving in Hakkari's towns since they would not have the qualifications to take any administrative jobs, or become artisans, nor capital to open a wholesale shop or the like. The wealthy villagers who migrate into town usually continue to depend on livestock for their livelihood, renting pastures, buying clover fields or buying and selling animals between different villages. Some other possible urban occupations for new settlers are to run a truck service between villages and towns, work as hired labour for seasonal hay cutting on the plain and harvesting. Learning crafts and artisanry is less likely for the first generation town settler, but possible for the second one.

Age group distribution and infant mortality in Hakkari

Hakkari's age group distribution fluctuates remarkably over the years and differs from Turkey's overall figures according to the population census results. From 1950 to 1980 Hakkari's population under 15 years of age had risen from 44.4% to 50.4% of its total population. The corresponding figures for Turkey are 41.2% (1950) and 38.5% (1980).[17] The implications of such an age group distribution are that; a) the dependency of the younger generation on the working population in Hakkari is higher than Turkey's average and b) the household composition would be affected by this age group distribution, as indicated by the average household size being 8.5 for Hakkari.[18]

The population census figures in Hakkari are, however, to be taken cautiously. During our stay in the province we made some observations about the registration of births and census in remote villages. First of all, the registration of births is usually done late in villages, mostly after the child reaches school age. If the girls are not to be sent to school, they are not registered often until they marry and have children. There were quite a number of people who were not registered (i.e. they had no identity cards and faced serious problems when there was an identity check in town or on the road) even after they married, had children and sometimes grandchildren. The act of not registering the children was explained as the desire to spare the sons from doing military service.[19] My impression is that this is unfounded; sons are registered before daughters in the hope that they will go to school, learn Turkish, reading and writing and later on do their military service with less trouble. Frequent identity checks and the difficulty of travelling, even between villages, without a proper identity card, are other obvious motives for registering sons before the girls. A second point concerning the census is that it is usually carried out in early October when there would still be pasture camps with fewer people (mostly women and young girls) staying. For instance, during my stay in

Hakkari on the census day the census staff failed to write down some of the pasture camp residents when they found no one in the village houses.

Another population characteristic, which has a bearing on both the high birth rate and the underdevelopment of the province, is the infant mortality rate. 1980 population census data include some figures about the different age groups of married, divorced or widowed women, the number of children alive, the number of children born alive, the number of children born alive in the last year and the level of formal education women have. Some of the figures from Hakkari are presented below:

Table 3.1. Women and infant mortality in Hakkari.

Number of women aged 12 and over, married, divorced or widowed	29,284
Number of children born alive	143,723
Number of children alive (on census day)	113,990
Infant mortality rate	21/100

(Based on *DIE Hakkari Sonuçları 1980*, Tables 9-12, pp. 18 -19.)

My data from the village of Sisin are based on marriage case histories of ten women. Although it is a very small sample of the married or widowed women (about 1/5th of the village total), it indicates a high rate of child mortality. These ten women have 65 children living and 36 who died. Of the 36, 24 were between the ages of 0-2 and 10 of them were between 3-5. Thus 2/3 of the children who died were of the ages 0-2, when they are most prone to illnesses or malnutrition.

During my stay in the village, within two months towards the end of winter, 3 infants under 2 years of age died, possibly because of malnutrition combined with diarrhoea. Women mentioned children's illnesses such as scarlet fever, measles or whooping cough causing many infant deaths within a year, sometimes killing 4-5 children in one household. Similar cases of high infant mortality are cited by Aydın (1980:175) in his study of two villages near Diyarbakır, where in the village of Gisgis 3/4 of the total households had infant deaths - the number of deaths per household ranging between 1 to 6 or more. The figures for infant deaths do not differentiate for male or female infants, thus it is not possible to comment on a differential treatment of girls and boys. The few infant deaths able to record in the village showed a higher figure for boys than girls, and the 3 infant deaths which occurred during my stay were all boys.

Development indicators in Hakkari

Health services and attitudes towards health. One of the main infrastructural networks in Hakkari, the situation of the roads, has already been mentioned. The availability of motor roads is crucial for the other basic services, not only to introduce but also to maintain them. For example, there were campaigns in previous years to open village health centres (*köy* or *bucak sağlık evi*) and the construction of some buildings had started.[20] Yet partly due to the seasonal and irregular accessibility of those villages, even after the buildings had been finished it was not possible to fill up the personnel vacancies, nor acquire the equipment to be used, or store the medicine to be handed out to the patients. The town of Şemdinli, for example, in 1982 had no chemist's shop and the supply of medicine for the town could not be regulated because of bad roads; some of the villages further away lacked health services altogether.

The overall health services, in the sense of modern medicine, are very limited in Hakkari. Although the province has been included within the underdeveloped region of Turkey, to be dealt with as part of the state's special development schemes since the 1960s,[21] its share of the national health investment has fallen from the first planned period (1964-67) to the following second period (1968-72). The health centres numbered 8 town units and 52 village units, but the town units served an average of 17,600 people instead of its limit of 7,500- 10,000 patients in 1980.[22]

The doctors in Hakkari were almost all general practitioners with limited equipment in their private practice or the health centres. There were a few private doctors in town (with higher charges: in 1982 a visit costed 1000-1500 TL. and the minimum wage was c. 18000 TL. then), but they lacked not only basic equipment like an X-ray machine but could not prescribe many kinds of medicine as these were not available in the pharmacies in Yüksekova. There were occasional check-up visits to various villages by a medical team, but even for immunization campaigns the team could not reach some of the remote settlements.[23]

The villagers' attitude to formal medicine, or to health care, mother and child death, in return, is mostly a mixture of distrust, ignorance, or unrealistic expectations. The occasional visitors to town, when they visit a doctor, are keen to have lots of medicine prescribed, preferably injections. But as there is no health education and little knowledge about health care and treatment, the expectations from medicine are independent of the variation of illnesses or their treatment. The general attitude is to favour a treatment which has a sudden effect, as in the case of injections, and which costs a lot. Long term treatments are hardly ever followed through, nor the exact daily dosage taken. Secondly, when one range of medicine prescribed by a doctor is not effective within the patient's self-appointed time period, then the next step is to go to another doctor in town. The doctors have only some townspeople as regular patients who come to see them more than once or twice; the villagers usually visit a doctor only after the illness is at a developed stage any way, and when there is no other way of treating it within the village.

Formal medical treatment, however, is not the only source of healing methods; the two other basic types of "medical" experts are the native healers (*hekim*) and the religious holy men, *shaikh*s or *mela*s.

The native healers have different reputations, types of training and areas of specialization. One type of healer "specializes" in skin and internal diseases and uses herbal medicine. A second type is the "osteopath" (*çıkıkçı* in Turkish and *cebar* in Kurdish) who deals with broken or dislocated bones. A third kind is the "dentist" (*dişçi*). The first type of healer is regarded as the more sophisticated, somebody who has mastered the "science of nature". The knowledge is passed on usually among first kin, mother to son or daughter, father to son or daughter, but it could also be transmitted from an expert to a novice, if there is a special relationship between them. This type of knowledge is not considered to be a truly mystical or supernatural power; however, it is thought to contain many secrets of nature and thus it is something learned by observation, training and practice and mastered by being gifted and talented oneself. The knowledge is not available to all and the healer keeps secret which herbs, flowers, roots he/she uses, how to prepare them or for which illness to apply the medicine.[24] The ones with a good reputation would receive patients from different places and villages, and they would ask for a payment in kind or money, although the less well-known ones might do some of the healing free of charge for relatives, friends and acquaintances.[25]

The "osteopath" is someone usually trained by a similar type of "expert", or by some religious healer who also practices osteopathy. On the whole, there were a few successful or widely accepted and acknowledged osteopaths, but more people who were incorrectly treated by them and left either lame or with some sort of disability. Nevertheless, the osteopaths are more frequently referred to than doctors in the health centres for example, as it is generally believed that formally trained medical personnel know nothing about broken or dislocated bones.

The third type of native healer is the "dentist", who is again said to have had some training with experts of the "informal" dentistry; the dentists visit the villages and carry their equipment with them, usually perform other services like male circumcision, hairdressing as well as pulling out the rotten teeth or (mostly the experts) making golden false teeth. The most "famous" dentists come from the neighbouring province of Siirt and regularly visit various mountain villages during summer months, and they charge for their services mostly in cash. Other than the types mentioned above, there are of course people who are not recognized as "experts" but who have some knowledge about particular illnesses or healing methods; some elderly women in villages would be consulted in cases of minor skin diseases, infant's illnesses, an injured arm or the like.

There are no native "midwives", but some elder women are asked to assist at births because of their skill in handling difficult births, but again this is not a widely recognized "profession", and women deliver their babies more or less without any medical help or knowledge. Complications during child delivery causing fatal results either for the mother or the baby were not rare. However, the services of midwives who are trained in formal medicine and appointed to various big villages are not easily accepted, and they are mostly called in at the last minute of delivery when there is an obvious and serious complication.

Religious people like *shaikh*s, *sayyid*s or *mela*s are the other sources of healing power. They are thought to have esoteric knowledge and healing power of varying degrees.[26] The most ordinary type of healing power is believed to be contained in the *muska*s (amulets) written by a *mela* (religious priest, *imam* in Turkish). The *mela* could be an ordinary villager and have no specific holy qualities other than his knowledge of the Qoran and being able to read and write in Arabic. The *muska* (*nivişt* in Kurdish)[27] is written for simple complaints from headaches to more serious illnesses like psychological disorders, but in this latter case *muska* could be written or prepared only by powerful, respected *shaikh*s and other religious personnel. For example, a *mela* in Yüksekova from a very respected *mela* family (thus a *melazade*) was said to receive patients from all over Turkey, with incurable diseases (mostly psychological) and cure them. It was said, however, that he advised the sick people to see a medical doctor first, and then come and see him if still not cured. He also visited the doctor in town frequently for his own health.[28] Nevertheless his mystical powers were sincerely believed in by many; once, my host Hüseyin said that he was very ill in bed at home and sent some people to ask for the *Mela*'s prayers and a *muska* from him. Despite the fact that there was no physical contact between Hüseyin and the *Mela*, Hüseyin had a dream in which he saw the *Mela* praying for him next to his bed and touching his forehead with his right forefinger. Hüseyin claimed to have been well again shortly after seeing the *Mela* in his dream.[29]

The order in which patients resort to a source of healing power changes according to the illness, situation and the people themselves. For example, the village women would ask a travelling and begging *sayyid* for a *muska* or prayers for a headache and pay him back with butter or wool, but they would not mind trying aspirin in another case. Similarly using local traditional herbal medicine in addition to the chemist's is considered quite normal. An illness which is considered to be a psychological disorder, (for example, being possessed by *jinns*, or *din bû*, i.e. to become mad)[30] would mostly be referred to a local or distant *shaikh* with a reputation. There is ample literature on this.[31]

Education. Hakkari has the lowest literacy rate among all the provinces of Turkey. The literacy figures from Hakkari and Turkey as a whole for the last two population censuses are given below:

Table 3.2. Literacy in Hakkari and Turkey.

	Year	Total %	Male %	Female %
Hakkari	1975	26.0	40.6	8.1
	1980	31.6	48.8	10.9
Turkey	1975	61.9	75.0	48.3
	1980	67.2	79.8	53.8

(Source: *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, Table 19, p. 3339. *DIE 1980 Census Results for Turkey and Hakkari*)[32]

Since the 1980s there has been a literacy campaign all over Turkey but its effectiveness is limited in Hakkari as it is designed to teach how to read and write in the whole of Turkey, independent of any regional or local language differences. In Hakkari, for example, the ratio of people who speak Turkish as a first language is very low. In 1965 the number of people who spoke Turkish in Yüksekova (as first or second language is not indicated) is given as 10% of the total population there.[33] Even if the ratio of people who speak Turkish (as first or second language) might have gone up since 1965 (the number of primary schools has doubled between 1961-80, secondary schools have increased to a total of 15 in 1980 from two in 1965),[34] the quality of education and literacy is still low. Many village men who learn Turkish and some reading and writing during their military service forget most of what they have learned because of the isolated village life and lack of motivation to keep up the language. Nevertheless, there are a remarkable number of men who keep up a fair level of Turkish by listening to the Turkish radio news broadcasts and speaking with the various Turkish civil or military servants or visitors to the area. For women, in terms of literacy or ability to speak Turkish, the situation is obviously worse; fewer girls are sent to school, hardly any from the villages to secondary schools and there is no chance of learning Turkish or acquiring literacy in adult life except, perhaps, in the recent literacy campaign.

The problems of the school system in general are: a) schools without teachers, b) teachers without all the school age children from their region despite compulsory and free primary school education in Turkey, c) limited or no teaching due to heavy winter conditions, d) shortened teaching period to suit the pastoral and agricultural production pattern when the students are needed for household work, and e) the general low quality of teaching often resulting in primary school graduates who can hardly read a newspaper or write a letter.[35]

A study of the socio-economic development of 19 eastern provinces by the Turkish State Planning Organization (*DPT*) draws attention to the educational problems in the area, namely the generally low number of village schools, and this problem is exacerbated by the higher number of smaller settlement units like *mezraa*, *kom*, *mahalle* in these provinces.[36] According to the *DPT*, which promotes the regional boarding schools (*bölge yatılı okulu*), the rural population favours the idea of sending their children to state boarding schools if they were not too far away from home.[37]

Even if the state boarding schools may have been designed to serve as educational centres for small, scattered or isolated rural settlements, the *DPT*'s point about the schools having "a potential for furthering the Turkish language and culture"[38] is a complex issue and has been a focal and controversial topic for nationalist Kurdish organizations as well as some of the teachers' unions.[39] The arguments against the regional boarding schools were that they concentrated too heavily on fur thering the Turkish language and culture, and by taking children away from their families, cut them off from their mother tongue and culture. Thus they served as an instrument of the Turkish state's assimilationist policies. Apart from this controversial effect the boarding schools might have, another relevant point about them is the effect they have on the household economy and the labour force both during schooling and afterwards. It is clearly a sacrifice from the parents' point of view to send away sons or daughters to these schools when their labour is needed almost all the time and the unity of the family also has great significance.[40] For example, in Sisin there was no school (until 1986) and the villagers regretted this, claiming that it was to their advantage to learn Turkish, and reading and writing, before going to do military service, yet none of them would willingly send their children to the boarding school in Yüksekova, for reasons stated above as well as the parents' fear that children would become cut off economically and culturally from the village community.

Industry. Hakkari can be said to have had no industry at all at the beginning of the 1980s. There was one semi-industrial enterprise in the province in 1981 which had more than 10 employees, the dairy factory in Yüksekova. The meat combine (*kombina*) was not in production until 1983, although it was planned to open in 1981.[41] Another production unit involved a tobacco treatment and storage depot in Şemdinli which had less than 10 employees.

According to the 1980 population census data, the working population of 12 years of age and over were engaged in the following economic activities and professions:

Table 3.3. Work and economic activities in Hakkari.

Economic activities	No. of People	%
Agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry	56,182	82.5
Mining and quarrying	12	0.01
Manufacturing (a)	559	0.82
Electricity, gas and water (b)	38	0.05
Construction and constructional workers	2,668	3.9
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, hotels	947	1.4
Transport, storage and communication	682	1.0
Financing, insurance, real estate and business services	147	0.2
Community, social and personnel services (c)	6,760	9.9
Activities inadequately defined	84	0.12
Total	68,079	99.9

a Food and beverage producers, tailors and sewers, carpenters, weavers are the largest group in this category, according to the DIE's classification system.
b Electric installer, electrical machine operators, etc.
c Teachers, government executive officials, police forces, guards, religious personnel and building caretakers are the largest group in this category.
(Source: *DIE 1980 Hakkari*, Table 21, pp. 44-49.)

Local trade and commerce. From Table 3.2 above, it is possible to observe not only the very low level of industrialization but also the almost negligible percent age of the population listed as being involved in whole sale and retail trade. The reasons for this apparent lack of traders in the province are related to the "unofficial or black economy", which is based on pastoral production and smuggling of herds. Hakkari, according to the statistics, has the highest average number of sheep and goats per person in Turkey (Hakkari's average number is 9 animals per person, Turkey's is 1.5),[42] yet (in the 1980 population census data) under the category of traders no one was listed as trading in pastoral products or live stock.[43] Since there is hardly any source of income for the villagers other than raising livestock, using and selling their products, the trade of livestock should be complementary to raising sheep and goats. Indeed, the traders are largely the villagers and townspeople themselves, yet because the profitable markets are across the borders (and also many traders have their own sheep and goats), the type of trade and people involved in it do not appear as a separate category in official statistics.

The trade of sheep and goats is carried out at the village level approximately as follows. The villagers keep their animals together in one or more herds through out summer and early autumn pasture camps. The buyer, whether he is a kinsman, from the same tribe or an outsider, comes to the village or pasture camp to choose the animals. There is no animal market anywhere in Hakkari where sheep and goats could be bought and sold to a wider group of people. The time for the sale of animals is also fairly stable; it is mostly be towards the end of August before the pasture camps move to their late summer sites and after the animals have recovered from any illnesses and weaknesses they may have had during the long winter, when they are kept mostly indoors and fed with dry hay. There is fresh grass till the end of July, and the shepherds try their best to fatten the animals before the time of sale.

The way of buying and selling animals varies with the position of the village, its proximity to the borders and the availability of pastures. For example, if a village is very near the border and has ample pasture to raise large herds, the trade may be more direct. In other words the villagers will probably be selling the animals to a co-villager, or an acquaintance from across the border, thus getting a good price by avoiding the middleman. Villages further away from the border might sell their animals to a middleman who would re-sell them to another buyer nearer the border or to a bigger tradesman, who could take the herds by trucks to sell further away, a long the Syrian border by legal or illegal means.

Ismail Beşikçi had already pointed out at the end of the 1960s the importance of smuggling for the economy of Turkey's southeastern provinces.[44] He then drew attention to the dependency of the border villagers, who raise sheep and goats, on the markets across the borders, the stratification within the smuggler-trader group and the blind-eye the central government turns to smuggling, mainly because it cannot provide these areas with the goods, services and roads they need.[45]

> In a discussion of the types of traders within the pastoralist nomadic economy, Beşikçi identifies three kinds: 1. *çerçi*, the pedlar, who travels to the pasture camps of no mads and semi-nomads and barters their products with small items he has brought with him. The products he buys are sheep's wool, goat's hair, clay and *kitre* (gum tragacanth); in return he gives cloth material, tea, sugar, various cheap ornaments and the like. Money is not used and he barters mostly with women; 2. trader in town, to whom the nomad takes his products (the same as for *çerçi*) and the terms of trade are settled both with barter and money, the nomad buys from him clothes, shoes, kitchen utensils like pans and trays; 3. the trader from the city, who comes to the pasture

> himself and does larger amounts of animal and wool buying; in return he gives credit and cash and usually forms a long-term trade link with the nomads who sometimes sell their produce to the same trader for many years.[46]

Beşikçi's classification and his attempts to correlate barter and money exchange to different stages of feudalism or the capitalist economy need a separate critical discussion which we shall not go into here. However, some of his points are worth taking up in comparison to the cases in Hakkari. First, although Beşikçi cites these 3 types of traders and trade relations as existing simultaneously, his attempt to generalize these relations to cover semi-nomadic pastoralists as well as the nomads is far from being convincing. He says, for example, that the pedlar, *çerçi*, and the trader from town buy similar products from the nomads. The point here, however, is that even if they buy similar products, the amounts and the quality of goods bought differ. This is because: a) the pedlar, according to Beşikçi, bargains and barters with the women but in fact women alone are unlikely to have complete control over the sale of produce, which is also sold for cash in town by men, b) in many cases the nomads, who buy goods in town as well, know that *çerçi*'s goods are of a lower quality and more expensive than in town, thus the only reason to buy from him would be in cases of emergency (e.g. lacking sugar or tea) or being too far a way from trade centres. These reasons would severely limit the amount of trade with and decrease the dependency on *çerçis*.

When compared to Beşikçi's types, the semi-nomadic villagers' organization of trade in Hakkari could be summed up as follows. First, during my fieldwork, the *çerçi* as a regular salesman did not exist, other than the occasional salesman from surrounding provinces or countries with special luxury items or antique jewelry, pots, pans, and the like. This was very rare and the use of money for these goods seemed widespread. In fact, these occasional salesmen who travel between villages are mostly other villagers, tribesmen or friends, and the goods are smuggled items, which may be hard to get or the person selling it has a surplus amount of the goods.[47]

Very few products (animal, agricultural or other) would be brought to town for sale; the town's traders come to the villages or camp sites to buy the products and arrange their transportation themselves. If a villager has to carry the sold produce with his own mules to the motor road, that has to be separately agreed upon and the price adjusted accordingly. The traders from town are either kin to the villagers, or they are shopowners who settle in town from outside the province and build long term links with the villagers. For example, all the villagers of Sisin trade with one shopowner form Siirt who lives in Yüksekova, and comes to the village at different times of the year to buy wool, butter, cheese, *kitre* and walnuts. He pays the villagers extra for transporting the produce with mules from the village to the road, where transport by trucks is arranged by him. He pays a unanimously agreed price for each good and gives credit to villagers for the goods they buy in his shop. The villagers find his prices to be average, but this process secures them the sale of all their produce without the risk of losing money by shifting seasonal prices (e.g. of walnuts) or unreliable payment conditions. The social control and competition within the village paves the way for this monopoly by a single trader, yet if one decides to go one's own way, it is possible to sell the product to a chosen trader or to try to buy others' produce and market them alone. The crucial assets one needs to become a trader are to have capital either in cash or credit, in both the material and symbolic senses. When one proves trust worthy (i.e. paying on time, even if not the highest bid), the trade relation could prove to be lifelong.[48]

The sale of livestock in Sisin, however, is not carried out with the same shopkeeper. The shopkeeper is an outsider, and he uses his links to the neighbourhoods and provinces (including his home town, Siirt) to market the produce he collected for sale and being processed there. An animal trader, on the other hand, has to have different links, mainly either to the large herd traders who operate legally and sell the animals in internal or external markets, or through the local smugglers' networks. The buyers in the village of Sisin are largely traders from the same Oramarî tribe; they form partnerships to bid varying prices for their kin's and affines' animals and also to arrange to take the herds across the border. The foreigner or outsider traders are hardly effective within these villages as the animals are not of high quality, nor the smuggling roads suitable for large herds. The means of exchange is money and usually foreign currencies (Iraqi Dinar, or Iranian Toman) depending on the directness of trade (i.e. the number of times the herds would change hands.) For large scale smuggling the roads are more or less well-known and are determined not only by the landscape but also by the permissiveness of the internal and external "customs" conditions, Turkish border gendarmerie or Kurdish soldiers.[49]

Beşikçi, wrongly in my opinion, assumes that the border trade and smuggling in Hakkari is unaffected by profit and trade interests.[50] It is true that in Hakkari's border villages smuggling is different from the large scale smuggling in other provinces like Van, Diyarbakır, Siirt and Mardin, in terms of its organization. The former is more based on kin, friendship and/or tribal links. Nevertheless, these multilayered relations are not devoid of commercial interests. Quite the contrary, most of the prices of goods are determined in anticipation of the demand, sales and payment conditions across the border, irrespective of kin and tribal obligations and loyalties. For example, Sisin villagers who sell their walnuts for a price per tin container (of a fixed size, *teneke*) continuously monitor the price changes in Iraqi border villages (which also grow walnuts but of a different quality) and try to arrange the sale in order to get the best price-transport-payment conditions. Those who are nearer the border sell their produce to the Iraqis, not only because they are kin or tribal members but also because their prices are higher, or their sale conditions are favourable.

Apart from trade interests, personal tastes, the quality of goods and personal preferences determine the type of goods brought into Hakkari. Tea and rice are typical examples of this case; Turkish tea is much cheaper but inferior in quality to the smuggled tea from Iran and Iraq, and smuggled rice from Iraq is better in quality but almost double the price of Turkish rice. The same applies to other smuggled goods like scarves, cloth, and cigarette rolling papers; they are of a better quality but more expensive than Turkish products. Kinship, friendship or tribal membership may pave the way for trading links but they alone never determine the intensity of trade relations nor the prices. People prefer, in fact, to trade with non-kin and if possible non-tribal people, so that the loyalties involved in kinship and tribal membership do not interfere with commercial interests. Kin and tribal members actually try to influence and control the amount and mode of trade and seek to promote personal benefits under the protective cover of kin and tribal solidarity.[51] The trade links formed outside the kin and tribal circles demand individual mobility, management and resources and are not possible for all the villagers.

The smuggling of various goods is a concern for the military and civil authorities in the border provinces of eastern and southeastern Turkey. As Beşikçi (1970) and Erdost (1968) have pointed out, there are different kinds of smuggling, varying according to the scale, organization and goods involved. It is outside the scope of this study to detail the large scale and sometimes inter nationally organized smuggling of arms and drugs, although it exists to some degree in Hakkari as well. What is more important and relevant for the socio-economic setting in Hakkari is the widespread but small-scale smuggling of livestock and consumer goods. Livestock smuggling is part of the totality of pastoral production in almost all the border and mountain villages. The reasons are manifold and can be summed up as the lack of motor roads, the low productivity of pastoral economy, the lack of animal markets, limited purchasing by the state owned Meat Combines,[52] no storing facilities, the lack of veterinary services to improve the animals' health conditions and meat quality, the existence of better prices in neighbouring countries[53] despite the risky and unreliable conditions of organized smuggling. The central administration has provincial committees (*İl Kaçak Komisyonları*) to prevent and control smuggling. The Hakkari committee's measures, for example, include declaring areas of control along the border in which the people are asked to make official declarations of almost all the goods they have (other than livestock and its products, rubber shoes, kilim rugs, leather jackets, old copper, fox skin, honey, flour, sugar, cheese, tobacco, tea) and inform the local authorities if they sell or buy any of these goods[54]. Other than the impractical nature and difficulty of enforcing such regulations, these measures tend to undermine the local political, state - regional relations and the notions of political authority and legitimacy. The nature of political relations within the centre-periphery context will be dealt with extensively in the chapter on tribes and tribalism. Here, however, it is important to underline the extent of the smuggling of consumer goods and the fact that the central administration could prosecute the residents for possessing a box of smuggled horse shoe nails, a kilogram of Iraqi tea, or cigarette rolling paper. These regulations to control smuggling contribute to the background of corruption amongst the gendarmerie officers along the border posts and the distrust between the residents and the military and civil administrators.

Summary

Hakkari as a region is characterized by its high mountains, long winters under deep snow and small and dispersed population settlements. The landscape and climate are most suitable to semi-nomadic pastoral production. Although the region is fully integrated into the Turkish administrative system, it lags behind in infrastructural, industrial and urban development. The economy of the region, mainly because the infrastructural factors are not fully developed, involves a limited variety of productive activities. The towns are not much more than large villages, where the central administrative agencies are based, and they are not important local foci for economic and political activities. The uneven integration of the region (more administrative and military presence but less integrated in terms of economic and indigenous political processes) is apparent once again in the case of the organization of the semi-nomadic pastoral production. Local traditions dominate the production processes, but the marketing of the produce is arranged in cooperation with internal and external black markets.

Finally, the regional physical, economic and administrative factors create the general environment, with its resources and restrictions, within which village household structures are formed (see the discussion in Chapter 5), and particular patterns of kinship and tribal relations develop.

4. Tribes and tribal ideology in Hakkari

Introduction

The introductory case study of Sisin's guns involved villages and villagers from different tribal areas. Tribesmen came together to give support to or challenge their own and other tribesmen. Traditional tribal divisions played a role in determining lines of alliance and fission. Tribal leaders used their weight to influence the decision making processes as well as the flow of loyalties and the discourse on loyalty. This chapter takes up the contemporary tribal structures, organization and tribal leadership. It tries to follow up the links to Hakkari's tribal and other semi-feudal past and to its social and physical setting.

The previous chapter has pointed out the main source of livelihood as being semi-nomadic pastoralism, supplemented by some cereal cultivation and gardening. The semi-nomadic pastoral production in Hakkari is based on mountain pastures which are used by tribes communally, and land for hay collecting which is divided according to tribal boundaries, whose usage rights are individuated and transferred from father to son(s). Trade activities in border villages indicate the significance of using tribal and other networks for organizing the illegal trade of the villagers' own produce and import of goods and cash. The discussion of the history of the region above, on the other hand, introduced the political and administrative background to the contemporary political and economic formations in the region. Hakkari's history contains details about periods of tribes united under a strong ***mîr***, or tribes divided in support of rival religious leaders, rival contestants for the paramount chiefdom or tribes allied to neighbouring empires and rebel leaders. As we have seen, the region accommodated tribal and non-tribal groups, Christian and Muslim populations. Here I to examine contemporary tribal organization, not necessarily as a relic of a prior structure, but while looking into the common or different features of the past and present systems, I attempt to identify a model of change. Local and non-local classification of tribal organization, the nature and scope of tribal ideology and relations, continuities and dis-continuities in tribal leader-commoner and tribe-state relations will be considered and the theoretical models that have been suggested to analyze the Kurdish tribal system and relations will be evaluated. The discussion of other networks, such as the significance of kinship within or outside the tribal groups, and the significance of marriage alliances and affinity for tribal and non-tribal groups and politics are dealt with in subsequent chapters.

Terminology and classification of tribal organization

Mal: For Hakkari sources quote up to 15 different tribes inhabiting the region and the local people usually count approximately the same number of tribes, although they rank the tribes in terms of their quantitative and qualitative (culturally determined) characteristics like size, population, importance, "wildness" and nobility. What are the criteria the local people use for identifying a tribe, a higher or lower level organizational unit or a non-tribal unit? To begin with, the lowest level unit of tribal organization, *mal*, means "the household", "a kin group sharing common residence", and "a lineage" at the same time. The first two usages of the term will be discussed in the following chapter. The last usage, that is, *mal* as a lineage, includes a group of patrilineal kin descending from a fictive ancestor (man or woman) with a specific name. In anthropological literature lineage is usually defined as a group of people who claim and recognize kin links between themselves and who can trace their origins to a specific common ancestor. Clan, on the other hand, is defined as a group of people as part of a larger unity, who claim kin links among themselves without necessarily being able to trace their origins to a common ancestor.[1] In this case, *mal*, with a specific ancestor whose name designates the group of descendants but where no household can or needs to trace its genealogical link to the ancestor, corresponds partly to the definition of lineage and partly to clan; hence, I use the term here interchangeably; lineage or clan as the equivalent of *mal*.

For tribal people, after being a member of a household, the first communally recognized level of tribal membership is the *mal* membership. A tribal person throughout his/her socialization learns about his/her kin and affines gets to know the patrilineal kin in his/her own lineage. These patrilineal kinsmen who are often affines as well, may be neighbours, may live in another village, town, city, or even country. Thus *mal* is not by definition a residential group even though members of the same *mal* often reside together, and if they move from village to town, tend to buy property adjacent to one another.

Members of a *mal* are usually known to one another although some *mal*s (like the *mala* Meyter of the tribe Oramarî) are said to have hundreds of households as members. The more members a *mal* has the more it is considered to be a powerful and influential lineage within the tribe. Tribesmen's knowledge of the numbers of *mal*s and how many households belong to each is not consistent however, and there is no consensus among them even for their own tribe. The *mal* membership has significance at the local and neighbourhood level. Only when a *mal* claims nobility (like the chiefly lineage, *mala* Mîran of Oramarî) or religious holyness (like the *Melazade*) does it have significance and influence beyond the specific tribal framework.

A *mal* is not a property owning group; nevertheless, it is the social unit where a person or household's tribal membership is most clearly defined or challenged. Because *mal* is the smallest tribally recognized social unit based on common descent ideology, the best way to test a person's tribal membership is to demonstrate or question the person's membership in a *mal*. Rights of tribal pasture usage are not divided into sub-tribal or lineage segments; nevertheless, proof and recognition of the membership in a *mal* could be necessary to practise this right. In other words, if one day a household comes up and claims membership in a tribe and thus rights to the pastures, people may demand proof of membership in a recognized *mal*.[2]

Ocax/qabîle: The next level of tribal organization is the sub-tribe, referred to by the local people as *ocax* or *qabîle* (the former borrowed from Turkish, the latter from Arabic), which is said to include varying numbers of lineages/clans, i.e. *mal*s. *Ocax/qabîle* is usually believed to have originated from brothers (who probably gave their names to the *qabîle*s) or father's brother's sons. In the case of Oramarî, there were two *qabîles* cited who were thought to be descendants of two brothers (Mef and Lemdîn, who gave their names to the two *qabîle*s) and came to Oramar from Cezire (see Map 2). These two brothers were said to have descendants in today's Cezire as well, who call themselves with the same *qabîle* names of Mef and Lemdîn and recognize (hypothetically at least) kinship links to their "father's brother's sons" in Oramar. Other tribes in Hakkari were similarly divided into *qabîle/ocax*s; for example, the Dorskî tribe was said to have two *qabîle*s, those of Himbî and Satî. Already at this level, the criteria for defining how large or small a *qabîle* ideally is, are unclear, and ambiguities are ample about whether a group of lineages referred to as one *qabîle* is indeed a *qabîle* or another tribe (*eşîret* in Kurdish), or something else. The Satî mentioned above were referred to sometimes as a *qabîle* of Dorskî, and sometimes as an *eşîret* on its own. In general, a *qabîle* is thought to include 4-8 *mal*s; thus the number of people it includes varied considerably. It is clear from the informants' descriptions that *qabîle* is a unit of a higher organizational level but does not necessarily contain equal population groups.

Qabîle, like *mal*, is not a territorial unit and marriages between members of different *qabîles* are frequent and considered normal. Finally, *qabîle* is not a property owning group; tribal pastures or hay cutting lands are not designated to *qabîles*, they belong to the higher collective body, the tribe.

Eşîret: The next unit of tribal organizational hierarchy is the tribe, referred to as *eşîret* in Kurdish and *aşiret* in Turkish. People who belong to the lineages and tribal sections are referred to altogether as one tribe, *eşîret*. For the local people the main ideological principle for classifying a population group as an *eşîret* is that they share the ideology of common patrilineal descent even if the exact traces and links are impossible (or unimportant) to ascertain. The most important attribute of an *eşîret* is that it is the main population group which can claim, on the basis of traditional rights, the use of certain pastures as tribal communal pastures.

According to the local classification, higher than the *eşîret* level of segmentation, common descent ideology becomes secondary to other unificatory principles, like those of territory and political alliances or divisions. The decrease in the importance of common descent ideology from the concepts of *mal* to *eşîret* is reflected in the fairly consistent pattern of *mals* having the names of ancestors (e.g. *mala* Xane, *mala* Meyter, *mala* Kemalan), *qabîles* those of ancestors or places (*qabîlê* Satî, *qabîlê* Mefî), and *eşîrets* having the names of places more often than of the hypothetical ancestors (e.g. *eşîretê* Oramarî: Oramar is a village; *eşîretê* Dorskî: Dorski is a region, a group of villages; *eşîretê* Bilicanî: Bilican is also a village). This should not be taken as a definite rule, however, but only as a tendency. The case of *eşîret* names corresponding to places (region, villages, or mountains) was reported by O. Blau much earlier as an indication of Kurdish nomadic tribes' losing their ancestral names after settlement and acquiring the name of the area of settlement.[3] Similarly, it is likely that the correspondance between today's tribal names and area names is an outcome of processes of de-tribalization and fragmentation into smaller tribal units.[4]

Organizational units higher than the *eşîret*, such as confederacies, are not (locally) terminologically defined, but as described below, the tribes are known to form alliances and blocs and to have been ruled together under a *mîr* in the past. Thus, other *eşîrets* in the region (within and around Hakkari) are ranked in terms of "closeness" or "distance". Here "closeness" is not so much an issue of kin or origin but is defined rather in terms of political alliances, according to a vague local model of "traditional" allies and enemies. For example, the tribe of Dorskî living within the boundaries of today's Hakkari, refer to themselves as being Dorskî *jorî* (upper Dorskî) and to a neighbouring tribe living in Iran today as Dorskî *jerî* (lower Dorskî), implying a previous unity between the two parts, broken by political and boundary changes. Similarly, Dorskî and Oramarî say they are "close" (*nizik*) to each other without necessarily meaning a kinship link, but implying a prior political unity which today exists only as a hypothetical situation which might be activated in case of war or major dispute.[5]

The Oramarî describe the traditional local model of ally and enemy tribes as follows:

Table 4.1. Tribal blocs in Hakkari

	Tribes		
baskê çep (left wing)	Ertuşî	Pinyanişî	*baskê rast* (right wing)
	Jirkî	Oramarî	
	Dirî	Dorskî	

These are mostly the tribes living in and around Yüksekova to which the Oramarî have contact. Certain fights over pastures are cited as evidence of the left/right wing groupings. For example, in a fight between the Oramarî and the Jirkî over a pasture site, the Dorskî came to the Oramarî's help and the Ertuşî to Jirkî's. The Pinyanişî and Dirî were getting ready to take their respective sides; then, it would have become a fight of the "left" against "right" tribes, but the gendarmerie forces in Yüksekova intervened and the fighting stopped. The local representation of "right" and "left" tribes, and how it might have acted out the segmented model, in fact, omits the other tribes who are affiliated to the Pinyanişî and Ertuşî but live outside the Oramar district. The Ertuşî who came to help Jirkîs were actually neighbours of the Jirkî and did not involve all the Ertuşî sections. The Jirkî concerned were the local residents and not their far away tribesmen in western Hakkari.

Such tribal blocs are commonly found in many parts of the Middle East.[6] The role of these blocs, their function in the segmentary system today and to what degree the segmentary system was effective are discussed below; the point here is that the bloc or confederational organization of tribes does not have a local name, other than the term *bask* (wing) mentioned above, which could in theory mean any "bloc" above or below the unit of tribe.[7]

Criteria for the local denotations for tribes

Territory is an important element of local tribal classification as in many cases tribes and not sub-tribes or smaller units are said to inhabit traditional lands. A group of villages, a number of adjacent pasture sites would be said to belong to the Ertuşî, Oramarî, or Dorskî, even if these villages referred to, have sections of non-tribal or other tribal groups. It is possible that in former times villages were more homogeneous in terms of tribal membership, but in the last 70 years of population movements, wars, and exiles in the area, some of the villages have been settled by mixed groups and these village units have formed mixed pasture camp units (*zoma*), using the pastures which belonged to the evacuated groups (like the Nestorian tribes) on a mutual sharing basis.

> The villages of Memkan and Alakan on the plain of Yüksekova are examples for this mixed tribal composition. The villages were previously Nestorian settlements,[8] and they were bought from the central administration by several people from different tribes. The residents now are mostly descendants of these late settlers. They camp together as 1 or 2 camp units although they retain their rights to their respective tribes' traditional pastures. In some cases the opposite seems to happen as tribesmen from other villages who are kin/affine to those in Memkan or Alakan join in the latter's camp units, sometimes on a contractual basis but sometimes without it, as affines or kin.

The power of tradition: The connection between certain territories and certain tribes is crucial for the tribal groups themselves, since the right to pastures can be claimed on the basis of "traditions", i.e. the claim that a particular tribe "has always used those pastures." How the individual households benefit from these rights depends on the individual household's accepted pedigree and length of residence. For example, it is possible to assume that an Oramarî household which lives, for a variety of reasons, away from the Oramarî dominated area and villages, let us say in western Hakkari, would find it difficult to exercise its rights for grazing animals on the pastures traditionally belonging to the Oramarî tribe, if the household has not cultivated relationships, such as relations of affinity, partnership, political and economic support with those using the pastures. The opposite is very likely to have occurred, especially in the past; various sections, groups, or households could have been incorporated into the tribal unit after generations of common residence, especially when it was still possible to expand territorially.

Today, the use of traditionally claimed pastures by non-tribal or other tribal groups is possible mostly on a contractual basis, and ambiguities about traditional rights to a pasture, based on pedigree, lead to challenges from other groups and fights over pastures between tribal groups.

In the past, apparently, although less so today, the boundaries of tribes were changed through conquer or losing territory in a war.[9] After all, many of the villages now settled by tribal groups, like the Oramarî, belonged to the Nestorians, who have since been expelled with the help of some Oramarî fighters, possibly the ancestors of today's settlers in the same villages. One of the latest important fights between tribes (sections of them) is reported to have been between the Oramarî and Pinyanişî about 25 years ago, when tribesmen of both sides are said to have used guns and fought for days with out any casualties.[10] The gendarmerie forces intervened only after some days and the dispute was settled to the advantage of the Oramarî. Recent disputes over pastures are solved by more or less immediate intervention of the gendarmerie and in many cases after a court trial.

History: Finally, the local denotations for tribal membership, taken together with the ideology of common descent and residence, also imply a claim to history, a cultural significance derived from the past. All tribal groups have some sort of real or fictive stories of their origins, which place them in a system of historical significance vis-à-vis other groups.[11] Non-tribals cannot claim superiority or nobility like the tribal groups, as they have no roots, no traditional lands, no glorious ancestors and no heroic fights or tragic defeats.[12] In fact, non-tribal membership locally means either a recent settlement from another province or a loss of tribal roots.[13] In historical records non-tribal Muslim Kurds and Christians are mentioned as the *reaya* class, yet this historical past does not have any significance for the present non-tribal groups except for the politically and economically powerful families, who maintain noble or independent family genealogies.

Cultural symbols: The cultural context of tribal membership, i.e. the connotations tribal membership has for both tribal and non-tribal people contains an additional constellation of symbols other than the common descent, residence or history. In Hakkari, tribesmen are thought to be identifiable by men's clothes, women's head dresses, certain types of tents, or the use of certain words and idioms. These symbols, however, are not devoid of social class differences either. Thus, the men of tribal leading families, or tribal chiefs wear the same clothes and speak the same dialect as the urban (non-tribal) people, who are stratified according to their socio-economic standing but not their tribal identity. For such "leading" and rich tribesmen, tribal clothes and women's dresses are symbols only to be remembered and invoked on special occasions.

Etic criteria: The non-local residents of the region, like administrators, civil or military servants, professionals or traders who originate from other provinces, attribute yet other characteristics to tribal groups. Although their attributes and system of classification define the tribes from outside, there is a dialectical relationship not only between what such administrators think about Hakkari's peculiar social organization and how central governmental policies are formed, but also between what they think and attribute, and what the local tribal and non-tribal people think of and attribute to their own system and organization. Tribal *agha*s, for example, while practising tribal policies of favouritism, patronage, and surplus extraction, claim they are against "tribalism" (*aşiretçilik*). Thus, the local people's definition of their social system interacts with etic definitions, especially more so if the local person concerned is seeking upward mobility and use of further central state resources. For such persons, tribes are "backward", "feudal", or "primitive" even if they continue to use tribal networks.

To many in the group of resident outsiders, tribal membership connotes behaviour and thinking ranging from blind obedience and servility to a tribal chief (*agha*), to banditry, ignorance, or total belief in blood feud vengeance.[14] From this point of view, tribes behave as units, but paradoxically have incessant disputes and fission among themselves. Without their leaders, who frequently exploit them, they are thought to be uncontrollable and unmanageable. Moreover, from the etic point of view, divisions of *qabîle*, *mal* or *eşîret* are usually meaningless or unnoticed unless accidentally discovered in the case of a fight between two tribesmen who may belong to different *qabîle*s. The usual assumption, then, is an irrational, unexplainable and deep-rooted enmity between the *qabîle*s and the fight is only a rekindling of this old enmity.[15]

In summary, the local people who are composed of tribal or non-tribal villagers, tribal, non-tribal and outsider townsfolk, in interaction with one another, define and attribute certain characteristics to tribal groups. These representations do not necessarily reflect one social reality but a combination of social change processes (like formation of class structures within the tribe, or assimilation of tribal groups into the national urban culture), as well as the prevalence of certain traditional cultural meanings (such as clothes, dialect and the like).

The problems of ambiguity in the local terminology of tribal and non-tribal groups, either in Kurdistan or in other areas, are well-known. As stated above from the 13th century onwards tribes have been said to inhabit Hakkari and play important roles in influencing the choice of the rulers there. Yet the tribes are referred to collectively as Hakkariya (or was it a single tribe, a tribal confederation?). In the 14th century records of Mamlūk historians, one tribal name, that of the Zerzarî is mentioned, and until today it has the same name, living in Şemdinli, while the name of Dumbulî (a tribe?) disappeared from the area. From the 16th century history of Kurdish principalities by Şeref Khan, we have the name of Pinyanişî as an important tribe, who supported or rebelled against the *mîrs* of Hakkari. An important tribe with the same name lives in Hakkari and south of Van, but none of the other "tribes" in Hakkari today are mentioned (at least by name) in the limited number of early historical records.

Missionaries and European travellers, military or political officers reported from the mid-19th century till the 1940s about tribes in Hakkari. At best they depicted the areas the tribes were concentrated in and mentioned nomadic and sedentary sections and some confederational organization,[16] but without elaborating on how they defined what a tribe, a tribal section or lineage was. Considering the present flexibility of the local usage of tribal organizational terms, and focusing on the tactical usage of kinship term extensions as well as the locally manufactured tribal hierarchy charts (i.e. that certain tribes are "close", certain ones are "rivals"), it is plausible to assume that the fluidity between different levels of the tribal organization, expansion and segmentation of certain units occurred then as much as it does today.

After the firmer control of Hakkari's administration and politics achieved by the central Ottoman administration, i.e. after the affair of Nurullah Beg cited above, many of the tribes which were until then parts of larger confederations broke apart and came to be known as single tribes of varying importance.[17] Thus, Ertuşî was previously the name of a confederation of tribes, while today Ertuş is the name of both a group of tribes and a specific tribe (among the group) which lives in various localities. Or, Oramar, which previously seems to have been a village name only, a village with a small Nestorian population but also Muslim

Kurds who allied themselves to the Herkî nomads south or the Dorskî sedentary further north, in the last fifty years has appeared as the name of a tribe whose members have filled the vacuum of evacuated Nestorian "tribal" villagers.

The implications of local systems of classification of tribal organization could be summarized as:

1. The tribesmen's own classification of their system is both empirically and conceptually flexible. The descent ideology is most significant at the level of the tribe, where the tribe maintains traditional usage rights to certain pastures. As the tribal pastures are not formally divided or segmented along the tribal segments, and since other types of land (hay cutting area, fields, and gardens) belong to individuals, can be bought or sold and are inheritable from father to son, the correspondance between the descent ideology and territory does not hold below the level of the tribe. For example, when compared to the Bedouin studied by Peters, the tribal Kurds in Hakkari have no "tertiary tribal sections" which correspond to camps, village, or neighbourhood settlements. (Peters, 1967:262) *Mal*, *qabîle* or *ocax* do not correspond to territorial units.

2. On the other hand, residence and territory are crucial at the level of the tribe (*eşîret*) because tribes have the traditional right to claim access to pastures. In order to prevent outsiders from encroaching on a tribal pasture, the descent ideology is brought forward, as a "folk model" or the local "frame of reference" in Peters' words (Ibid., p. 261, 270), in order to test and challenge the claimant. Thus, if and when challenged, one has to prove and successfully argue that one's own ancestors (father, father's father, father's father's father, and so on) also took part in the *zoma*s of the tribal pasture.

3. The tribal membership has varying connotations for non-tribal local and outsider residents. The cultural context for defining tribal membership is affected by the dialectical cognitive and classificatory processes of these various groups. What and who is tribal or non-tribal is reflected in cultural categories, which have their "frontiers in mind."[18]

Tribal ideology and relations

Tribal identity in Hakkari is one of the various identities available to the local people. As mentioned above, in the past and present, the region has accommodated tribal and non-tribal, indigenous and outsider groups for quite sometime. Religion was another source of identity, especially in the past, due to the considerable size of the Nestorian community. Today Islam is the common religion and only foreign visitors to the area are noted as non-Muslims.[19] As in the past, Kurd or Turkish ethnic identity is an important aspect of the identity perceptions and is often mixed with issues of kinship, residence, tribal membership and rural residence as I demonstrate below. This section focuses on the various aspects of tribal identity and ideology and aims to assess its importance in relation to other social organizational principles, e.g. kinship, ethnicity and nationality and residence. The content of tribal ideology is to be explored in the subsequent discussion of disputes and segmentation.

To begin with, Bates in relation to Yörük nomads of southeastern Turkey remarks that "Yörük" denotes "membership by virtue of patrilineal descent in one of a number of tribes."(Bates, 1973:35) There is no word in Hakkari which denotes tribal membership other than the word "tribe" (*eşîret*) or "tribal" (*eşir*) itself. Kurd, *Hakkarili* (from Hakkari), or *doğulu* (from eastern Anatolia) are all related to different frames of reference; the first one, to a linguistic ethnic group, the second one, to the province (as opposed to other provinces in Turkey), and the third one refers to a regional (and implicitly non Turkish) group. The tribes, as we have seen, are generally designated residential areas, but are never absolutely homogeneous on the ground. The area locally referred to as the Oramarî district contains non-Oramarî villages. Within such districts are often found mixed groups, households and individuals (especially women) from different tribes or non-tribal people. What does "tribe" or "tribal" mean for the people themselves then? As I pointed out above, the classification is based on patrilineal descent, residence, common culture, and historical significance.

The tribal ideology at its most abstract level demands patrilineal solidarity most concentrated at the centre of kinship, the immediate patrilineal kin, and spreading out along the lines of segmentation. Brothers, father and sons are to keep together against father's brother and father's brother's sons, all of the above are to unite against more distant patrilineal cousins, and all patrilineal kin against another tribe, and so on. However, when the informants give examples of how this model applies to the tribes in the area, they start at the top of the hierarchy and not at the bottom, the level of household or *mal*. Tribes listed earlier are classified as close (*nizik*) or distant (*dûr*), but the sections and subsections of their own tribe are not all categorized into close or distant categories, so that some *qabîle*s or *mal*s are expected to unite with one another against others. Segmentation, therefore, is thought to work at the top of the hierarchy and not at the bottom.

Instead, at the bottom of the tribal segmentation, actors are expected to take into consideration the multiplicity of obligations, duties, and loyalties. At this level equality and support between patrilineal kin are furthered with a very general term, " *em mirovêtekin*" (we are one people) which has empirical and conceptual flexibility to mean "we are one patrilineal kin", "one village", "one group of affines", or "one tribe" alternatively. When there is a conflict between the members of a *mal* (lineage/clan), the discourse of settling the dispute and mediation uses the words " *em mirovêtekin*", "*şerme*" (-it is- shameful), and "*mal xirabîyetî no ken* " (lit. do not ruin your houses, or do not bring disrepute on to yourselves, your group). Similar types of conflict or challenge within a village, between neighbours, members of one *mal* or different *mal* members would be met with similar reactions and discourse. Thus, the degree of assumed "shame" or "dishonour" inflicted on those involved in a conflict changes not only according to the level of tribal segmentation, but also according to the intensity of relationships and interests.

The village of Sisin and its lineages could serve as an example to illustrate the effects of tribal and other ideologies. As mentioned earlier, Sisin is in the Oramarî tribal area, a part of a larger *muhtarlık* (administrative village unit) of Yeşil, and all of its 25 households' members (including women), except for the *mela*, belong to the Oramarî tribe. The Oramarî tribe is said to have two *qabîles/ocax*s, those of Mefî and Lemdînî. All Sisin household heads belong to the same *qabîle* of Mefî and represent 7 *mal*s of Mefî, from a total of 10 *mal*s.

Table 4.2. *Mal* membership among Sisin households.

Lineage	A	had	11	households
"	B	"	2	"
"	C	"	3	"
"	D	"	4	"
"	E	"	2	"
"	F	"	1	household
"	G	"	1	"

Residentially, the village consists of two quarters (*taxe*), the upper and the lower, and these two quarters formed the core (but not all) of the two camp units (*zoma*s), alternating the camp sites between themselves every year. The division into upper quarter (*taxê jorî*) and lower quarter (*taxê jerî*) households is as follows:

Table 4.3. Sisin's households' lineage membership as distributed to two quarters.

Lineage	Upper quarter	Lower quarter
A	9 HHs	2 HHs
B	2 HHs	-
C	-	3 HHs
D	-	4 HHs
F	-	2 HHs
G	-	1 HH
None	-	1 HH (*mela*)

The *zoma* composition within Sisin varied through time, sometimes each year. Sisin households form the core of the camp units, and other households from other Oramarî villages join in or leave each year depending on the relations and negotiations between Sisin and non-Sisin residents. Below is one version of the *zoma* camp unit formation in Sisin as I observed it in the summer of 1982.

Table 4.4. Lineage membership and *zoma* composition in Sisin.

Zoma I.	From upper quarter	9 lineage A HHs 2 lineage B HHs
	From lower quarter	2 lineage A HHs 1 lineage D HH
	From other villages	6 lineage A HHs
Zoma II.	From upper quarter	None
	From lower quarter	3 lineage C HHs 3 lineage D HHs 2 lineage E HHs 1 lineage F HH 1 lineage G HH
	From other villages	2 lineage F HHs 1 HH from *qabîlê* Lemdînî

As is shown above, the upper quarter and *zoma* (I) are more homogeneous in terms of their lineage composition. Lineage A households are numerically dominant not only in the upper quarter and *zoma* (I) but also they are the largest lineage group within the village. This numerical superiority gave them a position to dominate in village affairs. Their numerical advantage however is the re sult of demographic as well as historical factors. Briefly, the village of Sisin was settled some 35-40 years ago. The initial 7 land shares were bought from the government by members of 5 lineages, those of A, B, C, E and another lineage member from the other *qabîlê* Lemdînî. Members of lineage A had 3 land shares initially, and now those shares are further fragmented among the 11 descendant households. Despite this fragmentation of land shares, the 11 lineage households altogether maintain most of the land in Sisin and thus could be seen as a core lineage.

Below is a kinship diagram showing the agnatic relations between the men in these 11 lineage A households. (The settlers in Sisin are in generation III.) From this diagram (Figure 4.1.) one can trace the genealogical relations and continuity between the original settlers of lineage A and the present lineage households. The second diagram (Figure 4.2.), however, shows the lines of extending kinship and affinity within the village simply by adding kin and affinal women to the first diagram. Thus, by adding women onto the patrilineal genealogy and lineage chart here one is able to show the kin and/or affinal links between 20 (out of 25 total) households. Only the women of lineage A create affinal/kin ties to 11 households from 3 different lineages.

I said that the core lineage A is numerically dominant and that due to demographic and historical reasons they control most of the land within the village. They are also the closest to one another within Sisin in patrilineal kinship terms. They do not have other such close patrilineal kin in other Oramarî villages. As a comparison, the two households of lineage C (C1 and C2 in Figure 4.2.) have 3 other brothers in 3 other places (2 in villages and 1 in Yüksekova town) and also many first cousins (father's brother's sons) in at least 5 Oramarî villages which provide them with a wide network of close patrilineal kin to work, trade, and have social relations with; thus they are less dependent on support from co-villagers and neighbours.

Lineage A households in Sisin form a closed group in terms of further agnatic relations, but have affinal links in a large area. The women of lineage A from generations I and II, and the women who married lineage A men from the same generations (see Figure 4.2.) affinally link these households not only to the households of the lower quarter (lineage A HHs are mostly in the upper quarter) but also to households in 4 other Oramarî villages, the town of Yüksekova and 2 non-Oramarî households (one from another tribe, Dorskî, and

Figure 4.1. Lineage A households in Sisin.


Generation
V
IV
III
II
I
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
Sublineage 1
Sublineage 2
Sublineage 3

Figure 4.2. Sisin households linked through women.


IV
III
II
I
E1
E2
D
D
D
A
A
A
A
A
C2
A
A
A
B1
B2
C1
A
A
A
○, △ Sublineage 1
◍, ▲ Sublineage 2
●, ▲ Sublineage 3
• HHHs
a,b,c... HHs
A,B,C... Lineages

the other from a *melazade* family). It was these affinal links, for instance, which mobilized financial assistance to Cihangir in the introductory story of Sisin's guns, and which led to diverse interpretations of who the informer might have been in the same case.

Lineage A households' influence on village affairs, thus, depends on the degree to which they act collectively as opposed to the other lineage households' alliances with tribes and kinsmen from other villages. These 11 households indeed act together to a considerable extent, especially in business and giving financial support for one another even if they do not hide all the differences in opinion between themselves. They trade with the same trader, buy and sell animals together, keep their herds together for the early spring grazing, and probably vote along the same lines in the village headman elections.

The support and collective responsibility the lineage members are expected to have is exemplified in the case below.

> A young man from lineage A and household (c) (see Figure 4.1) abducted a woman from another village. His helper was from the same lineage, a father's brother's son from household (b). The woman he abducted was a brother's daughter to a HHH in Sisin, B2 in Figure 4.2, from lineage B. The woman's father (living in another village) had not seen who the accomplices were, but gave the names of four men as responsible to the gendarmerie. The accused were the household heads of HHs (j), (b) and (f) in Figure 4.1 above, thus covering all the sublineages of lineage A in Sisin. (Sublineage 3 had no adult man at the time.) The father's accusations were based on the argument that the abductor's FB and father's brother's sons (FBS) were responsible for helping him in terms of actual use of force, advice, encouragement, and at least keeping quiet about the affair. As the case was taken to court, mediation and settlement was possible only after the intervention of a powerful tribal *agha* (from another tribe) of the region, who was the mayor of the town at the time.

It is important to note here the above case's implications for descent ideology and residence. The lineage A households in Sisin were treated collectively as parts of a unit and held responsible for the acts of one of its members. The affair did not expand to an inter-lineage one, however; hypothetically it could have done so, as the woman's father was from another lineage and another village. His neighbours in this other village are all close patrilineal kin to Sisin's lineage A households. Thus, if he had not limited his accusations to the sublineages in Sisin, then he would have challenged his neighbours, from lineage A, and probably upset a whole set of social and economic relations and the general peace in his village. According to the allegedly traditional alliances between tribes, in times of conflict certain tribes should come to the help of others. But in reality, as we have seen in the example above, this does not always happen. The case here shows that patrilineal ideology asserts shared responsibility for a member's acts but the extent of actual sharing and collective behaviour depends on many additional factors related to residence, affinity, density, and complexity of social relations between the parties involved.

Residence, neighbourhood and *zoma*

Common residence and descent are two principles which have been the pivot of corporate group theories. Sahlins (1965:105), for example, has argued that "the longer the system (of territorial groups) persists, ... the less agnatic it becomes. Yet the same ecologic and demographic pressures that disturb agnatic constituencies may in the upshot consolidate agnatic ideologies. For under pressure, agnation is functional, if not factual." The interaction of these two principles could be seen in the formation of neighbourhoods and *zoma* groups in Sisin.

The setting for the two neighbourhoods (*taxe*) in Sisin is determined largely by topography, climatic and physical conditions, availability of terraced fields, and the previous settlement pattern of the Nestorians. As we have seen above, at the time of settlement, out of the 7 land shares, lineage A members had 3, and they distributed their shares (fields, trees, and hay cutting areas) to both quarters. Their land stayed mostly within the sublineages although it was fragmented among the descendant males. Only one of their shares in the lower quarter has been sold and is now divided among 5 households from two lineages. 3 other households in the lower quarter bought some land from one lineage A household (sublineage 2 in Figure 4.1) and one lineage C household. Therefore, at the stage of settlement the agnatic groups carried out a strategy of spreading residentially,[20] thus forming mixed lineage neighbourhoods. They were further limited by landscape and climatic constraints. However, the physical division between the quarters does not correspond to the social division, which articulated itself in the formation of the two *zoma* groups.

After about 35 years of settlement and growth, Sisin as a village unit was divided into two camp groups (*zoma*) through a conflict which is recounted above. Here, the formation of *zoma* groups seems to be more flexible and suitable for articulating political and agnatic alliances, compared to the residential and neighbourhood formations. After all, in the case of a dispute between several households, involving the respective lineages or affinal groups, changing one's camp unit is easier than changing winter residence, fields, trees and the house.

In some cases where financial and property interests keep rival households together in one neighbourhood, the flexibility of *zoma* group formation allows for the expression of re-alignments between neighbours, kin and affines as well as causing further social fragmentation. In the early summer of 1982, Sisin's *zoma* groups had briefly broken up into further smaller units due to disputes between neighbours in the lower quarter. The disputes were settled quickly, so that those tents which had moved away into a different site returned and joined the rest of the *zoma* groups. In another village from the west of Hakkari the complexity and intensity of the conflict situation caused the fragmentation of *zoma* units on a more permanent basis.

> The village of Manitos is situated near the town of Hakkari and has a non-tribal population. It was previously occupied by Nestorians and is now settled by Kurds originating from surrounding villages. Today the villagers claim to be non-tribal although they recognize extended lineage ties to the original villages. The village is divided into two (physical) - and two social - neighbourhoods, after an unsettled dispute over pastures. Relations remained tense between villagers, (e.g. not visiting certain people despite the proximity), various members were hiding for long periods, and feared informants from the village would report to the gendarmerie about their activities. (The village is very close to another one which has been the centre of some Kurdish political activities, smuggling of arms and fighting with the military forces in the last 6 years.) In 1982 the village's two *zoma* groups had another fission and became 3 *zoma*s after 4 households broke apart because of the continuous tension and disputes between the village's rival blocs.

To conclude, in relation to residential and camp unit formations within a tribe, neighbourhood formation is rigid as a process, depending on topography and economy as well as the expansion strategies of agnatic groups. *Zoma* composition, on the other hand, because it is open to negotiations can become an arena for contests between political rivals, agnates and affines, or lineage blocs. Moreover, as I discuss below, *zoma*s are sooner and more often affected by disputes and their settlement than neighbourhoods.

Disputes and segmentation

Disputes often cause re-alignments or fragmentation within a tribe. This point is put more strongly by van Bruinessen (1978:51), who emphasizes that the segmentary character of the Kurdish tribal structure becomes perceptible only in conflicts. Here, I argue that disputes reveal segmentation to a certain degree, but the alliances or fission are not necessarily strictly along the tribal segmentary model. It resembles partly to another model, that of "tribal two-party system" as suggested by Gellner (1981:190).

Tribal segmentary and tribal factions models have been discussed extensively especially in the context of North Africa and Arab and Berber societies. Peters (1967) and Eickelman (1981), supporting him, argued that the tribal segmentary model is not a sociological but a folk model. Peters (1967:271-72) criticized the model with the following points: 1. the balanced opposition does not exist because resources are unevenly distributed between the segments, 2. there is a lack of joint action as the segments do not have a hierarchical set of institutionalized authority or leaders, 3. segments do not contain equal numbers of people or resources and some groups have dominance over others, 4. the model does not take women in to account, thus all the affinal links are ignored.

Gellner (1981), on the other hand, argued that the tribal segmentary model with opposing balanced segments existed at least in the past. Furthermore, he highlighted the sociological analysis carried out by Robert Montagne of the Berber tribes in Morocco, where Montagne had discussed the alternative internal structures of the tribes, as well as the relationship of these organizational forms to the central state. (Gellner, 1981:186)

The tribal organization in Hakkari today shows both segmentation and factionalism. The local model of tribal blocs presented earlier lists various tribes as traditional allies or enemies. But, as we have seen, in the case of a fight or dispute, not all tribes or all their sections as depicted in the model fulfil their assigned roles. Some parts of the rival blocs fight one another, but residentially more distant ones remain outside the conflict. Secondly, the local model of tribal organization lists some of the tribes as of a higher or lower level of segmentation and balanced opposition. For example, the 3 tribes listed as belonging to the "right wing" (*baskê rast*) of the tribal blocs, were, in informants' words, related to one another as follows: 1) If Dorskî fights against Pinyanişî, Oramarî would help the Dorskî; 2) If Oramarî fights Pinyanişî, then Dorskî would help the Oramarî; 3) If Dorskî and Oramarî fight each other, then Pinyanişî would remain neutral and would help neither. The interesting point about this local model of segmentary tribes is that the segmentation stops at the level of tribes and is not carried out in the smaller units of the tribes. For example, there was no similar segmentary model of opposing or allying units concerning the *qabîle*s of the Oramarî. As mentioned above the Oramarî tribe has two *qabîle*s, and each is said to have up to 10 *mal*s (lineage/clans). These *qabîle*s or *mal*s are not thought to be opposing each other in any form except for the rivalry between their leaders perhaps. Some *mal*s are quoted as "closer" (*nizik*) to each other, and this closeness is exemplified not in terms of conflict situations but in terms of having the hypothetical right of inheriting each other's property. No *mal* or *qabîle* is said to be under the obligation of supporting another in a dispute or fight against another similar unit. Therefore, at this point at least, the segmentary model of Hakkari's tribes seems to differ from both Peters' and Gellner's models.

The other point made by Gellner, that the segmentary model worked in the past, is difficult to test in the case of Hakkari due to the limited knowledge of its tribal past. The tribal rivalries accounted in Chapter 2 provide some evidence of strong leaders aligned to one tribe or another and thus, could suggest some form of tribal blocs perhaps; but I do not have knowledge of how the tribes were internally divided into various opposing segments.

The tribes of Hakkari closely resemble the Berber tribes of the northeastern Morocco discussed by D. Seddon (1973). Similar to the tribes in Hakkari, "the tribes of the northeast (Morocco), ... were never autonomous or isolated entities, either politically or culturally, and the majority of individuals living in the northeast were linked in a variety of ways with others from outside the tribe, the region, and even outside Morocco." (Seddon, 1973:116) As for the assumed opposition of the tribes to the Sultan and his *makhzen* (central government), Seddon objects to the model of permanent relation of hostility and opposition between *siba* (tribal dissidence) and *makhzen*: firstly, "the tribes often distinguished between the Sultan and *makhzen*, regarding the former with religious veneration and the latter with contempt." (Ibid., p. 117)

The distinction made between the Ottoman Sultan and his administrators could also be observed in Hakkari's history when tribes rebelled against the centrally appointed administrators but were quickly appeased by some favour or message from the Sultan. The local rulers of the tribes made this distinction a crucial part of their strategies in order to fully exploit the political resources. Secondly, Seddon remarks that "the tribes were not economically self-sufficient and could afford to cut off vital economic exchanges with urban markets only on a short-term basis." (Ibid., p. 118) Similarly Hakkari's tribes had a wide range of economic relations with the surrounding provinces and empires and could alternate between them according to the politics of the day but could not have survived a long time without the support of trade centres, cereal producing plains and the nomads who exchanged goods with them. Thirdly, the past and present situation of Hakkari's tribes resembles that of Seddon's Berbers, where "factionalism within the tribes generally prevented a long-term united front," and *makhzen* promoted this internal factionalism through differential treatment and strategies. (Ibid.)

As Seddon notes, "tribesmen were aware that while the 'segmentary lineage model' provided a reasonable shorthand and stereotyped 'explanation' of patterns of alliance and opposition, it did not really explain the actualities of political behaviour." (Ibid., p. 122) Further more, as stated above, the segmentary lineage model is thought to work at the level of tribes only. For alliance and opposition within a tribe, between villages or lineages, the ideology of patrilineal solidarity has to compete with mutual interests and obligations arising from residence, affinity and outside factors like ethnic and state politics. The fact that disputes effect *zoma* formation more often than neighbourhoods has already been mentioned. Below is a case study on how Sisin's two *zoma* groups were formed, illustrating how lineage ties mingle with affinal and neighbourhood obligations and how lineage blocs are formed within a village.

> The village of Sisin, until about 11-12 years ago, had a single camping unit. There were, however, various disputes between the households of the lower quarter (especially between the households from lineages A, C, E and F, without any consistent pattern of alliance or opposition) about field and hay cutting area borders, trees, grazing rights, and the like. Moreover, there were other disputes between members of lineages A and C in other Oramarî villages. There had been a previous wife-kidnapping between the settlers from lineages A and C, but the affair had long been settled. Kato (C2 in Figure 4.2) had kidnapped his wife from a lineage A family before or shortly after settlement in Sisin. The second attempt to kidnap a wife within the village caused the breakdown of relations between the lineage A HHs of the upper and lower quarters (lineage B HHs of the upper quarter sided with the latter), and the rest of the lower quarter households led by lineage C households.[21]
>
> A young man, Sülo, of a lineage C household in the lower quarter attempted to kidnap a woman from the upper quarter (from the *zoma* camp in summer). (She was a daughter from household 'h', in Figure 4.1.) He had two accomplices: Mehmet, (son of E1 in Figure 4.2), also a neighbour, and Çeto,

another neighbour's son. The two accomplices belonged to two lineages other than the kidnapper's. On the night of the kidnapping, as the three men were dragging the woman out of the tent and down the valley, they were seen by Tahir (the household head of 'i' in Figure 4.1) and Ali (B1 in Figure 4.2). The two men belonged to different lineages, but Tahir was a FBS (traceable cousin in this case, thus of the same lineage A) and, at the same time, mother's brother's son to the woman being kidnapped; Ali (of lineage B) was a MFZS to the woman and FFZS to Tahir, with whom he was travelling up to the *zoma* that night. They had guns with them and shot in the direction of the 3 kidnappers and the woman. The kidnappers were scared and ran away, leaving the woman behind, in a neighbouring village where the kidnapper, Sülo, had a lot of influential lineage FBSs, *pismams*.

After this incident, the three men (Sülo, Tahir and Ali) hid for a few months, while the relations between the lineage A and B households and the rest of the lower quarter deteriorated rapidly. Lineage A households in Sisin mobilized other lineage A households in other Oramarî villages against lineage C members; the brother of Sülo was beaten up by a non-Sisin lineage A man. Not only were lineage members getting involved in the dispute but upon the complaint of the woman's father, the gendarmerie forces in Oramar arrived in Sisin, and a gendarmerie corporal is supposed to have beaten Sülo's brother's son (Sülo and his brother were hiding, another elder brother was away), Mehmet's father (E1 in Figure 4.2) despite his old age, and another man from Ali's household. With the involvement of the gendarmerie, the tension escalated and the affair had to be referred to the tribal chief of Oramarî (who is now dead) who mediated between lineages A and C, especially between Sabri, the leading lineage A man in Sisin (the household head of 'j' in Figure 4.1) who was also the muhtar of Sisin earlier on, and Şükrü, the leading member of lineage C in Sisin (C2 in Figure 4.2) and other tribesmen from two other villages. The three men, Sülo, Tahir and Ali returned to their homes, the woman was married to her first cousin FBS, and from then on the "neighbourhoods" formed two camping units, *zomas*, resembling lineage blocs.

The above case illustrates several points about residence, patrilineal solidarity and forms of alliance and opposition. Firstly, lineages, or rather households belonging to certain lineages, align themselves differently depending on situational circumstances. The lineage B households who aligned with lineage A households in this case were the antagonists of lineage A households in the former incident of wife-kidnapping.[22] Similarly, lineage C households in Sisin have various affinal links to lineage A households and many call one another *pisxal* (the extended reference term for mother's brother's son). Yet in this case, although the affinal links eased the tension to some degree, especially by keeping the lines of communication and interaction between Şükrü's household (C2) and Sabri's household (j), they were not strong enough to prevent the fission.

Secondly, the responsibility for kidnapping, which challenges the honour of not only the household and lineage involved but of the whole village, is diffused between the households whose members are accomplices to the kidnapping. It is significant that Sülo did not go to his co-lineage households (who are also neighbours) for help in kidnapping but chose his friends and age-mates. The friends' household members, especially the male members, are thus drawn into the affair and have to share the responsibility as well as suffer the consequences like being beaten up for it.

Thirdly, the mechanism of dispute settlement is not regulated within the tribal system alone. There are no obvious leaders of tribal sections, such as lineage or *qabîle* leaders, to mediate between the households and lineages involved. The political and social system in the region is integrated into the central administration so that conflicts of all levels are referred to the gendarmerie or civil authorities. In this case the gendarmerie has followed the principles of collective responsibility since they beat up the closest agnates of the fugitives. In fact, according to the informants, the gendarmerie corporal was doing this on his own account as he was said to be a friend and "man" of lineage A households. We could conclude, therefore, that outside elements and coercive factors are part of the dispute settlement mechanism and tribal customs or justice do not function alone.

Finally, the case above illustrates that disputes may cause solidification of lineages as much as their segmentation. As we have seen, all Sisin households formed a single *zoma* group prior to this conflict, but with the culmination of the kidnapping affair the result was a fission for the whole of the village, yet at the same time, a solidification of agnatic ties between lineage A households and closer ties between lineage A and B households. Today the *zoma* groups strongly resemble lineage blocs so that each group attributes certain characteristics to one another, saying that the upper *zoma* people are more "conservative" or that the lower *zoma* group is not "united", "mixed with strangers" and the like. The upper *zoma* group, and especially lineage A households are very keen to present their lineage as a united front and are careful to conceal conflicts and disagreements within the group especially from outsiders. They consult one another first on many decision making matters and try to come to collective decisions on various trading, economic and political issues. They are fairly successful in their attempts to remain and look united as all the minor conflicts we were able to observe in the village involved those from the lower quarter and their *zoma* group, but never those within the upper quarter and their *zoma* group.

Leadership in Hakkari

Some theoretical points: From the history of Hakkari we know that leadership roles have been frequently but not always filled by tribal leaders. Today tribal leaders use different mechanisms to attain or maintain power and have to operate in a more complex political environment. As in the past, there is more than one type of tribal leader in Hakkari and these types exist simultaneously. The relevant questions to ask here are: How are these leadership types related to one another, to other authority and power sources within and outside the region and to the commoners? In this section I deal with such questions and try to show the changes and causes of change in tribal leadership in Hakkari.

The type of tribal leadership signifies the structural composition of tribal groups, the notions of equality and hierarchy among them, and the central state's attitude for ruling these tribal groups. Tapper, following Bailey's discussion of leaders and followers (Bailey, 1969:27-55), states that "tribal and governmental situations give rise to contrasting types of leadership"; when the challenge from the central state is weak, the leader may be a "brigand" type and attract "hirelings" by transactional ties; otherwise, in the case of the tribe's recognition of the government, the leader may be the chief who mediates in disputes and attracts the "faithful" with moral ties.[23] As "actual leaders combine elements of the two types",[24] actual power and control relations between the tribes, their leaders and states are more complex. Gellner points out that when the central state is very weak indeed, the leader is not even a brigand, but an official tribal head negotiating with the central state. The brigand arises when the state is strong enough to prevent overt tribal autonomy, but not strong enough to catch the brigand. Very strong leaders arise if the state is very weak or non-existant at one extreme, or very strong and actually chooses to appoint a local head.[25]

Gilsenan, in his discussion of the dependency between two types of leaders, lords and *shaikh*s in the Lebanon, distinguishes between lords and *shaikh*s of the mountains and the plains. For the *shaikh*s of the mountains, he points out, "the *shaikh*s form only one descent group among several others commanding equal resources of men, arms and rights to pasture and water, support comes in money and produce in return for political mobilization and mutual displays of 'respect'" (between lords and *shaikhs*).[26] The evidence from the history of Hakkari, especially between 1880 till the 1930s[27], is that, in the past the religious *shaikh*s and *sayyid* families had relations to tribal *agha*s, similar to those of the mountain *shaikh* families in the Lebanon as discussed by Gilsenan. Today, however, *shaikh* and *sayyid* families carry no more weight in political matters, especially after the most prominent *sayyid* family of Sadatê Nehrî was expelled, and their roles were assumed by tribal *agha*s.

Another theoretical point about the role of tribal leaders has drawn attention to the unificatory position of the tribal leader within the tribal unit itself. Van Bruinessen's analysis of tribal organization and segmentation in different parts of Kurdistan suggests that where the basic characteristics of Kurdish tribal organization are kinship and segmentation, the *agha*s of different segmentary units by competing among themselves may help the articulation of notions and relations of unity within the tribe, the sub-tribe or lineage.[28] Like the Big Man of Melanesia, therefore, the Kurdish tribal leaders could be seen as an "indispensable means of creating supra-local organization: in tribes normally fragmented into small independent groups, big-men (or Kurdish *agha*s) at least temporarily widen the spheres of economy, recreation and art, economic collaboration, as well as of war." (Sahlins, 1962-63:292) Kurdish *agha*s are not only key-men bringing factions together and building up a political career using "calculated generosities, by placing others in gratitude and obligation through helping them in some big way," (Ibid.) (like bailing out a client tribesman, or paying off part of a bride-price after a kidnapping), they are also in some ways office and title holders. Like the Polynesian chiefs, they sometimes keep a retinue (see below), "who could be directed internally as a buttress against fragmentary or rebellious elements." (Ibid., p. 297) How and why these apparently contradictory qualities of leadership could be found simultaneously is further dealt with below with contemporary and historical evidence from Hakkari.

Finally, it is suggested that the external factors (formal religion and literary traditions, a centralized state, other tribal confederacies and so on) and internal factors (relations of production, cultural and ideological commitments, and ecology) determine jointly the particular forms of tribal structures giving rise to certain differential roles for tribal chiefs.[29] Some authors emphasize external factors in the formation of tribal confederacies, whose chiefs (*mîr*s) have monopolized the power distributed from the centre,[30] while others give predominance to internal factors (like segmentary structures) to give rise to specific chiefs.[31]

It is beyond the scope of this work to account for all the external and internal factors which have affected the formation of all the 15 tribes of different sizes in Hakkari today, but on the basis of data collected from the tribe of Oramarî, which has links and relations to several tribal leaders, and comparing the findings to those from other parts of Turkey and Kurdistan, certain leadership types and trends become apparent.

Historical perspectives on leadership in Hakkari. The main features of the historical evidence on leadership types, tribesmen and leaders, and tribal leaders - state relations can be summarized as follows:[32]

1. As early as the 12-13th centuries, Hakkari was inhabited by Muslim Kurdish tribes led by chiefs, who joined in military expeditions in alliance with the Turkish Atabegs of Mosul. The tribes paid taxes to these paramount rulers (Atabegs or Ilkhans) in return for protection; but whether they were also taxed by their own tribal chiefs, and which groups (dependants, townsfolk, or *reaya*) had to pay taxes, we do not know.

2. From the mid-14th century onwards, the tribes in Hakkari are said to have united under their own paramount chief or prince (*mîr*). A dynastic name, Şembû, appears then, whose rival branches or members competed with one another for the office thereafter. The Şembû dynasty claimed descent from the Abbasids, and was thus theoretically of non-Kurdish origin, (the Arab origin was considered nobler then, as it still is today, at least for the *sayyid* lineages).

3. In the 16th century, the Ottoman administration extended its influence to the principality and formally appointed the hereditary ruling dynasty Şembûs to govern Hakkari. Yet, this recognition of the old aristocracy was not total, as the Kurdish *mîr*s were under the command of centrally appointed and mostly non-Kurd *mîr-i mîran*s (provincial governors). The latter manipulated the appointments of *mîr*s in Hakkari, the rivalries within the dynasty as well as between the tribes to an extensive degree.

4. Around the late 17th century, Hakkari's Şembû dynasty rulers had other titles like *müdür/mütesellim* (governor, as appointed by the central administration), in addition to the hereditary title of *mîr*. By this time, Hakkari is mentioned by Evliya Çelebi, as having an administration "like" *hükümet*; and some tribes, like the Pinyanişî, are also mentioned (by Evliya) as a separate *hükümet*, with their own land for collecting revenues, and whose rule was given to the tribal ruling family in return for providing tribal cavalry in times of war.

5. The existence of tribes ruled by tribal leaders was not peculiar to the Muslim Kurds only. The Nestorians who lived in Hakkari, are reported by 19th century missionaries and travellers to have had tribes (*eşîret*), subject peasantry (*reaya*), hereditary tribal leaders (*malik*) as well as religious community leaders and archbishops (*Mar Shimun*), whose areas of influence and interest led the *malik*s and *Mar Shimun* into frequent conflicts. Moreover, the Nestorian tribes are reported to have been divided into two rival camps, "left" and "right" tribes, and allied to the corresponding Kurdish "left" or "right" tribes. They also had a say in the election of the Kurdish *mîr* of Hakkari.

6. In the 19th century, there were various uprisings of (Kurdish, Turkish and other) provincial semi-independent rulers, after which the Ottoman administration set out a series of reform procedures, directly affecting the ruling power of the Kurdish *mîr*s and other rulers. In Hakkari, as in the case of Nurullah Beg (see Chapter 2), there were frequent clashes between defiant Nestorian tribes, Kurdish *mîr*s and tribes. As the area was under the influence of a number of forces by that time (European powers, in addition to Persia and the Ottoman central administration), the *mîr* had more opportunities for playing one force against the other, as long as the Powers were competing and not collaborating with each other, and internal rivals were not conceding to the state's pressures and promises.

7. With the abolition of the position of the paramount chief (*mîr*), the lesser tribal chiefs and religious *shaikh*s seem to have taken hold of the fragmented power. The power struggles among them had caused territorial divisions regarding areas of influence and tax collection, especially where the sedentary population had become the target of feuding rival chiefs and *shaikh*s, being not only taxed, but also raided on and exiled. The kinship ties between the lesser *agha*s and their tribal followers, and the lack of one powerful external source of authority must have created the "brigand" type of leaders, with the "hireling" type of tribal followers, prepared to raid and loot for their own and tribal interests.

8. Around the turn of the last century, the *sayyid*s and *shaikh*s seem to have benefited from the pan-Islamic ideology of Hamidian policies and the protection of the Sultan against the other local political forces (like the urban notables or provincial governors); they expanded their influence, kept armed retainers and collected tax from peasants and nomads. Apart from their power base in the region, they had followers throughout the surrounding provinces because of their religious authority as Naqshbandi *shaikh*s, making it possible for them (through the *tariqa* networks) to organize both Kurdish nationalist and religious uprisings.[33]

9. The changes during the first World War and the subsequent 20 years imposed a pattern not only of occupation and wars on the area, but also the expulsion of the Nestorians, of the most powerful *shaikh* and *sayyid* family and the gradual consolidation of the Turkish state in the area by a process of rewarding those tribal leaders and lesser religious personalities, such as the *melazade* families, who were cooperative against insurgent elements, and punishing those who were against the central forces, in various rebellions during the first 30 years of the Turkish Republic. For instance, Sadatê Nehrî *shaikh*s and *sayyid*s, who were prominent until 60 years ago, no longer have power based on land in Hakkari. One *melazade* family was famous for its holiness, and the late *mela* was said to perform miracles such as appearing in the dream of the military commander in Yüksekova and avoiding conscription in the army. These *mela*s are supposed to receive visitors from as far away as Istanbul, but they do not play any significant political roles, nor are they successful mediators. Some disputes, especially those concerning land and inheritance, are allegedly brought to them to be judged according to the *Sharia*, but there are more cases settled by tribal leaders, local administrators, gendarmerie or the civil courts.

Several concluding observations on the development of tribes and tribal rulers in the region are that: (a) The tribes in Hakkari have never been totally autonomous units but have given varying forms and degrees of allegiance to local or non-local rulers and the administration. (b) Tribal organization and leadership cut across religious community boundaries. (c) The political alliances between tribes and leaders function in forms of tribal blocs, segmentary structures or the checkerboard pattern. Tribal blocs seem to function at higher levels of tribal organization than those of federal confederacies, and correspond to the period of strong local leaders who also had to negotiate with the neighbouring and encapsulating political structures, such as the Ottoman and Persian empires. (d) The checkerboard pattern of tribal alliances corresponds to the period when either the neighbour states were weak and competing with each other or there were new outside political forces, such as the European Powers, missionaries and the like. (e) The aftermath of the First World War brought fundamental political changes to the region; new boundaries, exiled religious leaders, firmer application of central administrative control and new types of political processes (political parties, elections and organizations) caused the decline of some tribal practices (such as carrying guns or the blood vengeance) but provided new political resources and channels of mobility, such as education, party career, or professions. Some of the old ruling families have disappeared altogether from the political scene but having a tribal base and keeping kinship networks working are still important assets in political competition as we shall see below.

Leadership in Hakkari today. Today, there are tribal leaders (*agha*s) in Hakkari who are locally and in formally ranked according to their prestige, power and influence. However, there is no recognized "office" as tribal chiefdom. Moreover, the *agha*s have to reckon with hostile ideological positions of local left-wingers and non-local urban administrators, as well as the rivalries and strategems between the local political forces. Below, I present the case of a tribal leading family and suggest why certain tribal leaders are influential and how they are ranked in the eyes of the local population.

> At the head of the local ranking is the family of Zeydan's (which was listed as a sub-tribe of Pinyanişî by Sykes in 1908),[34] with three brothers, all referred to as *agha*. One of them is considered to be the most influential because of his long term membership in the Parliament of different political parties.[35] The second brother was chosen to be mayor 3 times, until he was removed from office after the 1980 military coup later to return to power in the last local elections (March 1984). The third brother owns a gas station in town and is fully occupied with trade and farming.
>
> In the 1983 parliamentary elections all 3 brothers nominated themselves, but two were vetoed by the National Security Council. The last one, the former Member of the Parliament, won a nomination from the list of the new Motherland Party (ANAP), but lost the elections to the candidate supported by Ertuşî leaders, who is now a member of the opposition party in the Parliament. (He resigned from the main opposition party, was an independent MP till August 1986 and now belongs to the new main opposition party, SHP.)
>
> The source of these brothers' power and influence is said to lie in the family's long history, their father's good relations with the founders and first politicians of the Republic,[36] their wealth ("owning" a few villages, the gas station, a big house in town, receiving "gifts" of produce and animals from their own tribesmen and clientele, enterprise in the construction business in the district), their good connections with other tribal leaders (two brothers who lived locally have three wives each, some of them are from other tribes' leading or chiefly families), and most significantly their firm hold of their own lineage and village group. The firm hold is actually defined by Oramarî

informants as the three brothers' absolute domination over their own villages through the use of threats, coercion and their obedience.

The Zeydan brothers demonstrate how different aspects of leadership qualities, which are referred to as structural contradictions, namely the oppressive versus popular rule,[37] can be distributed among different brothers. It is, in some respect, a division of leadership roles among them, thus alleviating the contradictions but introducing new problems.

> The eldest brother, ex-MP, is reputed to be a religious, respectable and learned man;[38] the second is the traditional, farming and local leader, known for his firm rule, three wives, ownership of one of the two gas stations, and having affinal links to the other family owning a gas station. The third brother, the mayor, is the clever man of politics, mediating between tribal groups, allegedly receiving high sums of money and "gifts" for this purpose, reputedly full of strategies and intrigues, shrewd and ambitious.

The separation of these inherently contradictory characteristics of leadership, therefore, entails another structural problem, mainly how to maintain a balance of power and prestige between the brothers and prevent any one of them from monopolizing the power. The strongest reinforcement obviously comes from external threats to the system of chiefdom and *agha* domination. These threats not only stem from the competition of other *agha*s, but also the central administration's agents who want to break the monopoly of the *agha*s' power as well as local political groups who pursue anti-*agha* politics.[39]

Whatever the internal relations, rivalries or support between the three brothers actually are, an internal strife recently became public as rumours spread about the three having "informed the authorities" (*ihbar*) on each other's activities, after the nominations for the candidacy in the last parliamentary elections had resulted in 2 brothers being vetoed. The local opinion was that the brothers were working against one another, thus the problem of divided (or collective) leadership has not been overcome, at least for the time being.

The Zeydan brothers not only have a divided power rule between themselves, they also have to maintain their position vis-à-vis (a) the rival leading branch of Pinyanişî, and (b) the leading *agha*s of the Ertuşî tribe.

> The rivalry to the Zeydans, in the political arena, comes from different levels of segmentation in their tribe. The first and most important rival was a matrilateral kin, a lawyer, who is also an affine (wife's brother) to the late Oramarî *agha* (Oramarî, it should be remembered, belong to the same tribal bloc as the Pinyanişî). He was the senator of Hakkari for one term. Allegedly, at the time of his second candidacy, the Zeydans did not support him and instead supported the other candidate, an Ertuşî tribesman. The Ertuşî candidate belonged to Zeydan's political party then. The local interpretation of the affair is that the Zeydans supported the Ertuşî candidate **not** because of their common party political affiliation, but to hinder their lawyer kinsman from becoming prominent in the local political scene without their consent.
>
> A second rival family to the Zeydans is the Cellî lineage (which is again reported as a sub-tribe of Pinyanişî, see Sykes, 1908:462). Similar to the Zeydans, Cellî is referred to more as a family with influential and wealthy members rather than as a sub-tribe or clan. They claim equal noble status and historical significance, and have western Hakkari as their area of influence and followers. They have power to influence Hakkari's municipal elections, are members of the province's regional administrative organizations, owning shops, gas stations, or engaging in the construction business. They are frequent rivals in municipal elections to candidates from the Ertuşî tribe, but so far have not come up with a candidate for the national elections.

Leadership, therefore, is not vested in one lineage or dynasty alone, nor is there a single rule, such as primogeniture, to determine the leader; but it is a power position achieved as a result of successful use of resources, tactics and political management in the same way as the Melanesian Big Men. This could hardly be said to have emerged only in the recent history of Hakkari: Hakkari's paramount chiefs in many cases emerged after fierce competition between close patrilineal kinsmen and some times rival lineages.[40] In fact, some historical evidence suggests that the leaders were chosen by the tribal leading members and the elders (*rih spi*).[41]

Today's situation seems more like a choice determined after a competitive career in political leadership. The followers still have some possibility of rejecting a certain chief, i.e. not obeying his demands or not showing "respect", known as "not recognizing the *agha*" (*ağayı tanımamak* in Turkish), but then the followers have to have some basis of self-reliance for rejecting the *agha*'s protection and the concomitant imposed authority. Evidently this was not possible for the Jirkî group recorded below.

> In a valley west of Sisin and on the other side of the Cilo mountains, Nestorian tribes used to live; after their expulsion, the valley (which is said to have been comprised of at least 10 villages in the time of the Nestorians) was fought over between Jirkî, Oramarî and Pinyanişî tribal groups, the latter two allied against the first. A Jirkî *agha* managed to have control over a large part of the valley and the Oramarî kept only a pasture site. In 1980 the *agha* of Jirkî had settled in the main village of the valley a whole new group of people who fled their village in Beytüşşebab because of a blood feud. They belonged to the *agha*'s tribe of Jirkî but not to his sub-tribe or lineage. Their relationship to the *agha* was semifeudal; in return for his protection and refuge, they paid him in cash and kind as well as *zebari* of the non-reciprocal kind (see Chapter 5). The tribesmen were bitter and very conscious of being exploited and talked openly about the oppression of the *agha*s. One young man in conversation said: "Let me put it this way. One *agha* orders his man to go and steal sheep; of course, the shepherd of the other *agha* has to protect his own *agha*'s sheep. The first man will shoot to steal, the other to protect the animals; one of them will die but both *agha*s will be sitting comfortably at home." In this case, the protection from the *agha* was crucial and the relationship between him and the tribesmen was based on the lack of alternatives and the recognition of power.

Finally, on the question of ascending to leadership; as has been seen in several cases in Hakkari's history, possessing tribal membership or originating from the area are not absolute requirements for gaining political support in supra-local elections. Hakkari had one senator and one MP who were both from other provinces; one had worked in Hakkari as a governor (*kaymakam*) before and later as a lawyer, the other had won the elections from a small party in 1965.[42] It should be added, however, that an *agha* position, i.e. leader of a tribal group, is unlikely to be filled by a rank outsider; there has to be some connections to the rural tribal basis, even if through affinity.

If the leadership in Hakkari depends not only on a number of given factors but also and more importantly on the establishment of a career goal, then the question to ask is; what does a leader have to do to attain and maintain this position? Different authors emphasize different aspects of what leaders do. Vinogradov (1974: 215) lists the Shabak[43] patrons in terms of what they mediated: 1) *pirs* were mediators between the Divine Power and the Shabak, 2) urban *sada* (holy lineages, similar to *sayyid* lineages among the Kurds) were economic patrons and landowners and mediated between the State and the Shabak, 3) rural *sada* (ex-Shabak, newly Arabic speaking and claiming holy lineage status) mediated within and between the Shabak.

Gilsenan (1977:171-75) in a similar vein, distinguishes between the "domains of influence" of *shaikh*s and those of landlords and stresses the "links of dependency" between them. The historical evidence from Hakkari resembles both the Shabak and the Lebanese situations, but presently the links with the Divinity are no one's monopoly and chanelled more into supporting a variety of anti-state or anti-Kemalist religious political movements, like the Hizb-ul Islam - an Iranian influenced underground party - or the National Salvation Party (MSP) prior to the 1980 coup. Lesser religious authorities exist around Hakkari (and across the borders) but are neither united nor is the political power to be reckoned with.[44]

Van Bruinessen (1978:91) emphasizes the processual aspects of leadership, and claims that Leach's classification (1940) of *agha*s as village, clan, and tribal *agha*s, and his stress on the "levels of organization and corresponding leadership", "could obscure the real processes." Meeker's (1972) discussion of the great family *agha*s of the Black Sea Turks pronounces similar processual aspects. According to Meeker, the political categories are a product of the local system and the national culture and common history. The *agha*s of the Black Sea region have their base in large patronymic groups, which sometimes includes hundreds of households cutting across different village lines, but it is **not** an *aşiret* system. "The *agha*s of Yeşilyurt were not tribal chieftains of descent groups; neither were they, as *agha*s, holders of an office which existed formally apart from its occupant." (Meeker, 1972:244) They were mentioned as either "good" *agha*s, who "cultivated a reputation for honour, piety, hospitality and generosity," or "bad" *agha*s, who "relied excessively on violence and coercion to maintain ... authority." (Ibid., p. 247) A third aspect of the legitimacy of *agha*s depended on "the nature of their relationship with the formal hierarchy of the state," which was neither considered good nor bad in itself, but determined the extent of an *agha*'s authority. (Ibid.)

In Hakkari, similarities to Yeşilyurt's chieftainship exist with respect to the classification of "good" or "bad" *agha*s. Some *agha*s are considered "close", generous, caring for their people and of noble origins, whereas some, like the lesser *agha* of Jirkî in the case above, are considered cruel (*zalim*), despotic, and greedy. The main difference between the two cases is the existence of *aşiret*s in Hakkari and their absence in Yeşilyurt. The national culture, which is spread through the central system of education and the media, includes Hakkari as well to a lesser or greater degree and is riddled with political patronage relations.[45] The emergence of *agha*s in both tribal and non-tribal organizations cannot be pure coincidence. Moreover, the *agha*'s relations to the formal hierarchy of the state are not seen with an indifferent eye, but are a vital if difficult part of the Hakkari's leaders' careers, especially throughout the turbulent years of the Republican period.

Eberhard (1953), Erdost (1968), Yalman (1971), Kudat (1975), and P. Khoury (1982) have emphasized the landed base of tribal leaders. After sedentarization of nomadic tribes, tribal leaders have been transformed from "'patriarchs' into profit-seeking landlords" with the tribesmen as cultivators and tillers of the land (P. Khoury 1982:180), while the leaders usually employ intrigues, foresight and power in registering the land in their own names. (Yalman, 1971:187) Erdost (1968) pointed out that the religious *shaikh*s and *sayyid*s of the Sadatê Nehrî family in Şemdinli had bought the land from the tribes. It is not clear whether the purchase was from individual HHs alone or more from other tribal leaders and *mîr*s. They also monopolized the trade and cultivation of certain profitable products, like tobacco, around the turn of the last century.

The emphasis on the landed interests of tribal and religious leaders as the source of power and economic domination cannot be applied to Hakkari, especially as regards the present situation, mainly because of the relative unimportance of the scarce land for cultivation and the greater importance of pastures. As was described earlier, of the 86% of the soil in Hakkari suitable for cultivation, 59% of this is used as pastures and only 1.4% for cereal or other agricultural produce. Therefore, land ownership (i.e. for agricultural usage) cannot be the main source of economic domination in the area,[46] despite the fact that the tribal leaders are sometimes said to "own" several villages; in these villages share-cropping arrangements exist.

Since the main source of income is pastoral production, the ownership or control of pastures is the main issue here. Tribal groups theoretically have collective rights to traditional pastures. In practice, tribal leaders could influence who uses these rights, organize fights over pastures or rent the rights of usage to a different tribal group. Such cases from Hakkari have been reported by Hütteroth (1959), van Bruinessen (1978), and it is mentioned in the province's official yearbook that tribal leaders rent unused pastures in western Hakkari to nomadic groups.[47] The crucial difference in this situation from that of the landowning *agha*s in Diyarbakır plains[48] is that the pastures on the mountains cannot be legally owned as private property, thus when it comes to legal defitions no group or individual can prove they own them. The case of the pastures which are within the village borders or next to it is somewhat different, as these "village pastures" are legally administered as common village property; in these villages where the tribal *agha* is the dominant person, he may use his power and influence to determine who in the village, or outside it, can use the pasture. But the fact that pastures are used by *zoma* groups means that the *zoma* members have to defend their individual household's interests. For tribal *agha*s to expel a whole group of *zoma* members from a certain pasture, a variety of complex strategies are required which cannot be based solely on landownership.

I suggest that in Hakkari the tribal *agha*s' power and position rest in their ability to manage the different resources of authority and power simultaneously. Coercion, confiscating land and animals, the use of sheer violence against the central government's administrators or local opposition through hirelings are as much a part of the *agha* politics as consolidating their position through affinal links to rival *agha*s, forming *kirve* relations[49] with the local military officers, supporting the governmental party as well as Kurdish nationalist politics and having professionals, politicians and farmers simultaneously in the family. As it is difficult for one person to consistently carry out all these strategies simultaneously, there are fluctuations in the careers of *agha*s, division of roles and ranking between them in terms of "greatness" and "influence", all of which vary in the course of time.

Contemporary tribal leaders, like the central state, have to adjust not so much to changes in technology and increased capitalist production,[50] as to an increased level of politicization, clearer expression of ethnicity, and a greater frequency of contacts with Kurdish nationalist politics across and within the borders. Ethnic consciousness is an important factor for identification with the tribal leaders. Sisin villagers, for instance, say they support the Zeydans because they are Sisin's "men" (*mirovê me*), and can better represent their interests and political opinions, despite the difference in tribal membership. This does not, however, make Sisin villagers into clientele of Zeydans, as they use different 'patrons' for various services and do not agree with Zeydans all the time. It could be said that leaders nowadays are more obliged to take up a position with respect to the Kurdish political question and the conflicts with in it, more so than the Kurdish *mîr*s of the past did, who calculated in terms of personal rivalries in the area and played regional support against the outside political forces.

Therefore, it is not surprising that *agha*s of different tribes engage in rival Kurdish and Turkish politics. This is as much a product of the combined effect of Turkish political culture becoming more representative of the local political views, as the leaders' families are the first ones in the region to be incorporated into the Turkish educated and professional classes, who can now participate in the nationwide spectrum, of parties, associations and profesional groups. Today, having been arrested for alleged Kurdish political activities or hiding fugitives from the government, is as much a part of the Kurdish *agha*'s 'fame', as his rule over a tribe or a village, or as banditry won in the past. The common ethnic identity of the local leaders and followers is a political factor on its own, which needs to be reckoned with separately from, or at least without reducing it to, tribal cleavages and local rivalries.

Summary and concluding remarks

In Hakkari, where approximately fifteen tribes of varying size and importance exist, the most significant aspect of tribal membership is the communal rights to tribal pasture usage. Common descent is the ideology shared by tribal members but it is both flexible to suit various strategies and claims, and needs cultivation and reinforcement through affinal, neighbourhood and friendship relations. One could lose the benefits of tribal membership through neglect and separate residence or alternatively take part in tribal pasture camps by forming contractual or affinal links. Thus, the residential organization, in terms of neighbourhood and village formation, reflects environmental and historical factors, rather than social relations, alliances or disputes, which play an important role in the formation of pasture camp (*zoma*) groups.

In Hakkari's tribal organization, segmentary and factional models are alternative folk models, with which real or hypothetical disputes at the level of tribes are explained. A segmentary model or factionalism, however, does not work at the lower levels of tribal organization. Other principles of social relations, those of patrilineal solidarity, notions of honour and manhood, obligations of neighbourhood and affinity, are more important in determining alliances, cooperation or fission at lower levels of tribal organization.

In this context, tribal leaders emerge as mediators as well as political careerists, property managers or semi-feudal lords. The successful leaders are those who can either divide the leadership roles between close kin and manage collectively without any major dissent among the kin, or those who can fill the leadership functions simultaneously. Leadership is both an office, for which there are certain privileged candidates, and a career, for which the candidates have to develop suitable strategies. Finally, tribal leaders do not base their power and authority on land ownership, as communal pasture land is more important than individual agricultural plots. Yet, the existence of a strong leader has much to do with securing communal access to tribal pastures by preventing fragmentation of the tribal group. Identification with a strong leader affects the perception of the group as a powerful tribe. Strong leaders who manage successful political careers could in return reward their supporters by channeling resources to them, thus reinforcing the reasons for tribal solidarity.

The contestants for political leadership are not exclusively from the tribes. The issues to be dealt with in political decisions and management are complicated and contradictory. Political leaders have to take position on ethnic issues, which can not be expressed as ethnic issues, and on central administrative issues which make them vulnerable to tests of loyalty from both the central government and the local forces. Thus, these constraints on the political structure contribute to the unstability of leadership positions.

The descent ideology has been said to be a pivotal principle for the tribal system. Tribal membership is claimed and recognized to pass through patrilineal lines but kinship through matrilateral lines are also important. Matrilateral kin, affinal relations and neighbourhood ties often complement the importance of agnatic lines and provide the networks for economic, political and social cooperation. In the following I discuss how kinship ideology works in tribal and non-tribal contexts at the village level, how kinship terms are extended and what sort of tactical meanings these extensions have.

5. The village and the village household

The village setting

It has been indicated earlier that c. 70% of Hakkari's population lives in villages which are located along valleys and on mountain slopes. The first settlements in Hakkari date back to early centuries, and now, on the ruins of some of these early villages, new villages have been founded. The choice of the site of a village depends on the features of landscape and climate as much as to the political and economic conditions. In the past, for instance, settlements seem to have moved further up into the hills and deeper into the valleys in times of population expansion or threats from outside; today almost all the villages are settled on those early sites which are along accessible valleys, near the roads and the plains. The tendency is to leave the inaccessible mountain villages in order to move into towns or villages closer to roads and with better transportation facilities.

Mountain and plains villages are different in their outlook to some degree. Mountain villages do not have much space into which to expand other than by breaking up into smaller units and re-settling in distant corners. The climatic conditions cause the clustering of houses together. Indeed, mountain village houses are so much on top of each other that it is sometimes difficult to differentiate the houses from the landscape around it. In Sisin, for instance, avalanches regularly swept away some of the fields and trees at the edges of neighbourhoods and restricted the area of land use and expansion.

The plains village houses are more dispersed in comparison to the mountain village houses. Similarly, fields and orchards would be more dispersed around the plains villages. In terms of infrastructure, such as roads and electricity, the plains villages have a better chance than the mountain villages of being provided with these facilities by the central administration. Not many mountain villages, however, have water supplies, schools or roads, hence the more primitive standard of housing, irrigation and cultivation. In villages where there is no clean or piped spring water, the houses are built on sites where some drinking water is accessible (especially in winter) and used water does not get mixed with the spring water.

The use of physical space within the village reflects communal concerns as well as the individual household's interests. Each household owns (or rents) a house, certain fields and trees in the village. There are various water springs which are communally used even if they happen to be within a household's field or property. The property owner cannot prevent the other villagers from using the water. Similarly, the construction of an animal shed, an outside toilet, or the preparation of a new vegetable garden must take into account the effects on neighbours' property and interests. The irrigation water for vegetable and fruit gardens and fields is also shared on an agreed time-plan and by using irrigation canals. Animals are kept on the household's own property in winter and watched carefully by children and other household members.

The space around the village, i.e. the hills, forests and pastures, is also divided into communal or private use areas. Although legally the hills and pastures are state property, the traditions of usage rights are recognized according to tribal and/or village membership. It is expected that the pastures and hills around a village will be used by the members of that village but also to some extent by the members of the tribe which those villagers may belong to. For example, Sisin has various pastures and camp sites which are collectively used by Sisin villagers but other Oramarî tribal members too have rights of usage. Yet an Oramarî (tribesman) who is not from Sisin (village) cannot simply enforce his rights of usage without consulting the villagers and/or having some close friendship or kinship ties to them. Similarly, Sisin villagers take their animals to graze in early spring to lower valleys which are closer to other Oramarî villages; they have a traditional right to do so. Not all the villagers use their traditional right mainly because it causes conflicts with the members of those villages concerned.

> In the early summer of 1982, a couple of Sisin villagers wanted to activate their rights for the early grazing grounds of lower valleys near the village of Oramar but were refused by the *muhtar* of Oramar (who was also the son of the late Oramarî tribal chief) who presented the case as a village communal decision that the area of concern belonged to Oramar's administrative unit and thus could not be shared with other villages. A solution was sought among the Sisin villagers which would not openly challenge the *muhtar*'s point, and it was decided that households would divide their animals into twos or threes to be fed together with their Oramarî affines' herds until the pastures were free from snow. In return, these households from Sisin would pay in money or produce or would feed a few of the Oramarî affines' animals throughout winter, meaning they would have to supply the fodder for the affines' animals. It was not possible to investigate how these arrangements

were implemented after the fieldwork period. Yet, considering the problems of pasture and grazing area shortage and how this affected the internal alliances within the tribe, between villagers, kin and affines, it is possible to assume further similar conflicts where traditional rights are challenged or redefined.

The point, then, is that the physical environment, of mountain villages especially, can stretch far beyond the village's administratively drawn borders and the use of space is heavily influenced by the political and social relations within and between the villages, as well as the tribal politics.

Fights over grazing areas, pastures and trees are very frequent in Hakkari and often provide the grounds for court cases.[1] These fights often involve women as claimants or victims of attacks and people who are linked affinally. However, tribal, kin or affinal links all have to be kept up in order to practise the traditional rights. Many tribesmen who live in Yüksekova, for example come to the tribal region and mountain hills to collect wood and *geven* (tragacanth bushes) to burn in winter, or to collect herbs in summer; these rights can be challenged or denied if they are not continuously practised. To conclude, although the tribal members have a traditional right to benefit in various ways from the tribal communal lands, these rights have to be sustained by continuous usage, supplemented by forming affinal alliances with the politically powerful members of the tribe or those who have extra usage rights deriving from residence.

The house: the use and symbolism of its social space

As the position of houses is arranged according to the physical features of the land and climate, the choice of sites in some of the mountain villages is limited. All the construction material (i.e. stones, tree trunks, bushes, hay and clay) is local and requires mostly unskilled labour, usually collectively provided by the village men. New houses are built mostly after households divide. Depending on the distribution of land which the original household owns, the new house will be built in the vicinity of the original, or in another village or town. When it is in the same village, the common pattern is to build an adjacent house by extending the original building and adding one or two new rooms (sometimes also a new kitchen) for the separated members of the original household.

The building itself, called *xani* in Kurdish (or *mal*, see below), is made from stones in Cilo mountain villages and mud (*kerpiç*) or cement bricks in plains villages and the town. It usually consists of two stories, each storey having its own entrance. The mountain village houses are built with stones, on top of each other, mortared with the local clay and hay mixture and made into thick walls with small windows. Window frames, glass and doors made by carpenters have been recently introduced and where they exist, have been brought from the nearest town. The walls, like the roof, are supported by poplar trunks. For the roof and the floor of the first storey, poplar trunks are covered with thinner branches, bushes, dry hay and finally clay earth. Both the floor and the roof have to be repaired and renewed often. On the roofs, all the houses have cylindrical stone rollers (*bogirdan* in Kurdish) to keep it flat and disperse the water after rain or snow fall.

Other than the main building, there may be several additional structures such as a separate cooking and bathing room, storage room(s), and fold(s) and stable(s). In Cilo mountain villages, the lower ground storey of the main building was used in winter as a sheep fold and hen pen, and in summer as a cool storage place for cheese, butter and vegetables. In plains villages and some old style town houses, the lower storey also has a kitchen and bathing space. The number of buildings a household would have depends on its wealth and prestige.

The main building where the household members eat and sleep has at least one and at most three rooms in Sisin, which is also the average size in mountain villages.

Figure 5.1. Sketch plan and frontal view of a main building.



The largest living room (*mezel* in Kurdish) would serve the guests as well as being the sleeping and eating room for the male and female household heads (HHH). As I discuss below, receiving and entertaining guests is an important part of the village social life, indicating rank and hierarchy within and between households. Moreover, unlike many Turkish and west Anatolian villages, east Anatolian Kurdish villages have neither "village rooms" (*köy odası* in Turkish) nor coffee shops (*kahvehane*) where villagers and outsiders, mostly men, meet and visitors to the village could spend the night;[2] thus, receiving guests in ordinary houses and in a well-kept room is of utmost importance.

One of the first consequences of this arrangement is that the guest-cum-living room is both a private and public space. Household heads compete with one another in order to receive guests in their own guest room, as there is not a "neutral" space like a village room or coffee shop. Secondly, because the guest room is within the house, the male-female or age group segregation is not as strict as has been reported in some other Middle Eastern societies.[3] The main guest-cum-living room's social importance for the household members and the village social relations, is reflected through the objects contained in it. A list of typical objects one would find in a main room in Sisin is given below:

> Wool carpets on the floor (woven by the women of the HH), cushions to sit and bolsters to lean on spread around the room (all hand-made), bedding neatly piled up at one corner (those covered with better material come on the top), a small table at another corner on which an old samovar (not used, but bought at a high price in Iran) and a tray with tea glasses are kept, a low wooden cupboard (made by the male HHH) on which the bedding is kept, a bench covered with strips of woven rug and cushions to sit or sleep on (by important guests), a goat's skin prayer rug hung on the wall (should be visible to the guests who use it at prayer times), a wooden trunk (the only furniture brought in by the daughter-in-law in which she keeps her private jewelry and clothes locked) binoculars (from the Korean War), a rifle (not displayed for a while after the 1980 military coup, see Chapter 1), a butane gas lamp used only when there are many and important guests - the strong glow of the butane lamp indicates the visit of a special guest in the village that night -, a hi-fi casette recorder and a radio (smuggled, used for playing Kurdish or Turkish music to entertain guests, or to hear news broadcasts) and pictures and photographs of friends, ancestors, and relatives, mostly taken during the military service.

The quality and quantity of the objects in the main room vary slightly according to wealth and social status from one household to another in mountain villages. For example, in a *sayyid*'s house in a Şemdinli village, one could find furniture such as chairs and armchairs, a big wall clock, a furniture bed or a steel desk. All these goods have been carried to the house on mules as there are no proper roads. The inner walls of such a house would be painted white and green (similar to the *sayyid*'s white and green turban), the colour of holy and *sayyid* families. In another village house, one could find religious objects such as items brought back from the Hajj, special and valuable prayer rugs, paintings of Muslim saints and the Prophet; objects displaying female taste and elegance such as embroidery, knitting and woven material; or picture-cards or posters of past and present Turkish political and military leaders suggesting the HH head's political affiliations. The tidiness of the room is another indicator of the household's prestige which has to be maintained and improved with the collective efforts of the household members, even if some members have more responsibility and authority than others. These fine details (except the *sayyid*'s green coloured walls or armchairs) are noticeable only to familiar and scrutinizing eyes, otherwise, they are not ostentatious symbols of prestige and authority in the tribal village setting.[4]

As a comparison, a tribal chief's or a wealthy tribal trader's house in town has furniture as in cities, electrical goods such as refrigerators, stoves, TV sets, and the house has been built with cement bricks (instead of the mud ones) and has a tiled roof (instead of the flat mud roof). The power and prestige symbolized in the style and decoration of the house is linked to the household head's "modern" and "urban" way of life, augmented by his city clothes of the urban Turkish style as opposed to the simple, village and Kurdish traditional ways.

> A mountain village house, which had a special room containing these prestigious items associated with the urban, modern and Turkish culture belonged to the late Oramarî tribal chief, in the village of Oramar, and was inhabited by one of his sons, the muhtar of the village. The house was built with stones, to that from the outside it was not different from other houses. Yet, the insides of the walls were covered with cement and painted, even if it was not very well kept (windows were broken and doors would not close). One room contained the bed of the HHH and the children's bedding and it was modest in style; the villagers and kin were received in this room. In a second room, there were armchairs, tables, and a big bed with sheets

> and pillow cases to accommodate outsider guests; otherwise it was not lived in (it had no permanent stove) but was kept shut and clean. These two rooms and the style of furnishing illustrate two aspects of the muhtar and his family's social status in the village - first that he is expected to be an ordinary (and not rich) member of the tribe, but secondly that he is also the son of the ex-*agha*, himself a muhtar and thus obliged to host outsiders in a style suited to urban and "civilized" people.

Other than the main "guest" room, there may be one or two other living rooms (*ode* in Kurdish, same as *oda* in Turkish), not as big, well-kept or decorated, but used primarily by an elder married son and his wife and children. In this secondary room mostly women, especially those with suckling babies, and children spend their time during the day, whereas adult men either sit in the main room or spend their time outside, at work or visiting. The patterns of room usage reveals a hierarchy according to age, sex and sibling order within the household. A young bride for example, is not expected to sit or eat in the main room unless she is specifically asked to do so by the male or female household head, otherwise she sits in the secondary room and occupies herself with some chore. Children do play all around the house, yet they could be easily chased away from the main room when the male household head wants to use the space for himself alone. He is expected to spend his time at home in this room in winter and outside on the porch in the summer. Other adult men of the house are expected to follow his behaviour and thus not spend their time where the children "make noise" or women "chatter" (*gijgijê jinkan*) except at night when a man should sleep with his wife.[5] This connection between room usage and social position within the household provides the household members with strategies for claiming or expressing changes in status.

> In two households in Sisin, two adult men (one was the eldest son, the other brother's son to the respective male household heads) were getting ready to separate their own households from the original extended ones. Ideally partition is delayed as late as possible (ideologically sustained with Kurdish proverbs like: "*Kurekî ku ji bo bavê xwe dixebite, ji bo nefsa xwe dixebita*", a son who works for his father, is working for himself)[6], the partition between father and son, father's brother and brother's son being harder than that between brothers. In the case of these two men (in their mid 30s) the topic of separating their houses could not be brought up in public by themselves. But because the partition was imminent, they were

displaying the anticipated and desired change in status by spending their spare time with women and children in the small room and not in the *mezel*. They had to put up with the teasing (*lomeykirin*) of the male HH heads, ridiculing the two for preferring the company of women and children to that of adult men in *mezel*. The wives of the two men were engaged in similar strategies; although they were senior brides in their respective households, they hardly ever sat with the guests in the main room, usually giving either legitimate excuses such as the amount of chores they have to do (although they could easily spare some time or get some one else to do them), or the number of children they have to look after (five and eight in each case; the excuse is also the woman's public statement about the size of "her family" - *ayal* in Kurdish means both children and family - thus her need for her own house and household management). The wives' discreet refusal to join the guests in *mezel* (unless specifically and clearly asked by the guests) was also a means of obliging them to come and visit separately in the "other room", hinting a new centre of household formation.

In another case, a young bride, who did not get along with her mother-in-law, very rarely came to sit, eat or serve in the main room although the guests were often real or classificatory FBSs or other patrilateral kin to her. (She was a traceable FBD to her husband.) As a protest she squatted in the second or third room with her child in a dark corner, rarely taking part in conversation or eating food with other women and children. She also spent a lot of time hanging about in the dark corridor,[7] or outside in front of the porch in winter. She was scorned by her mother-in-law for this behaviour, but by taking only secondary, marginal and undesirable space in the house, she was expressing not only her unwillingness to be a part of the household, but also the fact that her mother-in-law treated her unfairly and was not trying to make up with the daughter-in-law, thus bringing "shame" (*şerme* in Kurdish) to the household. A senior bride-cum-FBD like her demands a stable and honoured position in her affinal household.

Because the second or third rooms are assigned for women and children's use, the male household head, like villager or non-villager male guests to the house, would not enter the secondary rooms unannounced, usually calling first and waiting at the door for some time, thus allowing those in the room to change their position or attire and show due respect. If one could rank the rooms, with respect to their day-time usage, according to the principles and codes of respect, prestige, gender, and sibling order: the main room (*mezel*) would be reserved for the male household head - he eats, sits, works and sleeps there during the day and night. Senior sons, brother's sons and the female HH head also spend most of their time indoors in this room, especially when there are guests. The senior brides, young daughters, and children eat in the secondary room, or with guests if they are asked to.

The sleeping arrangement at night, however, may be different, as different avoidance principles apply. Firstly, the eldest son, his wife and children would not sleep in the same room as the male household head. Secondly, a grown up daughter would not sleep in the same room as her married brother, or two brothers and their wives would not sleep in the same room. However, these avoidance rules cannot be strictly followed as some households have sometimes up to four married couples with small children, but the number of rooms is rarely more than three.[8] Furthermore, there are frequent guests who stay the night, thus displacing a few children or girls to secondary or third rooms for the night. Guests almost always sleep in the main room irrespective of sex or age. In this case, the arrangement of beds in the main room conforms, to the gender or rank specifications. The guest with the highest status will get the best corner and bedding of the room. The best corner is furthermost from the door, designated as a "high" position (*evrozê* in Kurdish) similar to the ranked sitting order with guests.[9] Among the guests, unmarried women would sleep next to other women, or husbands and wives would be given a single large bed. Or the main room may be left to the guests if the male household head has two wives, he then would sleep in the second room with the wives and children.[10]

Apart from the main building (*xani*) where the living rooms are, there are usually additional rooms and buildings for storage, as a kitchen or stable. The mountain villages have no sewage or piped water system inside the houses. Drinking water is supplied from various springs around the village. Some of them, however, freeze in winter or dry in late summer, thus some households have to carry their water from distant springs. There were, until recently, no toilets in Sisin; as a result of military and civil administrators' orders some villagers have built cabins over running water to serve as toilets, yet they prefer to use the open fields and hills in the former style. There is not a special room for bathing and in most villages the bathing and cooking is done in the same room. This room which is called *gulke*, has the *tandır* (or *tendur* in Kurdish, the earthenware oven made by women and buried into the ground with a pipe opening to the side, used mainly for baking bread) and several other hearths where wood is burned and food is cooked.[11]

This last room, *gulke*, is assigned as a female space because of the activities there. To begin with, all actual cooking is done in this room. Women and girls spend much time in this room baking, making tea and cooking the food. The preparation of vegetables or meat can and usually does take place on the porch or inside the house. Food is prepared in large quantities, usually in anticipation of a number of unannounced guests. The division of various intermediary chores related to cooking, however, shows hierarchical relations between the women of the household. The most senior woman (the female HHH, *kabani*, see below) would be in charge of the decision making process about what and how much should be cooked; she would hand out the necessary ingredients like butter, flour, and meat herself - other women or girls do not fetch these themselves.[12]

Men, ideally, neither cook nor bake bread. They frequently pride themselves on not knowing how to break eggs and fry them. Shepherds, hunters and men who stay with the herds at distant spring pastures do cook, but otherwise if a man has to prepare his own food or bake, it is considered to be a great misfortune, showing his helplessness in finding a wife to do this for him. In households where there are several adult men and women, men expect all the food and tea to be prepared by women and do not fetch any food for themselves even if they are hungry. This division of labour according to gender accompanies the association of *gulke* and storage rooms with women. Men do not stop at *gulke* except for a few minutes to chat with the women working there.

Gulke is not only a place associated with darkness, food and women, but also where one has a wash, more so in winter. The practice of washing hands, and other parts of the body is laden with symbols and concepts related to sexuality, ritual purity, and religious prescriptions. The daily ritual ablutions following the Islamic prescription requires the washing of hands, face and feet with running and clean water. This could be done indoors by using a basin and pouring it from a vessel, or out doors at the springs. The other ablution, washing the whole body (*gusül*), is performed after menstruation and sexual intercourse. People usually wash before the Friday noon prayers; otherwise washing is done almost secretly. Women especially, wash as discreetly as possible and, even in summer, one rarely sees women drying their hair in the open; it is immediately combed, plaited, and covered with a scarf.[13] Similarly, clothes which are worn next to the body are not dried on a washing line like other clothes, but are dried in distant branches of the trees or covered with scarves. The term used for taking a bath (*serî xwe bişum*, lit. I am washing my head) conceals any reference to the body and one's own sexuality. Young women are teased when they have washed and put on new clothes, by being asked whether they are getting married. A popular folk song is exactly to the point: "those who have a beautiful wife spend all their time in the hamam (the public bath)", implying the sexual activity and the compulsory ritual purification before and after it. Thus, the *gulke* where both cooking and bathing takes place is designated as a female space, where men trespass either secretly (at night for washing) or visit only for a short time during the day. The male realm, in return, is either the open space, e.g. the fields, hay cutting hills, the porch or the main room. Women tread this space as well but always with some work-related purpose, for instance, to weed the garden, feed the animals, collect wood or herbs, or fetch something from the main room.[14]

Seasonal changes and the household

The use of the main building, *xani*, the extensions, *gulke* and the space around the house compound is subject to the arrangement of seasonal work and leisure. Briefly, the semi-nomadic pastoral production in Hakkari, apart from requiring specific patterns of land, water and labour use, also affects the spatial arrangement of the house and its compound, and the use of this space by household members.

The seasonal cycle of production and labour usage is compiled in Appendix III. Here, the focus is on how the social and physical space described above is organized according to the seasonal production and consumption changes. The details of the sample case below are from Sisin.

To begin with, winter and summer months are diametrically opposed to each other in terms of spatial use: in winter, especially between January-March, the house compound and more specifically the main building, *xani,* is the shelter for all, whereas in high summer season (July-September) the house compound is only an additional residence, it is not even the centre of activities. In the first case, the determining climatic condition is the heavy snowfall, the isolation of mountain villages (and sometimes neighbourhoods) from one another, and the danger of avalanches. During the winter months people and animals spend a lot of time indoors and intra-household face-to-face relations are most intense. Men and women alike visit neighbouring houses a great deal and every opportunity to be outdoors for work or play is taken. The only work activity which takes men away from the village settlement area is bringing fodder from the surrounding hills on primitive sleighs, (*garte*). Women and children help to pull the sleighs for short distances within the village. Otherwise visits to villages or the town are conducted only by men for the purpose of supplying an important item (e.g. medicine or money), for expressing condolences, sometimes for trade relations and rarely for weddings. Winter visits, by elder men especially, usually last longer and are more informal and relaxed than summer visits, since in summer there is much more work to do. People say that the only consolation in winter, when out doors activities are limited, is this practice of visiting within the village or less often to other villages.

Women, on the other hand, do not have the same amount of freedom to visit either within the village or in other villages. Their visits are shorter, mostly during the daytime and only in the near vicinity. This difference of spatial mobility is in a way reflected in men's and women's clothing too. Women's clothes hardly differ from summer to winter; they add a few more layers in winter (but of the same synthetic cloth material), wear wool socks and wool cardigans if they have any. Men, on the other hand, wear wool trousers, thick cotton underwear, two pairs of wool socks, a hat, gloves and either a heavy jacket or a coat. Some village men have leather boots for winter. Women have only one type of shoes, the rubber galoshes worn throughout the year. When they have to be out side along time (like helping with sleighs or feeding the sheep), they wear their husband's or brother's jacket.[15] On the whole, women dislike the restriction of movement in winter months and long for summer, whereas men have various options, whether it be visiting others, working outdoors or using the winter months for socializing and recreation.

After March, snow conditions improve and the possibility of mobility for both women and men increases. It is the hardest time for feeding the animals as they are often weakened after the long winter spent indoors, and illnesses break out mostly during these months. As the snow line withdraws higher up the hills, men, women and animals begin to roam to pastures anew. Those households who have hay stacks on distant hills take the first opportunity of favourable snow conditions (as early as the beginning of March) to move the male sheep and goats to the shelters (*gove* in Kurdish) near the hay piles (*dih*). These shelters are mostly several hours walking distance from the village and are very primitive lodgings for both the sheep and young men who stay there to feed them. This is the first stage of the cyclical fission and fusion of households: 1-2 adult men from each household stay in these shelters with the sheep, with the basic food (butter, bread, cheese, tea, sugar and some dried vegetables) coming from the village once or twice a week; young women, the wives or sisters, carry the food to them in local rucksacks (*parzin*) and return on the same day. This arrangement usually lasts until the sheep and goats are ready to be taken to lower valleys (if the individual HHs have rights or special arrangements for the grazing lands along the lower southern valleys).

About April the movement of animals and people away from the house and the village increases, but still on a daily basis. Firstly, boys of 10-14 years of age take the goats and calves separately for grazing near the village and return them to their stables at night. The second stage, around early May, involves taking the wethers of the household, perhaps together with those of 2-3 other neighbours, to the nearby hills for grazing. By this time, the village and the nearby hills are free of snow but the summer pasture camp sites are not. Households unite their herds and graze them on the designated early pastures around the village. For this job, several young men from the herd-owning households are chosen as shepherds and they spend the night in caves and come to the village every 4-5 days to replenish their food and clothes supplies. Only ailing or ill animals remain in the village. The household members begin to frequent the hills and valleys around the village. Young women climb up the hills once a day to milk ewes and goats and return to the village. Milking increases gradually and before women move up to the pasture camps, they may have to go milking twice a day (a trek of at least one hour or more) and bring the milk back. Until the time of pasture camps, the activities are divided between grazing the lambs, goats, sheep and calves, ploughing the fields for sowing maize, hoeing and planting the vegetable gardens, collecting fresh herbs and plants for cooking and making cheese. Reduced supplies of sugar, salt, flour or tea may require the first visits to town with vehicles or other means of transport.

By mid-June the daily excursions away from and back to the compound come to an end when households break up to move up to the first pasture camps. In Sisin there are two camp groups (*zoma*) and 4-6 camp sites at different altitudes on the hills. The formation of these camp groups, i.e. who goes with whom, depends on the tribal links, patrilineal ideology and power relations, as well as on the notions of neighbourhood and friendship. From the demographic point of view, the village households go through fission and fusion according to seasonal changes and pastoral production processes. In Sisin the primary camp sites (of the two groups) are taken soon after they are freed from snow.

Members of households in that *zoma* group move to the site within 2-3 days. The early summer camps start with young men and 1-2 young women from each household. It is still cold at night, thus children do not join the camps till July or August. With the establishment of early summer camps, herds join as *zoma* herds, shepherds are chosen and a deal for the payment is made. At this time the activities around the village house and the camp site are nearly equal in terms of concentration and work load. Adult men of the house stay in the village at night but at dawn set out to cut the fresh grass on nearby hills. Young women stay in the camp and go milking twice a day and make cheese at this time. Elder women remain in the village to do the household chores, cooking and planting the vegetables. The third focus of activity and residence is the herds and shepherds, but during June the herds are still grazing around the camp, thus women do not have to go far for milking or to bring food to the shepherds.

The largest spatial mobility is during the high summer season, mainly the month of August. The camps are then at their second place slightly above the first sites, the herds are on higher hills and travel once a day back to the camp for milking. Men and women travel daily to distant hills where the cut grass has dried and has to be piled into stacks for winter usage. Traffic between the hills, camp sites, village and town is the busiest of the year. The focus of activities is the pasture camp where people stay for work, play, trade and also to avoid the heat of the plain and valleys. In villages like Sisin, where pastures are at most two to three hours away, people do not have to leave the village houses uninhabited but one or two persons remain behind to water the gardens for instance. Only the households who do not have any adult men or women to leave behind in the village, close their village houses and move entirely to the pasture camp.

After September the direction of mobility is reversed. Young women and shepherds remain last in the late summer or early autumn camps. Usually male HHHs travel to other villages and town to procure the goods to be consumed throughout the winter and spring and to sell or barter their own produce and livestock. Once the last pasture camp moves back to the village, men continue grazing the animals around the village or travelling to town, while women's activities are once more withdrawn to the borders of the village and perhaps nearby hills to collect wood and bushes for burning in winter. The first heavy snow, mostly around December, completes the cycle of expansion and withdrawal of household's spatial mobility.

Household members and composition

Mal: I pointed out above that the house and the main building is referred to as *xani* in Kurdish. This term covers the physical structure more than the social context of the house; the latter is contained in the term *mal* similar to the English usage of home versus house, or French *chez*.[16] However, the term *mal* has additional meanings; J. Blau's French-English-Kurdish dictionary cites "wealth", "fortune" and "family" under *mal*.[17] Yet an other meaning is "lineage", (see Chapter 4) which includes a group of people claiming descent from a common ancestor (usually the name of the ancestor designates the lineage, as in Mala Mihan, Mala Karahan)[18] and maintaining joint rights of inheritance over pastures and grazing lands.

The lineage members, i.e. members of a *mal*, even if they cannot trace their genealogical links back to the ancestor of the lineage, usually know either personally or indirectly the other members (households or HHHs) of his/her own lineage. The usage of the term *mal* in fact resembles the Bedouin usage of the term *beit* as discussed by Chatty (1978:401-2): the *beit* is "a group of agnates whose common ancestor is said to have been four to six generations removed from the living", "the physical residence" and "the kin group sharing the same residence". The latter two meanings of *beit* are exactly the same as in the usage of *mal*. The usage of the term *beit* as a unit of tribal classification, however, differs slightly from the Kurdish tribal classificatory meaning of *mal*; among the Bedouin *beit* is the basic economic unit (Ibid, p. 401), whereas *mal* in Kurdish tribal organization does not always designate an economic unit although membership of a *mal* is considered a prerequisite for claiming rights over pastures.[19] Also, like the term *beit*, the term *mal* is used in many idioms, folk sayings and proverbs.[20]

The usage of the term *mal* as the "physical residence" and the "kin group sharing the residence" indicates two crucial properties of the term, that of residence and kinship. For the people the term *mal* ideally defines a group of kin living, producing and consuming together as a household. As we shall see below, the developmental cycle of households sometimes emphasizes one property over the others, e.g. a household sharing production and consumption but not residence continues to be defined as one *mal* or vice versa. The contextual usage of *mal*, that is, the way the local people use the term in everyday language, emphasizes the kin unit living together and led by a male household head (thus, *malê* Ahmed or *malê* Hacı, and so on). Let us look at the properties of the term one by one.

Mal as a property holding, production and consumption sharing, hence an economic unit, is especially important for the discussion of "transitional" household forms. Division of property and budget is the most clear sign of formal household division. In transitional households the undivided property is, thus, the proof of being one household (*em ne cûda bûn*; we are not divided), despite the fact that there are two places (houses) of residence and two groups of household members living separately and permanently in these two houses. *Mal*, as a property holding unit, means that its members produce for and consume from a single budget and the management is mostly (but not always) done by the male HHH. The property itself, i.e. the trees, the houses, fields, animals and all other movable and immovable goods, although managed (mostly) by the male household head is considered to belong to all the members of the household and not to any one person.

The second property, patrilocal residence, is a function of the ideal of patrilineal solidarity, requiring sons to stay in their parental house after marriage and brothers to stay together after the death of their father. Residence is, however, never permanently one house or place and changes depending on the seasonal and pastoral production cycle in mountain villages. Households break up or unite seasonally, changing their shelters, between tents and houses. However, living in one house becomes a crucial symbol of being one *mal* at the time of household division. The use of space within a single house can symbolize unity or disunity as was seen above in the case of the senior bride spending more time in the secondary room prior to formal household division. Thus, the division of the social space (along with property) is a powerful and emotionally charged symbol which clearly marks the division of a *mal*.

> The moment a household decides to divide, the units (or the new heads of the new units) determine the conditions, time and plans for the new house. In a household division in Sisin, after the formal talk about the division (which was attended by all their patrilineal kin in the village), the unit which was to separate from the original (the male household head's brother's son and his wife with their eight children) spent the night together in one room and the next day set up their own tent in the early pasture camp.

In summary, in the case of transitional households, the criterion of residence is crucial; the villagers who consider themselves as one *mal* but live in two houses stress their unity more often and present the division of houses as only a transitory stage which should ideally end with restored residential unity.

The third property retains that the members of a *mal* are primary kin or affine to each other. There is no other native term than *mal* to refer to everyone together as a family or household. Adoption is rare and the incorporation of outsiders is exceptional.[21] The local ideal of the household as a kin group favours paternal and/or fraternal joint household types.

Other than the emphasis on patrilineal kin unity as a basis for household composition, the local ideal household would have at least one married couple. Neither in Sisin, nor in other villages have I come across a HH without a married couple, even if it were a very young couple of ages 12-13. Only in the town of Yüksekova were there a few households composed either of a widow and her unmarried young or grown-up offspring. These households, however, were at a critical transitional stage (outside the normative developmental cycle of households) which was economically unstable and socially incomplete. They were unstable because they depended on other households, kin and affine, for provisions of labour, goods and cash. Such was the case of a town dwelling widow with small children; she was to a large degree financially supported by her mother, married sisters and brothers. These households were treated as incomplete, as was the case with an elderly mother with her adult son; there was no married couple in the house and particularly no bride to do the chores. The situation was a transition between the prior household form where the elderly mother, an unmarried son and a younger married son with his wife and children co-habited, (then the married brother separated his house and the stage described above was reached), to the stage when the elder brother married and brought his bride in to the house. During this process of fission and transformation into two new units of households, a lot of tension occurred especially because the mother and the elder unmarried son demanded labour from the newly separated HH of the younger brother, and mainly from his wife. In summary, other than patrilocal residence and joint property, the specific kin links between the members of a household were considered important functions of being a *mal*.

Developmental cycle of households: The ideal developmental cycle of households consists of stages where marriage, co-residence and joint economic activities are present at each stage. Thus, an unmarried son or daughter is not expected to have his/her own house or set up his/ her own household, equally a widowed parent would not be expected to maintain a household alone.

> In the latter case, an acceptable level of self-sufficiency in economic management is crucial: for example, a widow in Yüksekova lived alone and did so by using her wealth to assist her married sons and daughters (with some financial aid) and in return had them work for her interchangeably; her household had reached the final stage of development as her youngest son separated his house after conflicts between his wife and the mother. Alternatively, after their separation, she might have had to join the household of one of her sons or daughters, if she had had no house and property of her own -which she had inherited from her two deceased husbands.

A new household is founded by a married couple, usually with children, after they separate from the man's parental household. Thus the first stage of a *mal* corresponds to the married adult stage of an individual's life cycle. The age group of couples setting up their own HH is usually 30-45 years, and it may even be later in the case of large households where the parental household remains undivided until the eldest generation dies.

After households start on their own as one *mal*, they may remain in the restricted labour size stage for quite a while depending on the number, age, and sex order of their offspring. It is not the couples who have many children who are most likely to separate and set up their own house, but those who have an ideal labour composition from their offspring; e.g. one or two sons in their teens and a daughter of the same age to help with the mother's chores. Again depending on the sex composition of the off spring, the speed of expansion and growth of the household will be determined. If, for example, the eldest ones are all girls then the household will not be expanding in labour size very quickly, although it may expand through birth. The advantage therefore of having teenage sons is important in terms of increasing both male and female labour force.

In a household with daughters only, the expansion and the time period for the maximal household size depend on the number of daughters. Once the daughters are all married out the HH would reach its minimal size and socially most undesirable stage. A

HH with at least one son is the minimal desirable situation since it would mean continued labour force for the parents in their old age.

Thus, after expansion, the next stage of household development involves household division depending on the number of sons. In a household where there is one son only, there would be no division but transfer of all the property to the son after the death of the father, and possibly transfer of management duties to the son before the father's death in his old age. In households where there are several sons, household division may come into question, if the household grows into an "unmanageable" size. The definition of "unmanageable" involves the labour size, the number of unproductive household members (such as infants, invalid elders, handicapped members), size of property, and the social relations within the unit. The local explanation of the "unmanageable household" stresses both size (usually physically verifiable in terms of the number of people per room) and incompatibility between adult women or men. Men and women blame the fights among women more often, yet those among men are not ruled out as reasons for household division. The ideal remains, however, that sons do not separate from the parental household as long as the father is alive and that brothers remain together as one *mal* as long as possible after the father's death.

An examination of the data on household composition and division from Sisin allows a better understanding of the above general points on the various stages of household development. Table 5.1a below shows the household types in Sisin. The classification of households treats *mal*s as property owning groups. The reason for such a classification, where residence is treated as a secondary issue, is the villagers' own classification of some households as one *mal* despite the existence of two houses. The double residence for one *mal* cases are explained subsequent to the discussion of optimum household size and the point of household division. The households are classified in column 2, into fraternal joint, paternal joint, fraternal+paternal joint and simple household types.[22] These are the types that existed primarily in Sisin. Polygynous or fragmentary (no married couple) HHs existed in Yüksekova, but are not included here among the data from Sisin.[23] Fraternal joint households are those where brothers (married or unmarried) share one *mal*, and the eldest brother is accepted as the male HHH. As is shown in Column 5 all three fraternal joint households (F.J.) had a widow within the *mal*, and in all the cases it was the widowed mother of the HHH. Paternal joint (P.J.) type is where the male HHH has married son(s) in the household.[24]

Finally, the last type is the simple household where there is one married couple as can be observed from Column 3. Column 4 provides information on grandchildren which is relevant for the discussion on HH division and the optimum household size. Columns 6 and 7 deal with the "residence" and "transitional household" form. By taking households as single property units, we can show the cases where double residence is treated as a single *mal*. Thus columns 6 and 7 show households who have houses outside Sisin, and the number of people who live in these other houses. In one case only, that of household no.1, did the *mal* have two houses but was not divided into two groups; the second house outside Sisin was in the town of Yüksekova and was rented to an affinal tribesman.

Table 5.1a. Household composition in Sisin (early 1982).

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
	HH no.	Lineage	HH type	No. of married couples	HH with grand-children	HH with a widow(er)	House outside Sisin	HH size
Lower quarter	1	a	F.+P.J.	4	+	-	-	19
	2	b	F.J.	3	-	+(♀)	+	16+4
	3	b	P.J.	3	+	-	-	14
	4	None	S.	1	-	-	-	8
	5	c	P.J.	3	+	-	+	13+5
	6	c	P.J.	2	+	-	-	8
	7	d	P.J.	3	+	+(♂)	+	14+1
	8	e	S.	1	-	-	-	8
	9	e	S.	1	-	-	-	7
	10	e	S.	1	-	-	-	8
	11	e	S.	1	-	-	-	8
	12	b	F.+P.J.	4	-	-	-	18
	13	f	P.J.	4	+	-	+	12+4
Upper quarter	14	g	P.J.	3	+	-	+	13+5
	15	g	P.J.	3	+	-	-	13
	16	a	P.J.	3	+	-	-	12
	17	a	F.J.	2	+	+(♀)	-	15
	18	a	S.	1	-	-	-	4
	19	a	P.J.	3	+	-	-	12
	20	a	S.	1	-	-	-	10
	21	a	P.J.	3	+	-	-	11
	22	a	P.J.	3	+	-	+	7+4
	23	a	F.J.	2	-	+(♀)	+	5+3
	24	a	S.	1	+	+(♀)	-	3

Total 258+(26)=284

Table 5.1b. Totals, mean and percentages for Sisin HHs.

Mean for married couple/	HH: 2.3			
Number of Paternal J.	HHs: 11	% to	Total HHs:	45.8 %
" " Fraternal J.	HHs: 3	" "	" "	12.5 %
" " P.+ F.J.	HHs: 2	" "	" "	8.3 %
" " Simple	HHs: 8	" "	" "	33.3 %
Total	24			99.9 %
Mean population/	HH(*mal*):11.8[25]			

Because of the way *mal* is classified above, although the village of Sisin had a population of circa 258 people and 24 HHs (in early 1982) the population of *mal*s was, in fact, more than the sum of Sisin with 284 people.

From the small sample of Sisin the highest frequency is that of paternal joint households which include a married household head with one or more married sons and in all the cases (in Sisin) with grandchildren.[26] The mean number of people per paternal joint households was 13.5. The second highest frequency group is that of the simple HHs. The mean size of simple HHs was 7. The third group was the fraternal joint HHs with a mean HH size of 14.3. Finally, the last group of fraternal+paternal joint type had two cases, with HH size of 18 and 19 each.

The cases listed of course represent different phases of the households' developmental cycle. In fact, all the cases in Sisin (see Appendix IV) had followed the HH developmental pattern of simple => paternal joint => fraternal joint => simple household. There were no cases for example of a direct change from P.J. to simple HHs.[27] The simple households had all devolved from fraternal joint households; only three of these HHs showed some variations because of the early deaths of household members or their displacement due to war.[28]

In order to interpret the case histories of HH developmental cycle of the present Sisin households, various factors pertaining to the physical and social environment are relevant. First, one has to remember and take in to account the fairly recent settlement in Sisin of Oramarî tribesmen. (See Chapters 2 and 4) After the exodus of Nestorians, the first households who settled in Sisin had come from other Oramarî villages and in many cases they were extensions of households from 3-4 original villages for the purposes of exploiting new land, fields and pastures. My data relate only to the more recent (up to 10-20 years ago) settlers' pre-Sisin backgrounds (see Appendix IV), e.g. whether they came from fraternal or paternal joint or other types of HHs in their original villages. However, it is possible to assume that the pattern of extending the household to another settlement (another village or town), thus dividing the residential unit but not the property, providing the new unit with some capital, and keeping it dependent on the original unit existed then as today. The motives for the primary extension, after which the first households settled in Sisin, were, according to the informants, mainly to acquire new land to cultivate and thus increase the household's economic livelihood; the same motives lead the Sisin HHs today to extend into town and other villages.

I have said that the local ideal is the patrilocal joint household. A correlate of this is delayed HH division. Significantly, the division of a HH (*cûda bûn* in Kurdish, lit. to be separated), between brothers, father and son, father's brother and brother's son is clearly defined and regulated through mediation (by close kin). When a household breaks up into two or three units, it is the end of a process about which kinsmen and villagers have speculated, and of which they probably witness the formal division procedures. Thus, what clearly identifies a household which has broken up is that the new units start the process of sharing out all the property and building a new residence, a new *xani*, for the newly created unit, as soon as possible. When the emphasis on setting up a new household with its own space is so strong, then households with double residence calling themselves a single *mal* present an ambiguous category. Such households publicly claim their unity as one *mal* - that they have not separated, (*em ne cûda bûn*) - but structurally it is an intermediary phase. As Table 5.1a above shows 7 out of 24 HHs had this annex HH, of which 5 were in town, one was in a neighbouring village, and another one in the village of origin (i.e. pre-Sisin settlement). 6 of the annex households were made up of simple households formed by the son (and his wife and children) of the Sisin HHH. The 7th case was again an elder son of a Sisin HHH (of HH no.23) but after his father's death, he became himself the HHH and the household entered its fraternal joint phase.

It is argued here that this intermediary type of two houses but one economic unit household is an adaptive form resulting from the constraints of economic needs and necessary expansion strategies on the one hand, and the normative ideology of patrilocal joint HH and joint residence on the other. The setting of the new household in another village or town is in most cases the initiative of the HHH and not the son's. If it were the son's initiative only, then it would have been categorically a demand for dividing the household. Sons traditionally have a right to separate from the father's household, yet it is socially disapproved of as it means division of the property. The conditions of the father's household may be forwarded as an excuse but it usually causes much tension. Also the father may refuse to give the due share to the son, implying he must wait to inherit it.

How the two houses in this transitionary form will develop, that is, whether it will lead to a final division of the economic unit between the son and the father depends on factors such as the economic viability of the household in the village, how strong the motives are for the village HH to move into town, and finally the labour supply and number of animals of the economic unit.

> In one of the Sisin cases, the HH left behind in the village was planning to move the parents (the household head and his wife) to the son's

> house in town after buying some more land (clover fields) on the plain of Yüksekova. This would be a partial re-unification of the previously extended and split HH; although the son in town had his own house, he was totally dependent on his father's HH back in the village for provisions of food as well as cash. He did not have any skills to earn a living in town other than working as a seasonal labourer, cutting hay on the plain, which he could not do as he rejoined his brothers in summer months to prepare their fodder around the village for the joint herd of their HH.

Appendix IV, where the individual household developmental stories are detailed, shows that the longest period of a HH surviving as a single unit (after settlement in Sisin) was 27 years and the shortest 7 years.[29]

The number of and the mean time period between HH divisions, combined with the fact that the divisions in Sisin HHs were all from fraternal joint into paternal joint or simple households, gives an insight into the structural reasons for household division. Some writers have emphasized that when there are grandchildren, especially grandsons in the household, the division becomes imminent.[30] In HH division in Sisin, as the partition occurred mainly between brothers, the newly formed households were either simple or F.J.+P.J. households.[31] The majority of the new household units, however, were simple households, formerly shared between brothers; there were no grandchildren either before or immediately after the partition. Hence in Sisin, the significance of having grandsons and its correlation to HH partition was very low.

The next factor affecting the time of partition is household size. For the 9 partition cases in Appendix IV, the largest HH size prior to partition was 19 and the lowest was 8, the mean HH size being 14. The largest and smallest HH sizes corresponded to the longest and shortest periods of HH unity respectively. The difference between the highest and lowest HH sizes prior to partition could be attributed to the differences in household composition (e.g. the age order of sons and daughters affect the labour composition), differences in individual HH management and economic resources, and the differences in the personalities of the people involved. Yet in terms of spatial arrangement, (houses have at most three rooms) as well as the economic constraints of a fixed herd and land size, one could postulate that in Sisin, HHs tend to divide when they reach a size of 14 or more, including three or more married couples and children. Here, obviously, the size in terms of the number of people is not more important than how these people are related to one another. In other words, it is not just any 14 people but brothers, father and sons, mother and daughters who should ideologically form the closest and tightest social group.

Gender roles and relations of rank and order

Above I have frequently referred to the male HHH implying that there is also a female one. Firstly, the male household head, *malxi* in Kurdish, is usually the eldest male resident of the house; in paternal joint and simple households it would be the father, in fraternal joint ones, the eldest brother. In cases where the eldest man in the house, father/brother/father's brother, is mentally or physically disabled due to old age or for other reasons, he would still be *de jure* HHH, but his role and work would be carried out by the next suitable man in the house. The *malxi* being the eldest and most respected man in the household is, of course, the ideal situation. Yet, because households have relatively long periods of paternal or fraternal joint phases, there is often more than one competent man in the HH, and this frequently raises problems. Adult men may have to wait till their late 30s or early 40s to become a *malxi* even if they have adult sons and daughters.

Malxi is the representative of the household to outsiders and especially to the community of men (*cemaat*). The behaviour of his household members is "asked of him"; in other words, he is morally responsible for the household members and exercises varying degrees of control over them. He makes the major decisions for the economic livelihood, affinal and social relations of his HH. Moreover, he represents the household unit within the tribal system and its sections. When, for example, a lineage group has to unite in order to support a cause -giving aid to another group or individual- the *malxi* either goes himself, as the representative of his household, or sends another adult man/woman of the *mal*. (Further examples of how this household unity and representation works out are given below.)

The female counterpart of *malxi* is *kabani* (or *kebani*), the female household head.[32] Usually she is the eldest member of the household; however, physical incapacitation forces women to retire from their role as *kabani* earlier than men. A female household head, like her male counterpart, is responsible for the management of certain household chores and supervision of female labour especially. Nevertheless, the male HHH's authority is ultimate and women are expected to obey him. *Kabani*, as the mistress of the house, is a social role, seen as the counterpart of *malxi*; it does not necessarily mean a woman taking the role of the male household head, e.g. in the absence of a suitable male. *Kabani* is also expected to work hard and carry out the prestigious chores like baking, knitting, weaving, and cheese making. Baking bread is a highly prestigious task, and although women complain about the heat and smoke one has to put up with while baking, to be assigned the "baker" (*nanpej*) of the household is a declaration of a high, if not the highest, female status within the household. Women's bread is always commented upon and compared with the quality of other women's or the city baker's bread. Thus, when a *kabani* gives the job of baking over to her daughter-in-law, this implies her recognition of the seniority of the latter.

The rules for the intensity of work are different for *malxi* and *kabani*. The male household head could retire from heavy chores such as hay cutting and piling as soon as there are several adult men in the HH (male adult status is reached around 15-16 years of age) and spend his time in socializing, politics and travelling for visits and business. Women, on the other hand, do not have the same degree of freedom to move around the village and its surroundings; visiting other villages for women is rare and usually done for a socially "legitimate" reason (wedding, illness, or death of a close kin and the like). Thus when a *kabani* retires from her role as the manager of household consumption activities and an active member in all parts of female labour, she has more time for socializing, visiting and resting, but ironically her status as the old woman in the house, even if it demands more respect from men and younger women alike, implies a loss of sexual attraction and good health. Different aspects of ideal female character, mainly having good social manners and being attractive (physical beauty and/or social skills) and working hard are difficult to maintain at the same time. When a woman becomes a *kabani* at an early age she works hard but has little time to represent her HH in the women's community, with visiting and helping others; and when she becomes old her *kabani* role is more oriented to socializing but the credit for hard work goes to her daughter-in-law or daughter perhaps.

In polygynous households, in order to achieve the status of *kabani*, the contrasting qualities of the ideal woman may become the basis of harsh competition between the co-wives, as the female strategies and relations in four polygynous households below show:

> 1. In HH A, the two wives were of different ages and degrees of attractiveness. The second one was younger, more beautiful and came from an influential family within the tribe of her husband. She knew a little

Turkish and was a perfect hostess to outsider guests. The first wife never met and sat with the guests but did all the work, baking and cooking as well as the other chores. The second wife, claiming her health poor, did not carry out any heavy chores, did some fine knitting and sewing (not a common skill among mountain village women) and visited other female HH heads, her married daughters in other villages or her son in town. The *kabani* status which meant fulfilling certain social roles and carrying out the household management, was continuously contested between the two; the roles of the women and which was the better wife, was a topic of discussion among other villagers.

2. In HH B, the husband was the muhtar of the village (see the case of Emin in Chapter 7). The first wife, a traceable cousin to the muhtar was known for her beauty in her youth. The second wife was a widow, not much younger or prettier than the first one, a woman from another tribe for whom the muhtar had paid a considerable bride price. The first wife, although she was elder, did some of the heavy chores like collecting wood from the surrounding hills, while the second one declared that she was not used to the work of mountain villages (she had lived in the town before) and would only bake and cook. She dressed better than the first one and came to sit with the guests even if the guests were close kin of the first wife. In this case, the *kabani* status was not shared to the satisfaction of either woman. The second wife put pressure on the muhtar and his kin and supporters for recognizing her as the *kabani*. The villagers who had kin and tribal links to the first wife continued to treat her as the mistress, but did not challenge the second one either mainly because the first wife wanted to avoid a confrontation with the second wife and the husband. The husband was under considerable attack at the time for his political behaviour, so a war waged between the wives would ruin the HH's reputation altogether.

3. In HH C, the first wife was again elder, close kin to the husband and beautiful in her youth. The second wife had eloped with the husband having left her own first husband and children. She was younger, more attractive and hard working. She took on all the role of *kabani* after a few years of marriage: she received guests, visited other villages and households (leading wedding ceremonies as the most senior woman, *berbuk*) did the baking and serving food to the guests and went to the *zoma* in summer to carry out the active woman's jobs of milking, making butter and cheese in the summer camps.[33] The first wife had resigned herself to a marginal role in the house, she did not dress up but acted like an old grandmother taking care of the second wife's children and abandoning the *kabani* status as if it

had been a normal process of mother-in-law handing the status to her senior daughter-in-law. She did in fact give her old age as an excuse for her marginalized status in the household.

4. In HH D, the two wives had separate houses as the second one lived in town and the first one in the village. The marriage of the second wife had begun by her going to the village from the town. But after 3-4 years she could not get along with her co-wife and more or less on her own initiative and supported by her mother, sisters, and brothers she moved back to town with her only son. She supported herself there through occasional paid work, like cooking for wealthy households on special events but mainly through sewing and embroidery. She was the *kabani* of her own household but although she was much respected by her husband's tribal kin (she did not belong to any tribe), the other wife had a fuller recognition of her *kabani* status because she stayed in the village and was directly involved in the production and consumption processes like milking and weaving. Also the husband spent longer periods in the village although he preferred to receive his guests in the house of his town-dwelling wife.

Learning gender and rank: In the village, production and consumption is carried out jointly as a household, with the participation of all the members. But the internal division of labour and consumption patterns indicate hierarchical or egalitarian types of relations and ranking of household members according to age, sex, kinship, and affinal position in reference to other household members (especially to the HHH).

To begin with, the differentiation of gender roles becomes relevant not in infancy or early childhood but after the ages of 12-13 for girls. The dress style manifests sex differentiation slightly earlier. Boys and girls up to 4-5 years of age are dressed similarly, usually a long shirt and underwear; sex specific dresses are worn after 4-5 years, when girls get their first *fistan* and *kiras* (the female gown) and boys get their first trousers, which they very much look forward to. Until their early teens boys and girls have nearly equal time to play or obligations to help adults. Nevertheless, in houses where there are boys and girls of similar ages, one sees a differentiation in the type of obligations each has after the age of 10 or so, as girls at that age and even earlier start their training in taking care of younger siblings and other infants in the household, learning how to spin, knit and helping with the preparation of food, whereas boys become more attentive about learning men's jobs, herding, feeding the animals, sowing and tilling. However, other than strictly female jobs like knitting, spinning and cooking, all the other chores related to animal tending or agriculture provide areas of learning for both girls and boys; in cases of an unequal distribution of male/female siblings, each child has to learn about the other sex's chores to a greater degree. Until about the ages of 12-13 both girls and boys are allowed to disappear into the distant corners to play, and they mix in games, except perhaps for some boys' games such as marbles, played with walnuts. As for consumption patterns, both sexes of children receive equal shares to eat and sit together around the food tray.

The adults' behaviour towards their children does not differ according to the sex of infants and children. The adults' own status sometimes matters more than the child's sex. Young parents, for example, do not publicly display affection for the new-born; some young mothers carry this to such an extreme that the baby is undernourished because the mother is "ashamed" (*şerm kir*) to take her baby along when she has to work on the fields. In general, mothers, fathers, and other adults show equal affection and care for both boys and girls, although boys accompany their fathers on visits more often and earlier than girls. Girls go on fewer visits, as they would be taken along more often by women than men. At the birth of a baby, a boy may occasion more rejoicing, but there is no public celebration or gift giving at birth; on the contrary the birth of a baby is almost kept secret or not mentioned, in case some evil spirit or "*nazar*" (evil eye) may affect the mother and/or the baby. Infants sometimes remain unnamed until they are 3-4 years old and are not considered as full members of the HH until they start eating on their own and with other children.[34]

After puberty, sex roles become clearly differentiated and teenage girls and boys spend less time together. These years are important for boys to learn animal husbandry thoroughly and train in the management of herds and other animals. From the age of 15-16 onwards young men start praying together with other adult men which marks the public recognition of male adulthood. From then on young men do not spend time alone with their female agemates other than those in their own household. Adult men of the HH work together like the household's adult women. Opportunities for mixing with the other sex are not rare, as inter-HH cooperation for hay cutting, wedding preparations, or weaving make it possible for youth to visit and spend time together with the neighbours.

Love affairs are difficult to keep secret in this environment of frequent visits and working between households, and the slightest suspicion of feelings between two people immediately becomes the subject of teasing or gossip. In this respect there is greater control over, and ideological devaluation of women. Young women, especially if they are attractive, are said to be a "source of trouble" for their kin and household. Marriageable women are considered a source of concern for the men of the house anyway, as their behaviour and others' behaviour towards them could easily be interpreted as an insult on the honour of the family, the *mal.* When the young women are pretty there is more to worry about. Young men, however, are rarely reprimanded for showing (restrained or very general) interest in the other sex. It is considered normal, apart from those women who are taboo, *haram.* Just the opposite, the slightest unhappiness of a young man is joyfully and teasingly attributed to his being in love with someone. Male sexuality is believed to be at least equal to if not more powerful than female sexuality, such that men should be married earlier and not remain widowed or unmarried in later life.[35]

Children who were members of one household can later marry each other as often happens in fraternal joint HHs. Thus, son and daughter of two brothers may have lived in the same house in their infancy and marry later. Yet such a possibility does not create any special avoidance type of relations between children. During the later years of adolescence, young members of the household cooperate with each other almost all the time, but in social life the requirements of gender roles override the matters of seniority between the household's adolescents. Younger brothers join adult men for visits, sit together with them, even join in the conversation, whereas their elder sisters would not immediately join any male gathering in her house, would not visit as often and would eat with other young women and children after elder men, young men, and elder women. Young brothers are also often given the responsibility to accompany their elder sisters when they have to travel outside the village.

Age order between siblings is relevant as a general rule of showing respect for the elder but it is not as strongly emphasized as implied by the Turkish usage of the terms for elder brother (*ağabey*) and elder sister (*abla*). In Kurdish such specific terms do not exist, brothers and sisters are generally referred to as *bra* and *xuşk* and specified when necessary by adding the appropriate adjective to it, (see Chapter 7). On the other hand, village elders (women and men) have a higher status as a group than the younger adult men and women. This is most clearly expressed in communal behaviour related to hosting, hospitality, greeting, and public speech. Below are the details of the manner of speech and behaviour according to the formal norms and in informal contexts.

> Social gatherings in Kurdish villages occur mostly in village houses, especially on winter evenings when men visit a great deal. Visits are usually

made in groups of 2-3, e.g. the father, his son(s) and grandson(s). The visitors leave the house after sunset and walk in a row, one after the other, the eldest in the front. When they enter the neighbour's house they would greet not any young girl they see around, but perhaps the elder woman, and they might talk to her for a minute or so. The woman would urge them to go in side the *mezel*, the main room, where the men are. Taking the shoes off lasts a few seconds and although the host may see the guests, nobody greets each other until the guests are all in the room and the eldest of the visiting party greets the host and others present with the Islamic greeting: "*selamün aleykum*". The host (leading) and other men joining in reply with "*aleykum esselam*" and slightly or fully raise from their seats on the floor. If the guests are from outside the village they shake hands with the host and other men, (even if there are women in the room, they do not shake hands with the women)[36]; yet if it is an ordinary visit within the village it is sufficient to greet each other by raising the right hand and putting it on the heart when replying to the formal set of greeting sentences. Again depending on the relative statuses of the host and the newcomers, if the guest is of equal or higher status and age, the host would get up completely and offer a seat next to him, in the "higher" (*evroz*) part of the room, and give him plenty of cushions and bolsters to sit and lean on. All the men sitting around the room budge from their seats and the newcomers sit next to their age mates. The youngest guest sits next to the door - the lower part of the room (*jêr*) -. He would be urged to move further "up"; after several rounds of refusals and exhortations he moves one or two seats closer to the host and elders.

Politics of everyday life: Apart from the seating order, hierarchy and status are reflected, reproduced or challenged through the particular use of the codes of hospitality and respect. In the community of men especially, the manners of greeting and speech and the amount one talks are important as elders have the right of to greet and speak first and the longest. Similarly, the humblest and the youngest sits with both feet tucked under, on the floor, taking as little room as possible, whereas the highest status person either stretches or crosses his legs in front of him, taking the most space in a seated position. Finally, young men, like women, have to show restraint and modesty in eating together with elder men; they would first decline to join in around the tray and would not eat till they are full unless encouraged to do so by the host or elder men.

Such occasions express ranking order among women. What determines, for example, whether a young woman would sit together with the guests or not is her status within the household and her relation to the guests and other contextual conditions. Women may receive male guests when the men of the house are away, yet a young woman would not sit long with a young stranger man but instead ask a neighbour or kinsman to come and keep him company. Elder women frequently take part in the company of men, even if they do not sit at the "highest" place in the room.

Women in general eat or pretend to eat less than men, especially in the company of men.[37] On a visit, elder and adult men eat first, the tray is replenished and brought in front of the young men and teenagers (12-13 years and above). Elder women would take the third round and mostly younger women and children eat in the adjacent room as the fourth party. By that time the best parts of the meat dish and fresher pieces of bread would be finished, yet there is usually enough if not plenty to eat. Women, especially young ones, on a visit, refuse to eat unless the hosts insists and offers several times, and also while eating, take care to eat slowly and frugally. Although any guest is expected to show shyness about eating food and eat less than at home, the host should insist convincingly enough, to ensure that guests eat till they are full, but in the case of women, shyness and refusal of food is considered appropriate.

Taking part in eating or sitting together within a household are important daily rituals through which a member's full or marginal participation in the household as a social unit is defined. Just as the male HHH "acts" like a guest in his house by eating alone, not sitting together with women and children, and not stepping into the secondary room without announcing himself, he establishes his position of ultimate authority in the HH. So a new bride would work hard, but eat less, inconspicuously and serve almost everyone in the HH fulfilling her transitory role as the "new member" and low ranking position especially in terms of labour requirements. Daily frictions, long-term resentments or claims to a new position are again articulated through these daily activities; just as the elder brother's son (see above), who wanted to separate his household from his father's brother's, ate, slept, and spent more time with his wife and children in the secondary room, so would a bride who is not treated well or a boy who wants to join the adult men's eating group refuse to eat together with children and women. The bride would expect to be asked specifically and thus have her position publicly clarified and reinstated, and the boy would expect to be asked to eat with adult men and thus publicly declare his adulthood.

Another form of consumption which reflects the system of ranking according to age, sex, kinship position and individual claims to mobility is the possession and consumption of prestige goods. The difference between men and women's clothes has already been mentioned. The mountain village woman has an average of five to six sets of clothes, and everything she has is used to its maximum. Dresses are sewn from new material for a wedding or special occasion and when outgrown are made smaller to fit a younger sister. Each piece of cloth will later be used as a rag by children. Nevertheless, both men and women say that women's clothes always cost more than men's. Indeed, women seem to have ostentatious clothes, scarves, and jewelry, however these items can hardly be classified as personal luxury items as they are circulated between women, e.g. the jewelry is passed on within the family, given as a present to a new bride or a daughter at marriage,[38] and the clothes are passed on to younger ones. The women do not have a final say in how some of the valuable material or jewelry will be distributed. Hence, women's valuables are prestigious goods at least as much for the HH and the HHH as for the woman who wears them.

Men's prestige goods, on the other hand, show a greater variation and are not limited to clothes or jewelry, but include many personal goods which they can buy as they control cash, property and travel to town and other cities where various consumption goods are available. Men's winter clothes have been mentioned above. Some wealthy men and those villagers who have a house in town have a tendency to wear better quality and "modern" clothes.[39] They also are keen on buying expensive watches, lighters, fancy pens, pocket calculators or torches all of which require cash and are primarily for personal use. On the whole, then, women's expenses amount to much less than men's despite the general belief to the contrary.

In summary, division of labour, production and consumption patterns within the HH reflect various aspects of hierarchy and ranking. The achieved statuses, *malxi* and *kabani*, require skills in HH management in addition to the outsiders' recognition and respect. Because these various aspects of hierarchy are reflected and reproduced in social manners related to visiting, communal eating and socializing, claims and counter-claims for status could be articulated through subtle strategies such as getting up only half way when an elder arrives or refusing to eat without explicit invitation. Next, I shall examine the social and economic relations **between** village HHs are the principles of exchange, hospitality, honour, and religiosity.

6. Relations of exchange between the households and village economy

The production and consumption activities within the household, then, are regulated according to age, gender role and kinship position of the household members. The work within the household, which is supervised by male and female household heads, is, nevertheless, not strictly regulated. The ideal of working hard for one's own household,[1] combined with the pattern of seasonal work which is learned throughout childhood and puberty, allows for a work timetable including work for other kin and neighbours. The work for others and the prestige attached to it is partly dependent on the work within the household. Where household members do not perform their expected duties, this often results not only in fights between the members and but also in ridicule among age mates. In summer, women of different households work together a lot, thus the social control and competition between the women extend beyond the intra-household framework. In a way by working hard for one's own household, one increases one's individual social or symbolic capital (consisting of personal qualities like being hard working, hospitable, sociable, or cheerful).

The value attached to hard work, however, is juxtaposed to another socially idealized quality, that of "modesty" especially in the religious sense. As Bourdieu elegantly put it, "symbolic capital can only be accumulated at the expense of the accumulation of economic capital.... Belief in imminent justice ... no doubt helps to make of generosity a sacrifice designed to win in return the blessing of prosperity." (1977:180) The concept of sharing the religion of Islam, the belief in the same creed and in being created as the servants of Allah are frequent allusions used to emphasize equality, against other direct or indirect claims to superiority. The Surahs, which warn against avarice and invite Muslims to generosity and modesty in behaviour and attire, are frequently referred to in order to express criticism of fellow villagers. The male household heads who have to work hard to maintain a large herd and to buy expensive goods or property in other areas are open to this public criticism, for not meeting the standards of an ideal religious person.[2]

This sort of religious phraseology for criticizing individual ambition applies more to male household heads than their junior male members. A village elder belongs to the age category of *rîhspî* (white beards) and this status demands clear and strict adherence to religious duties as well as restrained and dignified manners and full participation in adult male gatherings. For example, when an elder male household head is away too often on business trips to other villages or carrying hay in winter with the sleigh when he should be sitting and chatting with other men and not missing his daily prayers,[3] he would be more vulnerable to criticism than if it were a younger man or a younger male HHH. Elder men have more patience (*sebr*) and understanding (*fehm*), they say. They are neither lazy (*betal*) nor do they rush into decisions or acts (*betangov ninin*). Hajjis especially are thought to have different obligations and work patterns; they should not show any distress because of labour demands on them, nor start working hard themselves. Hajjis, nevertheless, are frequently good traders even if they do not do the physical work of cutting or carrying hay; this is not criticized as much as a Hajji who works with younger men at hay.

Religious duties are often thought to be neglected by women and young women especially are said to be ignorant about carrying out prayers and rituals properly. However, their hard work is never referred to as unholy ambition. Women's work is considered to contribute to the overall well-being and prosperity of the household and not necessarily or explicitly a contribution to its material wealth. Men have full control and responsibility for the management of property and cash income, thus their vulnerability to accusations of greed and immodesty. Consequently, when a woman controls property and cash (such as the widow in town who inherited a few shops from her husband, see above) she is equally susceptible to such accusations as lagging behind in her religious obligations. Such women, then, usually are very punctual about their alms-giving, *zekat* or assisting others financially in order to alleviate the 'burden of economic capital' and counterbalance it with 'symbolic capital' and the blessing from those she assisted.

Exchange and reciprocity

Religious phraseology is only one of the ways of limiting access to power and prestige; principles of exchange of labour, goods, and visits provide other means of maintaining and reinforcing ideas of reciprocity and equality and having control over economic differentiation within the community. Economic differentiation within the village is more often concealed than political and social differences such as supporting different political groups or parties, belonging to different lineages, sub-tribes and the like. The villagers were keen to emphasize that they were more or less equal in wealth, although the social division and groups within the village were brought up quite early in the fieldwork period. Similarly, the number of animals possessed, the fields owned, the area used for hay cutting, or the amount of other valuables owned are extremely difficult to discover. Often the villagers themselves claim that they do not know how many animals they have.[4] Praising the beauty or strength of their animals especially is not unusual but the amount owned is rarely mentioned. Let us first look at how this ideal of equality within the village is reflected in the rules of exchange.

I refer here to three sorts of things that were exchanged: labour, goods and visits. The modes of exchange were either reciprocal, emphasizing equality and egalitarianism, or non-reciprocal and unequal. First, the labour exchange between village households: the most significant type is *zebarî* (or *zebare*) in Kurdish,[5] which in fact covers two types of labour exchange, the reciprocal and non-reciprocal. In Sisin, *zebarî* exists in the form of reciprocal and rotational types of communal work for one household each time. For instance, a household, which has a labour shortage to finish some chore may specify a day as its *zebarî* and sends a child to all the village households asking them to take part in it (*pala vegerin*). Each household thus is obliged to send one member at least. Those households which have only one adult male are exempt from this obligation. The joint work lasts as long as a normal work day and is interrupted by several tea-breaks and at least one big meal (with rice and meat) all of which are provided by the *zebarî*-holding HH. A household sending no one to participate in the work would probably be reproached by the *zebarî* holder, (*gazinda kirin*) if no legitimate excuse had been made. In any case, the non-participating household would not expect anyone from the *zebarî*-holding household to attend its own *zebarî*. The rule is strictly reciprocal.

Those households having only one adult male can not send the member on another's *zebarî* days and in return face the danger of slipping out of the circle of labour exchange. But in fact they are not totally left out, since *zebarî* is at the same time a non-reciprocal relation through which status differences are acknowledged. *Zebarî* is quoted by some writers[6] as having existed in the past in the form of corvée labour extracted by tribal chiefs (*agha*), higher rulers or princes (*mîr*) or religious *shaikh*s from tribesmen, subject peasantry (*reaya*) and followers of *tariqa*s. Oramarî confirm that the *zebarî* for tribal chiefs and tribal leading families perhaps existed in the past but not any longer. Instead, what they do for two households in the village who have the lowest labour force and fewest animals is to hold several *zebarî* for them, more as alms giving than reciprocal exchange.[7] I observed only one case of *zebarî* for a wealthy trader, who was not from Sisin, but had business and affinal relations to some of the villagers; he came in person to ask for the villagers' help with the construction of his house in the neighbouring village. The villagers claimed this to be unpaid labour and 5-6 households (all with several adult males) sent a young man each for a day's work. The trader was reproached and criticized among the villagers for pretending to be influential and powerful enough to ask for the non-reciprocal type of *zebarî*. They claimed that help was given only once and out of politeness. Finally, *zebarî* occurs not only among men but also among women and the same rules of reciprocity and providing a communal meal apply to them as well. Women's *zebarî* occurs less often than men's, and is usually combined with men's; i.e. men come together for a chore and women are asked to participate as well.

As for the exchange of goods and valuables, there is a limited number of occasions for exchanging goods between the village households. The produce within the village is more or less all of the same kind, differing only in amounts. A few households keep bees and produce honey for sale, even to fellow villagers. When a household runs short of some food stuff, it asks a neighbour; the exchange would be for a price, not necessarily paid in cash but also in kind (barter), for example exchanging tea for dried figs. Valuables such as radio-casette recorders, a watch or jewelry could also be sold for cash amongst the villagers, depending on demand and after a strictly business-like bargain. The only type of direct exchange of goods within Sisin involves giving a percentage of one's own produce (mostly corn) as *zekat* (religious alms) to one another. After the produce is cultivated, each household calculates the amount to be given as *zekat* and then divides it amongst all the households, regardless of differences in wealth. This may amount only to a small bowl of corn yet the symbol of equality among households is significant. *Zekat* which is actually given from rich to poor people, (who is eligible to receive *zekat* is religiously defined)[8] in this case is said to be given by all to all, as a denial of wealth differences between households.[9]

An interesting point is that *zekat* is mentioned by Edmonds (1957:224) as a form of payment to the tribal *agha* among the northern Iraqi Kurds; it was a "tithe on the winter crop of wheat and barley." Similarly, Erdost (1968:171) lists *zekat* as one of the forms of payment to tribal chiefs. Nikitine (1956:84 ff.1), on the other hand, notes that *zekat* is paid to the *mela* in kind and cash, and although he lists various forms of payment to *agha*s, *zekat* is not among them. The Oramarî refer only to the religious significance of *zekat*, that it is a religious obligation to give alms to the poor, and following from this argument *zekat* in Sisin is given by all to all since everyone has more or less equal wealth. Thus the ideology of egalitarianism and communal solidarity seem to be the dominant arguments in this case.

The formal occasion for exchanging goods is gift giving at weddings, *baban* (first visit of a young bride to her paternal household after the wedding), *seradanê bûk* (visiting the new bride in her affinal HH for the first time after the wedding by her close kin).[10] These are occasions for perpetuating the affinal links through gift exchange between two kingroups. The village households, depending on the kinship position of the new bride or the groom, compete with one another for participating in gift giving and receiving. The type of kin or affinal link to the bride and/or groom prevails over obligations of village membership; however, especially when both the bride and groom are from the village, taking part in the wedding ceremony, helping with the preparation of the food, accommodating guests from outside and receiving gifts from the wife-takers are minimal village and neighbourhood obligations and expressions of solidarity and equality between households.

Gift exchange, as has been discussed by Mauss, involves not individuals but groups and "under a voluntary guise" is "in essence strictly obligatory."(1974:3) To give and to receive is a sign of acknowledging the communication and intercourse between the two groups. (Mauss, 1974:11). Bourdieu (1979:105-106) has emphasized the "challenge" character of the gift, and that it "presupposes ... the choice of playing a particular game in accordance with certain rules." Gift giving among the Kurds is similarly entangled with notions of honour and generosity and it is a part of the wider exchange relations. Gifts, gift giving and receiving mean different things in different contexts; gifts are exchanged in relations ranging from friendship, travel companionship to that between tribal chiefs or *shaikhs* and their followers. Often the symbolic meaning and value of the gift, or "the spirit of the gift"[11], is distinguished from its market value. One gives a gift with the words *bû xatrê tê*, which means "in the memory of (you)", "for your sake" or "that you remember me", and presents it with words belittling its material value. The recipient, in reply, inflates both the material and symbolic value of the gift. Depending on the relationship, the gap between the material and symbolic values of the gift becomes wider or narrower. For example, a simple gift (a lighter, a scarf or a picture) given by a holy person, such as a *shaikh* or *sayyid*, would have not only a highly symbolic value but also some mystical power, with its own spirit to cure illnesses or as protection against the evil forces. The "spirit" in fact is not a function of the relationship between the donor and the recipient here but of the "holyness" of the donor. When or if the gift is transferred to another person the "powers" remain with the gift.[12]

The immediate or delayed return of a gift, and the time of giving the gift are important. Mauss (1974) and Bourdieu (1979) point out the immediate return of a gift, especially when identical to the original, means the end of the exchange and probably the relation. Similarly the Kurds give their gifts and do not return them immediately. The time factor has a subtle meaning; to return a gift "too late" (this "too late" is strictly relative, contextual, and open to interpretation) is seen as damaging the relationship, but not to return or even worse to admit the inability or unwillingness to do so is certainly a sign of discontinuing the relationship.[13]

Food exchange is an indispensable part of most of the inter-household work, visiting and other social relations. Above we have seen that in *zebarî* communal labour, cooked food is provided for all those present. Despite the fact that visits within Sisin are casual and almost always unannounced, an offer of tea and/or cooked food is expected from the male or female hosts. Only very brief visits and those outside the house (on the roof, the gardens or *gulke*) would go without an offer of food. When no food is offered after perhaps a half or one hour of arrival (the offer is more important than actually bringing the food in), it could be taken as a clear sign of rejecting the minimal obligations of hospitality, thus the guest is unwanted. But this rarely happens and guests are always asked to stay on at least until some tea is prepared.[14] On regular visits within the village more or less the same type and quantity of food is offered. Cooked food, which is ranked highly, - the best is rice pilaf and meat - is expected to be offered when important guests arrive.[15]

Food exchange is not only a part of social visits but cooked food is also distributed on religious occasions. Apart from religious holidays (*ayd* in Kurdish, *bayram* in Turkish) and *mevluts* where all the households cook for guests and all the households visit each other, food is distributed between households as a meritorious act to win Gods's favour for dead ancestors and to ward off misfortune. For example, food distribution on Thursday evenings (*eyinî*, considered an auspicious time of the week) is believed to benefit the dead ancestors and "feed them", ("otherwise they would go to other doors and ask for food"). It is not done by everyone but the eldest widow in the village, who is also the most pious woman there, and a few other households occasionally, sent two pieces of bread to each household every Thursday evening.[16] Similar to the alms from the produce given to the poor, another case of distributing food in connection to death is also thought to produce religious merit; after someone dies, his/her household members do not cook food for some weeks -varying according to sex and age of the dead- and food and bread are prepared by all the other village households and sent to the members of the dead person's household. This is called *şivê mir* (the meal of the dead) and is part of the other mourning rites including not cutting hair, not listening to the radio or music, and not bathing for a certain period.

In summary, the exchange fo food and labour and visiting within the village as part of a wider framework of mutually held values concerning hospitality, generosity, and religiosity help to establish notions of equality between households. Unequal exchange relations are either denied or represented as belonging to the religious realm, mainly as personal merits. Individuals or households who accumulate material capital are expected to redistribute it through their obligations of generosity and hospitality or otherwise will be subjected to public criticism for their greed and immodesty, thus depleting their symbolic capital of prestige and respectability.

Domestic economy and economic differentiation between households

The main sources of wealth in Sisin households are livestock animals and their produce, land, and trade. All the village households have these sources except for the *mela* who is a refugee from Iraq and has no animals but only a house and a small plot of land given to him by the villagers, where he grows tobacco and some vegetables for his own use. Otherwise his income is the pay he has from village households for his religious services, the produce received as *zekat*,[17] and the pay for his eldest son's work as an occasional shepherd of the village herds. All the other households are engaged in raising livestock: sheep and goats, chickens as well as mules, horses, oxen and cows to use them for transport, ploughing or for their meat and produce. Sheep and goats, more specifically wethers and shearlings, are for sale, ewes are for their lambs and milk, goats are used for their milk, hair and sale; they are all important assets which can be turned into cash when necessary.[18] In fact animal prices are, as with the money markets, subject to fluctuations with other prices and rates of exchange depend on them. Sheep-raising villagers frequently quote their expenses and gains in terms of the number of animals sold or bought on some occasion. For example, an antique samovar's value would be judged by the number and kind of animals it took a person to sell/exchange for it.

Land and trees are the second source of livelihood. Land for hay cutting and collection is divided into shares of which usage rights are owned by households and transmitted patrilineally. Land used for terraced fields could be bought and sold or inherited, from father to son, in a similar way to the hay-cutting land and is divided into equal shares between sons. In Sisin, fields are ploughed with a wooden plough (produced locally), drawn by one or two oxes (shared for a price between ox owners and others), sown by hand and reaped with a sickle (*das* in Kurdish). All the fields are used for cultivating a rotational combination of corn, potatoes, radish, and turnip. Some land is spared as vegetable garden where tomatoes, cucumbers, green beans, onions, marrow, pumpkin, and cabbage is grown. The space between fruit trees (apricots, plums, mulberries, figs, pears, and peaches) is also used for growing vegetables and for vineyards.

The produce of fields and gardens is largely for household consumption. Some surplus onions, peaches, and corn are used in barter for wheat from the plains villages. Other vegetables or fruits are not bought from town or other villages except on rare occasions and in small amounts. The most important cash crop is the poplar and walnut trees. Poplar trees are used for house construction and households make sure they have enough trees for repairs or building a new house, otherwise one has to buy the trunks at high prices. Other sorts of trees are also used for furniture and tools, many of which are either made in Sisin or other villages. Walnut trees, on the other hand, are valuable not only for their wood but also their fruit. In the last 10 years or so, the price of walnuts has been increasing both in local national and Iraqi markets. For example, in 1981 at the beginning of walnut sales Sisin villagers had agreed to sell to a Yüksekova trader (shop-owner who sold goods to the villagers on credit) one paraffine tin measure for 400-450 TL. (holding c. 7-8 kg. of walnuts) (200 TL.=1 Sterling in 1981). In a few weeks time the price had gone up to 570 TL. per tin and at the end of the sales season (end of November) the price was circa 700 TL. per tin. During the same period the price across the Iraqi border was c. 850 TL.per tin, yet the journey to the border was risky for those villagers further north of the border, and although people checked the prices continuously they did not attempt the journey. In a few years time (1984) the price had gone up to 2000 TL.per tin (500 TL.=1 Sterling in 1984) in the local market.

The wood of the walnut tree is also very valuable and high prices are offered for it in neighbouring villages, but in Sisin nobody considered cutting the trees to sell them. The rising cash value of walnut trees in recent years seems to have made them vulnerable in times of conflict, just as sheep, mules, fodder have been targets for destruction or stealing by individuals or parties in fights.[19] Recently there have been cases of walnut trees cut in order to provoke or challenge a rival group.

The villagers of Sisin own land and trees not only in their own village but also some of the households[20] have fields and trees in other villages (mostly villages of origin and ancestors) for which they have share cropping arrangements with their kin and affines. Thus the land and trees in Sisin are not the only source for the agricultural produce consumed by Sisin households.

On the distribution of animal ownership in Sisin, my information is incomplete due to the unwillingness of herd-owners to be precise about the size and composition of their herds, not only because of the beliefs about the "evil eye" mentioned above, but also because of the over all nature of the pastoral economy, namely the fact that animals are for sale across the border, the administrative term for the trade being smuggling here.[21]

The list of the number of goats and sheep owned per household for 23 HHs in Sisin is presented in Appendix V. The overall mean herd size per household is 70.3, but when separated into the two camp units, the lower camp unit (*zoma*) has a mean of 74.1, whereas the upper *zoma*'s mean is 67.5. This difference is probably due to the upper *zoma* unit having the two smallest herd size HHs (30 in both cases) whereas the lower *zoma* group has the maximum herd size holding household (with 136 sheep and goats). These figures compared to neighbouring nomadic groups (see, Beşikçi 1969; Bates 1973; Tapper 1979) are strikingly lower than the nomadic Yörük[22] and the Alikan nomadic Kurds[23] but similar to the poorer sections of the Shahsevan nomads.[24]

The reproduction of herds[25] varies greatly from year to year depending on weather and fodder conditions, as Bates has shown for Yörük nomads and their herds over a period of three years.[26] In Hakkari's mountain villages, which are isolated from one another in winter months when motor roads are closed due to snow and avalanches, the greatest concern was to have enough fodder stored for the herds. The amount of fodder for a specific herd size is determined as follows:

In mountain villages the grass on the hills is cut by sickle and made into big bundles (*bağ* in Turkish). These are left to dry on the hills and then some are carried to sites on the hills, to be brought down on sleighs (as it is easier to bring them sliding in winter than on the backs of men and women in summer), and the second part is piled near the house to feed the animals between November-January when there is not enough snow on which sleighs can slide. Thus one has to cut not only a reasonable and sufficient amount of hay but also distribute it to the hill and village sites so that in times of early or late snowfall the animals will have enough to eat. Further considerations are the composition of a pile, what type of grass should be put where (in the middle or bottom), and which fodder should be given to weaker animals and lambs. Apart from mountain hay, the herd is fed with the leaves of oak shrubs (*cîlî* in Kurdish) cut in July, dried and burned in winter. Thus, the herds in the mountains are fed with hay and oak leaves, whereas the plains villages have a slightly different combination; the hay bundles in Yüksekova are smaller, grass is of lower quality and there are not enough shrub oaks, yet on the plain field clover is considered to be a high quality fodder and was sold for 30 TL.=1 bundle in August 1980. Moreover, as indicated above, Yüksekova plains villages could buy fodder in emergency situations in winter and transport it in large amounts on trucks for prices higher than in summer but not as high as in mountain villages.[27]

The amount of hay bundles necessary in the mountains or the plain for a herd size of 100 was estimeated by villagers to be c. 4000-5000 bundles (or 7-8 piles, *dih*) in the mountains and 5000-6000 bundles (or 2-3 *dih*) on the plain. On the plain the grass and clover fields are reaped with the scythe, thus one man could reap 100-140 (small) bundles/day depending on the type of ground and the worker's strength and skill. The mountain villagers estimate that 5000 mountain bundles of hay (necessary for a herd of 100 sheep and goats) should be reaped between around 10th of May till the end of June or mid-July (in July the lower parts of the hill grass is already drying). This makes the number of work days about 50, meaning that nearly 100 bundles of mountain hay have to be reaped daily. Under ideal conditions, two adult men can accomplish this task.

Appendix V shows the number of adult male or female labour force/HH corresponding to the herd size/HH in 1982. From this data one can see that households which declared 100 animals or more all had 4-5 men and women who worked in various stages of hay and bush cutting, reaping and collecting. As indicated above, although husbandry is the main source of cash income, and the largest part of the work in mountain villages is related to husbandry, semi-nomadic pastoral production involves multiple production processes which have to be carried out simultaneously. Thus, the household labour force has to be allocated into various chores of the production process. The months in which fresh grass is cut and made into bundles are also the months when male labour is divided between herding (one's own shearlings), hay cutting, ploughing (depending on the rain, fields are ploughed and sown at the latest in early May), and procuring the diminished food stocks from town. Women in this period collect herbs and mush rooms to be cooked or eaten raw or used for cheese, and basically are busy with early milking (travelling to the hills and bringing milk back, and making cheese). Therefore, the number of two adult men/HH I referred to above is only the minimum adult labour force for raising a herd of 100.

The amount of hay reaped, apart from being dependent on the household's labour force, the amount of land and climatic conditions, is itself directly correlated to the herd size which in return is dependent on its reproduction rate and the sale of animals and animal produce. The latter is carried out in the months of August and September after butter has been produced in July, and lambs, sheep and goats are shorn at the end of August which is an occasion for festivities (*berxbir* in Kurdish). The remainder of lambs and sheeps wool is sold after keeping the amount necessary for the household that year.[28] Goat's hair is not sold but used mainly for weaving sacks, tents and ropes for the household.

In addition to wool, the trader from town buys butter, a type of cheese made from skimmed milk (*keşk* in Kurdish), and some gum tragacanth (*geven sakızı* in Turkish, *beniştê qêzan* in Kurdish) collected by village women and children. The price of butter in 1980 was 280 TL. per kilo and a household with 130 sheep and goats and 19 members could sell 60 kg. butter at this price. Butter is an important item for sale and most of the milk is used for making butter for HH consumption and sale. Yogurt and cheese in Sisin, on the other hand, are for HH consumption only and not for sale. Milk is rarely drunk fresh (except by children staying in the pasture camp) but all of it is processed. This is strikingly different from the Yörük nomads described by Bates (1973:155-56) and the Shahsevan nomads by Tapper (1979:56-57) who consume milk regularly (depending on the production) as they are in the vicinity of the animals more than the semi-nomads' situation whose households divide between the village house and the tent. Another difference between Yörük and Shahsevan nomads and the semi-nomads in Hakkari in terms of animal produce processing, is that the nomads can sell the meat and skin of their animals to the villagers on migration or in winter locations, and the milk of their animals can be sold directly to the traders who manufacture cheese on the spot.[29] In Hakkari, the cheese and butter production is done by village households, and the meat of animals is not sold.

Finally, among the sources of cash income the most important category is the sale of animals. The sale has two purposes; to provide cash to buy food staples and other household necessities, and to supply cash and credit to invest in further animal or property purchases. The second purpose is articulated in trade relations; someone engaged in buying and selling animals for the general purpose of trade (and not to restore one's own herds, or replace lost animals) would not provide for the animals from his own resources (land and hay) and labour (household members), but pay for the services with cash and credit. For example, a trader buys animals from fellow villagers or others, visits the households, selects the animals, and then either takes the animals to a third party to feed them at a price, or leaves the animals with the original household and their herd, to be picked up at the time when the final herd is to be taken across the border. The first case, however, i.e. the sale of animals for subsistence and marginal profits, is no less tricky. The price of lambs, shearlings and ewes are not determined on the spot but on the local informal smuggling market, thus each year a price for lamb and shearlings is formed by the market forces of smuggling, bribery, road conditions, and the prices of staple goods.

Table 6.1. Animal prices in Hakkari.

The price of 2 lambs (*çift*) in 1980 : 8000-9000 TL.
" " " " " " 1981 : 10000-12000 TL.
" " " " " " 1982 : 14000-15000 TL.
" " " " " " 1985 : 40000 TL.[30]

Table 6.2. Estimated (partial) costs and returns of a household in Sisin (1981).(*)

(a) Returns

Sale of lambs, ewes and wethers (30 total:20 lambs, 10 sheep and goats)	140,000 TL.
Sale of wool (80 kg. x 200 TL./kg.)	16,000 TL.
Sale of butter and cheese (60 kg. x 280 TL.)	18,000 TL.
Sale of gum tragacanth (20 kg. x 220 TL.)	4,400 TL.
Sale of walnuts (57 tins x 570 TL.)	33,000 TL.
	Total 211,400 TL.

(b) Costs(**)

Flour (20 sacks wheat flour at 1 sack=2600 TL.)	52,000 TL.
Sugar (20 sacks at 3000 TL./sack)	60,000 TL.
Salt (800 kg. for own and animals' consumption)(***)	9,050 TL.
Tea (50 kg. at 550 TL./kg.)(***)	27,000 TL.
Rice (100 kg. at 80 TL./kg.)	8,000 TL.
	Total 156,550 TL.

(*) For a HH with 19 members: 9 adults and 10 children.

(**) This is a limited list of items which are most important and expensive. Other common items which are also yearly bought are kerosene, tahini, tobacco (for those who do not grow it themselves) and other clothing, shoes, medicine or luxury items.

(***) Only 100 kg./HH of salt was sold by state monopolies. The rest was bought in the blackmarket at double the price. Tea was smuggled from Iran and was more expensive than Turkish tea.

The household, given as an example above, was fairly large and labourwise self-sufficient, and had a much above average number of sheep and goats, such that the household head could use some of the cash and credit for trading with sheep and goats. Thus the above calculations are estimates for a part of his household budget. Moreover, the household head was one of the village "elite" (*mazin*), receiving lots of guests and having to frequently provide food for them; thus his food expenses are not only for household members. Other households with fewer people, and varying numbers of sheep and goats would obviously have smaller budgets. Finally, it should be remembered that some of the expenses and services are met with with barter, such as the shepherd's pay, *mela*'s *zekat*, the price of the mill, and the price of wheat bought in plains villages.

Summary and concluding remarks

In Hakkari rural life is dominant, and Sisin, similar to many other mountain villages in the region, is a small settlement, consisting of households which make their living from semi-nomadic pastoral production. The physical setting and the mode of production require a specific pattern of mobility and space usage. Households seasonally and cyclically divide and unite between the pasture camps and the village houses.

The use of the space within and around the house is affected by gender roles, age ranking, and kinship position. Claims or counter-claims to status changes are made through subtle strategies involving seating, eating, or visiting patterns.

Households are primarily property holding, consumption and production units, but patrilocal residence and kinship relations are ideologically crucial to the local conceptualization of a household, *mal*. The household division is ideally delayed between brothers rather than between father and son and in Sisin household divisions have indeed occurred between brothers with an average period of 16 years. 67% of the Sisin households are extended paternal, fraternal and paternal and fraternal joint types. The mean household size is 11.8.

The labour organization, consumption and production patterns reflect the hierarchy within the household as well as between households. Attitudes towards work and religious and moral identity indicate a differentiated evaluation of work, merit, generosity, and wealth. Adult men and women are expected to work hard for their households, yet only men's work should not precede religious obligations and for this reason much attention is paid to religious alms giving (*zekat*) by men within the village.

Exchange relations within the village, especially those of labour, gifts and goods exchange, emphasize the egalitarian aspects and where the relation is unequal or non-reciprocal, it is presented as a religious merit, as in the case of *zebarî* and *zekat* for the poorer households. Otherwise, the receiver of labour or goods in this unequal relation is expected to have a higher status, the way the tribal chiefs and *shaikh*s receive gifts and corvée labour in the past. The villagers' attempt to further their ideals of reciprocity and equality are also felt in the suppression of economic differences within the village so that all households are said to give *zekat* to one another as a sign of equal wealth status.

The economic bases of livelihood are raising sheep and goats and trading livestock and their produce. Agricultural production is mainly for household consumption and some barter. The organization of the animal trade through the black market requires more resources in terms of labour and cash than average pastoral production does. Prices of goods are dependent on national, local, and international market forces, as well as on political and administrative conditions.

The size of a herd owned by a household is dependent not only on land for cutting hay but also the labour force; in this respect the Sisin households which own more than 100 sheep and goats are the largest HHs with 4-5 adult men and women. As for the household's costs, like the produce sold for cash or bartered, there are fluctuations in the prices depending on the national or international market and transport conditions.

Village economy is dependent on the illegal trade of goods and livestock. The border area that is administratively integrated into the Turkish state is economically and to some degree politically not fully integrated. The political and administrative structures in Hakkari, tribal and kinship relations effect the forms of economic and social ties of cooperation. In the following chapters I shall investigate the significance of kinship ideology and marriage strategies for determining the social relations within the village and the tribe.

7. Kinship and affinity

This chapter treats the type and character of the kinship system which has a pivotal role for the tribal organization in Hakkari. Tribes exist as fictive kinship groups and tribesmen identify their co-tribal group as the group of their real or fictive patrilineal kinsmen. The kinship system in Hakkari, however, is not completely identical to the tribal system because a) kinship is reckoned bilaterally, b) the same kinship terminology is used by tribal and non-tribal, urban and rural Kurds. The discussion here deals with kinship categories and roles and tries to relate them to the tribal ideology on the one hand and to the political economy of the region on the other. First, I look at the general kinship categories and how this classification reflects official and practical kin groups. Secondly, principles of extension in reference and address usage are analyzed. The extension of kinship terms is carried out at different levels; a) at a conscious level, in order to extend the moral meaning of the term for a tactical usage, b) at an unconscious level, e.g. for one's own tribesmen whose genealogical position is impossible or unimportant to certify. Principles of extending the kin and affinal terms in reference and address also reflect hierarchical, egalitarian, or gender specific relations between kin and affines. Thirdly, kinship terms from Hakkari are compared with other available Kurdish terms, and similarities or different usages are linked to social organizational elements like tribal organization and the dominance of patrilineal ideology. Fourthly, a selection of kin and affinal relations are presented, through which the use of kinship terms, and its corresponding kin related behaviour, norms, and practical rules about kinship are illustrated. The strategies of matrimony and further aspects of affinity are discussed in the following chapter.

Kin and affinal categories and kinship terminology

a. *Xism* versus *xwîn/warîs*:

The native categories divide kin and affines in a general sense as *xwîn* (blood relations, kin) and *xism* (as *hısım* in Turkish) meaning those who are related to EGO through marriage in one's own, plus ascending and descending generations. *Warîs*, on the other hand, is used interchangeably with *xwîn*, although it literally means heir or heiress. These three terms are used for categories of people rather than for individuals, thus they are not used in addressing but in referring to people. As categorical terms, they do not describe genealogical positions or extensions, but denote cultural values of patrimonial predominance and social "closeness".[31] They are, in a way, similar to what Bloch (1971:80) describes as the "moral meaning of terms" which originates "in the general belief system of the culture independent of tactical use." Bloch argues that the Merina kin term for "ego's own father's own immediately younger brother and ego's own mother's immediately younger brother" is *dadafara*, but it is used for many other people whereas "one need not actually call one's dadafara '*dadafara*'."(Ibid., p. 84) Similarly *xwîn/warîs* or *xism* refer to all the people who are related through blood or affinity respectively, but one never refers to individual immediate kin, agnate, or cognate as *xwîn* or close affine as *xism*. For close kin and affines there are specific terms of reference and address; the above categorical terms, however, imply some "distance" in the relationship to the group in question. The local term for such a kin or affinal link is "*dûr kevin*" (lit. to fall distant, same as *uzak düşmek* in colloquial Turkish). The distance is subjectively and tactically determined; for any kin or affine with whom social contact is weak, unprofitable or antagonistic, the distance indicating terminology would be used: *ew min dûr keft* (lit. he fell distant to me).

The significance of these category terms is apparent in their contrasting usage with other terms deriving from tribal classification. The double usage of the term *mal* for household and lineage has already been mentioned. Since lineage membership is established through patrilineal lines, one would assume that *xwîn/warîs* are other terms for *mal*. Indeed in some cases people define not only their own lineage (*mal*) members as their own *warîs* but also that other lineages (*mal*s) are *warîs*, i.e. heir, to each other. *Xwîn*, on the other hand, includes women who would be denied the right of inheritance according to tribal customs. *Warîs*, therefore, emphasizes more the men as heirs, whereas *xwîn* is a more general term covering women as well. *Mal* is a term used in the context of tribal allegiance and membership, whereas *xwîn* and *warîs* emphasize kinship ties which may or may not overlap with the boundaries of *mal*. For example, two *mal*s as lineages may refer to each other as *warîs*.

Xwîn or *warîs* are usually used in comparison to *xism*. Where *xwîn* or *warîs* refers to a category of people to whom blood and inheritance relations are asserted, *xism* covers a potentially large and fluid category of people who are related to EGO's ancestors through marriage (thus in the ascending generation), but also to EGO's wife's secondary kin and affines. *Xism*, therefore, morally means those who are not related by blood, but in its tactical usage it covers a fluid group of people with whom one could be matrilaterally linked.

b. Genealogical and classificatory kin and affinal terms:

In each category of kin and affines there are genealogical and classificatory or extended terms. The genealogical kin terms are shown in Figure 7.1[32], and the genealogical affinal terms are shown in Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 below.[33]

It is interesting to note that terms for affines of patrilineal kin and those for female affines are clearly specified. The HZH does not have an affinal term although if probed could be described as *mîrê diş*: husband of *diş* (HZ). In comparison, *jintî* (HBW) is a well defined and clearly accepted term. One immediate correlate of this differentiation is the patrilocal residence and the common pattern of married brothers sharing a household. A man and his ZH would rarely, if at all, live in the same house, yet a woman and her HBW may well share the same HH for many years.

c. Extension of kin and affinal terms:

The extension of kin and affinal terms works as a "genuine" principle, where the term first and foremost mean the primary referent is an actual kinsman. When asked who a *xal* or *xolat* is, the informants always answer *xal* as MB and *xolat* as MZ. If the person referred to is not a real (in the genealogical sense) MB or MZ, but is referred to as *xal* or *xolat*, the person using the terms would admit that he/she is not a **real** MB or MZ, but that he/she is "like" a MB or MZ to him or her. The usage, here, is not a categorical one but a **conscious** extension from the meaning of primary kin. Therefore, when looked at from the EGO's point of view, the terms are used for more than one person. This type of "conscious" extension implies that the exact position of the referent on the genealogical map is available to the speaker making the reference. Another type of extension (which is also "conscious" in a way) is the tactical usage of extending various terms in contextual and temporary usage for persons who cannot be placed on the genealogical map but for whom some kin-like relation is temporarily asserted. This distinction discussed further in examples below. First, however, let us look at the methods of immediate extension.

Figure 7.5 below depicts the extension of kinship terms, where the following principles of extension could be observed:

1. Extended terms exist at generation (0) (EGO's generation) for second patrilineal male and female cousins. The rest of the cousins will mostly be referred to with a descriptive term as in *kurê kurmetî bavê*=S of F's FZS. The extension along the unilineal side of the patriliny is downward for the term and upward for EGO's generational position, (e.g. the term *pismam*: FBS is extended to FBSS, but EGO takes his father's viewpoint).

2. At generation (+1), EGO's parents' patrilateral cousins can be referred to with the extended terms used for father's and mother's siblings or EGO's first cousins. Here the particular choice of the term depends on the relative age of EGO and the referent. For example, whether EGO's FFBS is *pismam*: FBS or *mam*: FB to EGO depends on the age difference of the two, that is if EGO is much younger than the cousin, EGO might call or refer to him as *mam* rather than *pismam*.

3. The extension mentioned at point 2 has to have EGO's point of view; when the EGO's parents' generation is the initial point of genealogical connection then the terms assume their real kinship connection. For example, for EGO, MFBS is *pisxal*: MBS, and this of course is an important transformation of the relation, as M's patrilineal kin is transformed into EGO's matrilateral kin. The significance of this transformation is the terminological disguise of the mother's patrilineage, which may be different from EGO's (and his/her father's), and the use an affinal term, *pisxal*, which stresses alliance (marriage) over fission (patrilineal descent grouping). For EGO's M, however, her FBS is always a *pismam*: FBS.

4. At generation (+2), EGO's FF's and MM's siblings are extended the terms for EGO's F's and M's siblings respectively. This principle is more explicit in the case of EGO's patrilineal ascending generation than for the matrilateral case.

5. In the first descending generation (-1), EGO's first cousins' offspring would have the extended terms as of their relevant parent. Thus EGO's FBSS could be refer red to as FBS only. This depends also on age difference; *pismam* is someone nearer to one's own age. This is the point on the genealogical chart where especially the patrilineal kinsmen start being referred to with a single term, *pismam*, and exact genealogical and generational differences are omitted unless there is a big age difference between EGO and the referent.

Figure 7.1. Genealogical kin terms.


Bappir
Dappir
Bappir
Dappir
Xolat
Xal
Day
Bab
Metî
Mam
Pisxolat
Dotxolat
Pisxal
Dotxal
EGO
Bra
Xûşk
Kurmetî
Keçmetî
Pismam
Dotmam
Kur
Keç
Brazê
Brazî
Xarzê
Xarzî
Nevî
Nevî

Figure 7.2. Affines of patrilateral and matrilateral kin.


Jinmam
Zava
Mirxolat
Jinxal
Zava
Jinbra
EGO
Jin
Zava
Bûk

Figure 7.3. Male EGO's affines.


Xezûr
Xesû
Hevzava
/ Hevling
Diş
Jinbûra
Bûra
Jin
EGO

Figure 7.4. Female EGO's affines.


Xezûr
Xesû
Jintî
Tî
Diş
Mîr
EGO

Figure 7.5. Extension of kin terms.


+2
+1
0
-1
-2
-3
Xolat
Xal
Metl
Mam
Plsxal
Plsxolat
Xal
Xolat
Mam
Metl
Plsmam / Mam
Dotmam / Metl
Dotxal
Pisxal
Dotxolat
Pisxolat
EGO
Dotmam
Plsmam
Keçmetl
Kurmetl
Plsmam
Dotmam
Pisxal
Dotxolat
Pisxolat
Dotmam
Dotmam
Plsmam
Nevl
Nevl
Nevl
Nevl

6. At EGO's second descending generational level (-2), EGO's grandchildren all have the same kinship term, *nevî*.

7. Finally, in the third descending generation from EGO (-3), his grandchildren's children will have the same term as their respective parents from EGO's point of view.

To summarize, the methods of extending the kin terms in reference (and also in address, especially on the patrilineal side, see terms of address below) are: a) to contract genealogical distance on the patrilineal side (as in referring to FFBS as FBS), b) to be more precise for the patrilineal kin term extension but less so for the matrilateral kin (even changing one's own mother's patrilineal kin to own matrilateral), c) to differentiate the term according to the speaker's and referent's relative ages.

The diagram in Figure 7.5 is a hypothetical model since in reality relations between living people seldom stretch for more than four generations. Horizontally, cousins of the third order or more are usually noted on the patrilineal side as "traceable" FBSs, meaning the exact genealogical link is not immediately available or remembered, but the speaker and the referent have FFFs who were either brothers or FBSs to each other. These "traceable" FBSs (the term is mine, the local people call their genealogical, classificatory, and lineage patrilineal cousins by one term only, i.e. FBS=*pismam*) are usually the effective patrilineal kin with whom residential, social, economic, and affinal links are manifold and complex. "Lineage" cousins, on the other hand, are again "FBSs" whom one knows to be in one's own lineage, but the exact kin link is unknown or unimportant; the only common explanation about what the basis of the link is is that the lineage male members descended from a common ancestor, hence they are sons of brothers, i.e. FBSs to each other.[34]

The next type of extension is that of the affinal terms explicated in Figure 7.6 below. This diagram shows the extended terms for the husbands and wives of EGO's ascending and descending generational kin and affines. Some observations from Figure 7.6 are as follow:

1. In Figure 7.2, where primary affinal terms are shown, in EGO's own generation EGO's BW has the term *jinbra*, which literally means brother's wife. Yet the term used for EGO's son's wife, *bûke*, could be used for *jinbra* as well. Similar to the extended usage of the term *mam* (FB) for an elder patrilineal cousin and *pismam* (FBS) for a patrilineal cousin of one's own age group, the relative ages of the two people affect the choice of the reference terms. *Bûk* literally means "bride" and "daughter-in-law", and the speaker would

Figure 7.6. Extension of affinal terms.


+2
Jinmam
Jinxal
+1
Zava
Jinmam
Jinxal
0
Bûk
Zava
Zava
Bûk
Zava
Bûk
EGO
-1
Zava
Bûk
Zava
Bûk
Zava
Bûk
Zava
Bûk

Figure 7.7. Kinship terms used in consecutive or polygynous marriages.


Jinbab / Day
Bab
Day
Zirbab
Xûşk
Bra
EGO
Xûşk
Bramek

Figure 7.8. Women and their children in polygynous marriages.


EGO
Mîr
Hevî
Nevisî

differentiate in reference, whether it is the elder or younger brother's wife, using *jinbra* for the first and *bûke* for the second.

2. As a comparison, for EGO in his own generation the husband of his sister has only one term *zava*, which EGO (male) would use only if he is older than the ZH, otherwise he will use no term, but the person's name.

3. For wives and husbands of 1st patrilateral cousins, from EGO's point of view, the terms *bûke* and *zava* are extended respectively usually without taking into account possible age group difference.

4. For a male EGO, his wife's sibling's husband or wife would almost never be referred to as *zava* or *bûke*. However, for a female EGO, her husband's sibling's husband or wife is more likely to be called *zava* or *bûke*, more so if her husband is the eldest son. The significance of this usage is that married women more often use affinal terms for their husband's affines than their husbands do respectively. Women thus assimilate their own "affinal" position into becoming a member of the husband's HH. The woman's usage of the same terms as her husband, but not vice versa, indicates the terminological aspect of her incorporation into the husband's group.

5. In generation (-1), EGO's first descending generation, EGO's own sons and daughters-in-law and EGO's siblings' sons and daughters-in-law are all *zava* and *bûke* from EGO's point of view.

6. In the first ascending generation (+1), the husbands of EGO's patrilateral relatives are *zava* to EGO. For instance, EGO's FZH is *zava* to EGO. Thus the term *zava* which primarily and simultaneously means 'bridegroom' and 'son-in-law', could be extended to refer to a male affine from the ascending generation.

7. The point above, that is calling a patrilateral kinswoman's husband *zava*, does not apply to EGO's matrilateral kin's husbands except in some special cases or circumstances of referential usage where EGO belongs to an elder generation than his MZH and then could refer to him as "their" *zava*.

8. In the second ascending generation (+2), EGO's patrilineal and matrilateral kins' wives have the extended affinal terms for generation (+1) and in the respective line. For example, EGO's MMBW has the same term *jinxal* as MBW, similarly FFBW is called with the same term as FBW: *jinmam*.

9. The husbands of patrilateral and matrilateral kinswomen in the (+2) ascending generation would not be referred to as *zava* by EGO because of the generational and age

differences and the due respect towards elders. As mentioned above, the use of the term *zava* for an affine implies a set of affinal obligations and relations with the person, that the *zava* has to fulfil the role of a wife-taker. Thus, using *zava* for an elder affine of the 2nd ascending generation would overlook the generational distance and the elders' respected position and could be seen as a claim for a higher status than the referent.

Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show kin terminology related to polygynous situations. They have to do with men polygynously married, women and men marrying different people consecutively, and what the co-wives call each other and their offspring.

From Figure 7.7 it can deduced that EGO differentiates between half-brothers from mother's previous or later marriages and those from father's other wives. MHS is a *bramek*[5] whereas FWS is a *bra* just like one's own MS. The differentiation is not made terminologically for EGO's sisters. The reason, most probably, is patrilineal inheritance of property. *Bramek* would inherit property from different fathers, whereas *bra*s inherit from one father. As women do not, according to tribal traditions, inherit property, a differentiation in terminology according to different fathers is not necessary. Secondly, EGO has two different terms for stepfather and stepmother, but in the case of the father having more than one wife at the same time, i.e. a polygynous marriage, EGO and his siblings are encouraged to refer to all the wives as *day*: mother; the reference is usually followed by the name of the wife in comparison to one's own mother.[6] The same principle does not apply to stepfathers. As there is no polyandrous marriage, a stepfather is either an ex- (and dead) husband of one's mother, or someone married to the mother after one's own father's death; in these cases the stepfather would be *zirbab*. The stepfather of a second marriage being referred to as *zirbab* is unusual, especially if the first marriage had ended in divorce. Another special case is two sons from two marriages of a woman calling each other *bra* instead of *bramek* because their fathers are brothers. This supports the argument above about patrilineal inheritance of property and the terminological difference between male siblings from the same mother but different fathers. In this case, *bramek* is not used, as the property of two brothers would be inherited by their offspring who call each other *bras*.

The methods of extending affinal terms, in summary, are as follow:

1. In the immediate generations below and above EGO, the terms for bride/daughter-in-law (*bûke*) and groom/son-in-law (*zava*) are widely extended. The

extension is restricted concerning matrilateral affines and affines of one's own spouse. The patrilineal ideology involves some distance and avoidance between secondary affines and unless these relations are padded with neighbourhood and friendship links, the affinity is not emphasized with such extended terminology.

2. Compared to the extension of kin terms, the extension of affinal terms is more flexible or less precise in reflecting the age difference between the speaker and the referent. It is suitable to extend the term *zava* (son-in-law/groom) to a second cousin's husband, who is older than the speaker, but one is more careful to refer to or address a patrilineal second cousin as *mam* (FB), if he is older than EGO, or *pismam* (FBS), if he is of the same age group as EGO. Age difference is important especially in address and the person's name is often added to the term. Addressing elders with first names alone is not disrespectful *per se*, but depends on the context, language, and manners. Nevertheless, it is common to address (if not refer to) an old kinsman with an extended term used together with his first name, e.g. *mam* Hasan (Uncle -FB- Hasan), *xalo* Haci (Uncle -MB- Haci) and the like.

3. The reference terms of *zava* and *bûke* are used, more or less, for all the husbands and wives of patrilineal kin, especially when no other kin link can be found.

4. Half-brothers and half-sisters are treated differently in terminology; half-brothers from different fathers (who inherit from different fathers) are called by a separate term than half-brothers from different mothers (who inherit from the same father). Half-sisters from different fathers or mothers are not terminologically differentiated. This usage is fully in accordance with the patrilineal inheritance and linage membership system.

d. Comparative Kurdish kinship terminology:

Appendix VI lists all the kin and affinal terms with the corresponding range of persons mentioned above. Other Kurdish kinship terminology lists have been compiled by Leach (1940) and Barth (1953). Leach (1940:20), despite the fact that his "knowledge of the Kurdish was not sufficient to verify the exact use of these (kinship) terms," points out the classificatory usage of FBS, MBS, FZS, and MZS terms. He mentions a *tira* (tribal) subdivision (lineage according to Leach) is referred to as calling one another FBSs. (Ibid.) This is a point which has important implications not only for the extension of kin terms within the tribal segments but also for the discussion of FBD-FBS marriage, patrilineal solidarity, lineage unity and questions of segmentation, fission and fusion within the tribal groups. Barth's diagram (1953:31) shows, nevertheless, the same usage of the term *zava* for EGO's both ZH and DH, as in the case of Hakkari.

Barth's assessment of the unimportance of affinity and affinal relations, however, is not supported by the type of kinship and affinal relations in Hakkari. He states that "affinal relations are, as far as the male is concerned, of secondary importance, and the basic terms for spouse's father, mother, adult brother and adult sister suffice. The woman, except for these terms, adopts the kinship designations of her husband, usually with the given name of the person appended." (Barth, 1953:32) Unlike the southern Kurdish usage discussed by Barth, the affinal terms from Hakkari numerically as well as in elaboration (in respect to gender and age of the referring and the referred) indicate a differentiated usage and significance attached to affinity. Women continue to be members of their own patrilineages after marrying, and they continue using the same kin terms for their own kin and agnatic terms for their affines only if the kin link existed prior to the marriage.

Turkish and Kurdish kinship terms, when compared, resemble one another to a considerable degree, yet the differences are significant.[37] For one, the Kurds differentiate between elder and younger siblings, but this distinction is not reflected in terminology, as is the case of *ağabey* (elder brother) and *abla* (elder sister) in Turkish, even if one could describe an elder brother as *brayê mezin* and elder sister as *xuşkê mezin*.

Secondly, there is no single generalized term for sibling in Kurdish as the Turkish word, *kardeş*. The terms for male and female siblings are mutually exclusive in Kurdish. Similarly, the general term, *yeğen* in Turkish, which is used for a sibling's son or daughter, is differentiated in Kurdish. Not only the sex of the sibling but also the sex of the offspring are taken into account as in; *brazê*: brother's son; *brazî*: brother's daughter; *xarzê*: sister's son; *xarzî*: sister's daughter. This is surely closely related to the principle of claiming membership and inheritance according to patriliny among the Kurds.

Thirdly, Kurdish and Turkish terminology differ from one another for affines. The word *enişte* which refers to ZH, FZH, MZH in Turkish is different from *guvah/damat* which designates DH, the groom. The Kurdish terminology has a common word for all of these; as mentioned earlier, *zava* is DH, BDH, ZH, (FZH), (MZH).[38] The extended usage of *zava* reflects the importance given to affinity within the patrilineal system. Different from the Turkish usage, the Kurdish terminological system puts affinal men of one's own ascending and descending generations together, whereas Turks differentiate between affinal men of the ascending and descending generations. *Zava* therefore has a primary meaning of son-in-law, but also has a classificatory usage as wife-taker or affine. Moreover, Kurds have separate terms for FBW (*jinmam*) and MBW (*jinxal*), unlike the common term *yenge* in Turkish for FBW, MBW and BW. This distinction in Kurdish between FBW and MBW is again consistent with the patrilineal system.

e. Reference and address terms:

The use of kinship terms in reference and/or address is significant not only for kinship and tribal classification, but also kinship and tribal behaviour. Extension, usage in reference or address of kin and affinal terms reveal different aspects of kin-based social relations. Different possibilities of close kin or affinal group definitions and alliances, male and female avoidance or intimacy, joking behaviour, in-law avoidance and respect code, age and sibling order hierarchy and rivalry, inheritance, and property relations are some of the social structural and behavioural aspects which are implicitly or explicitly reflected in these usages. An examination of the use of kin and affinal terms in reference and address leads to the following observations:

To begin with, affinal terms are mostly used in reference, only a few of them being also used in address. Moreover, only a few affinal terms can be extended in address or reference, whereas almost all of the kin terms are extended in address and/or reference usage. Hence, kin terms carry a positive **moral** implication rendering them flexible for the tactical usage of extension in reference and address. Affinal terms which are hardly extended in reference or address lack the "ideal" and "moral" value, but because their usage is not subject to inflation, it carries more significance when a person is referred to with an extended affinal term. For instance, calling someone one's own *zava*, when the affinal link is not immediate, carries with it a certain emphasis on equality, reciprocity, expectations of interaction, and exchange. As we shall see shortly, affinal relations involve various degrees of avoidance, thus the use of an affinal term in extension cannot be casual or spontaneous without being presumptious.

Furthermore, affinal reference terms are replaced by kin terms in address in many cases. For example, co-wives (*hevî* in reference) call each other *xuşkê* (Z), or a co-wife calls her step-child not *nevisî* (a reference term) but *keç/kûr*, terms for daughter/son.

More significantly, among cousins, the speaker's and the addressed cousin's sex determines the usage of the appropriate address term. Ideally all cousin terms ought to be used in address by either sex. Yet the modesty code for women and a certain degree of avoidance between male and female cousins, related to the preferential cousin marriage practices, sometimes hinder the use of address terms. Thus when FBSs can freely address and refer to each other as *pismam*, between FBD-FBS the address, in fact the whole contact is restrained, especially if they are of similar ages and unmarried.

Gender differences also appear in addressing a son or daughter-in-law. *Zava* is hardly used in address since the relations between male in-laws are restrained, and there is avoidance especially in cases of a significant age and generational gap between the men. Among male age-mate in-laws, *zava* could be used in address in a joking relationship and friendship. *Bukê*, however, is used in address freely as the daughter-in-law lives in her affinal HH (mostly that of her HF's or HB's) and structurally has a lower status among the household's adult members. Nevertheless, *bukê* should not be thought of as a negative or hostile term, reminding the bride of her lower status; it implies pride for the household (as wife-takers), as well as affection and admiration for the woman, since all young women are thought to desire marriage, thus being someone's bride.

Gender roles prevent husband and wife from addressing each other as *mîr*(H) and *jin*(W) in public.[39] The sexuality and the sexual relations are suppressed to the degree that H and W do not refer to each other with any term and hardly talk to each other in public. The bride's position as a member of the household, on the other hand, is established through the extensive usage of the term *bukê* by her parents-in-law. In other words, she is the "bride of the household", not only of the husband. In Sisin, especially among young and childless couples, this avoidance in address means also not using each other's names, neither in address, nor in reference. It is a major topic of joking and teasing among young women if and how they mention their husband's names and which term they use. When a woman has children, a husband refers to her as the mother of **his** children. Many women also refer to their husbands as the "brother of so-and-so", "FBS" or using other kin or distant terms.

The custom of respect and avoidance, which applies to both men and women, prevents the use of address terms for parents-in-law. If the daughter-in-law, living virilocally (i.e. in her parents-in-law's HH), is already a kinswoman, she might call her parents-in-law with the appropriate kin terms such as *jinmam*, *mam*, *xolat*, *xalo* and the like. Yet, direct address is very much influenced by the status of the daughter-in-law in her affinal HH, her age, and her prior kin or affinal position; the custom is not to apply direct address terms for parents-in-law for sometime as a sign of respect and avoidance. Yet after some years, when the bride's position in the HH is more settled, she would be expected to use an address term, at least for the mother-in-law. The son-in-law, however, does not use address terms for his parents-in-law, as the distance is maintained for a much longer period. An exception is the case of the son-in-law already being a kinsman, i.e. *xarzê* or *brazê* to one or both of the parents; then he would address the parents-in-law by an address term.

Kin and affinal interaction

This section explores kin and affinal behaviour: the questions of who interacts with whom, how and in what context. The analysis is based primarily on tribal village households and the people who are kin and affine to each other across villages and town.

To begin with the latter, the kin and affinal interaction within the town has some parallels to those in and between the tribal villages. The town, however, has a social dynamic of its own. Socializing patterns, production and economic activities, household structures, and marriage patterns show important variations as they exist in a socio-cultural milieu where the norms and values range in a spectrum from traditional and tribal to modern and national. The focus here is on the traditional end of this spectrum, where tribal links to the village are strong and where economic and political interdependency is manifested in frequent kin and affinal interaction.

The main areas in significance for kin and affinal relations, or else the socio-economic basis of these relations, can be listed under five headings:

1. Inheritance: The rules and practice of inheritance are crucial for the definition of certain kinship categories and relations, and they also contribute to the working or disruption of these relations.

2. The rules of succession to authority and status positions and social roles: This principle is most specific within the household perhaps as it prescribes the socialization practices for children and youth. However, it is also relevant between households, as one could succeed to the social position of an affine or a kin from outside the household.

3. The significance of kin and affinal interaction and the organization of work and production activities: This consists of the day-to-day interaction between the people, and

it offers the possibilities for daily (short term) manifestations of challenge to kinship solidarity and affinal affiliation, as well as routines for long-term commitments and expectations.

4. The "social life" within and between the villages: It contains the formal or informal principles of visiting, religious and ritual participation, communal consumption and sharing. These activities and the rules concerning them again are dialectically related to kin and affinal interaction, so that whoever participates at one's funeral is both a consequence and cause of who is a kin/affine/neither.

5. Marriage rules and practices: Although marriage rules and practices have a direct influence on the definition of affinity and attitudes towards affines, they will be separately handled in the next chapter, where many aspects of marriage choice, ceremony, pre- and postwedding negotiations and contracts, concepts on marriage partners and female-male compatibility are treated thoroughly.

It has been pointed out above that within the tribal system inheritance of pasture usage rights and property pass along the patriliny, from father to son. The traditional tribal custom denies any inheritance to women. Nevertheless, the availability of other inheritance systems, such as those of the *Sharia* or the Turkish civil laws, allows for a range of practices which contradict or challenge tribal customs. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 6, the organization of production and consumption patterns within and between village HHs reflect principles of hierarchy and ranking according to age, gender role, and kinship position. Notions of equality, personal and religious honour versus individual or group interests affect the intensity and patterns of social relations between household members. How the ideal of patrilineal solidarity interacts with practical and vital relations of affinity, friendship or neighbourhood is explored within a selection of kin and affinal relations in reference to the five aspects mentioned above. The selected relations are most representative in terms of displaying a subtle interplay between normative and practical discourse of patriliny and affinity.

a. Sisters-sister's sons and daughters.

When women are added to kinship charts from Sisin (for instance to the chart in Figure 4.2 above), by showing women from three different lineages, 20 HHs (out of a total of 25 in Sisin) are linked in kinship and affinity. All Sisin wives who originate from other villages and the town belong to the Oramarî tribe. All Sisin HHs belong to one sub-tribal section, *qabîlê* Mefî, of the Oramarî; but some of the wives are from the other *qabîlê* Lemdinî. These wives are mostly kin to one another, as well as being kin to the wives of the previous generation.

The kinship ties between Sisin wives provide important channels of interaction, mutual support and feelings of "closeness" for the Sisin HHs. Sisters as wives are the most important group, since 10 Sisin HHHs have wives who have at least one sister married to another Sisin HHH. There are also sisters who married not HHH, but other household members.

Giving daughters in marriage to households who are neighbour, affine, or kin to one another is considered wise and as serving better the interests of the daughters. Respectively, taking sisters as wives for the men of different households usually involves a close link of kinship or friendship between the wife-taking HHs. "When one's wife proves to be a good choice, why not take her sister for a friend or cousin," was the sort of reasoning behind the strategy. Indeed, a woman's reputation as pretty, hard-working, docile, a good household manager (*kabanî*), and with a good "moral" character (*ahlâk* in Turkish and Kurdish) affects the marriage position of her unmarried sisters as well. In such cases, the sister's status is as important as the mother's reputation and status.

Sisters, especially when their status in their own affinal HH is high (such as being a *kabanî* or senior bride), have close contact, a higher degree (in respect to other married women) of freedom to visit each other, exchange gossip, advice or help. Sisters participate in each other's weddings, *mevlut*s, and religious celebrations. Funerals are especially important for manifesting sisterly solidarity and emotions; if the husband or the child of a woman dies, her sister would be considered as a primary mourner. How this differs from other mourners is that the closest kin and affinal mourners would be crying more vigorously, refraining from washing or cleaning themselves longer, helping the sister's HH at least for a month with cooking, and hosting the guests who come from other villages and towns as a way of expressing their condolences.

Inheritance does not pass between sisters. If the *Sharia* would be applied (by preference or as a solution for a conflict) then the sisters would get some share a long with their brothers.[40] For instance, in one case involving a conflict with a brother over land inheritance, three sisters were able to stand together against him and have the support of their husbands and sons, (although the husbands were reproached for greediness over wives's property), contradicting the ideal norm that women should not divide the land. Movable property is not inheritable among women other than what is given to them as wedding presents by their parental household. These few items may be given to a sister's daughter, otherwise no items are inherited among women.

The relationship between MZ-ZS/ZD is associated by the people themselves with mutual sympathy, affection, and closeness. MZ is condidered as close as one's own mother, and as a substitute, if she is missing. She is considered to be very attached and affectionate towards her ZD/ZS. In return, the ZD/ZS is expected to care for MZ by asking after her health and condition. A mother's sister would be a first choice for "milk-mother" (*daykê şîr*). When two sisters have suckling babies at the same time and one has no milk, the sister might nurse the baby with her own. The bond created thus is called milk-motherhood for the child and milk-brotherhood or sisterhood between the two children. As this relationship forbids them from marrying each other, it is not totally desirable to nurse a ZS/ZD (it reduces the chances of marriage), but the sister's milk is considered as one's own mother's and good for the baby. Because of the marriageability and possible matching between MZS/MZD, the relationship between MZ and ZS may involve some avoidance, especially when the ZS reaches puberty and there is an eligible ZD. The avoidance relationship ends when the ZS or ZD is married.

b. Father's brother-brother's son relations.

Within the tribal system where membership is reckoned through patrilineal descent for both men and women, the relationship between FB and BS/BD is one of the most morally valued and idealized relations. Sons are not expected to separate their own house before the father's death, and thereafter the brothers are expected to remain together as long as possible (the failure to do so often being blamed on the quarrels among women). Thus, the FB-BS relation goes through different stages of intimacy and formality throughout the developmental cycle of the HH.

To begin with, due to the long period of fraternal joint household stage in the developmental cycle, FBBS or BD relations begin within the same HH. Sons remain in their parental HH sometimes up to 20 years after marriage, thus there is ample opportunity for close and continuous contact with one's own FB or BS. Showing affection to children is common for men, and brother's sons and daughters are the first ones to receive this affection. (Young fathers are mostly shy about showing affection to their own children, especially in public.) With puberty, work relations between the FB and the BSs begin, and if the FB is the effective male HHH (e.g. the eldest brother in the fraternal joint HH) the structural basis for an authority relationship is created. The nature of the labour organization and authority relation, however, is not fixed or predetermined. It depends much on the relative ages of the FB and BS,[41] and the FB's status in the fraternal or paternal joint HH.

The inherent conflict or reason for cooperation between FB and BS is related to the management and division of the household's property. As the FB is more likely to have the ultimate say about the management of the property, in which the BS also has a future share, conflicts on this issue, especially when both men are adult and feel competent to manage their own affairs, are imminent. In such situations, normative discourse alludes to the due respect for the FB from BS and emphasizes the likeness of the FB to one's own father, that he commands equal authority, obedience, and respect. On the other hand, lack of cooperation and non-recognition of FB's authority is part of everyday reality, as men often admit that their brother's sons are closest to them agnatically -through blood-, but do not obey, whereas a sister's son who is "distant" in blood, is the best ally, closest in feelings (*şirin*, lit. sweet) and helper in many cases. Thus a BS is a "structurally and normatively prescribed", but not always personally willing partner and supporter in work, ritual, public-life and politics. In negative cases, fission between brothers and disputes between FBBS are also part of tribal village social reality.

In Sisin, lineage A households are, as discussed earlier, the closest and tightest patrilineal group. Five HHHs of lineage A households are brothers and their sons have much contact with one another and with their FBs. Yet the social pressure on these households to live up to the ideals of patrilineal solidarity is considerable and small misunderstandings or independent acts often cause tension.

> Once, one of the five brothers (all of them HH heads) became ill and had to be taken to the doctor in town and later to the hospital in Van. His son who lived in Yüksekova was with him throughout his illness, and when he died in Van, the son carried out the burial procedures there alone. This caused much resentment and criticism, directed by his widow towards the dead man's brothers and brothers' sons, that they had not accompanied him to hospital in Van and were not there at his burial. The dilemma was that it was one of the harshest

> months of the year, when it was still difficult to travel (in March) and there was pressing work to be carried out. The BSs were mostly young men, simple villagers, with no knowledge of Turkish and not accustomed to urban surroundings. Nevertheless, they had to swallow the criticism and could not publicly defend themselves. As a counter example, another BS who took **his** ill FB to Ankara and stayed with him till his death, despite his pressing business and own ill health, received much sympathy for his proper behaviour.

To summarize, the FB-BS relationship ideally involves respect, support and obedience from the BS and authority and control by the FB. Where the relationship does not fit this ideal, the practical explanations are plenty and ready at hand. For instance, that the FB had an extra share in the inheritance, that he is no longer capable of good management or that the BS had become an individualist, wanting to do things alone, thinking he knew better and so on. The complexity and multiplicity of relations, even within the tribal context, uses the ideal of patrilineal solidarity (and the norm of close FB-BS ties) as a folk model, showing how things ought to be, but at the same time provides for multiple and sometimes equally legitimate strategies which, on their own, contradict the ideal. The fundamental conflict of interests between FB and BSs starts immediately within the household, as the property of the paternal HH is to be divided into equal shares among the sons. The moment these brothers have different number of sons, the inequality in inheritance, thus the inequality between FB, BSs, and FBSs begins.

c. Cousins.

In the discussion on kinship terminology, it was noted that cousins of the opposite sex are possible marriage partners and that the reference and address terms reflect some sort of avoidance relations between male and female cousins. As it will be further elaborated below, although FBD-FBS marriage is considered the best, other parallel or cross cousin marriages are also much valued and practised. Avoidance is observed during the cousins' eligible years; once they are married, sentiments of support and "closeness" continue, especially between the patrilineal cousins. A FBD looks as much to her patrilineal male cousins (FBSs) for protection of her rights in her affinal HH as to her brothers, father, and FB. When men are unwilling to intervene directly to defend her rights, the women, such as FBWs or FBDs, may intervene and mediate on the part of the woman concerned. FBDs, after they reach higher female status (such as *kabanī*) in their affinal households. In fact, all female cousins share close sentiments and support when they are neighbours in their affinal HHs. The closeness between FBDs often arises from having shared the same household in childhood as their fathers may have lived together in one household.

Among male cousins, FBSs are apparently the ideal partners as well as rivals according to the tribal solidarity and segmentation models. The conflict of interests, as discussed above, stems from the inherent division of property and resources. Open political rivalry and conflict between FBSs is snubbed and fights between them are covered up. Smaller conflicts between FBSs about decisions, tactics and management in village life are tolerated but not encouraged to develop into bigger disputes.

Nevertheless, because conflicting interests should not become public, avoidance strategies and formal visiting articulate this delicate balance of mutual support and criticism. For instance, in a case which is detailed in Chapter 8, between a group of lineage A secondary cousins in Sisin, there was a restrained conflict caused by quarrels between a FBD-bride and her mother-in law. The father-in-law avoided the bride's father and brothers (who also were his FBS and FBSSs) so that the lack of harmony in his own household and the conflict between the two patrilineal HHs would not become formally and publicly recognized. Instead, FBDs and FBWs tried to mediate between the two women, putting pressure on them by threatening to bring the matter to the attention of men, and reminding the women that dissent within the patrilineage would be known to others as well.

Finally, matrilateral cousins, MBSs-FZSs are often close allies, friends and neighbours as their relation is devoid of these structural constraints and rules about formal support, equality and solidarity. In Sisin, MBSs-FZSs often cooperate in trade and labour and exchange frequent visits. The relationship, when it is not complemented by friendship, neighbourhood or further affinity, however, carries a formal and restricted nature about it, where *pisxal*s (MBSs) are treated as potential allies who have to be recruited but not pressured into giving support because of "moral" obligations, as would be the case between FBSs.

d. Brother-sister-sister's husband relationship.

In the Kurdish tribal system, men and women acquire and retain their tribal membership along the patriline. As women after marrying continue to be members of their patrilineage, the bonds between brothers-sisters before and after the sister's marriage are significant. The changes or continuities in the relationship and how the two relate to the husband reflect not only aspects of patriliny and affinity, but also male or female points of view and the conceptualization of gender roles.

Sibling bonds within the paternal household are strong and range from authoritarian and distant to sentimental and informal. The first type is encountered frequently between an elder brother and a younger sister with a few years of age difference between them. Brothers, especially the elder ones, are, like the father and FB, responsible for the honour of the *mal* (HH) and should control the access to and honour of the women in the HH. The need to control is especially strong when it concerns unmarried sisters. Another element which imposes formality and distanced behaviour between elder brother and younger sister of similar ages is the system of direct wife exchange, i.e. exchanging wives for sons in two different HHs. Direct wife exchange and its implications for the affinal links are discussed in the following chapter. The point here is that the possibility for a young man to receive a wife in exchange for his younger sister may force him to keep a distance from her, even more so if he has the formal say about the marriage arrangements (e.g. if he is the eldest son and the father is dead).

Contrary to these structural and normative elements of obligation to control and arrange suitable marriages for brothers and sisters, the fact that brothers and sisters of similar ages grow up together, sharing much time for work and play, creates close ties and strong feelings which frequently result in special attachments. Married women, who live away from their home village, say they long to see the members of their parental household, especially their brothers. When visiting, if an elder brother kisses his sister on her forehead, this is taken as a sign of strong emotional attachment. The sentimental attachment between brothers and sisters exists more often when the sister is the elder one or the age gap between the two is big. The exchange arrangement is still possible when the sister is older than her brother, but the younger brother's obligations and responsibility are not so strong.

The reciprocity in sentiment and care between brothers and sisters is reflected in the generalized and extended usage of the term *xuşkê* (Z) and *bra* (B). The unequal and unreciprocal element has to do with gender role formation; when a woman is called *xuşkê*, it means not only that one cares for her but also that she is in the unmarriageable category for the speaker and that he may assume the responsibility to arrange a good marriage for the woman.

After the woman's marriage, certain changes occur in the brother-sister relationship, as the woman assumes her married role in her husband's paternal HH. Meeker (1976) discusses the contrast between the brother-sister relation and that of husband and wife with examples from Black Sea Turks and Levantine Arabs. The emphasis of his analysis is more on meaning and values than on direct social interaction between brothers, sisters and husbands; he explains that the kind of affection between the three relates to the question of who controls whom, and if and how the woman's honour is transferred. Meeker's discussion presents interesting comparative points for the Kurds, since Kurds share many social organizational elements with both Turks and Arabs, such as tribal and clan organization, patterns of control over women, patrilocal residence, FBD-FBS and direct exchange marriages. Some comparisons can be made by looking at the type of social interaction between the brother-sister-husband; for instance, Meeker's point about the significance of the total transfer of control of a woman from her brother to husband and his claim that this occurs among the Turks but not among the Arabs. Meeker (1976:413) states that all women are "stranger-brides" among the Turks, that the responsibility for and consequences of women's action lie with the husbands. With the Arabs, however, women's actions have far more severe consequences and effects for their brothers and the patrilineal clan, than the husbands. The Kurds from this point of view could be seen as a mixture of the two systems.

Among the Kurds, the rights and responsibilities of husbands and brothers over women are negotiable and complex. The sentiment factor is as strong as among the Arabs, yet the control over a married woman does not remain completely with her patrilineal group. Here the overall aspects of affinal relations between the wife-givers and wife-takers should be the framework for evaluating the relationship of control and sentiment between brother, sister, and her husband.

With marriage, as I shall shortly examine in detail, the wife-giving and wife-taking HHs normatively assume higher and lower status positions respectively; a relationship which is very open to interpretations and manipulations depends on several other aspects, such as the relative economic and political power and prestige of the two HHs. Nevertheless, the structural position of wife-givers entails distance towards the married daughter, especially from her patrilineal kinsmen, even if they retain the responsibility for her behaviour and well-being to some degree. Her closest patrilineal kinsmen, i.e. her father and brothers, are not expected to visit her too often, especially within the first year of her marriage. But concern for her position and well-being in her affinal HH is articulated by frequent visits of her more distant patrilineal kinsmen, a relatively young FB, a FBS who may be a friend or partner of the husband as well.

> If a married woman becomes very ill and has to be taken to see a doctor or to the hospital, the initial responsibility is with the men in her affinal HH; but if they do not act soon, her brother would exert pressure for her to be taken care of or offer to take her himself along for treatment. The brother can not take the first initiative but the husband can not exclude her kinsmen from the responsibility either.

> In a quarrel among several neighbouring HHs in Sisin, a young woman sided up with her husband shouting abuse at the neighbour. In another HH neighbouring the first two, and not a close kin or affine to either of them, was a MB of the woman concerned. He was mad at her for getting involved in the fight and slapped her on the face. Upon this, the woman's husband was very insulted, shouted abuses at the MB and went directly to the gendarmerie post in Oramar to make a formal complaint about his wife's MB's behaviour. Public opinion about the MB's right to hit the woman was divided, the MB himself invoking all the rights of kinsmen for controlling the behaviour of women even if they are married.

What should be noted here is that the brothers or other close kin of a married woman, even if they continue to have strong attachments and feelings of responsibility for her after her marriage, would not act independently but would have to take into consideration the overall position of the HH, the affinal groups, and the patrilineage.

Meeker's discussion of the fact that transfer of control over women occurs among the Turks but not among the Arabs omits one important aspect of sibling and affinal relations. Among the Turks women often inherit property and/or receive a trousseau, or else their claim for inheriting property is recognized even if not actually practised all the time.

Among the Arabs the right to control a woman, and the effects of her behaviour are related to her patrilineal kinsmen; moreover women inherit no property. Among the Kurds of Hakkari, on the other hand, there are alternative systems of dividing and inheriting the property between heirs and heiresses, as mentioned earlier. The most commonly practised system is the traditional tribal one, depriving women from inheriting any land or pasture usage rights. This rule, however, interestingly enough, is presented as the will of the woman, as if she waives her right to inherit for the sake of her brothers. This aspect of dependency between brothers and sisters is relevant for determining the sentiments and mechanisms of control between them. In the case mentioned above, where three sisters wanted to receive their right of land from their brother as part of their inheritance, the only sanction against the women was to blame them for their lack of "shame" (*şerme*) and greediness. There was nothing else the brother could have done, especially since his sisters were determined to go to civil courts and claim their rights according to civil laws.

To conclude, brothers have an interest in both controlling and keeping a close relationship with their sisters in order to secure the right of retaining the inherited property. The concern for the sister continues in her affinal household, complemented by a concern to keep good working relations with her husband and affines as possible partners in trade and supporters in politics.

Concluding remarks

From the above analysis and discussion, it can be concluded that the interdependency between kinship and tribal organization is very strong. On the one hand, tribal categories are based on reckoning kinship ties and on stressing the patriliny. On the other hand, although kinship classification is separate from the tribal one, as we have seen in the categories of *xwîn* and *xism*, or in the reckoning of matrilateral ties and affinal links, it interacts with cultural categories, residential patterns, and tribal political configurations, thus reconstructing genealogical charts and appending moral meanings to kinship terms. In a way, kinship terminology and relations form the basis of the tribal system and provide the ideology for tribal organization. The difference between tribal and non-tribal groups, from a kinship point of view, is a matter of degree, of reckoning kin ties, as well as of quality, i.e. stressing one side of kinship, the patriliny, over affinity. As I discuss in the following chapter, the second aspect of kinship relations, the understatement of affinity in normative discourse, is counterbalanced with complex marriage strategies, tactical extension of affinal terms like *zava*, matrilateral terms like *pisxal*, and cross cutting networks between kin and affines for work, trade and political partnership. Affinal links through women are crucial since women maintain the membership of their own patrilineage after marriage, thus forming the vital links between households, patrilineages, and kin groups.

8. Marriage

Marriage alliances and strategies, the ceremony and the symbolism in marriage transactions have been widely discussed by anthropologists as reflecting and creating aspects of the social hierarchy, value and belief systems, norms and practices of the particular societies. Marriage as a process, with the number of people it primarily and secondarily involves, and the beliefs and acts which are activated by it, is indeed a complex procedure which needs to be analyzed from different perspectives and at different levels. This chapter aims to discuss the various aspects of marriage. It begins with the position and characterization of marriage within the belief system as recorded in Hakkari. Various formal aspects of marriage, such as terminology, age and sibling order, legal and religious ceremonies are to follow. The marriage types and strategies are given a lengthy discussion, as the variations from one type to another and the strategies used shed light on the economic and political power structures within and between households, village and town, the tribal setting, ideology, and gender relations. Various hypotheses concerning the dominant themes of marriage among the Kurds and in the Middle East in general, e.g. direct exchange, brideprice, FBD marriage will be reviewed and analyzed. The practice of wife kidnapping and elopement which shows aspects of male-female relations and gender roles is the final discussion of this chapter.

Local concepts relating to marriage and marital status

Marriage, in every aspect, is a source of interest and concern in Hakkari. Not only is the wedding ceremony or the interaction preceding or following it important, but also marital status is a fundamental part of a person's social identity. An inquiry about being married, engaged or not is not considered a private or intimate question; one is asked and asks about the marital status of other persons directly and casually.

People show equal interest in weddings. Weddings are "public" affairs and are looked forward to, as occasions when young men and women can dance and talk together and when there is plenty of good food to eat. The amount to which the household, lineage and/or tribe wishes to display its symbolic and material capital[1], determines how "public" and widely attended the wedding is. For the hosts of the wedding (the actual word for the hosts is "owner" *-düğün sahibi* in Turkish- and there are in fact two "owners", since the wedding takes place in two locations, the bride's and the groom's household and villages, but the wife-takers are the official wedding "owners"), weddings are considered to be times of *xêr û şer*[2] when emotions of both happiness and sadness are intense. The close contact of possibly hostile or rival groups and of young men and women[3] could easily lead to a violent conflict. For instance, it is a tradition to fire guns in the air during the festivities. Fights occur during many wedding celebrations and some of them even end in deaths and might have a snowball effect on inter- or intra-tribal conflicts.

The most widely accepted and prevailing beliefs and values about marriage are traced back to Islam by the people, and Islamic interpretations of the need for and the way of marrying are frequently invoked. Accordingly, Islam not only recommends but also prescribes marriage.[4] The book of *Şafīi İlmühali*, which is a source of reference for village imams, describes the Islamic prescription as applicable for all those except the very old, impotent, or the very poor (because they cannot provide for the expenses of a wedding or the bride-price, *mahr*).[5] The Prophet Mohammed is quoted as having said: "Among the young people those who are strong and capable enough should marry. Because marriage is the best mean to prevent (one's self) from looking at (those who are) *haram* (forbidden), and to protect one's *namus* (honour)." (Ibid) This belief that marriage is necessary to satisfy one's natural sensual desires reflects on the male and female gender roles and concepts, the power relations between the sexes, and the status of married men in particular.[6] An unmarried man is not only socially deprived of adulthood but also he could be considered as being sinful (*günah*) as he may be "looking" at (those women who are) *haram* (for him).[7] A woman's sexuality has to be under the control of someone other than herself, and until marriage the protection is given by her nearest male kin, i.e. her father, brother(s), and her father's brother and FBSs when necessary. After marriage the control of her sexuality is partly transferred to her husband. Since according to Islam sexuality and sensual needs are satisfied only in a matrimonial relation, the marriage of sons and daughters who have reached puberty is of great concern to parents and to fathers especially, as they are religiously responsible for their sons' and daughters' actions.

Terms of reference and address related to marriage

Marriage, although it marks adult status for both men and women does not mean breaking from parental authority or acquiring economic self-sufficiency. It does not bring economic independance immediately (with one's own house or means to live), but confirms the adult status with symbols, terminology, and participation in the religious community. Young girls and boys go through early socialization where being married is represented by adults as a desirable position. Girls of 11-12 tease each other as being "*bukê*" (bride and daughter-in-law) of such and such a family. Interest in the other sex in puberty can hardly be publicly mentioned other than in jokes about marriage, brides and grooms. This is due to the strict code of proper and restrained behaviour for young men, especially in front of the elders, and for young girls, following the modesty code, refraining from boisterous behaviour, especially in the presence of elder men.

For boys, puberty, and girls, marriage, is the turning point for being addressed or referred to with adulthood terms. Girls from the age of four or five onwards until they marry are called *keçik/keç*. (*Keçik* is the diminutive form of *keç*, meaning small girl or as an affectionate address term as in "my little girl".) As in the Turkish usage *kız* meaning girl, virgin and daughter, *keç* in Kurdish is used for the same meanings. After marrying, thus losing virginity, one can still be called *keç* as in *keçê min* (my daughter/girl) mostly by one's own parents or elder women who want to emphasize the age difference. *Jin/jinik*, on the other hand, primarily refers to a 'married woman' and 'wife'. Especially for non-kin, a woman would be a *keç* if unmarried and *jin* when married, widowed or divorced but not both at the same time. Finally, *keç* is a more common term of address than *jin*, especially when there is some acquaintance with the woman addressed. The husband's term of address for his wife (if it exists at all, since young husbands hardly address their wives in public with a name or term) is *keço/keçi/keçki* but not *jinik/jin*.

Young men's marital status, on the other hand, is not directly reflected in or evident from the reference or address terms. A boy of 15-16 is considered to have become a man, especially if he is to be married soon, takes a full part in the religious community, (designated by at tending Friday noon prayers at the mosque with the adult men) and definitely after having done the military service. The reference term for adult men is *zelam* (of Arabic origin). As a rule married men are called *zelam* but also unmarried men who have fulfilled the conditions listed above. Once a man reaches adulthood and is called *zelam*, calling him *kûr* in public would be for joking or ridiculing.

The terms in Kurdish for the act of marrying are: 1) *şû kirin*, 2) *jin inandin*.[8] The first is reciprocal; it means "marrying" for a woman or a man. *Jin inandin*, on the other hand, literally means "to bring a woman", thus marrying, but only for men. This term which expresses the male point of view also shows that marriage in Hakkari entails a rule of residence, which means a man or his family goes "out" and brings in a woman as spouse. It is in Lévi-Straussian terms; men staying and women moving.

Age of marriage

The age of first marriage for men and women varies from village to town and across different socio-economic classes. As a general pattern, women marry earlier than men. The average age of marriage increases for both from village to town, and from households with an agricultural-pastoral economy to those occupied in trader, shop keeper, administrator, or teacher types of professions. From my random observations, the age span for women marrying for the first time is estimated to range from 13 to 22 in villages and 16 to 23-24 in towns.[9]

A common practice in village households with few grown up daughters or no sons of marrying age who could bring in wives, is to delay the marriage of daughters as long as possible (sometimes so long that the girl elopes with someone) to be able to increase the household's chances for replacing her labour. The opposite inclination exists for village boys; the tendency is to marry them around 15-16, many before 18, the time of the military service. On the whole, the marriage age for girls and boys and the respective age of a bride and her groom depend on the household's calculation in respect to several factors[10] such as: a) the household's labour force, b) the availability of a bride to replace one's own daughter, c) the individual characteristics of one's own son or daughter (the ugly or handicapped have fewer chances to marry early or well), d) the type of earlier marriages in the HH or lineage (e.g. a daughter may be married away to settle a dispute after a wife kidnapping affair), e) the level of education of sons and daughters (a village girl with primary education would not be married in her early teens but, depending on the household's prestige and wealth, she might marry around the age of 20, preferably another "educated" man), and f) the type of economic means the HH has. Sons who have to stay in the parental HH and work within the pastoral production marry around 16-17. Those living in town, earning their living by trading or shop keeping aspire to start their own HH at marriage or soon after that and usually marry after the military service, at the age of 20-23.

While household strategies determine the age of marriage for sons and daughters, there are diverging beliefs and ideologies available to justify each action; parents who want to delay the marriage of their daughter till 20 or later could claim that it is "*günah*" (sin in Islam) to marry daughters so young when they are "still wetting their beds", "running around with boys in games", or that "their breasts are flat and hard like wood". On the other hand, those parents who want to justify the marriage of a 13-14 year old girl to someone 10-15 years older say that women "break sexually" earlier than men, so it is good to have a considerable age difference between the husband and wife.

Education and the limited availability of positions in the service sector, administrative or clerical jobs have a restricted effect on women's age of marriage.[11] For some of the young women in Hakkari, who had jobs as telephone operators or clerks, the marriage age was higher than average, due as much to being educated and wage-earners, as to the fact that they were from prominent trader or administrator families, who aspired for the daughters to marry from an equal or higher stratum of the native population or from outside Hakkari.[12]

The effects of education and employment in wage earning jobs seem to have a delaying influence more on the age of marriage for men than for women. Within the small category of indigenous, educated and wage earning men, the marriage age seemed to vary within the span of 19-25 in comparison to 16-22 among those in villages.[13] Other than the effects of education and wage earning employment on delayed marriage age for men, another factor, the mandatory provision of a separate house for the new couple by the groom's family,[14] has been cited for western Turkey. This was not found to be a major factor in Hakkari, since having a separate house for the newly married couple was very rare, and then only in towns.

Civil and religious marriage ceremonies (*nikah*)

In the Republic of Turkey the Civil Code was introduced in 1926. It abolished polygamy, requiring civil *nikah* (marriage ceremony) to be performed prior to or at least in addition to the voluntary religious *nikah*, and secured women's rights to divorce, custody of children and inheritance, which are radically different from those in the Islamic law. The religious *nikah*, which is commonly called *imam nikahı*, continues to be socially and traditionally significant for validating marriages. In Hakkari *imam nikahı* is the **only** *nikah* confirming the marriage, a belief and custom mentioned also for other rural parts of Turkey.[15] The primacy of religious *nikah* over the civil one, whether the civil one follows at all, and how long after, have various important implications concerning the bride, her family and the groom's social standing. Although a marriage without the religious *nikah* is unacceptable for all the sections of the city, town and village population in Hakkari, the question of who initiates the acquisition of the legal marriage certificate and **when** the civil ceremony is performed, reflect certain beliefs and norms of the society as well as the individual's or the group's socio-economic status.

Sociological discussions of the predominance of *imam nikahı* as validating the marriage point out the male bias in the practice, especially in the cases where the ceremony takes place without the woman (her legal guardian represents her) and more specifically in the case of polygyny. By civil law a man can be married to only one woman, but Islam allows a man to have four wives at a time. It is possible in Turkey to marry more than one wife but register only one of the marriages with the civil authorities. The Civil Code is not strictly enforced, thus the wives acquired by religious ceremony only are not covered by the regulations, compensation rules, and divorce procedures of the Civil Code. The problem, however, is well known and one might say also accepted. In order to ease the social problem created by many "illegitimate" children, general amnesties are declared from time to time.[16]

Various women's rights defenders have, unconvincingly to my mind, attributed polygyny to the practice of religious marriage, usually implying that the absence of any enforcement of the Civil Code makes way for polygynous unions.[17] Evidently, for polygyny religious marriage is necessary, but religious ceremony alone is not the reason for the practice of polygyny in Turkey. Furthermore, there is no evidence that all marriages conducted by religious ceremony result in polygyny.[18]

The evidence from Sisin and its surrounding villages show no direct link between *imam nikahı* and polygyny. Many marriages are conducted by the religious ceremony only, but among the living couples within the *muhtarlık* of c. 800 people in 1980 there were only five men who had more than one wife each. (For more on polygyny, see below.)

Coming back to the significance attached to the type of marriage ceremony: The civil ceremony is significant as an indicator of the wife's and her parental household's prestige and social status. In tribal villages, for instance, the civil ceremony is only a formality enabling the children to be registered when they become of school or military service age. It has little symbolic or social prestige value for women or their families, and this is so whether the marriage is polygamous or monogamous. Village women do not see the possession of a civil marriage certificate as preventing polygyny nor as giving them status. (Village women have other means and controls against their husband's further marriages, see below.)

In town, however, women are more concerned with the civil marriage certificate, and **when** the ceremony is held is significant. For women of an educated and wealthy background, it is expected that the civil ceremony immediately follows the religious one as part of the wedding celebrations. Depending on how the marriage is arranged and the type of in-law relations, the following can occur when it is a monogamous union: 1) the bride's family may insist on the civil ceremony before or during the wedding celebrations because of distrust or their higher status (in comparison to the groom's family); 2) the bride's parents would be unwilling to insist on the civil ceremony if: a) the woman has a conflict with her parents and has jeopardized the parents' social position, b) she has eloped with the man against the wishes of her family, c) she was not a virgin at the time of marriage and this was made public.

In equal status marriages the two sides may agree to have or not to have the civil ceremony at the time of the wedding. For example, in a case of FBD marriage, the civil ceremony (i.e. whether it is immediately done or not) would not indicate status differences between the two families.

In the case of polygynous unions, the respective status of the families would be already differently as sessed. In polygynous unions the interacting parties are not only wife-givers and wife-takers, one woman and one man, but several women, their kin and the man's kin. First, although it is generally the senior wife who gets the civil certificate, there is no guarantee that this will be the case. When a man marries two wives, one shortly after another and both by religious ceremony, the question of who gets the civil certificate is not always clear. In such instances, the social, kinship, or power relations between all the families involved and the situational context (how the marriage occurred and whether all the parties agreed to it or not), all play a part in the outcome.

> In an example from Yüksekova, the two wives of a health officer had quite different back grounds. The first wife was a villager from Hakkari, uneducated and pretty, the second one had been working in the same health centre as the husband. The second one was ethnic Turkish from a distant city and was not very pretty; she had to marry him after they had an affair and she became pregnant. The first wife had the civil marriage and the second one was in a difficult and humiliating position, as her children had to be registered as born to the first wife with the civil certificate. In this case, under "normal" conditions, it would have been expected that of the two wives, the one with education and profession, the status of an outsider would get the civil marriage. But the events leading to an urgent religious marriage made it impossible for her to outwit the first wife.

The civil ceremony, other than carrying status, also has important legal implications which are more relevant to the **wife** than to her parental household; the legal rights concerning divorce, custody of children, inheritance, and alimony are directly related to the wife; those women who are aware of the benefits of having such legal protection may insist on it themselves.[19] In one case from Yüksekova, a woman with grown up children was living alone and practising her legal rights against her husband, who had married a second wife by religious ceremony. She refused to accept the second marriage, sued the husband, lived separately from him, denied him a divorce as long as the court case was going on, and received some alimony for the children.[20] Not all women, however, exercise these rights or have access to legal advice due to social pressures and public opinion discouraging women from going to courts and making a "private" family problem public.

Polygamy versus monogamy; wife-inheritance

Polygynous marriages which are related to civil and religious marriage ceremonies have already been mentioned. Briefly, polygynous marriages are allowed in Islam in the form of one man being able to be married to as many as four women at one time, provided he fulfils the obligations and conditions related to such marriages described in Islamic rules and prescriptions.

The statistical rate of polygyny, which is a low 5% for Eastern Anatolia, does not reflect the social importance attached to such unions. Especially for the male ideology it is a vivid theme, kept alive by a whole set of discourse with jokes, myths, and stories.

Marrying polygynously is an exceptional phenomenon, and men, who practise polygyny, are not expected to keep a low profile or be discreet about it. Quite the opposite, men with many wives are noticed, talked about and publicly recognized. They in turn try to fit in and behave according to this special position, which derives from the mixture of myth and reality associated with notions of male potency, domination over women, ability to provide for all, being the benefactor and provider for all the needs of women and children, as well as a just ruler over a man's immediate domain, the household. Of course, the mythical aspect of such a position puts the man in a situation where his abilities and qualifications are continuously tested. Even if he declares harmony and unity within his HH and between the women, it is easier said than done, and public opinion has as much interest in the realities of polygynous unions as in male prowess and supremacy.[21]

In this context, it is not possible to claim that women always oppose the idea and that men are in favour of it. Women as much as men share the ideology (or part ideology) which emphasizes roots in Islam and seeks religious justification. The part-ideology asserts that social harmony would be created between the women who would aid each other in household chores and childcare and give mutual support. Accordingly, men are thought to have better judgement than women and treat everyone fairly; a man would, anyway, be more attached to a family and house where harmony and prosperity prevail amongst his wives and children.

This rosy picture does not explain why polygyny exists but reflects how people (both men and women) would like it to work. Women say that such harmony in polygynous HHs is possible or at least in theory. But in practice, wives do not want to have co-wives and husbands frequently threaten their wives with taking a second wife. The threat is often spurious; husbands who marry second wives to punish the first ones or to compensate for the lack of a fulfilling relationship with the first ones, run the high risk of losing face and status if the women can not be kept under control and there is continuous trouble between them. Successful polygynous marriages are rare. Wives have strategies to prevent such unions. If it happens strategies are employed against the husband and each other. These are sometimes as dramatic as attempting suicide, but more often avoiding having sex with the husband, or starting a competition for conspicuous consumption with the co-wife - demanding more expensive clothes, jewelry and the like. The husband, then, needs to employ good management and all his resources sometimes. Men who do not want to endanger their sovereignty over household matters and politics, say they would want to take more than one wife but cannot afford to take the risks.

Who, then, is able to marry polygynously and who are the wives? I shall here cite cases in the *muhtarlık* which includes Sisin. The cases concern five male HHHs who married polygynously. Four of them have two wives each and one has three wives. The one with three wives is a wealthy trader, linked to the Oramar tribe matrilaterally, and is not a permanent resident in the village. His third wife in the village is the daughter of a powerful and large family there. The other two wives live in different places, as the trader has three houses, one in the *muhtarlık*, one in another village on the plain, and one in town. He visits the three. His powerful position as a truck owner, trader, real estate dealer allows him to be shielded from public criticism to some degree, and there is a general sense of esteem held towards him as well as hopes for material and political benefits from him as was expressed by giving the daughter of a powerful family as a third wife to him.

The other four cases are men who either have traditionally and economically high status or are aspiring to such positions by a process of rapid social climbing. The eldest of these men is a leading member (*ilerigelen* in Turkish or *mazin* in Kurdish) of a tribe with a crowded patrilineage. He is also one of the wealthiest in the *muhtarlık*, owner of a shop (one of the three shops there), a mill and many fields; he had a large household with about 50 people (five brothers living together with their wives, sons and grandchildren) which broke up shortly before my departure from Sisin. His second wife is from a distant village of the same tribe and from a respectable family. His position at the time was not powerful enough for her father to consent to such a marriage, so he kidnapped her,[22] and the conflict was settled later on with pressure from the man's kin. His brother who shared the large household for many years has two wives as well, and the second wife was kidnapped while already married to some one else, from a different lineage village. The affair had caused much trouble between the two men's lineages and the first man (the kidnapper) from the *muhtarlık* is said to have used open intimidation (such as beating the husband, bribing the gendarmerie, and acquiring support from religious authorities) to acquire the husband's divorce from the woman.

The last two men are of relatively high economic and political positions as well. The younger one kidnapped his second wife from a different village, when she was already engaged to an Iraqi Kurd. The kidnapping, which occurred during my stay, caused a lot of anxiety to the tribal villagers as they were worried about the affair escalating into a conflict beyond the powers of the Turkish gendarmerie becoming a matter for the Iraqi Kurdish *peshmerges* (freedom fighters). The man, who owns the second shop in the *muhtarlık*, managed to get together a number of leading tribal men as intermediaries and paid a huge some of money (several hundred thousand Turkish liras at the time). He also gave his own daughter from his first wife in marriage to the deprived fiancé.[23]

The last man, who also married his second wife during my stay in Sisin, is the *muhtar* (village head man). His first wife is a classificatory FBD and they have grandchildren together. She is from an influential family of the *qabîle*, has politically active and powerful brothers and many patrilineal cousins and nephews. The *muhtar* claims that he married the second wife with the first one's consent and that the two wives get along "like sisters". The second wife is from Yüksekova (originally from a distant village, in western Hakkari), belongs to a different tribe (an Ertuşî, from the traditionally rival bloc of the now extinct tribal confederation) and is a widow with grandchildren herself. The reason for the second marriage is apparently "love";[24] her kinsmen could not have been any obvious political support to the *muhtar* and her ex-husband's relatives will have nothing to do with her. However, she contributes symbolically to the political power and prestige of the *muhtar* by being so "distant" in origin if not in social background.[25] It is similar to chiefly lineage marriages where tribal leaders choose alien women to make alliances with alien groups or simply to demonstrate a personal choice of a woman for her virtues and qualities alone. Marrying a non-kin woman, an outsider and paying bridewealth for her is like venturing into the unknown in the eyes of the villagers; it is a risky undertaking more suitable for the men of higher status families.

The *muhtar* is close kin to several households in Sisin. He has political support from most of the villagers and is considered a good and socially "close" man in general. However, he lacked consistent support for his second marriage from the villagers, who are as "close" to his first wife as to him. He was not openly critized, as not to undermine the male ideology which justifies and praises polygyny, but was the butt of many jokes, especially because of his arrangements for the living quarters in his house. The fact that he could not afford different living quarters for his two wives and that they have to sleep in the same room, sometimes with the guests when there are any, caused a great deal of speculation and jokes, so much so that guests who stayed over-night in his house were questioned about the details of his sleeping arrangements.

The *muhtar*'s case is an example of how gossip and joking can be used for private discourse, expressing disapproval of something not to be criticized in public. The *muhtar*, who accelerated the decline of his social capital by becoming a subject of jokes, could no longer rely on his patrilineal kinsmen for consistent support and could expect only tacit approval for his marriage strategies.

The polygynous marriages in the town of Yüksekova were exceptional cases as almost all of them were of either wealthy and politically powerful tribesmen or a consequence of some exceptional condition. Tribal chiefs, members of chiefly lineages, wealthy traders, and men from respectable families of various tribes made the largest category of men with polygynous marriages. For men of this socio-economic status, marrying young virgins as second or third wife involves large symbolic and material capital. In such cases, either the bride-price is very high, the man himself is a tribal chief (thus with high social capital), or there is some direct exchange marriage where the man gives a close kinswoman (a daughter or a sister) in exchange for the second or third wife.

It has been often asserted that polygyny, and its Middle Eastern version, is an institution which favours male dominance.[26] it has been further argued that it is a threat to women, putting them under pressure to have sons quickly and to agree to husbands' dominant position. (White, 1978:58) Or that it is a practice for the rich, *agha*, tribal chief, or the wealthy trader, with the purpose of extending economic and political alliances. (Leach, 1940:21) I would further argue that:

1. Polygynous unions, although an indicator of male dominance, are risky arrangements as the success of the marriage is assessed not only at one instance but continuously, over time. Hence, one can put a claim for a higher status based on male dominance to justify a second marriage, but the maintenance of a "harmonious" family life is very often problematic. A man with many wives has difficulty maintaining the increased status and avoiding ridicule if he loses control over his household affairs and especially over the women.[27]

2. The polygynous marriage has different meanings for the affinal groups involved. As seen above, within the tribe, taking a co-tribal woman as a second wife is acceptable, depending on the woman's status (virgin, previously engaged, or from a high status family) and the man's social position. If the man is marrying such a woman as a second wife to

improve his status within the tribe, there could be resistance to it, sometimes reflected as "disapproval" of polygyny.

3. Within the tribal network, as in Hakkari, where marriages tend to endlessly perpetuate multiple kinship and affinal ties, marrying polygamously within the tribe creates problems especially between the man and his affinal tribesmen who may back the rights and interests of one wife against another. The links (sentimental, honour, or of control) to sisters, and daughters after they marry continue to be significant,[28] thus their interests in their affinal HHs are of concern to tribesmen. When there is a conflict in a polygynous HH, between wives or the husband and the wife, the conflict may reflect on their affines.

4. Finally, the threat of polygyny for women has been mentioned by several writers, but the alternative strategies women could use against the husband's plans have been less frequently discussed. Especially in tribal households women have a position derived from their roles not only as mothers,[29] but also as sisters and daughters of their kin. Women have the possibility of using various threats against their husbands by rallying support from own kinsmen, withdrawing from various chores and roles as a good wife, thus endangering the reputation of the husband who should have "his house in order."[30] The husband of course could use coercion to undermine the wife's strategies, yet this does not solve the problem of needing to maintain a minimum level of cordial relationship between the two wives.

> In a Sisin household, the household head, whose wife was 15 years older than him and had passed the child-bearing age, did not dare to marry a second time, as he knew that the current wife would cause trouble in the household. He frequently threatened the wife verbally, and their deteriorating relationship was well known to the rest of the village. Despite the fact that the wife was seen as "misbehaving" and a "troublemaker" and that the household head was still young and "deserved" a second wife (in the eyes of most men and his kinswomen, the opinions of other women were split, depending on their own situation and position in marriage), any move towards acquiring a second wife on his part would have worsened the already tense relations within the household into a real crisis. This illustrates that when a husband has too much at stake to lose in taking a second wife, polygyny remains a source of threats and wishful thinking rather than a reality.

Polygynous marriages are somewhat sensational, but the major type of marriage is, in fact, the monogamous union, which amounts to 98.1% of marriages in Turkey according to Timur (1972:93). In Hakkari most marriages are monogamous, although it is common for men and women to marry more than once. Cousin, direct sister exchange, and widow inheritance marriages are the most common monogamous unions. Of these, the latter is discussed first.

Widow or wife inheritance between brothers or close kin (for which there is not a specific native term) was a traditional form of marriage but is not practised very often nowadays. It mostly involves marrying the widowed wife of one's elder brother,[31] hence, the young brother "inherits" the elder's wife. The practice is associated with cases where a significant bride-price has been paid, the widow has small children (especially sons)[32], where her help in the extended household is needed or the family would be disrupted with un-fathered children or a widowed wife. (Balaman, 1982:50-51)

Below are two such wife inheritance cases recorded from the Oramar tribe; both were in the living elder generation of villagers:

> The first case is from my host household. The household head, Hüseyin, had "inherited" his current wife, Esma, the widow and second wife of his only brother. The brother had had two wives; after having been married for a year and having a son from his first wife, he kidnapped and married Esma. Then he went to do his military service and died very young after an accident. The two wives were widowed. The first wife returned to her parental home and was subsequently remarried. (What weight her father-in-law had in the decision, or whether she wanted to leave is difficult to know.) Esma who was kidnapped remained in her affinal household, and it was decided by her father-in-law that she should stay with them and wait for younger Hüseyin to reach adulthood and marry her. Esma married the deceased man's younger brother Hüseyin when he reached the age of 15/16. At her second marriage, Esma should have been about 28-30 years of age. The son from the first wife stayed with his mother till he was three years old, and when she remarried he was returned to his father's HH and was raised by Esma.

In this case of wife-inheritance, the reasons for keeping Esma in the family were that, firstly, she had been kidnapped (or had she eloped?)[33] and, secondly, that the relations to her influential patrilineal kinsmen had been reconciled some time after the kidnapping. It is also likely that some amount of reconciliation money had been paid, as is usual in wife kidnapping cases. Her HH members cited Esma's personal qualities as reasons for keeping her; she was beautiful, hardworking, presentable, came from a respectable family, and had influential brothers and patrilineal cousins. Her lineage (*mal*) belonged to the other *qabîle* of Oramarî, thus the importance of maintaining the affinal link between the two lineages and *qabîles*. An additional factor was the loss of labour from the household. The younger brother was left as the only son, as his sisters were grown up and married, there would have been a serious shortage of female labour if both widows had been returned to their parental households. To return two women as if he could not have afforded to keep and look after them would not only have been a material loss (of labour) but symbolic loss as well, as the then household head was a leading member of his tribe, *muhtar* of (now three) different villages. Since all the daughters had already married, it was important to have the wife "ready" for the second son and not worry about someone suitable for him.

> The second case concerned an old woman who consecutively married two brothers. After the elder one died and she was widowed with two children, she stayed in her husband's household and married the younger brother, who is now also dead. She had more children from him who are all considered *bra* and *xuşk* (brother and sister) in stead of *bramek*, the usual term for half-brothers from the same mother but different fathers. The woman and the two brothers were classificatory patrilineal cousins. In this case the closeness of the agnatic relation, the existence of children from the first brother and her personal qualities seem to have contributed to the choice of this particular (second) marriage.

On the whole, this type of marriage seems to be less favoured these days. Young people think it is cruel and unjust to keep a widow in her husband's household and not to consider her or the young brother's feelings to wards one another. It is also thought to be more disadvantageous for the young husband, as the wife will grow older sooner and her reproductive period will be shorter.

Finally, the widow inheritance marriage is a custom which is not rigidly enforced even when the conditions are suitable. It was possible, for example, for a young widow in another Oramarî tribal village to refuse marrying after her husband's death in a tribal fight, on the grounds of her loyalty to the dead man. She had chosen to stay in her husband's household without marrying anyone and raise her only son by him.

Father's brother's daughter, direct exchange and bride price marriages in Hakkari: theory and practice

"Father's brother's daughter" marriage:

> "Father's brother's daughter (*bint 'amm*) marriages are permissible in Islam, ... and at least in some social contexts Middle Easterners assert that such unions are preferred, to the point of saying that if a woman and her family choose not to marry a father's brother's son, his consent and that of his family must first be obtained." (Eickelman, 1981:129).

With these remarks Eickelman begins his review of the discussion on FBD marriage in the Middle East and refers to a selected list of reviews of the literature.[34] The main points of the arguments concerning FBD marriage have been based on the assumption that it is a preferred type of marriage, a rule reinforced when a FBS takes or waives the right for his FBD to marry[35], and that numerically it is significant.[36]

Bourdieu (1977:32-33) remarks that theories of FBD marriage, "appeal to those **functions** which structuralism either ignores or brackets off, whether economic functions, such as the retention of the patrimony within the lineage, or political functions, such as the reinforcement of lineage integration." Bourdieu's main criticism is directed to the use of the notion of endogamous group and genealogies as a starting point for FBD marriage analysis. He asks: "Are we to be satisfied with abstractly dissecting genealogies which have the same extent as the group memory, whose structure and extent depend on the **functions** actually given by the group to those whom it remembers or forgets?" (Ibid., p. 33) Bourdieu supports Peters' (1967) assertion that "the genealogy ignores the real power relations between genealogical segments, that it forgets about the women, that it treats as contingent the most basic ecological, demographic and political factors." (Ibid.)[37] These warnings by Bourdieu (1977), Peters (1967), and Eickelman (1981) are fundamental indeed and a starting point for a critical discussion of preferential marriage systems, in relation to the Kurds (Barth 1953 and 1954) and to other Middle Eastern societies.

Let us first look at the evidence on Kurds by Barth (1953 and 1954) and Leach (1940); they both write that FBD is the preferred norm and that the actual frequency of FBD marriage is high. (Barth, 1954:167; Leach, 1940:20) Leach is more cautious about the classificatory use of FBS/FBD terms.[38] Barth, on the other hand, says that 9 out of 21 marriages in two tribal villages were with FBD, thus a rate of about 50%.[39] The data from Hakkari presented below indicate that not only is it difficult to generalize on the frequency of FBD marriage with out knowing the exact link implied (i.e. whether it is an extended usage or the real term for FBD), but also other types of marriages are as frequent as the FBD marriage.

> My data are from Sisin's 25 HHs with 65 married couples. Sisin households' numerous social links (of marriage, trading, partnership, friendship, co-ownership, and kinship) outside the village, with neighbouring co-tribal, other tribal, or distant villages (along the border with Iraq) and Yüksekova are also taken into evaluation, even if outside Sisin, data on socio-economic background, degrees of cognation and affinity, and lineage membership were randomly and unevenly available. The marriage types and negotiations, wedding ceremonies, and bride-price payments show considerable variations across town and village, various socio-economic categories, among tribal or non-tribal groups. Given this variation in practice and cultural norms, the data presented here reflect the salient characteristics of marriage practices even if not depict all the details and minor differentiations.

Let us look first at the marriage types in Sisin, classified from the men's point of view.

Table 8.1. Marriage types in Sisin.

FBD (1st cousin)	10	41.5%
FBD (2nd cousin)	1	
"Traceable" FBD	8	
"Lineage" FBD	3	
FBDD	2	
FZD	1	
FZSD	1	
FMBSD	2	
MZD/MZDS	3	13.8%
MBD/MBSD	4 (*)	
MFBSD	2	
No agnate/cognate	22	33.9%
Insufficient information	7	10.8%
Total	65	100%

(*) One wife here is a traceable patrilineal cousin and also a MBD and has been counted twice.

Some explanatory points for the table above are necessary:

a. The figures above show the number and types of marriages of couples and the former marriages of widows in Sisin's households (the household unit as has been defined earlier in Chapter 5). This definition is based on economic and social unity but sometimes separate residence and the way the villagers define the household, *mal*. The reason for considering married couples in *mals* is that the household as a unit, with its inner hierarchical structure and its outer links and strategies, plays the most important role in determining the marriages of the couples.

b. The table shows marriages from the point of view of the men. It shows the women as wives, who move within or into Sisin by marriage and not the women who move away from Sisin. This is to be able to treat the HH as an analytical unit; marriages outside Sisin although showing the other and necessary side of households' marriage strategies (i.e. the strategies for marrying daughters and sisters outside the village) require a larger unit of analysis including other villages, tribal settlements and the town.

c. The number of couples shown in Table 8.1 above is greater than the number of couples shown in earlier HH data in Table 5.1a. (Table 8.1 has a total of 65 couples, and 5.1a has 56 couples). The difference is due to including only couples, married and living in the HH in the first table (5.1a), but widows and engaged couples in the second (8.1). The widows and engaged people are included here to be able to deal with the marriage types and strategies in a continuum, with past, present and future marriage arrangements.

d. Tribal villagers use the same term for several categories; the first 4 categories in Table 8.1, for example, would all be *dotmam* (FBD) in reference and address. But, here a distinction is made between the 3rd and 4th categories, those of "traceable" and "lineage" FBD (both are *dotmam*, for the villagers). This is to differentiate between the "official" and "practical" kin categories suggested by Bourdieu (1977). This is a crucially important distinction which is discussed below.

e. The next four categories of patrilateral kin include women, who are related to the male EGO through his father, and who are members of different patrilineages. Despite the extension through several generations, the term the EGO uses for these kinswomen follows that of his own father, ignoring the real generational distance and the difference of the patrilineage. For example, the FBDD (on the genealogical map) is still referred to as the FBD (*dotmam*) thus overriding her different patrilineal membership and in return stressing her mother's patrilineal group identity. Similarly, FMBSD is referred to as one's own MBD thus skipping the father's generation and the mother's brother's **son** in between.

f. The next three categories of matrilateral relatives are the types found in Sisin and are not exhaustive of all possible types. Because of the parallel and cross cousin marriages which occur in successive generations, in many cases people are related to each other not only through one but several lines. Therefore, it is significant which link they emphasize in what context, or which link they ignore and why. For instance, in the case marked with (*) in Table 8.1

above, the woman called her husband "FZS"; her husband and her brother, however, referred to each other as FBS (traceable in this case) more often than MBS-FZS. It is not possible to establish here a difference due to male and female points of view. There is, nevertheless, a bias for patrilineal recall as Bates has pointed out for the Yörük of southeastern Turkey. (Bates, 1973:64)

g. The next category, non-agnatic/cognatic relations, contains all the other types of marriage partners (in Sisin all were within the same tribe). In all cases cited in this category, the wives belonged to a different lineage, clan (*mal*) and/or sub-tribal division (*qabîle*) from that of the husbands, and no agnatic or cognatic relation was mentioned. The identification as non-kin is significant in this context, since if one could map all the kin and affinal relations up to 4-5 generations ago, eventually 90% of the cases here mentioned might be indeed agnatically or cognatically related to one another.

The analysis of the data presented above and FBD marriage in general is presented under the following points:

1. The patrilateral cousin marriage (of various types) in Sisin has the highest frequency with 41.5%. (The women in the first four categories are all called *dotmam*.) Within this category 22 out of a total of 29 patrilateral marriages are patrilineal.[40] However, non-agnate/cognate marriage is also high with one third (33.9%) of all the marriages. Marriage with matrilateral women is 13.8%, and for 7 cases the information was insufficient. Statistically, therefore, marriage with a patrilineal cousin in Sisin is just as important as the marriage with a non-kin.

2. Although Barth (1953:67) admits the impossibility of collecting extensive census data, due to the limited period spent in the region, he seems to have taken the locals' statement uncritically and explains the higher incidence of FBD marriage as being "more of them." (Ibid., p. 27) The distinction made between the four categories of *dotmam/pismam* in Table 8.1 above is significant as it enables us to identify the lines of solidarity and fission between kinship and tribal units of various levels. Bourdieu's concepts of "official" and "practical" kin are useful here, as they correspond to the categories of "traceable" and "lineage" FBD mentioned above. Briefly, according to Bourdieu (1977:33-38), official kin are those one has on one's genealogical map within the locally defined boundaries of lineage, clan or tribe, and practical kin are those within the network of cultivated relations, people with whom one works, trades, socializes, and marries.

Kurdish villagers in Hakkari do not reckon their ancestors any further than third or fourth ascending generations. Hence, within the patrilineage there are two ways of tracing patrilineal cousins. The **first** one is the classification of certain patrilineal kin in one's own lineage as descending from identifiable ancestors, such as two brothers, even if the exact distance is not known. Under this category cousins are labelled as "traceable". Lineage A households in Sisin are an example for this: the 11 households considered themselves the descendants of two named FBSs. There were several other HHs in another Oramarî tribal village (where Sisin's lineage A HHs' ancestors originally came from) which were also considered as "descendants of FBSs."

The **second** way of tracing patrilineal cousins is classifying certain households in one's own patrilineage (whose size may range from 20-100 or more HHs) as FBSs or FBDs (here labelled as "lineage" cousins). This is the conscious type of extending the term, while the actor knows that proof of the exact kin link is impossible but also unnecessary. The referent is a "practical" kinsman[41] with whom special close relations already exist or are desirable. Coming back to Barth's discussion, as he does not distinguish the types of extended usage of the terms for FBS and FBD, his central argument which stresses the solidifying nature of FBD's marriage for the "minimal lineage as a corporate group in factional struggle" (Ibid., p. 171) is difficult to maintain.

3. Barth (1954:169) relates the high incidence of FBD marriage to the tightness of the lineage organization and asserts that where the rate of FBD marriage is low, village endogamy remains high.[42] To assess the significance of village, lineage, or tribal endogamy versus exogamy, however, further information is needed. To begin with, although it is not obvious from the configuration of Table 8.1 above, all the marriages counted in Sisin are within the tribe of Oramarî, thus the statistical behaviour of marriage practices approaches 100% tribal endogamy. Having said this, several important demographic, economic and statistical factors influencing the settlement pattern, the population movement, and the production in the area should be recalled. The population of the Oramarî tribe was estimated roughly as about 10,000 people,[43] inhabiting about 10-15 villages (within Turkey and an unknown number in Iraq) of different sizes. The tribal area, which was temporarily evacuated during the 1920s, was repopulated after the 1935 amnesty for the rebels of the Oramar rebellion. Sisin itself was re-settled after 1937 and the settlers came from two original villages of the Oramarî. Other close kin of the settlers are spread around in 6-7 villages and the marriages counted in Sisin are either from

Sisin or from the villages mentioned above. Therefore, the tribal endogamy mostly coincides with tribal-section endogamy (as all the HHs in Sisin belong to the same *qabîle*).

As for the question of village endogamy/exogamy, the number of women marrying within Sisin and the number of women from other Oramarî villages marrying into Sisin have to be taken into account. These data are presented in Table 8.2. below.

Table 8.2. Kinship relations of women marrying within, into, or outside Sisin.

	Women marrying into other villages	Women marrying within Sisin	Women marrying into Sisin from other villages
kin/affine	6	15	10
non-kin	6	4	12
Total	12	19	22

Table 8.2 shows that 19 women had married within Sisin, whereas 34 women had married into or out of Sisin. This can hardly be called village endogamy. In Sisin, where families already have close kin and affinal ties to various villages, marriages are from and into those villages as often as within Sisin. Looking further away from Sisin and the tribe of Oramar and around a larger area, marriage within the tribe and with close or distant kin or affine seem to be the dominant trend. However, in Oramarî villages, depending on the historical, economic and political relations between the people, marriages are mostly from HHs in surrounding villages of the same tribe, and sometimes from other tribes. Both the Pinyanişî and the Dorskî, tribes neighbouring the Oramarî, exchange wives with the Oramarî. Nonetheless, marriages between the Oramarî and the Ertuşî are rare,[44] and different social classes have different reasons for such marriages. Between the chiefly families, for instance, exchanging wives with a rival tribe may be to settle a conflict or to expand influence through alliance, or as we have seen in the case of the *muhtar* above, it may also be for the sake of love and social prestige. Similarly, in mixed population areas, as in various recently settled villages on the plain, in Yüksekova or the city of Hakkari itself, marriages between different tribal groupings or non-tribals occur frequently. In villages bordering Iran and Iraq, where villagers have close contact and some times kin or

affinal relations across the border, there are marriages into and from these countries as well.

Endogamy, therefore, is not the rule, but the practice followed is marrying into or from socially and economically close groups. As Bates (1973:60) points out for the Yörük nomads, "structurally, marriage patterns are highly endogamous at all levels of descent segmentation", but "the Yörük do not strongly express a sentiment for lineage-specific marriages within Yörük society at large.... Thus lineage endogamy is best considered a statistical by-product of other features of the marriage system, not itself a primary determinant of the kinship nexus." Similarly to Yörük nomads, the marriage strategies in Hakkari do not necessarily correspond to the local "ideal" of taking wives from outside and from influential groups, with whom one could have socially and materially profitable relations, but not giving them one's own daughters and sisters for the same reasons.

4. Coming back to FBD marriage, even if we accept that not all FBD marriages are with genealogical FBDs but include a larger category of women, we are still left with the problem of the high significance attached to a FBS/FBD marriage in Kurdish terms, to the event that children are teased for being in love with their FBD/FBS. There are songs and proverbs about the affection one has for a FBD[45], and that FBDs and FBSs often do fall in love and marry each other.[46] This aspect is the focus of the critique by Khuri (1970), who claims the existing arguments are functionalist, statistical, or that they take property as the main reason. Khuri applies an analysis based on Freudian family psychology, and argues that "in contrast to out-marriages, FBD marriage seems to nullify the effects women may have upon the division of the extended family into smaller units," (Khuri, 1970: 610) and that "it perpetuates, after marriage, the same social relationships which prevailed before it." (Ibid., p. 597)

Khuri's claim that, in a FBD marriage, the familiarity between FBD and FBS from childhood onwards, the close ties between the two brothers, their wives and offspring would alleviate the trauma of a woman marrying into a new household,[47] has been criticized mainly for his psychological assumptions about certain affinal and kin roles.[48] In Keyser's words, "if it is possible for people to like each other only if they know each other, it is also possible for people to hate each other only if they know each other."[49] The familiarity factor as a reason for undesirability is frequently cited by young men in Hakkari, especially when they are under pressure to marry a cousin and are instead interested in someone else. The familiarity causing close ties or dislike between cousins applies not only to FBD-FBS relations but to all the other cousins too. Men refuse to marry a FBD or MZD, or to show interest in either one of them, on the same grounds of **familiarity**. Thus, there is no evidence that familiarity with FBD is different from familiarity with other types of cousins, or that it leads to a preference (or hatred) of the FBD.

5. Another aspect of FBD marriage which has been stressed in various arguments[50] is that it keeps the property within the family. On this issue, the evidence from Hakkari resembles that from many Middle Eastern populations. Despite *Sharia* or civil property and inheritance laws, women, especially in tribal villages, are not given property, land or houses, either as inheritance or as dowry.[51] This custom, however, is sanctioned only by social pressure on the patrilineage to keep their women modest, obedient, and respectful. As Beyazidî said a century ago (see note 51 above), to give inheritance to women is *şerme* (shameful, socially unacceptable and disgraceful). It has already been mentioned above that women do some times claim land as inheritance, even against their brothers. Considering this possibility of women resorting to such "socially unacceptable" and "immodest" claims on land, marrying women to their FBSs introduces an additional control on them. Women who claim land and inheritance would not act alone, but usually with their husbands and sons, who hope to benefit from the claims. Thus, a daughter married to one's BS is less likely to gather support for her claim from her husband, who in this case would have to claim land from his FB or FBS. If the husband supports his wife against his FB (and father-in-law) then the rules of sharing the property of the patrilineage are challenged, and male domination in controlling the property would be endangered. Therefore, in the tribal system of Hakkari, the FBD marriage is not primarily a measure to prevent the alienation of property from the family - this is already ensured by practised inheritance laws -, but it reinforces this inheritance system and the tribal ideology.

6. Yet another argument on FBD's marriage is that it strengthens the defensive unit (Keyser, 1974:293-294), as mentioned above in relation to Barth's analysis. Barth says that FBD marriage is a mechanism to keep the defense unit, i.e. maximal lineage, together against endemic segmentation, according to his model of segmentary tribal lineages. Some other authors have stressed yet other units, the household for example, which would be more stable through FBD marriage.[52] Hakkari's tribal Kurds hold patrilineal solidarity and tribal solidarity as an "ideal native model",[53] but this does not lead them to have endogamous lineages, sub-tribal sections or tribes, though people do marry their FBDs.

As Bourdieu (1977:46) noted, there is a "compulsory quality" about FBD marriage: "A man's supposed right to ... FBD, may be in fact a **duty** which obeys the same principles as the obligation to avenge a kinsman or to buy up a piece of family land coveted by strangers, and is therefore totally binding only in very special and even somewhat exceptional circumstances." The binding quality of such a marriage was the central theme of a marriage arrangement discourse. On a visit to a FBD's family, to ask formally for her hand, the main speaker of the wife-taking brother's (FBS) party used the following metaphor: that the *mal* (here, lineage) is like a "house" and the daughter of a *mal* is like its "door". One should not open one's door to strangers (*biyanî* in Kurdish), but only to one's brother. The compulsory quality of FBD marriage may, on the other hand, be disruptive for the household as well, as the example below demonstrates:

> A "lineage" FBS of Hüseyin, from lineage A in Sisin, kidnapped a woman from lineage B in an other village. The man had help from his FBSs and allegedly from Hüseyin as well. After the kidnapping, the men of lineages A and B had several brawls, the father of the woman complained to the gendarmerie and took the case to the court. The woman, although she had been by then religiously married to her kidnapper, was returned to her father's house after she claimed at court to have been kidnapped against her will. After the woman's return, the men and women of the two lineages, especially the households involved and their close kin were very bitter against one another. In the meantime, another FBD of Hüseyin (she was FBD-1st cousin to the kidnapper) had been asked to marry a co-villager, Tatar from a third lineage D. The latter man's household had affinal links to the kidnapped woman's parental household and had not remained impartial in the conflict between the two HHs and their respective lineage members. Hüseyin's patrilineal kin were against the woman marrying Tatar. Hüseyin, at that time, was contending for a leading position in his lineage A in Sisin, and his patrilineal kinsmen (who were also affines to him) put pressure on him to act in order to prevent the marriage. So Hüseyin took his lineage FBD as wife for his son, despite the opposition from his wife. Thus, from the genealogical point of view it was an ideal FBD marriage. Hüseyin's (of course, also his son's) move was a duty to his lineage. Yet, the conflict between the new bride in the house and Hüseyin's wife caused tension between Hüseyin's and the bride's parental HHs. The tension was kept under control to a degree by Hüseyin ignoring the causes of the conflict in his household altogether and presenting it to the "outside" as a "petty affair between the women." If he were to get involved in the conflict and took the side of his

wife for example, the FBD/bride's parental HH might have interfered and this could have caused an obvious and irrepressible conflict between the closely knit circle of lineage A HHs in Sisin.

7. A final aspect of FBD marriage, the emphasis on an egalitarian principle, has been discussed by various authors. According to this point of view, giving a daughter to one's BS has to do with maintaining and stressing the equality between brothers. This aspect is indeed emphasized in the discourse on FBD marriages; the equality between brothers and the virtue of giving a daughter ("the door of the house") to a brother's son (thus "not opening the door to strangers"), is part of the discourse of FBD marriage negotiations.

In a similar argument and using the cultural approach, FBD marriage has been interpreted by Meeker (1976) as guaranteeing not only the daughter's modesty and securing the honour of her family, but also strengthening the ties of mutuality between brothers' households. Meeker, in his analysis of *namus* and *sharaf/'ard* among the Turks and the Arabs, asserts that the considerations for the clan *sharaf* carried by a sister or daughter into her marriage, leads to stress on the mutuality of Arab marriage: each man's *'ard/sharaf* depends on the other, thus FBD marriage is favoured among the Arabs. (Meeker, 1976:411) Among the Turks, however, unlike the Arabs, mutual obligations between the affines do not exist (Ibid., p. 391), thus FBD marriage complicates the relations between kinsmen.

The interest in strengthening the ties of mutuality and demonstrating solidarity and equality between brothers is juxtaposed to the interest in claiming a higher status for one's household through arranging prestige marriages for one's offspring. We have seen that the villagers value marrying women from outside one's own group, more so if she comes from a powerful family and lineage. Taking a wife from an outsider group is a proof of one's own prestige in the eyes of the others. Ordinary villagers who get outsider wives (from Iran or other parts of Turkey) are talked about. Thus marrying a FBD is as much an "ordinary marriage" -devoid of symbolic profit (in comparison to prestige marriages)[54]- as an emphasis on equality between brothers or lineage FBSs. The marriages of the *muhtar* discussed above demonstrate these two aspects; his first wife is a classificatory FBD -thus a "proper" but "ordinary" marriage; and the second one is an outsider (from another tribe and place)- a "prestige" marriage. The dilemma is caused by his attempt to have the two marriages at the same time, similar to tribal leaders or holy lineages of *sayyids* without having enough resources to gather support and maintain harmony between the wives.

To conclude, the arguments above which have drawn attention to various functions or limitations of FBD marriage are not satisfactory explanations on their own. Bourdieu (1977:43) rightly depicts FBD marriage as, neither "an ideal, hardly ever achieved in practice", nor "an ethical norm (a duty of honour) ... which can conceivably broken", nor "simply a 'move' recommended in certain situations" alone. Rather "it is all of these at once". For an ordinary tribal household in Hakkari to pursue a FBD marriage for one of the sons would be following are commended principle but also an ordinary marriage, whereas for a tribal chief's household or a *sayyid* family the meaning of such a marriage changes, as there is a stress on the elite status of the family on strengthening the bonds between the brothers. Thus, one could conclude that FBD marriage would take different turns and have different meanings when the social standing, overall strategies and social and material profit increases or decreases of the households are considered.[55] The changing meanings of certain strategies are recognized by the villagers themselves; in the case above, Hüseyin knew that the FBD marriage his son had made, - even if it was the proper type in the conflict between the lineages - brought him neither prestige, nor more support from his patrilineal kin. He acted under compulsion but not in his own family's best interest.

Direct-exchange marriage:

Direct wife exchange marriages form a significant part of Sisin households' marriages. It is called *pê-guhurk* in Kurdish (lit. exchanged, or changed together)[56] and *berdel* or *takas* in Turkish. The villagers' definition of a direct wife exchange marriage emphasizes the agreement on the marriage of one couple being connected to the marriage of at least one more couple. Thus, it is a marriage arrangement where the marriages of at least two couples are made conditional on one another. The decision on *pê-guhurk* marriages is also made together. For instance, if one household head gives a daughter to another one as wife for their son, he cannot later demand a wife in return under the name and right of *pê-guhurk*, if it has not been decided at the beginning. He could still ask for a wife for his own son, but such a marriage or demand would not be named *pê-guhurk*.

Pê-guhurk marriages, therefore, are wife exchange marriages where at least two couples are engaged and wedded at (approximately) the same time. The weddings of the two couples usually take place on the same or on two consecutive days; one day one group will be the wife-takers, next day they will be the wife-givers.

There are also cases where *pê-guhurk* arrangements are made for three couples. In this rare form, wives are circulated between three households; e.g. HH (A) giving a daughter as wife to a son of HH (B), B giving a daughter to HH (C) and C giving a daughter to A. There was such a case, for instance, in a village near Sisin; the three household heads were all brothers giving one daughter to a BS and getting a BD as daughter-in-law in return.

The most common type of direct wife exchange, however, is between two households and mostly as sister exchange. In Table 8.3 below, 16 cases of *pê-guhurk* arrangements, which resulted in 32 married couples, some in Sisin (as Sisin men and their wives) and some in other villages (Sisin women given away as wives in exchange) are presented. (The data are based on marriage types in Table 8.1 above.) The significance of direct wife exchange in Sisin lies in the fact that out of 65 extant marriages in Sisin (see Table 8.1) 21 have resulted from direct exchange.

Table 8.3. Direct wife exchange marriages in Sisin.

Husbands' kin links	Number of cases of sister exchange	Number of cases of non-sister exchange
FBSs (1st cousin)	4	-
FZS-MBS	2	-
MZSs	1	-
FBS (lineage cousin)	1	-
other kin	-	1 (MZD exchanged for MZDS)
non-kin	5	2 (*)
Total	13	3

(*) In each of these two cases one man's sister was exchanged for the other man's daughter. One exchange occured after the kidnapping of the sister, the other was normally arranged.

The conclusions from the figures presented above could be drawn as follows:

a. The largest number of direct wife exchanges in Sisin is of the sister exchange type.

b. Of these sister exchanges 8 cases are between HHs who are already kin or affine and 5 were between non-kin households.

c. Of the non-kin sister exchanges only one case is within Sisin, between two neighbouring households. The other 4 non-kin cases involve HHs outside Sisin.

d. 11 of the total 16 exchange cases occurred with HHs outside Sisin. Finally, only one case of wife exchange is the result of a settlement for a wife-kidnapping affair.[57]

e. The number of cases of direct exchange with kin or non-kin groups is nearly the same in Sisin; there are 9 cases of exchange with kin and affines and 7 with non-kin or affines.

f. A relatively high percentage of patrilineal cousin marriage is the result of direct exchange. There are 5 such instances of direct exchange, creating 10 married couples; out of the 10, 7 couples belong to Sisin households, thus 7 (FBD/FBS) couples out of the 21 in Table 8.1 were caused by direct exchange. In other words, 1/3 of all the patrilineal cousin marriages are a result of direct wife exchange between FBSs (of all types).

As the rate of direct exchange marriage among patrilineal parallel cousins is relatively high, we need to look at the relationship between these two marriage forms. We saw above that FBD marriage entails the dialectical aspects of affinity and patriliny; it is both a stress on equality between brothers and a renunciation of prestige marriages and of possibly useful affinal links. Another aspect of FBD marriage is the way it fits into the general pattern of affinal relations, especially to the roles played as wife-takers and wife-givers.

> Wife-taking and wife-giving are essentially and emotionally different matters. Wife-givers are assumed to have superiority just on the basis of giving a wife (people say that it is easy for women to marry, but difficult for men to get wives). Giving wives to outsiders is acceptable if the wife-takers are of a higher socio-economic status but not so high as to take advantage of the status difference and deny the wife-givers working affinal relations. Hence, if the daughter or sister is given to an outsider (who may not share the local cultural values and meanings of hierarchy or equality), it may be difficult to have useful affinal links. Because of the assumed superiority of wife-givers, it is harder for them to press for working affinal relations or to ignore them altogether than it is for the wife-takers. For example, a household head from Sisin had his mother from the family of a different tribe's chief; this meant that he had the "formal"

> right and obligation to associate himself with his mother's kin as his *pisxal*s (MBSs). He did this in a very formal manner, visiting the tribal chief's HH a few times a year, always going with some valuable presents and usually combining visit and business, exchanging news about sheep trade and politics. The mother's paternal HH was of a higher status and although they hardly returned the visits, they could not treat the Sisin household head or his sons as unimportant guests either, since the Sisin household members were the descendants of the wife-takers. The prestige of the mother's paternal household and lineage raised the status of the wife-taking Sisin HH, on the one hand, but because of the formality of the relationship, the assumed superiority was not convincing. The Sisin household head could only talk about his powerful *pisxal*s, but could not turn them into his "practical" kin.

In the case of a direct exchange marriage between two pairs of FBD/FBSs, as the wife-givers are assigned a formally and structurally superior position, the wife-takers **play** the role of receivers, who have been "granted a favour" and will benefit from the productive and reproductive capacities of a woman for "nothing" (as in the lack of bride-price among the Oramarî). It should be stressed that these roles are "played", especially during the wedding ceremony (see Appendix VII), and that they do not reflect the underlying status differences or the nature of previous relations between the two groups. The wife-takers, especially the women in this group, assume the role of entertainers during the wedding, and when the wife is being retrieved from her parental house, they sing loud and happy songs. If they express their joy too explicitly, the tension between the two groups easily rises and leads to frequent fights in the weddings. In a FBD marriage, these roles are further curtailed as the brother giving the daughter cannot show his sadness at losing his daughter. Fathers frequently express their regret in giving away a daughter just as she has become a full and useful member of the household. The brother taking the BD as a wife for his son, on the other hand, cannot rejoice too openly as this would be hurting his brother's feelings.

These roles, as enacted during the wedding, reflect the nature of affinal relations and the negotiations on defining the "closeness" and "distance" between affines. The replication of FBD marriage through direct wife exchange could thus be seen as consistent with the preference for FBD and also as nullifying the effects of structural inequality between the wife-givers and wife takers.

Another crucial aspect of direct wife exchange is that it is a preferred pattern and a marriage of expedience, especially in terms of household labour composition and within the larger social environment where brideprice practices prevail. The labour composition of the household was quoted as the dominant reason for one exchange in Sisin, while for others it was an additional motive. The expedient character of the exchange is cited by households who have several eligible sons and daughters. The uncommon but still existing practice of bride-price with in the tribe of Oramarî is given as another advantage of direct exchange; direct exchange cancels the possibility of one party asking for a bride-price. The cancellation of bride-price through direct wife exchange also applies to those groups who normally do pay bride-price and do not have an ideological position against it. (The relationship between direct exchange and bride-price will be further discussed below.)

Although direct exchange is a preferred pattern of marriage, it does not mean that in each case where there are eligible sons and daughters, a direct exchange will take place. As Bourdieu (1977) and Peters (1980) argue, the matrimonial arrangements are best understood by taking the household's social and economic history into consideration and assessing the composition of the HH and the kinship position of its members in relation to one another. Genealogical positions, age and sex composition of the household provide the skeleton of the analysis. Therefore, because it can nullify the effects of affinal inequality, direct wife exchange is chosen as a strategy for those households with whom long term and multiple relations are desirable. It is as advantageous to exchange wives with a neighbour with whom multiple relations of obligations or conflict already exist, as with a non-kin trading partner, friend or a matrilateral kin from another village, with whom some relations already exist and further strengthening and widening of these is desired.

The balancing effect of the direct wife exchange not only cancels out the unequal status position of wife-givers and wife-takers but in other contexts, such as blood feuds or wife-kidnapping, it could resolve the existing inequality and aggression between two groups.[58] In such cases exchanging wives ends hostilities between two groups, even if it does not lead to working affinal relations. Such a resolution has been cited between two leading families from the two rival tribal blocs in Hakkari. After a blood feud between them where three men were killed and one man was jailed for seven years, the end of the hostilities was marked by exchanging wives between the two families.

Marriage with bride-price:

The third main type of marriage arrangement in Hakkari is the case where there are marriage payments involved. If marriage payments could be defined as the total of cash, goods and labour exchanged over a certain period of time between wife-givers and wife-takers, the following categories of payments exist in Hakkari: Bride price, called *başlık* in Turkish and *naxt* in Kurdish[59], is defined in the region usually in a limited sense, as the cash payment demanded by the wife-givers at the time of the betrothal and at the end of negotiations, on the amount and the conditions of payment. Although the word *naxt* has this limited meaning, in practice people often extend the meaning to cover the costs of goods demanded by wife-givers, the presents given to the bride's family members and sometimes the wedding ceremony's costs. Nevertheless, if asked to detail the content of the payment, the speakers usually define the *naxt* as cash; "50,000 TL. *naxt,* so many sheep and goods demanded by the bride's father, so many pieces of cloth as 'presents' for her family members, so many lambs -slaughtered at the wedding-" and so on. Men tend to exaggerate the total costs and payments, to demonstrate their economic power and generosity as well as the worth of the woman they have chosen. The above extended usage of *naxt* is a well-known method for exaggerating the expenses and for challenging the person by asking how much **cash** and under what conditions he paid.

The total monetary value of all the payments (i.e. cash, plus goods demanded, the presents and the wedding costs) is as important as the quality and symbolic value of the goods and the particular combination of the different parts of the total payment. For instance, the goods demanded by a leading tribal villager may include an automatic gun, a horse, and sheep, whereas in town fathers more often ask for household goods and furniture, or similar consumption goods, which may amount to comparable material value but are in terms of their prestige value incomparable with the above goods.[60] Considering the limits of exaggeration, the amounts quoted to have been paid by different people as the cash part of bride price range from 50,000 to 300,000 TL. in 1981-82. (200 TL.=1 Sterling in 1981) The goods demanded as extra-payments range from jewelry, cloth, shoes, radio and guns to sheep, horses and mules. (See Appendix VIII for an example of items paid and given as gifts.)

As for the question of who pays and who receives the payment, the Islamic formulation of bridewealth, *mahr* formally prescribes the payments to be given to the bride in cash, gold, property or jewelry, to be kept by the woman in case of divorce. The practice, as has been studied by many anthropologists,[61] shows considerable variation across time and space. In Hakkari, the common practice is to give the cash and other valuables to the woman's father or brother. The woman, in most cases, does not have rights either to control the payments nor to possess the jewelry given to her at the time or before the wedding. The jewelry is given to **her** but after marriage her husband or father-in-law may decide to give it away, as part of another bride-price for the next bride. The valuables and cash paid as bride-price, then, are mostly under the control of the male household head, who decides how and whether to share them further, whether to give a share to the marrying daughter, or keep it for the other household members. Women are not expected to take a share of these payments and it is up to the male household head's interpretation of his loyalty and support for the daughter, and the considerations of status and prestige. A wealthy household head would endow the daughter with a big trousseau in return for a high bride-price for example.

Who actually contributes to the payment of the cash and valuables depends on the other circumstances of the marriage and the cause of the bride-price. Bride-price is not paid by all in Hakkari, and it has many meanings and implications. The most common type of bride price payment, where the wife-givers demand bride-price because of status differences between them and the wife takers, involves the groom, and his immediate agnatic kin and household members as responsible for raising and paying the cash and goods. As demonstrated below, depending on the context of the marriage arrangements and the relationship between the wife-givers and wife-takers, the group who contributes to the bride-price payments grows or shrinks. In a case where a poor man kidnaps a wife from a better off household without previously organizing support for his act (see below for the discussion of wife kidnapping), he may be left alone to pay the bride-price or continue the aggression between himself and the woman's kinsmen. In another case, politically and economically powerful people, such as one's tribal chief, could be called in to raise the payments.

The terms and means of payment are negotiable, and even if they are specified at the beginning of marriage negotiations, they can be revised, waived, or postponed. The usual pattern is to pay some part of the cash and some of the valuables at the betrothal and the rest at the time of the wedding. Again the cancellation or changing the forms of payment is related to the total relations and negotiations on relative status between the two groups, as discussed below.

The payment of bride-price usually accompanies the trousseau from the bride's family. The trousseau (*çehiz* in Turkish and Kurdish) is paid in goods and valuables only, and includes all the valuables given to the bride at the time of the wedding. It mostly included the household utensils, the bride's own clothes, bedding and linen prepared either by her or with paid or unpaid work by relatives or other women. Depending on the bride's family's prestige and social standing, she may be given furniture, rugs, kilims and other household goods as part of her *çehiz*. The bride's family usually tries to match the level of bride-price in the *çehiz* and also the expenses and presents at the time or before the wedding. However, from the figures given as bride-price payments (even if they are exaggerated in order to show off), it is unlikely that the wife-givers could match indeed the overall payments of the wife-takers.

The practice of bride-price and trousseau is not universal in Hakkari. In Oramarî tribal villages it is uncommon to give either. Daughters and sisters are not given any valuables or property of any considerable value definable as *çehiz*. Instead, a bride is given dress fabrics, some clothes, shoes, a few rings, or jewelry but that is about all she gets whether some bride-price is paid or not. The Oramarî tribesmen have an ideological position about these practices and say that it is *haram* (religiously forbidden) to pay *naxt*[62] and it is not their custom to give trousseau (*çehiz*) to their daughters. Such claims, nonetheless, are refuted by various cases where bride-price was paid. One case involved the tribal leader's family who paid a large sum of bride-price (allegedly 300,000 TL. in 1982) for the daughter of a leading family from the same Oramarî tribe. Both families lived in town and the bride-price demand and payment was interpreted by tribal commoners as adapting to the customs of town and city and acting according to their households' prestige and social rank. The so-called religious prohibition of the bride-price, which was vehemently defended by ordinary tribesmen and mountain villagers, did not seem to matter in this case. Piety is not a strong point or a necessary quality of chiefly or wealthy families. Their rules are separate and they are not openly criticized. Other examples of bride-price within the Oramarî tribe occurred between households from different lineages and tribal sections, and usually there was some special condition involved in the marriage negotiations due to differences in status, village or town residence, distance or animosity between the two groups, a prior marriage which had broken up or the like. On the whole, bride-price payment for Oramarî villagers implies taking or giving a wife from or to an outsider, e.g. from outside the tribe, non-tribal or non-Hakkari resident.

The relationship between bride-price payment and direct exchange marriage has been touched upon above. Whether these two practices are alternatives to one another is a topic for the local people. N. Tapper (1981) discusses the same issue in reference to the Durrani Pashtuns, where she points out that the latter is an expression of egalitarianism whereas the former expresses individual claims to higher status. Tapper suggests that the two types of marriages are open to multiple interpretations and meanings and that they relate to the defitions of social equality. The Durrani, who emphasize ethnic group endogamy as an element of their dominant ethnic identity, express social status differences within their group in a choice between a) direct exchange or b) 'generalized exchange', i.e. bride-price marriage. (Tapper, 1981:391-92) "A basic and explicit principle in Durrani marriage is that the exchange of women between two men indicates a mutual recognition of status equality, while the single transfer of a woman by one man to another for brideprice, indicates the recognition by the wife-giver of the potential or actual status superiority of the wife taker." (Ibid., p. 394) There are three forms of symmetrical, direct exchange marriage: "the 'neutral' form of essentially apolitical exchanges made for convenience, exchanges of 'recognition'," (of previously unknown groups as having Durrani or equal status), and "exchanges of 'reconciliation' (i.e. to settle the disputes)." (Ibid.) The asymmetrical modes of exchange depend on how the payment of the brideprice is negotiated and how its parts (cash and goods) are composed. There are three asymmetrical marriage types; in the first one, the contract fixes the amount to be paid; in the second, the amount is not fixed and is open for expressions of "highly inividualistic claims to status"; and in "the third one, the woman is given 'gratis'" in compensation for blood spilt by wounding or homicide." (Ibid., pp. 394-97)

The meanings and applications of bride-price and direct exchange marriage in Hakkari, like those of Durrani, are multiple and complex. Oramarî explain the practice of direct wife exchange as a way of avoiding bride price. Nevertheless, bride-price and wife exchange are not clear-cut alternatives. Negotiations on and recognition of relative status determine the degree of convertibility between bride-price and direct wife exchange.[63]

The payment of bride-price in Hakkari affects the relative status of wife-givers and wife-takers in different ways than suggested by Tapper for the Durrani. The difference begins with the attitudes and ideological positions about bride-price. Bride-price is indeed seen as the practice of high status and wealthy families or individuals who want to stake a claim for high status (as among the Durrani). However, there are ideological positions about bride-price, that it is *haram*, or from the state's point of view, it means "selling one's daughter", "ruining the husband's financial resources", such that there are occasional "bans" on the payment of bride-price. Rural and urban dichotomies, ethnic categories and tribal or non-tribal differences simultaneously influence the moral meaning of bride-price. Hence waiving it for an educated daughter would not necessarily be related to some "reconciliation" or "recognition" but simply a declaration of the father's conformity with the "urban", "modern" national culture.

The second difference between the Durrani and Hakkari's tribesmen concerns the wife-giving and wife-taking positions. Unlike among the Durrani, wife-givers in Hakkari assume a high status.[64] With bride-price the superiority of the wife-givers as well as the rights of control over the woman become questionable and unclear. The mixed meanings attached to bride-price and moralist views on it, whether the bride-price is returned with a trousseau or not, all relate to the issues of control over the woman, and allow for unclearly defined and changeable degrees of control as the example below illustrates.

> Keko was from the tribe of Dorskî and married to another Dorskî woman, a distant but traceable FBD. He was good friends with her father and her FB and had economic relations with them, in forms of partnership in sheep trading and working for them as labourer. He was in his 40s and had a bad reputation for having proposed to a few other women and having been rejected. He lived in town with a very low and unstable income, doing occasional odd jobs. His wife, Guli, was not pretty and not very young by Hakkari's standards (about 25-26 at the time of marriage). Keko claimed he flirted with her and was made to ask for her in marriage under pressure from his mother and her father's brother.
>
> A bride-price was fixed, some of which Keko paid. He gave his few sheep to be looked after by her father and brothers, and did occasional unpaid labour for them. Later, he changed his mind about marrying Guli and wanted his payment back. But it was refused, and after much pressure from his mother and the fiancée's FB, he paid some more and had the wedding.
>
> Within the first months of their newly married life, Keko started treating Guli rudely, ridiculing her in front of others all the time and not allowing her out of the house at all, sometimes locking the door on her if he had to go out in the evening. (Most of the houses in town have toilets outside like the village houses.) Some time later, he was verbally abusing her for not becoming

> pregnant. He said: "all that money I paid for you and you are good for nothing, your father and uncle have cheated me."... She had some complaints of swollen and aching legs and feet, he did not allow her brothers or uncle to take her to see a doctor; he said she was pretending to be ill and he did not have money for treatment anyway.
>
> The point here is that, although he paid an average bride-price for her (c. 90,000 TL. including all the wedding expenses, which is average in town), he claimed to have got a bad deal and he could not bother himself about her. Guli's kin on the other hand, acknowledged Keko's rights to decide about her well-being as they had forced him to marry Guli, who probably would not have had any other matrimonial chances.
>
> Guli's kin treated Keko as if he had a higher status for having paid a bride-price for her and allowed him to have total control over her. Keko exploited his advantageous position and humiliated his affinal kinsmen further by sometimes sending Guli to her father's house for a visit and not retrieving her for months.[65]

Bridewealth and status do not necessarily correspond. (Peters, 1980:152) The kind of social relations involved or desired affect the position of both the man and the woman. In the above case, Keko tried to claim a higher status for having paid a bride-price for an undesirable wife, but he was only partly successful as his real socio-economic status was lower than the wife-givers. If the brideprice is paid for a prestige marriage, e.g. taking a wife from another tribe or province, then the payment may affect the position of man and wife differently. The wish to use the wife's kin links may secure her a stronger position in the household. Bride-price would, then, follow the degree of prestige involved and not vice versa. (Peters, 1980).

Wife kidnapping and elopement

Wife kidnapping, which is taking a woman by force to marry against her will (*keçik revandin* in Kurdish, *kız kaçırma* in Turkish), and elopement, which is when a man and woman run away together to get married (*pê-revin* in Kurdish and *kaçışma* or *kaçma* in Turkish), have important social repercussions in Hakkari. Although the rate of kidnapping and elopement is not numerically significant,[66] the general interest in the events is remarkable.

People frequently refer to the practice of kidnapping or elopement to justify the beliefs about the vulnerability of unprotected women and the unpredictability of violent acts from men. In many cases girls are married in their very early teens because the parents are afraid they could be abducted. Another frequent practice to prevent abduction is to perform the religious nikah at the betrothal stage but to have the wedding and marriage formalized sometimes after 5-6 years; in this way the girl would be considered married in respect of religious laws, but the ceremonies and procedures not completed to allow time for the girl to grow up and her parents to use her labour for some more years. Elopement, on the other hand, is publicly criticized especially if the woman involved is a close relative, but privately the views vary from consent and sympathy to disapproval and according to male and female points of view. Elopement differs from wife kidnapping in the process, if not the outcome (usually but not always, in both cases the couple are expected to marry); more importantly, however, elopement brings the woman's decision and will out to the public. When what should be kept private becomes public in such away, the expressed female decision is underplayed, disguised, and manipulated by men by emphasizing how cunning the man or "loose" the woman was. Elopement always brings shame to the woman's immediate kin. Close agnates especially are expected, at least publicly, to show disapproval and anger; they often claim it to be kidnapping and try to stick to their claim as long as possible. However, the elopment of someone else's daughter or sister could be interpreted with more sympathy and even outright approval than those of one's own kinswomen. Such practices of wife kidnapping or elopement then contribute to the formation of certain marriage practices such as early marriage arrangements but delayed weddings.

Wife kidnapping and elopement have been the subject of various sociological discussions in Turkey and elsewhere.[67] Bates (1973 and 1974), for example, found a relatively high rate of wife kidnapping and elopement among the Yörük[68], and examined the practice, with its consequences and structural implications. His analysis suggests the following points: a) one aims to avoid paying a high brideprice; b) it is an expression of the young man's individual choice about the woman and the time he wants to marry (as opposed to the conditions imposed on him by the social norms, the elders, or his father); c) it is a means for the young man to claim the adult status attained only after marriage. Bates' discussion shows that bride-price is not totally eliminated by wife kidnapping but the number of cases where a nominal price was paid is significant as well as the cases where no bride-price was paid. He suggests that kidnapping is a solution for the poor to avoid a high bride-price and especially for non-kin marriages. (All the arranged, non-kidnap, marriages without bride-price were direct exchange marriages.)

Apart from these objectives of wife kidnapping, the practice itself has the following net effect on the social structure: a) "it levels the impact of wealth differentials among families regarding marriage opportunities" (Bates, 1973:86); b) it disperses the kinship links outside the agnatic group and creates an alternative marriage system in comparison to the normative system which strongly favours arranged and/or cousin marriages (especially FBD marriage). The case of kidnap marriages following the preference order of arranged marriages (among the kidnapped wives, FBDs are the largest group as in arranged marriages) presents a paradox. Bates argues that when FBD marriage occurs after kidnapping, instead of "acting out the normative ideology" and "strengthening ties among agnates," it "disperses actual patterns of in teraction ... outward from named patrilineal descent groups." (Bates, 1974:284)

The frequency of wife kidnapping or elopement recorded in Hakkari is not high, but the social disruption caused by such events leads to certain political realignments between households and sometimes lineages. The main features of wife kidnapping and elopement in Hakkari are as follows:

a. It involves often more people than the kidnapper and the kidnapped; the first one would not only have at least 2-3 accomplices for the snatching but also other allies and helpers from whom he could get support through the period following the snatching, i.e. hiding the woman and the man, mediating between the households and their kin, taking part in the indemnity to be paid to the woman's kin and the like.[69]

b. In contrast to the Yörük, the woman's part in the event is important for the two parties and for naming it. Whether it is designated an elopement or kidnapping indicates the relationship of others to the man and woman. Bates (1973:69) found that the term elopement was never employed by the Yörük, because "it is socially immaterial whether the girl is abducted by force or is enticed to run away ... It is the familial nature of the marriage arrangement which is crucial to its definition as an approved match." Among the Kurds in Hakkari, however, when the woman's kin knew or thought they knew that she eloped with the man, they would not come out to support any vindictive act against the kidnapper; her patrilineal cousins at best may put on a show of firing a few shots in the air. Similarly, the kidnapper's kin always claim that the woman wanted to come even if she had been dragged and beaten.

c. Wife kidnapping or elopement occur whether there is bride-price obligation or not, and thereafter, compensation in the form of cash payment or woman is inevitable. In which cases cash or a woman would be accepted as indemnity is dependent on a combination of factors, such as the degree of violence shown, the relative status or the social distance between the two households and their lineages, whether it is a first or second wife and whether there has been previous aggression between the two groups. Thus, it is not possible to talk of a bride wealth elimination purpose of wife kidnapping, nor a levelling of wealth differences by avoiding high bride price as among the Yörük. (Bates, 1973:68-79)

d. The kidnapper's right to the woman he kidnapped cannot be so clearly determined on the basis of definitions of woman's honour and how it is lost or maintained. The Islamic Shafii teaching considers any contact with *na-mahrem* (marriageable) women as ritually "polluting", such that men and women should renew their ablutions for prayer. This leads to manipulative interpretations; when the kidnapper snatches the woman away, the act itself already is thought to imply a sexual pollution.[70] Nevertheless, the views on such cases are not unitary and no suggestion was made that she would be raped or that it is taken for granted that she is already raped. This contrasts to other reports from other parts of Turkey (Yasa 1962; Bates 1973; Yorgun 1984) which emphasize the importance of rape to secure the right over the woman. On the contrary, in some of the cases in Hakkari, the man for whom the wife was kidnapped did not even take part in the act, or the woman was immediately given to the custody of the "protector" (often a leading tribesman, an *agha* or a wealthy townsman) by one of the accomplices. In fact, as there is such a strong disapproval of illegitimate sexual unions, the kidnapper would be frowned upon even by his accomplices if he were to rape the woman without having the religious *nikah*. This point perhaps should not be overemphasized; it is possible to come across cases where raping the woman would strengthen the chances of keeping her. But the act itself, even after the religious marriage, is not always a sufficient reason to give up the claim on the woman by her kin and end the animosity to wards the kidnappers. In the case of the kidnapping by a Sisin man described above, the kidnapped woman's kin did not accept it as *fait accompli*, and her father convinced the woman to return to her parental family to be immediately given as a second wife to another man. This was rather unusual because she had stayed with her kidnapper for sometime, had married him (with the religious nikah) and had not given evidence against the kidnapper at the beginning. The kidnapper husband tried to keep the wife by not divorcing her according to the religious law, but after much pressures and seeing that the wife was already "married" to another man, he gave up and divorced her.

The main features of wife kidnapping and elopement practices in Hakkari present various similarities or contrasts with the Yörük system. First, Bates maintains that the Yörük objectives for kidnapping and elopement are to express individual choice. "Yörük marriages in general do not create 'alliances' in the usual anthropological sense, as lineages do not enter into a special relationship with one another upon the intermarriage of any of their members. Any features that resemble an alliance possessed by the Yörük marriage systems remains at the household level." (Bates, 1973:81) Thus, the Yörük marriage is at best arranged by the household head and following the agnatic norms of preferred cousin marriages. As it is defined by norms and arranged for the son by the father, who also provides the bride-price, the son has no alternative but to accept the match and the time arranged for the marriage. If he is to exercise individual choice and also assert his personality against the father, he could do so by kidnapping the woman he "loves" - love, among the Yörük, is denied a role in the arranging of marriages -, and similarly the woman could assert her individual choice by "eloping" for "love". Among the Kurds in Hakkari, affinity is a concern for inter-lineage and some times inter-tribal affairs. In the inter-tribal case, a woman given as compensation in a feud would mark the end of hostilities by two groups of people, sometimes numbering up to thousands of people. According to Bates (1973: 67), however, the Yörük do not believe in marriage as a means of settlement in situations of bloodshed. Although women as well as men in Hakkari are married according to the choice and preferences of the household head, their individual preferences, likes or dislikes are not totally overruled, nor the opinion of the other kin -the father's brother, sometimes even a sister's husband could influence the choice for a marriage. Keko, for example, (see his case history above), was among the chief initiators for the marriage of his wife Guli's sister to her FBS.

Among the Kurds of Hakkari, the beauty of a woman and being in love are frequently referred to as legitimate, if not strategically wise, reason for a particular choice. Women are 'allowed' to elope when their patrilineal kin know the relation between the couple and when the man is also kin or a close friend of her patrilineal kin. In another case, in an exchange marriage, one girl refused the match and insisted on the younger son, thus up setting the sibling order, but her choice was considered a normal right. In Yüksekova, there were frequent conflicts reported between mothers and daughters, such that a daughter would refuse to marry a particular cousin and threaten the mother (who usually but not always acts as a representative of the father's opinion) with elopement or sometimes suicide. Such young women certainly were under immense pressure, but to marry them against their will is generally recognized as a source of trouble in her future affinal household.

Other than the point about the actors' individual objectives, Bates' analysis suggests that kidnapping structurally contributes to dispersing affinal relation ships. Bates tries to resolve the disjunction between actors' behaviour, resulting from individual interests - he emphasizes that the utility of dispersed lines of kinship is not related to the actors' objectives (Bates,1974:284) - and the structural consequences, by adapting Sahlins' discussion of the ideology of unilineal descent, whereby "the ideology disguises or allows quite divergent behaviour, the recognition of which in the ideology would be disruptive."[71] As the actual political and economic relations among the Yörük are not so much between named descent groups, the weakness of the normative system is overcome by emphasizing the individual acts of aberration, whereby new patterns of alliances are formed and the disrupted relations normalized at the latest by the second generation.[72]

Bates' argument has, however, several weaknesses. The first point is related to the way individual choice is contrasted to the normative system. Since among the Yörük FBDs form the largest category among kidnapped wives, it is difficult to see individual choice as being outside the normative system. In Bates' description, when the Yörük marries his FBD as an arranged and approved marriage, he "acts out" the patrilineal ideology, but when a man kidnaps his FBD who may have been promised to another FBS, he is acting out an individual choice. It is possible, however, that in the second case, there is a structural and normative obligation too. The FBS is kidnapping the FBD **because** the norm gives him the right over the FBD and he is expected to exercise this right.

Secondly, Bates assumes that elopement is a clear indication of both the man and the woman's choices, where as kidnapping is only the man's choice. As has been shown above, the borderline between kidnapping and elopement is not always clear. The kidnappers tend to describe the act more like an elopement whereas the woman's agnates expect her to define it as kidnapping. The woman's opinion and behaviour is significant and open to speculation and manipulation. Following from this, women's position is deeply affected by these kidnapping or elopements. It gives women leverage in expressing independence but at the same time strengthens the ideological background for exercising control on women. Young women are continuously warned that they may be kidnapped by men and are not allowed to wander off alone. Even married or engaged women are not free from these threats. The limited recognition given to women for elopement in fact is a double-edged sword; she could be kidnapped entirely as a result of power games between men, HHs or lineages,[73] but still could be accused of elopement. In one of the polygyny cases described above, the second wife was kidnapped when she was already engaged but the kidnapper and some of his allies said she eloped. To conclude, the effects kidnapping and elopement have on women's position and gender roles should not be overlooked by emphasizing the apparent individual male/female choice but should be understood with in the larger context of power politics and aspects of male domination, especially their control of resources within the tribal system.

Summary

Marital status is an important part of adulthood in Hakkari. Concepts of the institution itself, the roles of husband and wife, and how it completes the personalities of each are linked to the ideology of gender roles, and to the tribal and Islamic belief systems. The change of status through marriage is emphasized more for women than men and the terminology reflects this change as well as the patrilocal residence; marrying is expressed as "bringing in a woman or wife."

The age and sibling order in marriage, similar to marrying with civil and/or religious ceremony, are factors which are determined contextually, and within the overall marriage strategies of households. Hence, a woman's age of marriage could be delayed due to her parental HH's labour needs, and she might marry with or without the civil ceremony depending on the relations between the two households and their relative status.

Polygyny, although not very often practised, is very important in the male biased ideology. It is seen as desirable for men and good for women, but its practice is problematic both because of female strategies against it and because it basically complicates the matters and relations of household management. Giving women into polygynous unions is undesirable within a tribe, especially between equal status households as it complicates the lines of affinity, rights over women and their children.

Marriage among kin and affines is a common practice within tribal groups. However, kin and affinal links are often cross-cutting and repeated across generations whereby persons can be defined through patrilateral and matrilateral lines simultaneously. The rate of patrilateral cousin marriage and of marriages with non-kin are similarly high. Although cousin marriage or within-the-tribe marriages indicate tribal endogamy, this is more an outcome of historical, ecological and residential factors, rather than an ideological position. Within the tribe, residential groups have mixed lineages and the rate of marriages within the village is lower than the rate of women marrying into or out of the village. Marrying women from outside one'own group is desirable and often implies a prestige marriage.

Direct wife or sister exchange is a common practice and locally interpreted as an alternative to bride price marriages. However, within tribes like the Oramarî, direct wife exchange occurs often despite the lack of and in accordance with the ideological devaluation of bride price. In Sisin one third of the total marriages resulted from direct exchange. Most of the exchange cases in Sisin were with households which are outside Sisin, and with which long term reciprocal, affinal and other social relations already exist or were desired.

Marriage payments consist of cash, goods and presents and vary across town-village, tribal-non-tribal dichotomies as well as through different socio-economic strata within tribes. Oramarî reject both bride-price and trousseau and hold this position as an issue of tribal identity and egalitarianism.

FBD marriage is held in high moral esteem and often practised, even if the term for FBD could be extended to cover a larger category of people than the "genealogical" cousins. The practice is best understood in Bourdieu's formulation, that it has multiple meanings and flexible usage, that it is a myth, a norm, a compulsory form, an ordinary marriage and a desired type at the same time. The multiplicity of its meanings allows for its practice in different contexts for different purposes.

Affinal status relations between wife-givers and wife-takers involve a higher status for the former on the basis of the "act of giving". This status, formally acted out in the wedding ceremony, is open to negotiation and reformulation through FBD, direct wife exchange and bride price marriages. Direct exchange and FBD marriages underplay the status inequality between wife-givers and wife-takers, and are frequently practised together in order to reinforce the tribal solidarity and equality. Bride-price and direct exchange however are not always convertible, nor do bride-price and status always match. Through bride price, wife-takers have a right to high status but how this status is recognized depends on the particularities of the social and economic household histories and the contextual factors, such as kidnapping, dispute settlement, forced marriage and the like.

Wife kidnapping and elopement are other marriage practices which have a specific role in male ideology and gender concepts. It is frequently a practice to challenge other men and other households or lineages, yet the unclear boundary between kidnapping and elopement perpetuates the ideological devaluation of women. It is neither an outcome of exercising individual choice nor has it the effect of structurally dispersing kin links as Bates has argued, but rather a prestige marriage, where men fulfil their "manhood" roles, by ostensibly giving the woman a choice, but infact reinforcing the system of female subordination.

Notes to Introduction

1. Yalçın, A. L., 1986. "Kinship and Tribal Organization in the Province of Hakkari, Southeast Turkey", Ph.D. Thesis, London.

2. See van Bruinessen, 1978:52-53, 56, 82, 89-91.

3. See, for example, Beşikçi (1969), Bates (1973), R.Tapper (1979).

4. See Beşikçi (1970:30,355) and Nikitine (1956:159-162).

5. The village was actually 45 minutes walk to the nearest motor road in summer. In winter, it took over an hour to the same point, but the motor road was often closed by heavy snowfall. In the winter of 1981, I once had to walk 7 hours till some vehicle could be found and the road was open. The road conditions are said to have improved in the last years. The village of Sisin has a motor road now, which sometimes gets closed due to heavy snowfall.

6. All village and personal names have been changed.

Notes to Chapter 1

1.Surnames are used generally for dealings with the bureaucracy; otherwise, men and women are known as the son or daughter of so and so.

2.These figures were given to me by Cihangir's sister's husband Haso in Sisin; his share seems exaggerated, and it may be his own exaggeration. However, I have no reason to suspect the people who were asked, even if the amounts maybe over or underestimated.

3.See Bailey, 1969:12-18.

Notes to Chapter 2

1. The nomads mostly had a warrior class (free of tax obligations) which called itself "*eşîr*" (tribal), whereas settled population paid taxes to the warrior class or their tribal chief.

2. For names of places in this chapter see Map 2.

3. I have used annotated and compiled copies of these two works: *Chèref-nâmeh, ou Fastes de la Nation Kurde*, written by Şeref Khan (1597), translated from the Persian original and edited by F. B. Charmoy (1868-1875), 2 vol.s and 4 parts, St. Petersbourg, and *Seyahatname* (Travel Notes) Turkish edition by T. Temelkuran and N. Aktaş (Üçdal Neşriyat), Istanbul, 1976. A summary of *Chèref-nâmeh* is in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* (1981) "Kurds, Kurdistan" vol. 5, pp.458-461.

4. Abū'l Faraj was an Assyrian historian who lived circa 1200. See Sevgen, 1982:22, 138, 140.

5. Sevgen was an officer in the gendarmerie forces and served in many parts of Turkey. He has published historical studies on Kurds, Kurdish principalities in 1968-71 in a Turkish journal of history (*BTTD*). After his death, his articles were published together as a book by T.K.A.E. (Institute for Research into Turkish Culture), but with many alterations. The editors of the book must have found Sevgen's "nationalism" not strong enough, so that they changed (rather arbitrarily) the words like "Kurdish nationalist" into "separatist" or "Kurd" into "Turkish Kurd" (*Türkkürdü*) without any warning or reference to the original. See for example, Sevgen's TKAE edition (1982:171): "Ubeydullah was both a *shaikh* and wanted to divide the Turkish Kurds (*Türk kürtleri*)." The original in Sevgen, *BTTD*, no.24, 1969: 41 is as follows: "Ubeydullah was both a *shaikh* and an extremist Kurdish nationalist (*müfrit Kürt milliyetperveri*)." A few other examples are :"local people" in the original *BTTD*, no:24, 1969:42, and "Turkish Kurds" in the recent TKAE 1982:173; or "rebellious Kurds" in the original *BTTD*, no:20, 1969:66, and "Turkish Kurds" in the recent TKAE 1982:140.

6. This of course increases the possibility of bias as well!

7. See for example Evliya's (1976:1227) description of how Hakkari's tribesmen fight using their shoes as shields!

8. See H. Bobek (1938) "Forschungen im Zentralkurdischen Hochgebirge zwischen Van und Urmia-see", in *Petermanns Geographische Mitteilungen*, pp.152-162, 215-228.

9. As a general and fairly consistent rule the Turkish writers were ex-mayors, gendarmerie officers, or military doctors; the British were primarily military and political advisers, missionaries, diplomats, similar to the French, Italian or Russian writers.

10. Foreign and Turkish travellers alike had many romantic ideas about "wild" Kurds as well as some practical advice for better administration.

11. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p.3306.

12. Nikitine, "Shamdinan" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (1936) vol.4, p.303.

13. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p.3307.

14. *Encyclopedia of Islam* (1981), "Kurds, Kurdistan", p. 447.

15. Nikitine, "Shamdinan" in *E.I.* (1936), p.303.

16. Yonan, 1978:12.

17. For more on Nestorians see Badger, G. P. *The Nestorians and their Rituals*, 2 vols. London, 1852; Grant, A. *The Nestorians; or the Lost Tribes*, New York, 1845; Joseph, J. *The Nestorians and their Muslim Neighbours*, Princeton N.J., 1961.

18. He was a Kurdish historian from Jazirat Ibn ‘Umar (Cezire today) according to Vanly, 1973:6, ff.6.

19. "...al-Zawzan began at two days journey from Mosul and stretched to the borders of Khilat (Ahlat today, see Map 2): on the Azarbayjan side it extended to Salmas," quoted in *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.450. *Zawzan* is similar to *zozan* which means pasture in Kurdish.

20. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds, Kurdistan", p.451.

21. ‘Adūd al-Dawla, a ruler of the Buyid dynasty in Bagdad (see van Bruinessen, 1978:156; *E.I.* 1981:451-52), started an expedition against the Kurds of Hakkari and promised amnesty if they surrendered without further fighting. The people of Hakkari turned in their leaders expecting them to be pardoned but instead they were crucified for five miles along the routes from Mosul to Malatya.

22. "The Oğuz of Urmiyeh went into Hakkari, a dependency of Mosul, and ravaged the country, but while they were involved in the mountains the Kurds attacked them, killed 1500 men and took many prisoners and much booty." in *E.I.* 1981:453, quoting from Ibn al-Athīr's *Kamil*. See also *Y.A.*, p.3309.

23. See Nikitine (1956:2-17) for a summary of various theories.

24. Nikitine, 1956:17. See also *E.I.*, 1981:449.

25. Yazidis lived mostly in the neighbouring provinces of Hakkari. On the Yazidi religion and the Kurds see Nikitine 1956:225-233. On the Yazidis see also Müller (1967).

26. Nikitine (1956:26-27, ff.2) reports the following mythical story about the serpent and Prophet Noah: when Noah's ship had a hole the serpent lent its old skin to cover the leak after Noah's promise for human flesh. When the ship landed (on a mountain west of Hakkari in Yazidi and some Kurdish beliefs) the serpent asked for the promised flesh. Noah in despair and not knowing what to do called Archangel Gabriel who told him to kill the serpent. After killing it Noah was to burn it and blow away its ashes. When he did so, the ashes instead of being blown away all fell on the ground and became to Noah's horror millions of little insects and bugs at his feet. Thus Noah had fulfilled his promise despite himself; the ashes which became flees, lice, etc. feed on humans.

27. See Nikitine in *E.I.* (1936) "Oramar", p.992; Nikitine, 1956:249-50; and Dickson, 1910:375. The story briefly is that a saint called Mari Mamu had charmed the serpents, shut them in a cave, on top of which a church, in Oramar, Hakkari, was built. There lived a Nestorian family who had the guardianship of the stone which covered the cave; they survived among the muslim Kurds with this right. Dickson noted that "if the right of guardian is dispossessed the snakes will get out and the *Ziaret* (holy shrine) will lose its power for healing snake and dog-bites, stings of scorpions, flees, etc." This is an interesting allusion to the story of Noah and the serpent above in note 26.

28. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.449; Nikitine, 1956:17-18.

29. See M. Sykes (1908) "The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire", *JRAI*, 38, pp.470-71.

30. Minorsky in *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.454.

31. *Y.A.* pp.3309-3310; *E.I.* (1981), p.454.

32. *E.I.* (1981), p.454.

33. See van Bruinessen's (1978:160, ff.32) discussion and examples of native or outsider leaders and commoners.

34. Sevgen, N. "Hakkari Beyliği" in *BTTD*, no:20 (1968), p. 64; *Y.A.* p.3310; also *E.I.* (1981) p.454.

35. Sevgen (1968:64), *E.I.* "Kurds" (1981) p.455. The Ayyubīds were a dynasty of Kurdish origin, in whose forces the Turks were in the majority, but there were also Kurds among the civil and military personnel. See *E.I.* (1981), pp.454-55, also the article "Ayyubīds" in *E.I.*

36. Sevgen, 1968:64-65.

37. Minorsky in *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.455.

38. Ibid., also *Y.A.* p.3310.

39. Ibid., p.456.

40. Probably the tribe Zerza as it is known today, which lives in Şemdinli, subdistrict of Hakkari and in Iran.

41. Today the name Gewer applies to the plain of Yüksekova, the town itself is known as Diza/Yüksekova.

42. Zibarî today live south of the border of Hakkari, along the Turkish Iraqi border, in Iraq.

43. This confirms the view that the tribe Hakkari lived south of the region known by the same name but moved north sometime in the 14th century.

44. This is a very inexact description, but the Dumbulî are mentioned in later records as having ruled Hakkari, thus I take it they were living on Hakkari's mountains. Van Bruinessen (1978:176) says they originate from Cezire.

45. For the list and genealogy of rulers and a chronology of events in Hakkari, see Appendix I.

46. *Y.A.* p.3310.

47. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.459; *Chèref-nâmeh*, T.I, p.114.

48. *Y.A.* p.3310.

49. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.456; see van Bruinessen (1978: 161-63) on the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu Türkmen dynasties and Kurdistan.

50. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.457.

51. See Sevgen, 1969:78; *Y.A.* p.3310; van Bruinessen, 1978:175.

52. It is not clear from the primary sources whether he was a descendant of Izzeddin Şîr I, but secondary sources say he belonged to the same family.

53. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.459; *Chèref-nâmeh* T.I, p.118.

54. According to a theory based on popular sayings, Izzeddin Şîr II refused to fight the invading army of Akkoyunlus saying it was Şembî (Saturday or Wednesday, not clear; in Kurdish, however, Şembî is Saturday) and thus not a prosperous day and was killed. (Chèref-nâmeh, p. 120; Sevgen, 1969:66) His descendants and tribe thus were called Şembû. Nikitine however links the name Şembû to Şemseddin, a Kurdish prince who might also have given his name to Şemdinli, a sub-district of Hakkari. See Nikitine in *E.I.* (1936) "Shemdinan", p.306.

55. See note 44 above.

56. *Chèref-nâmeh*, Tome I, p.118.

57. Minorsky in *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.457.

58. This is interesting because the Shiite Safavids were leading bloody campaigns against most of the Sunni Kurdish *beyliks*, and they replaced the Kurdish chieftains with their own men as governors. See van Bruinessen (1978:163-68) on Safavid policies concerning Kurds; also *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.457.

59. The similarity to the European type of feudal organization exists here in at least one aspect; mainly the reinforcement of powers of the Kurdish nobility with the new titles provided by the Ottoman Sultan. Other aspects of the feudal structure, whether they existed in Kurdistan, at what period and to what degree could not be discussed here. There is an on-going debate however about the "feudal" structures in the Ottoman system and in particular in relation to the Kurdish principalities. See van Bruinessen's (1978:183-184) comparison of the Ottoman *timar* system to west European feudalism. He points to some major differences but emphasizes that "at times of weak central government the system tended to transgress its written rules ... remarkably approached its western European counterpart ... especially so in Kurdistan." (p.184)

60. van Bruinessen, 1978:171; see also *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds" p.457. See historical studies such as Inalcık (1973), Lewis (1961) and Shaw & Shaw (1976) for the administrative organization in the Ottoman Empire.

61. van Bruinessen, 1978:171-72.

62. Either in Şemdinli or near Culamerg; there are two villages with this name in Hakkari. Minorsky (in *E.I.*, 1981, p.460) thinks it was the one in Şemdinli, although I received information to the contrary during my stay. I could not visit either village.

63. Sevgen in *BTTD* "Hakkari Beyliği", no.20 (1968), pp.67-68, no.21, pp.63-64; *Chèref-nâmeh* Tome I, 2e partie, pp.124-28.

64. van Bruinessen's account of Zeynel's rule (1978:177-8) is slightly different in details and in the sequence of events. I believe mine is a more accurate chronology since it is based not only on Chèref-nâmeh but also Sevgen's study of the Ottoman documents, the correspondance between Zeynel, the Porte and *beylerbeyi* at the time.

65. *Chèref-nâmeh*, Tome I, p.128: "ce prince s'occupa, en vertu de ce *firman*, à regir et à gouverner ce pays avec un pouvoir absolu, et son règne dura près de quarante ans."

66. The Zeynel affair could of course be interpreted as a case of power politics, where the existence of different interests leads to shifting alliances and allegiance. However, the point I try to emphasize here is the vulnerability of his position and the processes which are activated to legitimize the authority of his office. As far as the historical sources are concerned (and we should remember that much of history reflects the rulers' point of view, especially in this case here), it seems that the sources for legitimizing the authority of the *mîr* were undefined and the position holder could be challenged easily.

67. Minorsky (in *E.I.*, 1981:457) cites historical sources which maintain that for those provinces which became *hükümet*s the hereditary dynasties had the right of transmitting power direct from father to son.

68. *Chèref-nâmeh*, Tome I, p.127.

69. See for example Adela Khanum's story in Jaba (1860:27-30) from the 19th century. Soane (1912), Edmonds (1957) and Hansen (1961) all mention Lady Adela of Jaf tribe, Osman Pasha's widow who ruled with her sons and negotiated with the British Political Officers. Nikitine (1956:99) mentions Shaikh M. Siddik's widow Meryem Khanum as having considerable authority in politics.

70. *Chèref-nâmeh*, Tome I, p.130.

71. Ibid., p.130. "Une somme de 100,000 ducats (Floury) (فلوری) a titre de redevance (تقبد , impot volontaire) au divan Ottoman."

72. Sevgen, "Hakkari Beyliği" in *BTTD*, no.23, (1969), p.69. See also van Bruinessen (1978:189-194) on the application of Ottoman administrative organization in Kurdistan.

73. Van Bruinessen (1978:190) points out the districts which were called *hükümet* "did not pay tribute to the central treasury, nor did they perform any form of regular military service (no *sipahi*s ... no fiefs)." Yet Evliya calls Pinyanişî a *hükümet* claiming at the same time that there were fiefs and military service in the district.

74. *Seyahatname*, p.1226-27.

75. Ibid., p.1301.

76. van Bruinessen, 1978:190-91.

77. *Seyahatname*, p.1227.

78. The *Sipahi* was basically a tribal cavalry, was granted land for its military services. Not all the members of the military class received such grants, like the *kapıkulları* (literally sultan's slaves) and *yeniçeri*s (janissaries), and some members of the military class were obtained from the *devşirme* system, i.e. they were Christian peasants' children educated within the palace. *Sipahi*s had to maintain a number of cavalrymen (*jebelu*) depending on the revenue he had from his land (fief). See van Bruinessen's summary (1978:181-89).

79. *Seyahatname*, p.1227. For a summary of land titles and taxation see van Bruinessen, 1978:182-87.

80. *Seyahatname*, p.1228. Van Bruinessen has drawn my attention to the fact that the division of Hakkari's tribes into left and right blocs resembles the division in the Ottoman army into left and right wings. This I consider a possible origin for the present division, yet Evliya reports that Pinyanişî soldiers were themselves divided along the wings on the front ranks. See *Seyahatname*, p.1228. Today Pinyanişî belong to the right and Ertuşî to the left group of tribes.

81. Nikitine, in *E.I.* (1936) "Nestorians", p.904.

82. One of the pioneers was Father Garzoni who spent 18 years in ‘Amadiya as a Dominican priest and wrote the first detailed grammar of Kurdish in a European language, Italian, in 1780s.

83. Niebuhr in 1780 quoted by Vanly, 1973:47.

84. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.462; van Bruinessen, 1978:221.

85. See van Bruinessen, 1978:222-28 for the emirate of Botan (Cezire) and Bedirkhan Beg; also Sevgen, "Botan Beyliği" in *BTTD*, 1969.

86. Sevgen (1969:69) thinks that Bedirkhan had no intention of rebelling but he suffered under bad administration at the time, and the intrigues of the governor in Mosul. Van Bruinessen (1978:226, ff.149) comments that Bedirkhan was later interpreted as having had nationalist intentions.

87. Quoted in van Bruinessen, 1978:226.

88. Ibid., pp.226-27. It is worth noting here that the Nestorians were divided among themselves as well. Some Nestorian tribes were allied to one confederation of Hakkari's Kurdish tribes, the others to the rival Kurdish tribal confederation. There also seems to have been a conflict between the Nestorian religious authority of Mar Shimun and that of their non-religious hereditary chiefs, the *melek/maliks*. Some Nestorian tribes who were allied to the Ertuşî Kurdish tribal confederation also had a say in choosing the *mîr* of Hakkari and did not pay taxes to the *mîr*. See Badger, 1852, vol.I, pp.190,258.

89. Mar Shimun took refuge with Rev. Badger who had been sent in 1842 to help the Assyrians. (See Heazell and Margoliuth, 1913:6) Badger's survey (1852:392) of the Christian population in Hakkari before they were massacred or fled the area, although very detailed in terms of covering each village, seems to be exaggerated considering the region's physical conditions. This is more surprising considering that Rev. Badger, too, found the number provided by Mar Shimun exaggerated; he says he reduced the numbers one third throughout. I found it impossible to believe the number of Christian families said to have lived in Sisin which is about 4 times more than now. There is land shortage now, and the environment cannot sustain a population 4 times larger.

90. Sevgen, 1969:77. Ertuşî is an important tribe with many sub-tribes. It probably was a tribal confederation earlier.

91. Ibid., pp.86-88.

92. The Ottoman Porte obviously did not want to use force immediately on Bedirkhan because they were worried about British and French influence in the area and their protection of Christians. Also they did not want to have all the Kurds allied to Bedirkhan rebels as well. See Sevgen's (1969:82-90) documents.

93. This father's brother's son Süleyman Beg was probably Nurullah's rival and he was the subject of some rumours about a Nestorian plot to overthrow Nurullah for Süleyman, before Nurullah's attack on the Nestorians in 1843. (Badger, 1852:261-62).

94. *Dağî* means in Turkish those of/belonging to the mountain, implying the rebel who hides in the mountains.

95. *Reaya* means "subject peasantry", thus a *reaya* village would consist of peasants who cultivate the land for the owner of the village.

96. In 1843 a commission with delegates of four powers (Russia, Great Brittain, Ottoman and Persian Empires) was formed to settle the Turco-Persian border and other issues. A treaty was signed only in 1847 while the Nurullah affair was going on. See Edmonds, 1957: 130.

97. Sevgen (1982:166) points out that the Ottoman government gave much importance to this affair, probably because of the delicate relations with Iran at the time. The affair was presented to the Sultan and discussed in the Ottoman cabinet.

98. It is interesting to note here that the British diplomats protested vigorously against Bedirkhan for his massacre of Nestorians but gave refuge to his accomplice Nurullah when he defied the Ottoman administration.

99. Jaba, A. (1860), *Recueil de notices et rècits kourdes* St.Petersbourg. Jaba was the Russian Consul in Erzurum in 1856s, knew Kurdish and collected stories and customs of the Kurds.

100. See Jaba, 1860:27-30, 52-56, 68-71.

101. Nikitine (1922), (1925a), (1925b), (1926-28), (1956); Nikitine and Soane (1923-25); Sevgen (1968-70); Erdost (1968); van Bruinessen (1978) and various travellers and missionaries who were in the area in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

102. For an annotated genealogy of Sadatê Nehrî, see Appendix II.

103. Yonan, 1978:22. A. Grant published a book called *Ten Lost Tribes* in 1841 where he argued that the racial origins of the Nestorians go back to the first Christian tribes.

104. Ainsworth, W. F. (1842), *Travels and researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Armenia.* 2 vols. London. He was sent by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.

105. Blau, 1858:596. "So sinken alle diese Stämme, die einen durch Verwilderung und Entsittlichung, wie die Dschelali und Melanly, die andern durch gezwungene Ansiedelung und Verschmelzung mit andern Nationalitäten, wie die Haideranly und Schakaki, seit der Lostrennung von ihren Stammverwandten mehr und mehr zur Stufe einer unterjochten, ihrer Nationalität entkleideten, ihrer Selbständigkeit beraubten Mischbevölkerung herab, und es kann nicht fehlen, daß das von der türkischen Regierung den Kurden gegenüber befolgte System mehr und mehr dahin wirken wird, sie ganz zu absorbieren, da hier nicht die Schranke, die sich sonst im Osmanenreiche der Verschmelzung der Racen so schroff entgegenstellt, die Religion, dazwischen tritt. Ist doch neuerdings sogar das Gebiet der ungebändigten Hekkjaris zur türkischen Provinz geworden, der Chef der Hekkjaris, Hadschi Ahmet von Baschkalaa, zum Pascha erhoben und sein Gaubereich mit Steuereinnehmern aus der Reihe der stambuler Effendis beschickt worden."

106. Blau, 1862:611. "Endlich ist in dieser Beziehung zu bemerken, daß viele Kurdenstämme, welche innerhalb des türkischen Reichs angesiedelt sind, ihre alte Stammverfassung ganz aufgegeben haben und gar nicht mehr unter eigenem Namen in der Liste der Staatskalenders als عشيرت figurieren, sondern höchstens den Kreisen, in welchen sie wohnen, den Namen gelassen haben."

107. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.462.

108. Nikitine, 1956:194; *Y.A.*, p.3311.

109. Yonan, 1978:23. Also Cuinet, (1891-94), p.731. For the accounts and correspondance of the missionaries see Heazell and Margoliuth (1913).

110. *Y.A.*, p.3311.

111. Van Bruinessen (1978:328-29) also gives a good summary of Shaikh Ubeydullah's revolt.

112. Nikitine (1956:194) agrees to the nationalist intentions of Shaikh Ubeydullah. See Eagelton (1963:5-7) for the relations between Ubeydullah and the American missionaries in Urmiyeh.

113. *Y.A.*, p.3311.

114. There are numerous works which refer to Abdulhamid's policies and the tribal corps. I used mainly Duguid, S. (1973), "The politics of unity: Hamidian policy in eastern Anatolia" *MES*, 9/2:139-156, and Kodaman, B. (1979) "Hamidiye hafif süvari alayları" *IÜEF Tarih Dergisi*, no.32, pp.427-480.

115. Tribal unit names from Başkale include names of some tribes from two *kaza*s (Mahmudî and Elbak) of Hakkari which are north of Hakkari today and belong to Van. Among them Şikeftî is the only one which has branches in Hakkari today. In Mardin (west of Hakkari) Ertuşî is also listed as in the Hamidiye corps. This must be a branch of the Ertuşî federation. See Kodaman, 1979: 468. From 9 out of 11 *kaza*s of Hakkari then, there were no tribal Hamidiye units.

116. Kodaman, 1979:437 (my translation). Abdülhamid's policy was to form the tribal corps from "weak, loyal, obedient and sunni tribes" (Ibid., p.448), so the lack of Hakkari's main tribes among the corps and the use of strategems for them is significant.

117. The *shaikh* Dickson met in Şemdinli could have been both the son of Shaikh Ubeydullah (M. Siddik) or his grandson S. Taha II. It is not clear from his reference which one he was, however.

118. Wigram and Heazell report the stealing of sheep, burning hay stacks, asking for extra taxes other than those paid to the *shaikh* as common methods of putting pressure on Nestorian peasants. See Heazell & Margoliuth, 1913:126,129,139.

119. *Y.A.*, p.3314.

120. *E.I.* (1981) "Kurds", p.462.

121. Dickson (1910:370) mentions *shaikhs* of Barzan, Bamarni and Şemdinli as rivals. For an entertaining account of this rivalry, see Nikitine & Soane (1923-25) "The tale of Suto and Tato" in *BSOS*, III, pp.69-106.

122. He was one of the founders of "Kurd Teali ve Terakki Cemiyeti" (Society for the elevation and progress of Kurdistan) and publisher of *Hetavî Kurd* ("Kurdish Sun", a Kurdish journal), but the rivalry between him and the Bedirkhan family helped the suppression of both activities. See van Bruinessen, 1978:370; Nikitine, 1956:195-6.

123. He wrote a letter to Nikitine asking for Russian-Kurdish cooperation against the Turks. See Nikitine, 1956:195.

124. See Edmonds (1957) and Hay (1921). Sayyid Taha II met Hay in 1920 in Arbil; Hay was very impressed and he felt "like some inexperienced novice arguing with a Socrates." (Hay, 1921:353)

125.Yonan, 1978:37; *E.I.* (1936) "Nestorians", p.904.

126. See van Bruinessen, 1983:382.

127. *Y.A.*, p.3314.

128. *E.I.* (1936) "Nestorians", p.904.

129. Ibid., p.904; also *Y.A.*, p.3314.

130. Ibid.

131. Today, the end of Russian occupation is officially celebrated in Yüksekova and Hakkari. On such a day, when I was watching the soldiers' performance, I found out, to my surprise, that some of the audience thought the "enemy", then, to have been the Greeks! I had not expected the teachings of the Turkish nationalist history to be so effective among the Kurds.

132. They had been organized into troops as tribes by the Russians. See Yonan, 1978:38.

133. For this period the books and memoirs of Political Officers in Iraq are interesting documents on the British understanding of and attitude towards the Kurdish problem. See Hay (1921) and Edmonds (1957).

134. For an excellent analysis and description of the revolt, see van Bruinessen, 1978:353-404.

135. *Y.A.*, p.3315. Hakkari's Nestorians were settled in some refugee camps in northern Iraq and Syria under British and French protection, but after some disturbances there too, they migrated mostly to America and Britain. See also Tunçay, 1981:110-12.

136. Suto Agha, see the story of Suto and Tato in Nikitine & Soane (1923-25).

137. Goloğlu, M. Üçüncü Meşrutiyet, (1968-72), pp.88-89. See also van Bruinessen, 1978:376.

138. FO 371, 1928, E5046/112/65.

139. FO 371, 1928, E399/112/65.

140. See N. Zaza (1982:56-57) and Kendal in Chaliand (ed.) (1978:97-102).

141. *Vatan* gazetesi, "Hakkari ilavesi", 5/11/1952, quoting the *kaymakam* of Şemdinli at the time of Oramar rebellion.

142. See *Cumhuriyet* daily, 18/7/78, 20/6/78, 21/6/78.

143. See the Turkish papers from 28/5/1983 to 13/7/1983.

144. See *Guardian* and *The Times* daily, 28/5/1983.

145. See *Cumhuriyet* daily, 28/11/1989.

146. See *2000'e Doğru*, 13-19 Aralık 1987, no.51.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3291.

2. In 1980 there were rumours in Yüksekova that some local tribal leaders were trying to prevent the project from starting as the lands that would have been dried out were to be sold to landless peasants at low prices. This would have caused changes in the power structures based on land ownership on the fertile plain.

3. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3297.

4. Ibid., p. 3298. The table below shows 1965 figures for the percentages of cultivable land in Hakkari's 6 sub-districts, divided into various usage categories:

Subdistricts	Gardens	Pastures	Forests	Fields	Total
Hakkari (central subdistrict)	0.2 %	82.4 %	8.6 %	8.8 %	100 %
Beytüşşebab	-	78.7 %	17.5 %	3.8 %	100 %
Çukurca	-	40.9 %	53.5 %	5.6 %	100 %
Şemdinli	-	50.1 %	46.0 %	3.9 %	100 %
Uludere	0.6 %	40.7 %	51.8 %	6.9 %	100 %
Yüksekova	-	76.5 %	11.8 %	12.0 %	100 %

(Source: *Köy Envanter Etüdlerine göre Hakkari*, 1969, Ankara.)

5. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3333.

6. This was especially so after the "underdevelopment" of Hakkari had been made a target of political and mass media campaigns in the late 1970s, after which there was a concerted breakthrough effort to build suspension bridges on the river Zab and village roads in Şemdinli.

7. Two examples are from the Yüksekova subdistrict: the state road to Dağlıca was planned to be finished by 1980 but due to various political pressures the share of the road from the provincial budget was cut down and the condition of the road under construction deteriorated continuously until its completion in 1983. Another example concerns a provincial road; a village trader was able to employ the municipality's work force and machines to extend the road close to his house. This he did under the protection of the local paramount *agha* and the blind eye of the head of YSE.

8. The Turkish Metereological Institute's 1974 report on the climate in Hakkari, the central town, and Yüksekova shows that the highest and lowest temperatures in Yüksekova were -37.5 and 34.9 degrees Celsius and in Hakkari, the central town, -22.6 and 38.8 degrees Celsius. The average rainfall in that year was 580.2 mm. in Yüksekova and 791.7 mm. in Hakkari. The average number of days under snow was 130.3 in Yüksekova and 102.5 in Hakkari.

9. See Tunçdilek, 1967:124-29; Aydın, 1980:146; Hütteroth 1982:291. See also Tunçdilek (1974) "Types of rural settlement and their characteristics" in Benedict & Tümertekin (ed.s) *Turkey: Geographic and Social Perspectives*, Leiden, pp. 48-70.

10. See Tunçdilek 1967:129-32; Beşikçi 1969:42-44. Hütteroth (1982:291) refers to *kom* as a Kurdish name for animal fold. *Kom* in Hakkari was a one room house as defined above, same as in Tunçdilek and Beşikçi. It was probably used more frequently in the past, but now only in cases of absolute necessity.

11. See Hütteroth (1973) for a description of different types of pasture camp settlements of nomads and semi-nomads in eastern Turkey and the Middle East.

12. This number shows the village *muhtarlıks* and not any smaller units outside the municipal boundaries of sub-district centres. See Table 3, p. 4 in *1980 Hakkari Population Census Results*.

13. Ibid,, Table 1, p. 3.

14. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, Table 15, p. 3335.

15. Ibid., p. 3336. In the last five years or so there has been a new reason for migration; with the escalation of terror and insecurity in the region and frequent unfair treatment by the government, many villagers have begun to sell their property and migrate to large cities in the south and west of Turkey.

16. The Iraqi Kurdish refugee wave of 1988 is the largest refugee flow into the area. The situation of the refugees, their legal and social problems are still unresolved in Turkey. See M. A. Aslan (1988).

17. Age group distribution in Hakkari and Turkey.

	Hakkari		Turkey	
Age groups	1950	1980	1950	1980
0 - 14	44.4 %	50.4 %	41.2 %	38.5 %
15 - 65	51.4 %	47.1 %	55.2 %	56.6 %
65+	4.1 %	2.1 %	3.6 %	4.6 %
Total	99.9 %	99.6 %	100 %	99.7 %

(Source: *DIE 1980 Örnekleme Sonuçları*, Table 1, p. 1, *DIE 1980 Hakkari Sonuçları*, Table 5, pp. 8-11, *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, Şekil 5, p. 3301)

18. *DIE 1980 Hakkari Sonuçları*, Table 33, p. 78.

19. See for example I. Beşikçi's article "Doğu Anadolu'da Göçebe Kürtler" (Nomadic Kurds in eastern Turkey) in *Forum* 1/11/1967, no.324, p. 16. He also pointed out the new trend of people demonstrating a willingness to learn Turkish, register births and send sons to the military. See also Beşikçi (1970:167) where he refers to Z. Gökalp's earlier findings on nomadic Kurdish tribes, that the nomads did not register their sons in order for them to avoid military service.

20. See *Hakkari İl Yıllığı* 1973, pp. 123-26.

21. See for example, *Doğu ve Güneydoğu İlleri Sosyal Yapı Araştırması,* DPT Yayını, Ankara, 1974.

22. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3343. Some figures about the health services in Hakkari and Turkey are given below:

Table 1. Number of hospital beds and its ratio to population in Hakkari and Turkey.

	Year	No. of hospital bed	Person/Bed
Hakkari	1980	60	2,591
Turkey	1980	99,117	491

(Source: *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, Table 26, p. 3343.)

Table 2. Number of doctors and its ratio to population in Hakkari and Turkey.

	Year	No. of doctors (Practitioner+Specialist)	Population/doctor
Hakkari	1980	29	5,282
Turkey	1980	27,241	1,642

(Source: *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, Table 27, p. 3343.)

A comparison of the provinces of Tunceli, Bingöl and Van in eastern Anatolia with similar population sizes and densities to Hakkari (Hakkari's 1980 population size:155,463 and density:16), yields the following figures:

	Pop. size	Pop. density	No. doctors	Pop./doctors
Tunceli	157,974	18	53	2,980
Bingöl	228,702	26	38	6,018
Van	468,646	24	106	4,421

(Source: *Türkiye Istatistik Yıllığı 1983.*)

23. A medical team visiting villages to vaccinate the children could not reach the village where I was staying because of time shortage and distance. I later volunteered to learn how to vaccinate children and was given (mostly outdated) vaccine from Yüksekova's health centre to use in the village over a period of two months.

24. This type of traditional medical knowledge was available to both men and women. Women only, however, could become mid-wives and often they monopolized the expertise on traditional treatment of women's illnesses, infertility and the like.

25. Van Bruinessen (1978:267) mentions the healing power of Kurdish *shaikhs*, who sometimes used herbal medicine but does not mention healers who were **not** *shaikhs* or *sayyids*. Healing power did not seem to be under the monopoly of holy people in Hakkari, although some melas and *shaikhs* were said to have such extra-ordinary powers.

26. See van Bruinessen (1978), Chapter IV, pp. 254-55, 257-58, 267-68, on the power of Kurdish *shaikhs*, *sayyids*, and *melas*. See also Nikitine (1926-28:126-28) and Nikitine and Soane (1923-25).

27. See Eickelman 1981:242, for a picture of the inner side of *muska*, the script. Hansen (1961) has pictures of Kurdish *muskas*. See also Beyazidî (Rudenko) (1963) who describes the occasions for writing *nivişt*.

28. Unfortunately I saw this *Mela* only on his death bed on a visit to him with a group of villagers. There was a surgeon doctor from the commando unit there the day I visited and the *mela* was connected to a serum drip. He died a few days later.

29. See M. E. Bozarslan's (1979) stories on Kurdish beliefs in the supernatural, the power of *muşka* and the *jinns*, in his book *Meyro*: "Ji Me Çêtira" (Invisible Spirits), pp. 21-24, and "Tabirr" (The Malaria Amulet), pp. 42-48. See also Nikitine (1956:244-47) and M. Beyazidî (Rudenko)(1963:27-28), who mention visits to *shaikhs* or *ziarets* for treatment of illnesses.

30. I was told that pregnant or weaning women were especially prone to the danger of being possessed by *jinns* (evil spirits). There were tales about fictive persons who were possessed by them but on no occasion did I meet or hear about a real person who was thought to be possessed by *jinns*.

31. See note 29 above.

32. Hakkari's illiteracy figures compared to three other provinces of eastern Anatolia with similar population sizes and densities are given below:

1975 illiteracy percentages (population 6 years of age and over).

	Total %	Male %	Female %
Hakkari	73.8	59.1	91.8
Tunceli	44.6	30.4	58.9
Bingöl	53.1	40.8	67.3
Van	68.3	54.1	84.2

(Source: *DIE Türkiye Istatistik Yıllığı 1983*, Table 31, p. 46.)

33. *Köy Envanter Etüdleri 1969 Hakkari*, Table 40. The results are based on sample data.

34. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3339-3340.

35. Within the last couple of years the educational system has been further negatively affected due to attacks on schools and teachers by some of the Kurdish separatist groups. Only insufficiently qualified assistant teachers, who are also from the region themselves, are now teaching in village schools. See *Cumhuriyet* Daily, "Doğulu öğretmen Doğu'ya", 3.10.89; "PKK korkusu", 3.12.89; " Güneydoğu'da eğitim sancısı",17.12.1989.

36. *DPT 1974*, pp. 90-91. The target of the state policy was "a school for each village." However, when the settlement units smaller than *muhtarlık* villages are counted as well, the percentage of rural settlement units with schools are only 13 % of the total (Turkey) number. (*Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3340.)

37. *DPT 1974*, pp. 101-102.

38. Ibid., p. 99.

39. See Beşikçi, 1970:400-404.

40. See chapter 5 on household development and devolution. Adoption or giving away one's own children for care was rare in Hakkari.

41. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3329.

42. *Yurt Ansiklopedisi*, p. 3328.

43. See *DIE Hakkari 1980*, Table 21, pp. 44-49. In the classification of data pastoralism or husbandry is not mentioned. Agriculture, hunting, fishing, and forestry are put together as one category. Thus one could wrongly assume that there was no husbandry in Hakkari. Secondly, as the trade of livestock is predominantly outside the national market, the people who engage in this trade define their profession (especially when asked by officials) as peasants or agriculturalists (*rençber* in Turkish and Kurdish)!

44. See Beşikçi (1970).

45. Beşikçi, 1970:166-170 and 199-207. The attitude of the government seen over a longer period of time gives the impression that the policies are tactical and do not necessarily reflect the military's inability or lack of funds and equipment to control the borders.

46. Beşikçi, 1970:168-170.

47. The goods ranged from horseshoe nails to women's clothing material, scarves and jewelry.

48. The villagers of Sisin were famous for their conservatism and caution, and should not be taken as the most "typical" case. They were jokingly referred to as having helped a trader from Siirt to become rich enough to go to Hajj, and that his successor, another "Siirtli" (no relation to the previous one), was pursuing the same end.

49. *Peshmerge* (Kurdish freedom fighters) as well as the Turkish gendarmerie were claimed to exact charge for allowing the herds across the borders. In autumn 1981, the smugglers said they paid 400 TL. to the Turkish gendarmerie and another 400 TL. to the Kurdish *peshmerges* in Iraq per two sheep. (In 1981 one Sterling was about 250 TL.)

50. See Beşikçi (1970:206): "Along the borders there is barter trade between people with kin, family, tribe and *tariqa* links and with the dynamic effect of these links the concept of a political border exist only on paper .... Thus there is no commercial goal here." (my translation)

51. Wealthy tribal members invoke tribal solidarity to impose restrictions on poorer members in using various smuggling roads and warn against any cooperation with military authorities who try to encourage villagers to inform on those smugglers and smugglers' routes.

52. The one in Yüksekova was not functioning to full capacity (until 1983), its prices were low, it did not buy all the animals (no goats for example), and there was a rumour that bribery and corruption were common when the animals were weighed and selected for buying.

53. All these reasons are in fact known and listed by the state authorities. See the manual prepared by the Ministry of Interior Affairs for the civil administrators appointed to the eastern and southeastern provinces, *Doğu ve güney doğu Anadolu'nun Genel Durumu* (Meslekî Rehber), Ankara, 1972, pp. 420-1.

54. In a copy of the minutes of one committee meeting in 1982 the items above were listed. The committee also decided on how much of each good/household should be exempt from the obligation to declare. For example, for a household of 8-12 people up to 20 sheep, 20 goats and 3 tins of butter were permitted.

Notes to Chapter 4

1. See R. Tapper, 1983:10.

2. This hypothetical situation is not that far removed from reality; one need only recall the recent history of this border region where there has been consider able population movement due to wars, rebellions, famines or economic reasons.

3. Blau (1862). See also, Chapter 2, note 106.

4. See van Bruinessen (1978) Chapter III, "Tribes and the State", especially the concluding pp. 244-48.

5. See also, van Bruinessen's (1978:52-58) discussion of the ambiguities of local classification, the inconsistency which existed within one area as well as through out Kurdistan, and also of outsiders' classifications, i.e. those of anthropologists, travellers, missionaries, and the like.

6. See for example, the study of Berbers by Montagne (1973) and Bourdieu (1979), the blocs among the *hamula* Arabs of the Levant by Granqvist (1931), the Swat Pathans by Barth (1959), the Shahsevan nomads of Iranian Azarbayjan by R. Tapper (1979), Yomut Türkmen by Irons (1974) and the Bakhtiari nomads in Iran by Garthwaite (1983).

7. *Bask*, or *kanat* in Turkish, was used in the Ottoman army in reference to its divisions or units. See Chapter 2, note 80.

8. See Rhea (1880), who stayed in Memkan himself between 1851-59 as a missionary for the Nestorians.

9. Conquered or lost territory was usually "booty" and there was no religious personnel to ratify the new settlement. *Shaikh*s who are quoted to mediate in disputes, especially after the tribal confederations and their powerful rulers were abolished, were not necessarily neutral parties but often had their own armed retainers and estates; see below for leadership.

10. Pinyanişî and Oramarî say they belonged to the same "right wing" (*baskê rast*) of tribal grouping and they boast having fired at one another for days. The fight was more to scare than kill. Peters (1967:269) comments that the Bedouin of Cyrenaica avoid total warfare within the tribe: between two primary sections, "the action is limited to a strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter." See van Bruinessen (1978: 44 ff.7) on a similar point about tribal warfare which he claims has now become a form of "conspicuous consumption"; tribesmen "shoot" but do not "fight". See also Bourdieu (1979:102) on the dialectics of challenge and riposte, honour and fighting.

11. See above, for the local model of tribal organization. Meeker (1976:245-47) argues that the *sharaf* (honour) pertains to certain events and persons in the past, and these honourable events and persons are part of the "sacred historiography" which "provides a historical significance by which men's acts are measured."(p. 246) This is similar to the historical significance of belonging to a tribe in Hakkari. One difference is that not all tribal historiography is "sacred"; tribes were also notorious as robbers and for their cruelty to the Christian minorities in the area; this type of history and significance today is either denied, ignored or suppressed.

12. Van Bruinessen (1978:54) points out that *eşîret* today means not only a level of organization but also "tribal" in the widest sense of the term. Previously, *eşîret* referred to a warrior class and nobility he says. I found the claims for nobility among the tribesmen still valid.

13. People say that formerly they (their ancestors) belonged to a tribal group and lived in a tribal area, but now this is insignificant and relations to the tribal area do not exist. Van Bruinessen (1978:120) suggests that this might indeed have happened, and forwards two hypotheses about non-tribal Kurds; 1) they are simply de-tribalized Kurds, 2) they belong to a different stock (ethnically speaking) from the tribes men, representing an older, sedentary, population. He concludes that in some cases (1) and in others (2) was true.

14. I do not claim that this is the dominant ideology of outsiders; it is shared by some of the non-tribal local people, especially the left wing youth. Such thinking about the relationship between tribal *aghas* and members I found particularly among military officers and civil police. Similar ideas prevail in most of the political writings about the social organization of Kurdish provinces in the "East".

15. See for example the following passage from a manual for centrally appointed civil administrators to eastern and southeastern provinces: "Tribesmen consider an attack on one of their members to be on the whole of the tribe. To take revenge is an unavoidable need and a duty, as well as a justful right. Tribesmen generally have an excessive love of guns. They consider guns as their only 'friend' and means of self-protection... Among rival *qabîles* and tribes (*aşiret*), if they are living in neighbourhoods and close villages, there are occasional shootings which may last several hours. Usually there is no one injured." (my translation) from *Doğu ve Güney-Doğu Anadolu'nun Genel Durumu* (Meslekî Rehber), I. cilt, İç İşleri Bk. Yayınları, Ankara, 1972, p. 485.

16. See for example Badger (1852), Blau (1862), Rhea (1880), Maunsell (1901), Sykes (1908), Bachmann (1914) Dickson (1910), Nikitine (1956) and Hütteroth (1961).

17. See van Bruinessen's (1978:244-48) summary and the hypothetical model about how this happened.

18. For a discussion of "tribal" as a "state of mind", see R. Tapper (1983:65-72).

19. The few Chaldean and Nestorian villages in western Hakkari are of course the exception here. Their population is said to be very low and they are a very small minority at the moment.

20. This in fact is the reason why the first settlers came to Sisin. As I discuss in Chapter 5, all the first settlers originated from other Oramarî villages and bought the land from the government in order to be able to use the evacuated land.

21. Wife-kidnapping was both a sign of manhood and a strategy for challenging the honour of another man and household. For a discussion of the meaning and types of wife-kidnapping and elopement and its effects on gender roles, see Chapter 8.

22. See p. 112 above. One lineage B household head was brother to, and the other lineage B household head was FBS to the father of the woman, who was from another Oramarî village and kidnapped by the Sisin lineage A man.

23. See R. Tapper, 1983:55-56.

24. Ibid., p. 55.

25. Ernest Gellner, personal communication. For Gellner's discussion of tribes and states, see his introduction to and article in *Arabs and Berbers* (1973), his contribution to *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (ed. R. Tapper) (1983), and articles in *Muslim Society* (1981).

26. Gilsenan, 1977:174.

27. See Dickson (1910), Nikitine (1956), Nikitine & Soane (1923-25), Erdost (1968) and cases in van Bruinessen (1978).

28. van Bruinessen (1978:147): "In several cases it is clear that Kurdish tribesmen act out of loyalty to a certain **leader** rather than to the **tribe** (for instance, the rapid growth of tribes under strong leaders, followed by decline after their disappearance)" (author's emphasis). In a later work (1983:372), he elaborates the importance of lesser *agha*s compared to the pre-1900s powerful *mîr*s, and that "the delegation of power and authority that is implicit in indirect rule took place on ever lower levels of (tribal) organization, and accordingly less power was delegated," giving the chiefs "less despotic power", and because they tend to be "kinsmen of their fellow-tribesmen, the Kurdish organization seems to have become more tribal, with increased significance of kinship and segmentation."

29. See the contributions to *The Conflict of Tribe and State*, ed.by R. Tapper, (1983). Salzman (1983:262-64) points out that "there are chiefs and CHIEFS, and no doubt Chiefs and **chiefs** ... there are lineages and LINEAGES; and so on."(p. 264) See also Gellner (1983: 443):"There is again an entire spectrum, ranging from rather small Big Men to really effective and powerful tribal Big Men."

30. See van Bruinessen (1978), (1983); Garthwaite (1983).

31. See above, for the discussion of tribal segmentary model and the criticisms of it.

32. These points are based on the data presented in Chapter 2. It should be remembered here that historical data, especially before the end of the 19th century, are of very limited use for understanding relations between tribal followers/commoners and the leaders, but being the history of rulers, is, more detailed about central states - tribal leaders or princes relations.

33. See van Bruinessen (1978) on the power and networks of Naqshbandi *shaikhs* at this time and his analysis of Shaikh Ubeydullah and Shaikh Seid's uprisings, chapters IV and V.

34. Sykes, 1908:458, 461. Today the Zeydan family is not referred to as a sub-tribe or even a lineage / clan (*mal*). People who work for and take orders from them, or local traders, shopowners, administrators who are thought to "support" them are simply referred to as "the men of Zeydans" (*Zeydanların adamı*). See Loizos (1977:125) who discusses the use of the same term, i.e. someone is somebody's man, in reference to patron-client relations in Cyprus.

35. He has changed his party twice: from the Republican People's Party (*CHP*) in 1961 to Republican Reliance Party (*CGP*) in 1969, and to Justice Party (*AP*) in 1977 and won the elections each time.

36. The father is cited as having helped the government's forces in Oramar rebellion in 1930. See *Vatan* (daily), Hakkari ilavesi, no.45, 5/11/1952, quoting R. Beyatlı, the *kaymakam* of Şemdinli in 1929.

37. See the discussion of the contradictions of the Melanesian and Polynesian leadership typologies by Sahlins (1962-63).

38. He has had primary school education; his "learnedness" comes from his experience in national political life, his religiosity, and residence in Ankara where his sons and daughters attend the university.

39. The central administration's representatives in the region are often convinced that the *aghas* and *shaikhs* are the main source of trouble there. The local opposition mentioned above is a serious and relatively new (since 1970s) threat to the *aghas*; some left wing Kurdish political groups have declared themselves to be the enemies of "feudal" *aghas* and took to violence against them. See also Z. Aydın (1980) who mentions landlords (*toprak ağası*) being threatened by these political groups in Diyarbakır.

40. See Chapter 2, the cases of Zeynel Beg and Nurullah Beg.

41. See Nikitine (1925b:14) who describes how leaders were chosen or dismissed. According to his records of what the local people have told him, the leader would be disposed of by the elders, in a meeting where simply his shoes would be put in front of him. Today giving someone his shoes in his hands is an offense meaning the wish to kick someone out.

42. The MP was from the New Turkey Party (*YTP*). Tachau (1980:224) comments that between 1963-73, "smaller parties and independent candidates garnered substantially larger proportions of parliamentary seats in less developed constituencies."

43. A Kurdish speaking Shia group in northern Iraq.

44. Other evidence from neighbouring provinces of Bitlis and Van shows that the political representation of *shaikhs* was still important. *Shaikhs* became MPs with large followings. See Kudat, 1975:83-84; Sayarı, 1977: 110.

45. See Kudat (1975) and Sayarı (1977).

46. Erdost's (1968) analysis is especially problematic as he does not consider the pasture or field ownership separately. Neither does he take account of the implications of the borders of Hakkari before 1920 and now; Sadatê Nehrî had a great deal of land in today's Iran and Iraq where the region is less mountainous and more suitable for agriculture. For a critique of Erdost, see Yalçın-Heckmann (1987).

47. See van Bruinessen (1978:118), Hütteroth (1959:26-28), *Hakkari İl Yıllığı* (1967:91).

48. See Yalman (1971), Aydın (1980), Keyder (1983).

49. Ritual co-parenthood: *Kirve* is the man who holds the boy during his circumcision ceremony. See Kudat (1975) on the political alliances through *kirve* relations in eastern Turkey.

50. See Keyder (1983), Yalman (1971).

Notes to Chapter 5

1. See *Hakkari İl Yıllığı 1967* and *1973*, (1967:97) and (1973:131). Nikitine (1956:135) and Beşikçi (1969) report similar conflicts among Kurdish pastoralists. Bates (1973:33) notes the pasture conflicts for the nomadic Yörük. In Hakkari, these conflicts were previously resolved through the mediation of tribal chiefs or religious leaders or with outright intimidation. For more on tribal pasture conflicts, see Chapter 4.

2. For Turkish villages, see Stirling (1965:22, 238-246), Berkes (1942:94-96). For Kurds see Beşikçi (1970:94).

3. See J. Khatib-Chadidi (1981), S. Wright (1981), Mernissi (1985:137-142), and N. Tapper (1978). Age group segregation exists in Turkey especially among men; young men go to one coffeeshop, their fathers or elder men go to another one.

4. See Gilsenan's (1981:164-191) excellent description of a village where lords and peasants are identifiable through their houses and the position of the buildings. See also Yalman's (1971:201) description of a rich landlord's house in another province of southeastern Turkey.

5. Bourdieu (1979), in his analysis of the Kabyle house, suggests that the inside and outside of a house, the way objects are placed and named are related to a wider symbolic system. Thus, in his analysis, the occupation of a particular space, whether it was inside or outside, light or dark, high or low has a deeper symbolic meaning beyond the manifestation of age, sex and prestige ranking which I refer to here.

6. Bedirkhan & Şivan, 1976:73.

7. See Bourdieu (1979:137) on the Kabyle house and note 5 above. Bourdieu associates female sexuality and fertility with darkness, thus dark parts of the house are female space.

8. A pasture tent is one room anyway; tents are not very large and not divided by curtains as among the Shahsevan nomads or wealthy nomads in other southeastern provinces of Turkey.

9. See, for similar high/low seating in the guest room in Doshman Ziari, Iran, Wright (1981:142-43), and for low/high parts of a Mongol tent, C. Humphrey cited in Ardener (1981:23), and Bourdieu (1979) for the symbolism of "upper" and "lower" in Kabyle house.

10. Husbands and wives should not sleep separately either at home or on a visit. Nikitine (1956:102-103) cites a story of the happiest man on earth as the one whose wife is not only a lier and stealer but also could not bear to sleep apart from him. See also Hansen (1961: 37) for sleeping arrangements among Iraqi Kurds.

11. Mokri (1970:15-31) describes the *tandır* being at the centre of the main room in other parts of Kurdistan, and that it was used as a heater for those sitting and sleeping in this room. In some of the old houses in the plains villages the *tandır* was at the centre of the main room, but because it had to be buried into the ground, it was either on the lower ground storey of the mountain village house or in the *gulke* (kitchen and bathing room).

12. The decision-making and control of food preparation is a well documented authority position. See Mernissi, 1985:130.

13. In personal communication N. Sirman pointed out that in the rural context of western Turkey, the same modesty and ritual purity rules apply; there the women are shy about showing their hair wet, especially to their in-laws.

14. Bourdieu's (1979:144) emphasis on the symbolic devaluation of women's work outside the house, that: "in contrast to man's work, which is performed outdoors, woman's work is essentially obscure and hidden", does not seem to be the case here. There was more restriction on women's outdoors leisure than their outdoors work. In any case, "outdoors" and "indoors" are concepts which are flexible. In the mountain villages outdoors, "*jidervê*", meant a much wider space for women than it did for the town's women.

15. See Maher (1981:117-135) for differences in consumption patterns of men and women in Morocco.

16. See Bedirkhan & Lescot, 1970:203, ff.1; also Mokri, 1970:28-29.

17. See also Bedirkhan & Lescot, 1970:69; Y. Ziyaeddin Paşa, 1978:230.

18. Van Bruinessen (1978:55-56) points out the closeness of the term *mal* to the term for "clan" and adds that *mal* was used only for lineages descending from very powerful persons. In my data, however, the 8 lineages or clans cited by informants as belonging to a sub-tribal section (*kinit* or *ocax*) of the Oramar tribe were all *mal*, and one of them had the name of a woman, Mala Xane. At the same time, there were some other lineages or clans which were considered noble, e.g. Mala Mîran (the house or lineage of *Mîrs*, princes).

19. Membership of a *mal* was only one prerequisite but not the only (or sufficient) strategy for having and main taining access to the tribal pasture. For more on tribal membership and tribal political structures see Chapter 4.

20. For example: *Xwedê malatê ava ket* (May God bless you, lit. may God build your house); *malxerab* (evil, lit. house in ruins); *malxi* (male household head); *malkêr* (someone who is a good house-manager, used usually for women).

21. Refugees and fugitives are given shelter as a custom; yet they are mostly allowed to stay as guests and for limited periods (several months at most). If a refugee has to stay for many months or years, then he/she has to acquire or be provided with his/her own house and means of production.

22. The classification is done from the point of view of the male household head. Therefore, when a man lives together with his married brothers **and** married son(s) or brother's son(s), it is classified as fraternal + paternal joint (F.J.+P.J.) household.

23. The stages where Sisin HHs were fragmentary or polygynous are shown in Appendix IV on Sisin HH histories.

24. As Column 5 shows there was one widower in one P.J. household but that was **not** the male household head but one of his sons, shown as (+1), in a separate residence, shown in Column 7.

25. This is higher than the 8.5 mean HH size for Hakkari found in the 1980 population census results. The percentage of HHs with a mean size of 10+ was 31.6% of all the households in Hakkari. The same figure for Turkey was 5.4%. (Source: 1980 population census 1% sample results and 1980 census from Hakkari).

26. A paternal joint household is not necessarily a three generational household. The son may be married but have no children.

27. The only exception was in two cases of F.+ P.J. households. One had developed first from a paternal joint to 3 generational P.J. (the married grandson lived in the same household as his father's father and father's brother; his father died before he married) and then into fraternal joint (male HHH and his married brother's son in the same HH, the grandfather had died by then) and into fraternal and paternal joint (the sons of the male HHH were married and lived in the same household). The second case was a fraternal joint HH first and with the marriage of the eldest son of the elder brother it became a F.+ P.J. household.

28. One HHH (of HH no.11) was an orphan, grew up with his FBSs and at marriage separated his household; another HHH (of HH no.4) was an Iraqi Kurdish refugee, had fled his village, I do not know whether he shared his previous household with his brother or father; the third case was HH no.24 of a very old woman living together with her son's son and his wife. In her case the change was from a paternal joint (husband and son alive) into a fragmented household (husband and son dead, son's son still a child) into a simple household (son's son now married).

29. Of the 9 instances of HH divisions between 1943-1982 for the total of 24 HHs, 6 HHs had split into 2 units and 3 HHs into 3 units each. The mean for the period between two divisions in Sisin was 16 years.

30. See for example Tapper, 1979:43; Stirling, 1965:40.

31. After 9 partition cases the results were 13 simple HHs 5 paternal joint and 2 fraternal joint HHs.

32. See also Nikitine (1956:103-104) for *malxi* and *kabani*. *Malkhe* (or *malxi*): "il occupe la première place et, en sa présence, les membres de la familie ne peuvent ni s'asseoir ni causer sans son autorisation." (p. 104) *Kabani*: "jouit d'une grande autorité dans la vie d'intérieure. C'est elle qui dirige la maisonnée et les domestiques sont sous ses ordres, c'est elle qui, pendant les repas, distribue les portions et sans sa permission on ne se met à manger. En l'absence de son mari, elle recoit les visiteurs, les régale et cause librement avec eux." (p. 103-104).

33. Nikitine (1956:103 ff.1) refers to the Kurdish term for co-wife as *berî*. *Berî* actually means the woman who milks sheep and goats.

34. On the beliefs about the evil eye (*nazar*) and evil spirits see Nikitine (1956), Beyazidî (1963), Hansen (1961), Mokri (1970).

35. Male sexuality is thought to be not only active over a longer period but also more active than female sexuality, as illustrated in terms of the male role in sexual intercourse as well as the "need" for polygyny. See Vieille (1978:461-472) on the concepts of male and female sexuality in Iran.

36. According to the Islamic Shafii school if men and women who are *na-mahrem* (not taboo) to each other shake hands or even touch, their ablution is cancelled, i.e. they are ritually impure and should renew their ablutions before praying.

37. Maher (1981:128) on Moroccon women and eating: "Women carry this modesty to extremes. If they are guests, they will often swear that they have eaten already, and if they are not that they are not hungry. One woman used to assure her fellowdiners that she preferred bones to meat."

38. In the town of Hakkari, women invited to a wedding borrowed jewelry (all gold) from other kinswomen if they did not have enough of their own.

39. Men's clothes were sewn by specialist tailors in town or bought from the shops as finished suits. Women's dresses especially in villages were all sewn by women by hand.

Notes to Chapter 6

1. Bourdieu (1977:175 ff.25) relates this ideal to work ethics in Islam: "There is strong disapproval of individuals who are no use to their family or the group 'dead men whom God has drawn from living men', in the words of the verse of the Koran often applied to them: they are incapable of 'pulling any weight'. To remain idle, especially when one belongs to a great family, is to shirk the duties and tasks which are an inseparable part of belonging to the group."

2. See N. Tapper (1981:392) quoting Pitt-Rivers (1977) on honour in the (1)competitive (2)religious senses. The above is similar to honour in the religious sense, where equality before God is stressed.

3. Both Bourdieu (1977) and (1979) and Gilsenan (1981) have very rich descriptions and analyses of the "art of living", the way of doing things and the repose and dignity men are expected to show especially in the company of other men.

4. Nikitine (1956:245) mentions that the Kurds believe it would bring bad luck to count the animals or quote the number they own, that it would get the "evil eye" (*nazar*).

5. For *zibarê* among Kurds see also Edmonds (1957:225ff.1) Erdost (1968:171ff.9).

6. See Erdost and Edmonds in note 5 above. Vinogradov (1974:212) also mentions corvee type of *zebarê* among the Shabak peasants for the landlords and *sayyid* families in Mosul, northern Iraq.

7. The female household head of HH no.24 on Table 5.1 a above (see Chapter 5) was an expert on religious services and did some services for the villagers; this could be interpreted as her paying back for the *zebarî* labour she got but had not returned.

8. See *Büyük Şafîi İlmihali* (1979:212) where it is explicated that the wealthy, non-Muslim, lazy people are not entitled to receive *zekat*. This book was frequently referred to in order to find out whether one had to pay *zekat* from animals owned, or other property and the details of this religious tax were vigorously discussed among the villagers.

9. As far as I could observe not all the village HHs practised this form of payment, yet my host household (which was a fairly rich), received *zekat* from neighbours and kins within the village and gave it to the same households. Only one household was mentioned as receiving but not giving this form of *zekat* as it was the poorest of the village.

10. For details see Chapter 8, also Mokri, 1970:50-61. At other rites of passage not gifts but food is exchanged as in the case of deaths or ending a mourning, see below.

11. See Mauss, 1974:8-10.

12. Such a gift is called *teberiq* in Kurdish.

13. Bourdieu (1979:107) discusses more the damage to the honour of the person who should return a gift or challenge; here we refer to the "relationship", not necessarily to the total "honour" of the persons involved.

14. This could take an hour sometimes. See Hansen (1961:48-49) who describes tea drinking as a ceremony among the southern Iraqi Kurds.

15. Village cooking is fairly simple and does not amount to a great number of dishes. Village men complain about the women's lack of knowledge and say their food is not good enough for sophisticated townspeople. In one case, after the death of a prominent villager (an ex-*muhtar*), when his family learned that the most prominent tribal chief (then an MP) was to visit to express his condolences, they asked an affinal kinswoman in town to come and cook for the occasion.

16. *Nan* (bread) has a special status as food item, meaning both bread and food. It is considered to be indispensable for well-being and the most important nutrient. All other food which is eaten with bread is called by a general name, *pê-xwarin*, which literally means "accompanying dish/food".

17. The *mela* was said to receive 600 TL. every autumn and spring from each household; other cash payments were c. 500 TL.for each wedding and *mevlut*. Moreover each household gave 2 kg. of sugar, 2 tins of butter, a mule's load of wood to burn and *zekat* (one fourtieth of produce) from corn in 1980.

18. See Bates (1973:149) on *sermaye* (capital). According to Bates the Yörük nomads do not slaughter an animal unless it is very ill. This applies to Sisin villagers as well; except that sometimes rich households slaughter a healthy calf for its meat and sell some of the meat to other households.

19. Hay (1921:75) mentions that tribal warfare consisted mostly of raiding the enemy's property, e.g. burning hay stacks or stealing the herds, rather than a pitched battle. For similar raids by Kurdish tribes on Nestorian Christians in the past, see Heazell and Margoliuth (1913:126,139). Recently, some tribal chiefs who were ambitious in power politics were said to use the same tactics to intimidate their opponents or challengers.

20. 7 out of 24 households owned some land (fields) and trees in other villages.

21. During my fieldwork governmental and military control in the area increased remarkably; one of the measures against smuggling was to register the number of animals/HH in all the border villages within a 25 km. zone north of the Iraqi-Turkish border. This precaution was to be administered by registering the number of animals/HH, checking these numbers at regular intervals and demanding reports to the administrative authorities for the purchase or sale of any animal not registered. To put this extremely impractical idea into practice, two gendarmerie soldiers accompanied by a village forestry guard (*koru bekçisi*) were sent to villages to write down the number of animals. On such a meeting we recorded the number given by each HHH in the presence of all the other households. This figure (January 1982) is the most reliable data I have on animal distribution and relative wealth in herds.

22. Bates, 1973:112. Mean herd size per HH or tent among Yörük nomads was 268.

23. Beşikçi, 1969:125. He gives 160 as the mean per tent.

24. Tapper, 1979:64. Mean flock size per HH for all groups of Shahsevan was 94, whereas the poorest group's mean was 70.

25. Tapper, 1979:64-65. He estimated for the poorest Shahsevan nomads (with a mean of 70 goats and sheep per HH) to have a mean of 44 fertile ewes per HH. Taking his figures as guidelines and using his simulated model, we estimated for a flock of 1000 ewes+wethers+gimmers + 20 rams (2 rams/100 sheep) one gets a flock size of 1292, thus a net increase of 272 animals. If the reproduction rate for goats is similar to that of sheep, then the total number of sheep and goats in Sisin before the sales would be c. 2000, which was the approximate number given by the villagers in July 1980 before the sale of shearlings and goats.

26. See Bates, 1973:150-153, Fig.12.

27. Some examples of prices are: in summer 1980 a bundle of hay in Yüksekova was as low as 10 TL., but in winter 1979-80 the price of a (mountain) bundle had gone up as high as 80 TL. for those who could afford it!

28. The price given by town traders for the wool of ewes was 200 TL./kg. in 1980 (200 TL.= 1 Sterling in 1980); the state run cooperative *(Yün, Yapağı Alış Kooperatifi)* gave a lower price, 190 TL./kg. and from one ewe one could get c. 1 kg. wool. Lamb's wool was slightly higher than a mature sheep's.

29. Tapper, 1979:56; Bates, 1973:155.

30. The price was told to me by the villagers in their letters. The prices for wethers, ewes and goats are usually lower than lamb prices and rams and he-goats are individually priced according to age and condition.

Notes to Chapter 7

1. See Eickelman (1981:91-93, 109-115) for a discussion of the concept of "closeness" in the Middle East, with a special reference to the Bnī Bataw of Morocco.

2. The diagram includes all the reference terms which are clearly definable by EGO. It stretches across 5 generations and the terms could also be further specified as in the cases of *xal=brayê dayê* (*xal*:MB) or *metî=xuşkê bab* (*metî*:FZ). Some of the terms are descriptive already on their own like *dotmam*=FBD, which literally means daughter (*dot*) of FB (*mam*). The differences and implications of reference and address terms are discussed below. Otherwise, the reference terms are not assigned any "primary meaning" here. See Leach, 1958, for a discussion and critique of "primary meaning" in kinship terminology. The reference terms cover a larger number of people on the genealogical map than address terms, which in return could be extended to an almost infinite number of people outside the genealogical map.

3. The above affinal terms are also descriptive, usually having the literal meaning as the husband (*mîr*) or wife (*jin*) of a kin, such as in *mam*:FB and *jinmam*:FBW.

4. See Tapper (1979:126) for similar terminology for traceable or distant agnates among the Shahsevan nomads.

5. *Bra*:brother, *mak*:mother. Bedirkhan & Lescot, 1970:29.

6. Goody (1976:52-53) argues that, terminologically, step parenthood implies monogamy. In Kurdish terminology mother and stepmother are "ideally" covered with one term, thus the correction to polygyny, but father and stepfather are terminologically separated. The strong patrilineal ideology and its concomitant patrilineal inheritance system explain the terminological distinction between stepfathers and its "ideal" absence for stepmothers and co-wives.

7. See Stirling (1965:152) for a list of Turkish kinship terms. He does not indicate whether these are reference or address terms, and notes the confusing usage of both standard Turkish terms and local village variations.

8. The last two people would be called *zava* in special cases, depending on relative age and status, and it is clearly a conditional extended usage. The Kurdish villagers who spoke good Turkish referred to their own DH as *enişte* -when talking in Turkish-, obviously not a ware of the terminological distinction between DH and ZH in Turkish.

9. See for example, Stirling (1965:154) for similar usage among Turkish peasants.

10. The rule is to give one share to the sister and two shares to her brother, when the property is to be divided between one brother and one sister only.

11. In HHs with many children, the age span between brothers may be so large that a married brother's wife may be having children at the same time as his mother (the mother-in-law); thus the brother's baby daughter or son would have an age-mate FB/FZ.

Notes to Chapter 8

1. For a major analysis of marriage strategies see Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, (1977), especially pp. 30-70. The terms and concepts used here are widely borrowed from him.

2. Literally "prosperity and fight/war", meaning there is both good and bad in marriages. For a different use of the same term among the Shahsevan nomads in Iran, see N. Tapper, in Beck and Keddie (ed.s), 1978:374-98.

3. See Mason (1975) for the symbolism of male/female roles as enacted in the wedding ceremony among the Libyan Berbers. Mason says the wedding ceremony symbolizes the "juxtaposition and interplay" of the sexes and there is much emotion and excitement involved in it. Although the Kurdish weddings were not totally segregated and men and women could watch each other dancing and sometimes danced together, the dance itself and the movements were very arousing especially for young people.

4. Marriage is *sünnet* (Sunnah) for both men and women. See also Mokri (1970:35-36), for the religious significance of the marriage among the Kurds: "le mariage est un sacré, recomandé par la religion ... C'est ainsi que chez les Kurdes 'Fidèles et Vérité', les termes de *şart* et *iqrar*, synonyme de pacte et d'alliance entre Dieu et les hommes, désignent aussi cette alliance terrestre qu'est le mariage."

5. See *Büyük Şafîi İlmühali* (the Shafii law) by Güvenç, (1979:347). The argument here is not that Islamic beliefs and customs explain the norms and behaviour of the people; rather that Islam and its particular interpretations as embodied in the Shafii guide book are invoked by the people themselves, to be able to explain why and how people should marry or not.

6. N. Youssef (in Beck and Keddie, 1978:88) points to the same emphasis in Islam as follows: "the Quran is not ambivalent with respect to the importance of marriage as a universal institution for Muslims ... all Muslim males are enjoined to marry to 'complete half their religion', the early and universal remarriage of widowed and divorced women is highly encouraged, and the purpose of marriage is explicitly stated to be not only procreation but the gratification of spiritual and physical needs. This means that sexual intercourse within marriage has positive value independent of reproduction itself."

7. Here it is "looking with an evil eye" (*kötü gözle bakmak* in Turkish, or *xirabiyetî kir* in Kurdish) which could mean being jealous or having a sexual interest in a forbidden (*haram*) woman. The unmarried status of young men being a threat to social order is also mentioned by Gilsenan, in *Recognizing Islam* (1981) p. 121.

8. There is a third term which refers to the marriage ceremony more than the marriage or marrying in a general sense. The term is ***mar kirin***, same as ***nikah kıymak/etmek*** in Turkish.

9. The difficulty of assessing the exact age, (women look older in villages due to heavy work from the age of 13-14 onwards) and lack of birth certificates for many of them, makes it impossible to know the exact ages.9.

10. Age is a part of a whole set of factors which affect marriages within a household; it does not have priority over the other factors like sex, number of children or other marriages in the household; "... the marrying of each of the children of the same family unit (i.e. the children of the same father, or in some cases the grandchildren of the same grandfather) depends on the marrying of all the others and thus varies as a function of each child's **position** (defined mainly by sibling order, sex and relationship to the head of the family), within the particular **configuration** of the whole set of children to be married, itself characterized by their number and sex." (Bourdieu, 1977:69)

11. The reference here is more to the low level of education for the female population in Hakkari. When the women in Hakkari take their fair share of the educational facilities and chances, it could be expected to delay the age of first marriage. Özbay (1979:205-6) thinks that education is a significant factor delaying the marriage age for women in rural areas; other factors cited are migration to cities and the shortage of available young men in rural settlements.

12. See Maher (1974:83-88) for the effects of education on jobs and marriage prospects of Moroccan women. The rural and urban attitudes are fairly similar to the situation in Hakkari. While rural Berbers see schooling as "a corrupting influence" on their women, "for modernist townsmen, a literate wife is a status symbol." (p. 83) However, the attitude of educated townsmen is more a theory than practice. "The idea of reducing the economic and political dependence of women on their husbands, fathers or brothers seems to present an intolerable threat to the status quo." (p. 84) The same can be said for educated women in Hakkari; their right to work was definitely in the hands of their male kin or husbands.

13. S. Timur (1972:96) presents on Table 51 the percentages of men, according to first marrying age and place of settlement. A comparison of village or town background shows that 10.9% in towns and 23.3% in villages married before 17 years of age, between 18-20 years the percentages are 21.9 (Town) and 34.4 (Vill.) between 21-24 they are 37.0 (T) and 24.1 (V), between 25-29, 22.9 (T) and 13.9 (V), and finally for those over 30 they were 8.2 (T) and 4.4 (V).

14. Benedict in Peristiany (ed.), 1976:234.

15. See for example Stirling, 1965:209, Beşikçi, 1969:180-181. Stirling noted that "to the villagers it is the Civil Code which is irrelevant. They do not regard people who have been through a civil ceremony as married ... To them, registration is not a rite within their system, but a meaningless piece of bureaucratic mumbo jumbo."(p. 205) However, in urban Turkey today civil marriage is a fundamental part of the whole marriage ceremony and procedures. In more upper class, educated and modernized sections of the urban centres religious marriage is done away with altogether.

16. See Fişek (1984:264-66) on the amnesties. He states that within 32 years over 10 million children have been registered through these amnesties.

17. For instance, see Kazgan, 1978:164-65; Mansur-Coşar, 1978:1278.

18. Timur's findings (1972:92-94, Tables 46-49) show that out of the total marriages, the percentage of those with religious ceremony is only 15% for all of Turkey, but is 21.3% in villages and 36.6% in Eastern Anatolia. When we look at the figures for polygamy in Turkey and Eastern Anatolia, which are 1.9% for the former and 5% for the latter, we see that marriage with the religious ceremony is by far higher than polygynous marriages in Eastern Anatolia.

19. E. White (1978:56) points out the implications of registering the marriage or not as follows: "Minimum marriage age and reforms in divorce and polygamy depend upon registration of marriages for enforcement; therefore, requiring registration is an appropriate indicator of intention to limit traditional restrictions on women."

20. For the ways rural women in western Turkey exercise their legal rights, see J. Starr "The legal and social transformation of rural women in Aegean Turkey" in Hirschon (ed.) *Women and property women as property* (1984) pp. 92-116.

21. Vieille (1978:471) formulates the dilemma of men as follows: "the polygamous home is habitually nothing but a hell of intrigues and violence ... man, as orderer of society, is here seriously doubted, and his sexual activity, conceived as sovereignly independent, is especially conditioned by feminine conduct."

22. In the words of the woman it sounded more like an elopement at a young age. See below for the discussion of wife-kidnapping and elopement.

23. The daughter was said to be only 12 years old. There was much contempt for the man who gave her away so young.

24. This was the explanation of both the man and the second wife. Being in love is a legitimate and respected reason for a marriage which otherwise could be criticized.

25. The woman was the subject of curiosity for many villagers, especially women. They wanted to know whether she could bake, work at hay collecting, what sort of dress she wears and so on. It was almost as novel as if the *muhtar* had married a Turk! This was clearly a prestige marriage as described in Bourdieu (1977:39) "... where the more distant the people between whom the relationship is established, the greater the symbolic profit."

26. Eickelman, 1981:119. Vieille (1978:464) notes that it justifies "the sexual satisfaction of the man."

27. The Turkish proverb sums up this point excellently: "Kadın adamı vezir de yapar rezil de." (Women could make men *vezirs* -Prime Minister- or abased.)

28. See the discussion of patriliny and affinal links in Chapter 7. See also Meeker (1976) on sister-brother and wife-husband relations among the Turks and Arabs.

29. Studies on Turkish families have stressed the importance of motherhood for women to gain a respected status in their affinal households. See for example, Kıray in Peristiany, 1976, and Kandiyoti, 1977. In the tribal context of Hakkari, young childless women were able to maintain a strong position in the household and not threatened with divorce or a co-wife as has been reported in some Middle Eastern cases.

30. The term in Kurdish for bad acts, corruption, treachery is linked to the house: "*malxirab*" (lit. a house in ruins). For a similar term among the Durrani Pashtuns see N. Tapper (1981:391).

31. Stirling (1965:198) notes that widow inheritance between brothers could lead to a polygamous marriage, but he does not specify whether there is any restriction on the younger or elder brother.

32. Goody (1976:83-84) discusses levirate from the aspects of securing an heir for property (an institution for taking care of childless unions) and of fostering. He states that levirate, at least in Africa, was more an institution of fostering where adoption was rare. The same point applies to the Kurds as well.

33. See the section on wife-kidnapping and elopement. The definition depends on who is quoted. Here the woman says she eloped with the man, because she wanted to, but according to her parental family she was kidnapped, since they didn't agree to it.

34. Eickelman, 1981:129, ff.39, also pp. 129-131. From Eickelman's list the following works are considered here: Barth (1953) and (1954), Khuri (1970), Keyser (1974), Meeker (1976), Bourdieu (1977), Peters (1978), and Aswad (1971) and (1978).

35. Bates (1973:61) remarks that *emmi hakkı* (FBS's right) exists among the Yörük nomads. This "right" however does not obviate the payment of bride-price.

36. Eickelman (1981:130) comments that the statistical incidence varies from 43% in tribal Kurdistan to 2% in Lebanon.

37. See also Eickelman, 1981:131.

38. Leach (1940:20): "I was told of the Dizai tribe, a group widely scattered in the Area C that 'they all call one another *amoza*' (FB's children) - (implying that they were all one *tira*) (lineage)."

39. Barth, 1953:68 and 1954:167.

40. Bates' (1973:65-66) figures on the FBD 1st cousin marriages among the nomad and sedentary Yörüks range between 16.7% to 24.6% of all the marriages. In my data, the number of 1st cousin FBD marriages is 10 out of a total of 65, thus c. 15% of all the marriages.

41. Our usage of "practical kin" is slightly narrower than Bourdieu's suggestion. The practical kin is also in one's own patrilineage, but belongs to a "distant" section of it.

42. "A Kurdish lineage and even the lineage segments down to the village level, are endogamous, socially isolated units. They are, furthermore, geographically isolated ... The local group, the village, is also the lineage segment." (Barth, 1953:75).

43. No census shows the divisions according to ethnic or tribal grouping.

44. Barlas (1975:16) says that Ertuşî and Pinyanişî do not intermarry. This is not supported by my data.

45. Mokri (1970:37) quotes as follows: "l'alliance entre cousins et cousines de souche paternelle est scellée dans le ciel."

46. M. van Bruinessen in a personal communication pointed out that even highly educated Kurds turn out to be married to their FBDs. Indeed, a lawyer in Hakkari had married an outsider during his studies in the big city. After he had two children from her, despite all the protests from his wife, he took a second wife from the village, his FBD!

47. For similar arguments see Meeker (1976).

48. Peters, 1976:61-62. See also Cuisenier, 1975:477-78, and Eickelman, 1981:130, ff.43.

49. Keyser (1974:294) quoted in Eickelman, 1981:131.

50. For a summary, see Khuri (1970:598).

51. See for example Peters (1978) on the Bedouin, N.Tapper (1981) on Durrani Pashtuns, Maher (1974) and (1978) on rural Morocco and Cuisenier (1975:184) on the Turkish villagers. For Kurdish customs see Jaba (1963:12) quoting Mela Beyazidî at the end of the 19th century: "jinêd wan zehfî hêse û pare ji malêd bab û dâed xwe nastînin. Bilako dibexşîne. Warisêd nêr Lewranî Erşêt (ji heşta yek hêse) standin di nîva wan da şerm e." (Women do not get the property shares or cash from their parental household, unless it is granted to them. Among the Kurds it is considered improper (even shameful, "*şerm*") for women to inherit any shares.)

52. Patai (1959) quoted in Keyser (1974:294).

53. The tribal system is explained by informants as having certain divisions and subdivisions, and that certain tribes unite or divide along the tribal blocs against the counterpart. See Chapter 4 on tribal organization.

54. "The more distant the people between whom the relationship is established, the greater the symbolic profit." (Bourdieu, 1977:39)

55. N. Tapper (1981:389) makes a similar point on the Durrani Pashtuns: "They treat all marriages contextually and easily change their perspective by altering the time frame and social grouping chosen for focus; thus, a particular bride-price marriage may be seen both as the unilateral exchange of a woman for cash and valuables between the heads of two independent households and as a delayed, direct exchange of women between two lineages." Her whole article discusses these contextual changes in the meanings of marriage types.

56. Barth (1953:27) mentions this exchange marriage as a popular type of marriage, especially in non-tribal villages. The term he gives is *jin-bû-jin*, which literally means "wife for wife/woman for woman"; he wrongly translates it as "sister exchange"; the examples above show that it is **not only** sisters who are exchanged, but also daughters.

57. This information is additional and not represented in Table 8.3.

58. See N. Tapper (1981) and Bates (1973:67).

59. Aswad (1971:57) notes the word *naqd* for bridewealth among the Arabic speaking tribal villagers of Hatay, a southern Turkish province bordering Syria.

60. Automatic guns as symbols of manhood, tribal identity and Kurdish nationalist feelings, are smuggled and illegally kept. Even if they cost as much as refrigerators and stoves, their unavailability and symbolic meaning makes them a different kind of prestige good.

61. See, Peters (1978:341), Pastner (1978:436-7), Maher (1974:152-4, 176-7, 216-8), Fischer (1978:200) and Marsot (1978:262).

62. Similar arguments from Yörüks are reported by Cuisenier (1975:185): in a Yörük village, people refused to pay *başlık* because it is against the *Sharia*.

63. N. Tapper (1981:401-404) distinguishes five spheres of exchange; men, women, productive resources, produce and cash. These are ranked and correspond to degrees of honour. Cash, she says, is "an anomalous factor" and has low status. In compensation payments women and cash are not always convertible. For homicide among the Durrani, women are the only acceptable compensation, whereas for homicide involving outsiders, "thousands" may be paid and accepted.

64. N. Tapper (1981:394,ff.4) notes that "the recognition of inferiority (of the wife-givers among the Durrani) ... contradicts Mauss's general rule 'To give is to show one's superiority'," and adds that Durrani "may also view any transaction in terms of religious honour and tribal egalitarianism, where the giver is superior, thus according with Mauss's rule."

65. *Baban* is the visit of the newly married daughter to her parental household. It is done usually within the first month after the wedding. The visits are quite formal and always accompanied by exchanges of gifts between the affinal groups. For how long the woman visits her parents is also important. A loving and caring husband is expected to show impatience and send messangers for her to be sent back. If the husband does not ask after his wife for a month or more, it is taken as his lack of interest in her, thus bringing shame to her family.

66. Within Sisin three men abducted women (two of them unsuccessfully), one man eloped with a woman from outside, and one woman eloped with her present husband from town. This was out of the total of 65 marriages listed in Table 8.1 above.

67. See for example, Bates (1973) and (1974), Bates et.al. (1974), Yasa (1962).

68. Bates (1973:73) states that 20% of his sample marriages arose through wife kidnapping. Magnarella and Türkdoğan (1973:1628) however, remark that only one marriage in ten is the result of elopement and a lesser number results from kidnapping in eastern Turkey.

69. Bates (1973:71) mentions that among the Yörük the kidnapper would get one or two younger male friends, neighbours, or cousins to help in the act, but the parties who are held responsible or bereaved are only the members of the two households. He cites a case where the woman's kin were chasing the kidnapper, found his brother, but did not beat him up because the brother did not know about the kidnapping. In Hakkari, immediately after such an affair the woman's agnates would beat up any member of the man's household without questions, it is a categorical right.

70. In a case of kidnapping in Sisin, the woman was beaten there was shooting between the men, and her kin saved her from being dragged all the way. Because she was "touched" by the man who tried to kidnap her, his side claimed her honour (*namus*) had been defiled, yet this was not accepted by her father and patrilineal kin, and she was subsequently married to her 1st cousin FBS.

71. Bates (1974:285) citing M. Sahlins' (1965) "On the ideology and composition of descent groups" in *Man*, 97, pp. 104-107.

72. The children of the eloped or kidnapped woman and her husband are not effected by the act among the Yörük. The opposite happened in Hakkari; a man had eloped with a woman and refused to pay any bride-price to settle the affair. The couple never reconciled with the woman's kin despite their children had reached their teenages. Their eldest son was afraid to run into his MBs on the street in case they would recognize and beat him up.

73. It is extremely prestigious to kidnap tribal leaders' sisters, daughters and other close kin or affine, especially from their private headquarters, their house in town or in the village. Whenever tribal chiefs have important conflicts with other politically powerful men, they put extra precautions to protect their women from being kidnapped.

Appendix I. Rulers and the chronology of Hakkari: *Şembû* Dynasty


Izzeddin Şîr I
Melik Mahmud
Sultan Ahmed
Imadeddin
Eseddin Kelanî
Izzeddin Şîr II
Zahid I
Melik Beg (to Bay)
Seyid Mehmed Beg (to Gevaş)
Zeynel
Bayındır (led the kızılbaş)
Budak
Hüseyin
Baeddin (posted to Albaq)
Beyazıd (killed in Aktamar)
Rüstem
Bayındır (seeks protection from Shah Tahmasp)
Yakup Beg
Zahid II
Zahid III
Seyidhan
Zekeriya
Ibrahim
Zahid IV
Hacı
Budak
Ulama
Sultan Ahmed II
Mirza
Melik
Şerefhan
Mir Aziz Sultan
Hüseyin
Bayazıd
Imadeddin
Zeynel
Nurullah Beg

Appendix II. Partial genealogy of the Sadatê Nehrî.


Molla Hacı (first settled in Deman and Melayan in Şemdinli)
Molla Salih (changed to Naqshbandî from Qadirî)
(Mevlana Halid's *khalifa*, Sayyid Abdullah settled in Nehri)
Sayyid Ahmed
S. Muhammed I
Sayyid Taha I
S. Adbülhekim
Sayyid Salih
S. Muhiddin
S. Abdülvahab
Sh. Alaeddin
Sh. Ubeydullah (1880 revolt)
S. Bahaddin
S. Abdülkasim
S. Nureddin
S. Muhammed Emin
S. Hamid
S. Osman
S. Fehim (II)
Muin
S. Fehim I
S. Halid
S. Şahabeddin
S. Muhammed (II)
S. Habib
Hacı Muhammed
Sh. M. Sıddık I (died in Şemdinli in 1911)
Sh.Abülkadir I (member of the Ottoman Senate, hanged in 1926)
Sh. Ismail
S. Taha II (1899 visit to Russia, 1923 mayor of Ruwanduz, 1939 died in Iran)
S. Muslih (1926 Şemdinli revolt)
S. Şemseddin
Sh. Abdullah II (1926 Şemdinli revolt, officer in 1946 Mahabad Kurdish Republic)
S. Muhammed III
S. Musa (in Iran)
S. Hızır Geylani (politician in Turkey)
S. Hacı (Dino)
Sh. Çeto (in Ruwanduz)
S. M. Sıddık II (Puşo)
S. Ahmed
Ubeydullah
Salih (in Iran)
Sh. Mazhar (Kevkes)
S. Reşid (in Şemdinli)
Sh. Abdülaziz (military officer in Iraq was in Mahabad 1946)
Sh. Abdülkadir II

III. Seasonal cycle of production and labour usage in Hakkari's mountain villages

April-May: Men plough the terraced fields for sowing corn and millet soon after the rains stop. The sheep and goats by this time would be taken to the hills around the village and in the lower valleys where there is fresh grass. The fields are fertilized with dung. Tomato and other vegetable gardens are prepared. In May animals are joined as herds and start spending the days on the lower hills. Women start going once a day to the hills for milking. Young women and girls gather herbs and mushrooms. Fresh cheese is made from the first milk. Men travel to town for provisions.

June-July: Move to the pasture camp. Women milk sheep and goats twice a day. They prepare yogurt and cheese for winter. Men start cutting grass on the lower hills first and gradually climb up the hills cutting grass and bush. The grass bundles are left to dry and are collected and piled in certain locations around the village first and next to the houses later. Women help men when needed. Gardens are tended by elder women or by men who stay behind in the village. Herds are given salt twice a month. Shepherds take the herds further up the hill for fresh grass. Mules and horses are left alone on the upper parts of pasture camps. Women weave and knit in the pasture camp. By mid-July, the camp moves to the second site further up on the hill where there is more water and fresher grass.

August-September: In mid-August shearing the wool of sheep, lambs and goats' hair takes place, (*berxbir*). Animals are sold to the merchants. Butter, cheese, wool, and gum tragacanth are sold to the traders. Fruit, walnuts and vegetables are picked and sold in September. Corn is reaped and together with some garden products is bartered for wheat in plains villages. Men and women collect the dried hay from the hills and make them into piles. At the end of August, the camp moves back to its first site. Wood and bushes are collected by women. Winter provisions are bought in town and transported on mules. Women dry fruit and vegetables for winter.

October-November: Last days of the herds on the hills. Shepherds finish their job towards the end of October. Thereafter households tend their own animals along the valleys and around the village. They take the animals into the sheds as late as possible. Procuring winter provisions continues. Wood and bush collection is finished. Animals are taken indoors as soon as the first snow falls in November.

December-January: Animals are kept around the house compound. Snow is cleared from the fields every day to make space for the sheep, when it eats the fodder. In January men start climbing up the hills and bringing bundles of hay on tree trunks used as sleighs, (*garte*). They go on days when it is not snowing and there is no danger of an avalanche. Women and children help with pulling the sleighs and carrying the bundles to the compound. The main activity is, thus, feeding the herds.

February-March: Same activities from January continue. Men occasionally hunt foxes and wolves. Women knit and weave at home. At the beginning of March the chore of bringing hay on sleighs is finished. Towards the end of March, after all avalanches have fallen and the snow begins to melt, animals are taken to distant shelters in southern valleys where more hay has been stored from the previous summer. The mobility of men and animals in and out of the village begins anew.

Appendix IV. Household histories from Sisin (1943–1983).



Of the 24 households, whose developmental cycle and histories are shown in the above diagram, households number 4 and 24 were in Iraq before they settled in Sisin, all the other households settled into Sisin from other Oramari tribal villages. As the diagram shows, the households before division were mostly fraternal and paternal + fraternal joint household types. The only case where a son separated from his father's household was the case of HH no.21. The son separated his household and settled in the village of origin (and not in Sisin) to look after the property there. After some years he returned to Sisin. Household no.15 had another exceptional situation; it was divided between two brothers but one brother moved out of Sisin to Yüksekova, thus the brother left in Sisin had at the time a simple household.

Between 1943-1982, there were 9 cases of household division for the 24 households in Sisin. In 6 of them the household was divided into two, in 3 instances into 3 new units. Below I list the household size and the number of years as a single household, prior to division for the 9 cases.

Case no.	Household size prior to division	Number of years as a single HH (prior to div.)
1	19	27
2	16	20
3	12	8
4	10	13
5	8	7
6	17	18
7	18	8
8	15	5
9	13	18
	Mean = 14.2	Mean = 16

The Pearson's correlation between the HH size and the number of years as a single unit prior to division was found to be 0.56, suggesting a positive relationship for the universe of Sisin.

Appendix V. Household labour and herd distribution among Sisin households (January 1982)

	HH no.	Herd size	Labour size (men and women) *
lower *zoma*	1	52	5
	2	35	2
	3	50	2
	4	43	2
	5	136	5
	6	100	5
	7	55	2
	8	85	5
	9	90	3
	10	95	4
upper *zoma*	11	130	4
	12	85	4
	13	45	1
	14	100	5
	15	71	5
	16	95	4
	17	70	4
	18	65	3
	19	36	2
	20	50	2
	21	70	3
	22	30	1
	23	30	1
	Total	1618	

Mean herd size = 70.3

Mean for the lower *zoma* = 74.1

Mean for the upper *zoma* = 67.4

(*) Labour size includes men and women who are capable of hay cutting.

Pearson's correlation coefficient for the relationship between herd and labor force size was found to be 0.76. In the regression analysis, keeping herd size as the dependent variable the corrected regression value was found to be 0.56. This means labour force size is highly significant in explaining herd size; 56 percent of the variation in herd size is explained by the variation in labour force size.

Appendix VI. Kurdish kinship terms from Hakkari

Day/daykê/daê=	Mother, FW
Bab=	Father
Bra=	Brother, paternal half-brother
Bramek=	Maternal half-brother
Xuşkê=	Sister, maternal/paternal half-sister
Hevî=	HW, co-wife
Keç=	Daughter
Kûr=	Son
Nevisî=	HWD/S, co-wife's offspring
Nevî=	Grandchild, SS, DD, SD, DS
Mam=	FB, FFB, FFBS
Metî=	FZ, FFZ, FFBD
Xal=	MB, MMB
Xolat=	MZ, MMZ
Jinmam=	FBW, FFBW, FFBSW
Jinxal=	MBW, MMBW
Tî=	HB
Jintî=	HBW
Bûra=	WB
Jinbûra=	WBW
Jinbra=	BW
Diş=	WZ
Hevling/Hevzava=	WZH
Keçêmetî=	FZD
Kûrêmetî=	FZS
Bûke=	SW, BSW, ZSW, FBSW, FZSW, WBSW, WZSW
Zava=	DH, BDH, ZH, ZDH, WBDH, FBDH, FZH, FZDH
Zirbab=	MH
Jin=	Wife (also woman)
Mîr=	Husband (also man)
Pismam=	FBS, FFBS, FFBSS, FBSSS
Dotmam=	FBD, FFBD, FFBSD, FBSD, FBDD
Pisxolat=	MZS, MMZS, MFZS, MZSS
Dotxolat=	MZD, MMZD, MZDD
Pisxal=	MBS, MBSS, MFBS
Dotxal=	MBD, MBSD, MFBD
Xarzê=	ZS, ZDS, WZS
Xarzî=	ZD, ZDD, WZD
Brazê=	BS, BSS, WBS
Brazî=	BD, BSD, WBD
Dappir=	MM, FM
Bappir=	FF, MF
Xesû=	Mother-in-law
Xezûr=	Father-in-law

Appendix VII. Village wedding ceremony

Weddings have two distinct parts. The first part is focused around the activities of "bringing in the bride" (*bûke inandin*) and takes place in the house and village of the bride. The second part involves the celebrations carried out at the groom's house and village. The second part which is called *davêtê* (lit. meaning invitation and dance) is considered to be the "real" wedding as it marks the end of marriage negotiations after the arrival of the bride in her new affinal house.

I have observed the two parts in different wedding ceremonies. Here I describe the parts on the basis of my observations from two different weddings in Sisin. The first part, that is the visit of the wife-takers to the bride's house usually takes place after a short notice. The groom's father sends messengers to the bride's father asking for a suitable date to come and take the bride. The bride's father usually delays it at the beginning, and sending a vague note such as "the first two weeks after the *bayram*" by the second time. The final message arrives only a few days before the deadline. (On various occasions I have tried to find out the exact date of wife taking in order to go along but have missed it by one or two days, sometimes by only a few hours.)

Depending on the prior kin and affinal relations between the wife-takers and wife-givers, the wife-taking part of the wedding ceremony will be more or less lively, joyful and long. The wife-takers come as a group, consisting of the closest kin of the groom, his neighbours and co-villagers. Neither the groom nor his mother accompany the wife-taking party (*berbûk* in Kurdish, lit. meaning those "before the bride", referring to the lining up of women to lead the bride and the procession out of her parental house). The groom has a best man, *brazava* (lit. brother of the groom), who is usually a close and wealthy kinsman and neighbour. In one wedding the *brazava* was FZS and next door neighbour to the groom; in the second case he was a traceable FBS and FZS as well as a close neighbour of the groom. *Brazava* has a special position and prestige and is responsible for organizing and leading the wife-taking party, paying for all the expenses of the day and hosting the guests in his house in the second part of the wedding ceremonies.

Brazava's female counterpart is *serîspî* (lit. white head), the woman who acts as the guide and assistant for the bride. She is usually the wife of the *brazava*, and as the terminology implies, is ideally an elderly and respected woman. However, in the two cases I observed, the women were in their late thirties (thus in their child bearing ages) and were not "white haired" as the term suggests. *Serîspî* leads the women of the wife-taking group, leads the dances and songs, brings on the part of the mother-in-law the jewelry, head dress and clothes the bride is to wear before being taken away. She represents the wo men (especially the mother-in-law) of the wife-taking household. She is responsible for accompanying and guiding the bride throughout the whole wedding ceremony in both places, preparing the bridal room and the bed. According to some sources (Barlas 1975) she shows the blood stained sheet or cloth to the mother-in-law as the proof of the bride's virginity and helps the bride to perform the ritual wash (*gusül*) after the consummation of the marriage.

After the arrival of the wife-takers, some on horse back, some walking, depending on the terrain and season, women congregate in the bride's house and men are hosted by close kin and neighbours. The weddings usually take place in autumn and winter, and weather allowing, men and women dance separately either outdoors or indoors. In the Oramari tribal weddings which I observed, men and women danced in groups separately. This was explained in terms of weddings being times of high emotion and excitement, such that if men and women were to dance together, they might easily fall in love with one another. Indeed, weddings are occasions for the young unmarried looking for a suitable partner; both men and women are dressed in their best, sing songs praising beauty and love, and there may even be a chance for a private talk with the admired. It is also said that when women dance, they leave the long sleeves (*levendî*) of their inner dress hanging loosely, and if a young man manages to cut the sleeve of the young woman he loves, this would mean a public declaration of his love and intention to marry her and the two may be considered engaged or "promised" (*sözlü*). Weddings provide the occasions to show off beauty, good manners, out spokenness, and talents in dances and singing, as well as close contact between women especially as they spend the whole day eating, sitting and dancing together.

The "real" wedding is said to be in the house and village of the wife-takers after they deliver the bride to her new house. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, bringing the bride marks the successful end of marriage negotiations and the beginning of a new life for the bride, the groom and his household. As the ideology emphasizes the difficulty of finding a wife, the ceremony and celebrations at the groom's house reflect success and happiness. Another reason for the rather "reserved" celebrations at the bride's parental house is the way the marriage of a daughter and kinswoman is portrayed as a loss and sad event for the wifegivers. In a wife-taking ceremony in Sisin, although the bride and groom were 1st cousin FBD-FBS to one another, the wife-givers, especially the men, were remarkably withdrawn, tense and reluctant to sing or dance. The wife-takers, who were mostly kin and from another village were trying hard but cautiously to have the bride's kinsmen join in the dances. The latter preferred to carry out the organizational aspects of giving food and room for the guests but refrained from showing any festive mood. The neighbours and kinswomen of the bride similarly acted reluctant to join in the songs and dances of the female wife-takers. They frequently sobbed and cried accompanying the bride who was expected to sit without motion, to be sad and cry underneath the bridal veil put on her head by the *serîspî*. The crying culminated when the *brazava* entered the room and gave directions to the *serîspî* to lead the bride out of the house. The bride kissed the hands of all the elder kinswomen and neighbours and they in return kissed her on the forehead bidding farewell and wishing prosperity in her new house.

The women wife-takers (*berbûk*) lead the bride out of the house, singing songs and help her mount a horse which is led by the *brazava*. In plains villages horses have been replaced by cars, but in mountain villages with out proper roads, horses and mules are still the main means of transport for the whole party. The wife-takers return to their village with joyful songs and the bride is accompanied into her affinal house by the *serîspî*. As she enters the house, the men gathered on the roof sing songs, and the *brazava* spreads a bag full of coins and sweets for the children and sprinkle wheat or corn over the bride's head. She enters with her right foot first and after a prayer, and kisses the hand of her mother-in-law who lifts up her veil and receives her in the best corner of the guest room. The bride, some of her close friends and kinswomen who have accompanied her from her house sit together with the wife-taking women and the *serîspî*. The bride from this moment onwards is not expected to cry or be sad, as this would be seen as her excessive attachment to her parental household or unwillingness to marry the groom.

After the welcome and communal dinner for all, women and girls sing and dance until the evening. Male guests are hosted in *brazava*'s house and the groom (*zava*) is kept company by men only. Men sing, dance, and eat together until the evening and that night *zava* and other guests sleep in *brazava*'s house. If the male party is too crowded, they may be distributed to neighbours and kin. All the guest women sleep in the house of wife-takers, where the bride spends her first evening. Next day is spent again with further eating, dancing and conversation. Only on the second night would the groom come back to his house and only for that night would the couple be alone in a room. By the time *zava* is brought to the house by *brazava*, with many jokes and encouragement, guests usually retire to spend the night in other households and the household head (mostly the groom's father) also spends the night as the guest of a close kin or neighbour. After the second night and the consummation of marriage, the guests leave the village and neighbours and other kin return to their normal lives without any further clear end to the festivities. As the bridal night mostly takes place on a Thursday, in the morning after, the groom takes his wash and puts on his best clothes, joins other men of the village in Friday noon prayers and is received with good wishes, as a full member of the village male community.

Appendix VIII. An example of marriage payments in Hakkari

In the town of Yüksekova, a tribal family with several sons had decided to have the youngest son, who was a lycée graduate and who worked in a shop owned by his father and father's brother, marry a young woman from the same tribe and town. Both families were relatively wealthy even if they did not belong to the élite in town. The grocery store was like many other shops in the market place and seemed to do normal business. The young woman had finished 8 years of schooling and was considered good looking and "modern"; she did not wear the traditional Kurdish dress, mostly did not wear a scarf and knew how to sew. For their marriage the following items have been listed as payments to the bride's family by the groom's family. The source of information is the groom's father's sister and the marriage took place in the summer of 1981:

200,000 TL.	bride-price (i.e. cash, as *başlık*)
100,000 TL.	gold (coins, chains, and bracelets)
50,000 TL.	a set of gold earrings and rings for the bride
5,000 TL.	one ring for the bride
30,000 TL.	three watches
20,000 TL.	ready made dresses for the bride
10,000 TL.	cloth material for the bride
20,000 TL.	two sets of men's suit
8,000 TL.	8 sets of clothing material for women
443,000 TL.	

With the expenses for the food, sweets, and drinks on the henna night and the wedding day, the costs were quoted to amount to over 500,000 TL. in 1981. The bride, in return, had brought the appropriate trousseau, which was furniture, enough to fill a house, but piled in one room as the couple had one room at the time of their marriage. It consisted of a bed set, sofa, armchairs and tables, a sewing machine, and a refrigerator which probably costed approximately the same amount of money as the groom's family's payments.



1. Yüksekova



2. A mountain village with terraced fields



3. Winter in a mountain village



4. A group of patrilineal cousins at the pasture camp



5. Boys carrying bush from the mountain to the valley



6. Women's quarter of the tent



7. Men dancing at a pasture wedding (Courtesy of E. Özkahraman)



8. Woman grinding maize with a hand-mill

(Courtesy of E. Özkahraman)

List of the kinship abbreviations

F	Father
M	Mother
S	Son
D	Daughter
B	Brother
Z	Sister
H	Husband
W	Wife
FF	Father's father
FM	Father's mother
MF	Mother's father
MM	Mother's mother
MB	Mother's brother
MZ	Mother's sister
FB	Father's brother
FZ	Father's sister
SS	Son's son
SD	Son's daughter
DS	Daughter's son
DD	Daughter's daughter
ZS	Sister's son
ZD	Sister's daughter
BS	Brother's son
BD	Brother's daughter
HB	Husband's brother
HZ	Husband's sister
WB	Wife's brother
WZ	Wife's sister
FBD	Father's brother's daughter
FBS	Father's brother's son
MBD	Mother's brother's daughter
MBS	Mother's brother's son
FZD	Father's sister's daughter
FZS	Father's sister's son
MZD	Mother's sister's daughter
MZS	Mother's sister's son
HH	Household
HHH	Household head

Glossary

agha	tribal chief; leader of a patronymic group; landlord
aşiret / eşîret	tribe
beg / bey	Ottoman governor; "feudal" lord
beylerbeyi / mîri mîran	governor of a province with several *sancaks*
dûr	distant (socially and physically)
eyalet / il	province; administrative provincial unit
hükümet	autonomous Ottoman provincial district
kabanî	female household head, the mistress of the house
kinît / ocax	sub-tribe; maximal lineage
köy / gund	village
mal	house; household; lineage
malxî	male household head
Mar Shimun	Nestorian archbishop
mela	Muslim priest in Kurdish
Melazade	descendants of a family of saintly *melas*
mezin / rîhspî	village or tribal elders, the respectable members of a tribe or village
mîr	Kurdish prince; ruler a tribal confederation
muhtar	elected administrator of a village

muhtarlık	administrative unit sometimes with several villages or neighbourhoods
muska / nivîşt	amulet against illness, bad omen, evil spirits, or for fertility
nizik	close (socially and physically)
peshmerge	Kurdish freedom fighters
qabîle	sub-tribe; tribe
reaya	tax-paying subject peasantry, mostly non-tribal peasantry in the Ottoman Empire
sancak	territorial unit in the Ottoman administrative system, smaller than an *eyalet*
sayyid	descendant of the prophet Muhammed
shaikh	*tariqa* leader; saintly person; sometimes descendant of a *shaikh*
sipahi	Ottoman feudal or tribal cavalry, with a fief for his services
şerme / ayıp	shame; shameful
tariqa	Muslim mystical orders
vali	governor of a province, *eyalet* or *il*
zoma	mountain pasture site and pasture camp

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The following abbreviations are used for periodicals and encyclopedias:

BSOS	*Bulletin of School of Oriental* (and African) *Studies*
BTTD	*Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*
EI (1936)	*Encyclopedia of Islam* (1936 edition)
EI (1981)	*Encyclopedia of Islam* (1981 edition)
IÜEFTD	*Istanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*
IJMES	*International Journal of the Middle East Studies*
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JRAI	*Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*
MES	*Middle Eastern Studies*

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Although Kurdish national aspirations and their political difficulties have become relatively well-known, scientific studies of the Kurdish society are rare. Various aspects of their society such as the significance of tribal membership, the ways in which people use marriage and kinship, the interaction between tribal and ethnic identities are some of the themes of this book. The author uses her anthropological fieldwork in Hakkari to throw light on processes of Kurdish identity, tribe-state relations, and local politics in southeast Turkey.

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